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SUMMARY
This thesis examines the attitudes to government common to Greek 
and Roman writers who lived between the advent of the Hellenistic Age 
and the heyday of the Roman Empire in the second century A.D., and who 
wrote theoretical works dealing directly or indirectly with monarchical 
government. This was, for most of them, the only form of government 
worthy of serious consideration.
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the extent to which the term 
'political* is a misnomer for the works of these writers. The writings 
are examined to discover the views of the theorists on the position of 
the individual in relation to society, on law and the ruler., on the 
characteristics deemed kingly, on the imagery of kingship, on the 
connection of the ruler with the divine and on his position vis-ä-vis 
the philosopher.
The conclusion reached is that the true concern of most of these 
writers for most of the time is not to set out how a ruler should relate 
to his subjects as a head of government, but to present an individual 
who is the model of the perfect man and for whom most dealings with his 
subjects are simply opportunities for him to demonstrate those social 
qualities which he shares with all outstanding men.
For these writers, religious, moral or philosophical, rather than 
political concerns have suggested this picture of the ruler, and their 
king has taken over and embodied the impersonal elements of government 
described by Greek theorists of the points. Thus we can see that for 
these writers, political life does not have an independent existence, 
any more than it did in the days before the concept of citizenship had 
been developed in Greece.
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INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM
In the fourth century B.C. monarchs at the head of Empires 
displaced the polis from its position at the centre of political 
speculation. The poli-S itself had come to maturity in the fifth century, 
and since then theorists had analysed and justified it from a variety of 
standpoints, and opposed those such as the Sophists who were attempting 
to undermine the old supports of the city-state and its law. From this 
time on, until the high point of the Roman Empire in the second century 
A.D., and beyond, writers, Greek and Roman, developed a brand of 
political theory that, in its concerns and preoccupations, was at odds 
with the speculation that had gone before it in Greek or Roman city- 
states .
In general, the writers of treatises on government were now content 
to entitle their works ’On Kingship', and having dissected this topic, 
they considered they had said all that was necessary. The way in which 
they discussed government showed they were interested particularly in 
the moral character of the ruler. They often suggested that the 
traditions and laws of democratic or 'constitutional' government could 
be retained under a monarchy, but most preferred to appeal to arguments 
showing by direct comment or analogy the benefits of individual rule.
Such arguments were frequently extended to embrace the religious and 
philosophical spheres, and to find reasons for kingship there. This at 
first glance evinces little of the concern about the nature of the 
government displayed by earlier writers, and it is this aspect of 
writings on kingship which we wish to examine here.
Perhaps, however, even the classical writers on political 
philosophy had shown inconsistencies and felt uneasy with some of their 
conclusions? To determine if this is so, we may begin by examining just
2how classical images of the state could suggest and reflect a view of 
the right way for government to operate. The use of such imagery was a 
popular, if unscientific, method of analysing society and its structures, 
and is an illuminating instance of how material drawn from areas not 
obviously political could enter political discussions. Because of this, 
it may give us some insight into the kind of writing we are dealing with 
in the works on kingship, suggesting how far or how little these 
differed from what had gone before.
Writers on political life, ancient and modern, rely heavily on two 
images of society and government that allow discussion to be conducted 
in terms of analogies. One shows the state as an organism, like the 
human body. The other describes it as something which an expert or 
craftsman must transform. The presumption is that this is a valid way 
of discovering the key to the structure of society. The first image, of 
the state as the ’body politic', may be used to justify quite different 
forms of government, just as it may be put forward with varying degrees 
of subtlety. The ruling class may correspond to the head, with the 
lesser elements occupying less vital positions, or else it may be the 
stomach, nourished by the activities of the other parts and thereby 
maintaining the whole body.1 Where the state is considered a human
2person, a more flexible correspondence is possible, as Plato showed 
(though of course for him it was really the other way about —  the person 
was best seen as the state). The application of this analogy in any of 
its versions may demonstrate that the government has the right to play a 
dominant role in every area of life, or may encourage the formation of 
subsidiary organizations. Aristotle and non-totalitarian versions of 
modern conservatism would support the latter course.3
1 See, e.g., Livy 2.32. for the latter version, which Livy introduces
apologetically: prisco illo dicendi et horrido modo.
2 In the Republic Plato, by providing parallels in the parts of the 
state to the parts of the soul as he saw them, justified the presence in 
the state of three types of people, and did not offer to his rulers the 
usual material rewards demanded by 'the head' in society!
3 Coleridge gives a typical account of the balance desired: 'The true
patriot will reverence ... whatever tends to ... bind [component 
individuals] together more closely as a people: that as a multitude of 
parts and functions make up one human body, so the whole multitude of 
his countrymen may, by the visible and invisible influences of religion, 
language, laws, customs, and the reciprocal dependence and reaction
3In either case the image inevitably implies a degree of 
co-operation between all parts of the state. Each has a role to play, 
and even though those proposing the analogy may do so merely to pacify 
the citizens of humble station, this is an attempt to foster harmony 
through an active response. Consent is important, however obtained. In 
a comprehensive description of the state in this way, accounts of such 
virtues as justice and moderation are important, for through them 
society maintains a balance of its elements. Because constant adjust­
ment is necessary to avoid tensions coming from overlapping areas of 
activity, this image is to a certain extent dynamic, and can therefore 
foster change, though societies employing it do not commonly welcome 
novelty.
The other analogy of government draws on the arts and crafts for 
its inspiration, although paradoxically downgrading them in the process.* 4 
On this view, a statesman moulds the shape of society as a craftsman 
fashions his product. The end-result, set as a goal before the 
statesman-craftsman, may be the same as that which the supporters of the 
organic state hope to achieve — namely harmony and co-operation. But we 
expect to find substantial differences in the societies patterned after 
such different models. Similarly if a political theorist uses both 
models, contradictions and inconsistencies are likely to result.
The organic image is essentially naturalist in that it conceives of 
man as naturally social, or at least, through need of others, compelled 
to be so. In a state which took this seriously, the rulers would feel 
themselves bound by many ties to the other classes. The differences
of trade and agriculture, be organised into one body politic. But much
as he desires to see all become a whole, he places limits even to this 
wish, and abhors that system of policy which would blend men into a
state by the dissolution of all those virtues which make them happy and 
estimable as individuals’ (From The Friend — Sec. I, Political Knowledge, 
Essay 14).
4 'While the philosophers conceive of politics as an art or craft, and 
thereby pay an implicit compliment to the arts and crafts, they use the 
analogy in a sense which is ultimately detrimental to the craftsman.
Since all arts require specialized knowledge ... and since one man can 
attain this specialized knowledge only in one art, it follows that the 
art of politics can be practised only by a professional class which has 
acquired such specialized knowledge’, Ernest Barker, Greek Political 
Theory (Methuen Paperback, London, 1960 reprint of 1918 edition), p.35.
4would be less significant than the common bond. When anyone accepts the 
'ruler as craftsman' image on its own as the true account of political 
reality, he acknowledges the leading man — or men — as a deus ex maohzna 
who is likely to have very little in common with his subjects. Because 
of this, however, these subjects are able to attain among themselves to 
a form of equality consisting in their shared lack of power. In 
executing tasks at the behest of the sovereign, whether as ambassadors 
or public servants, they are more like actors listening to the prompter 
than true participants in government.5 To fit the image, all except the 
ruler must be passive and inanimate: the material of the craftsman, the
instrument to be played on by the musician, the sick body to be cured by 
the physician.
What position did Aristotle take, at the end of the age of 
independent potezs, in the debate over the state's nature? Aristotle 
certainly attached great importance to the structure of society, and 
therefore found the organic image of society very helpful. He was 
naturally concerned to define clearly the constituent parts of the potzs, 
and proceeded analytically. To begin with, he enunciated: 'The
constitution is an organization of those living in a potzs' {Pot. 1274b). 
It is then necessary to know what makes a citizen a citizen, and 
Aristotle accepts, with reservations for states that are not democracies 
that a citizen is defined 'by having a share in judicial functions 
and office-holding ' , xtp y£TexeLV xpuaews Hau äpxns (1275a). The 
positive content given to citizenship inevitably restricted the number 
of those who qualified for membership. Within Aristotle's best possible 
state, the government exists primarily to bring about the good life, and 
this he believed to be the natural goal in all states, though many had 
gone astray in putting forward other ends.
When the state has such a task to discharge, it is unlikely that 
other institutions will even consider claiming a share of its political 
functions. Aristotle, to be sure, moved away from Plato's position by 
asserting that groups such as the family and the village had a right to 
an independent existence within their own sphere. Still, he looked to 
public life to provide many of the satisfactions and impulses to virtue
5 Cf. Plutarch, Movatzay 813e-f.
5which a contemporary liberal democracy considers best produced by an 
individual’s personal decision in his private life.
Although Aristotle idealized the polis and gave it, in theory, a 
role it could never have fulfilled to his satisfaction in practice, in 
analysing its structure he was recognizing its claims. When he examined 
the government of society as an art, he was less careful about 
preserving the legitimacy of the form of government that he knew. In 
much of the discussion in the Politics and in the Ethics too, he puts 
forward the political art as the master science. This was, of course, 
nothing new. Plato had developed the idea, especially in the Politicus. 
Sophists like Protagoras gained added eminence by asserting that the 
political skill they taught was the one thing necessary for all-round 
excellence. Protagoras, however, optimistically anticipated that all 
men could be taught the political art, having a natural bent for it, 
whereas Plato and Aristotle clearly felt that the evidence was against 
this. Yet there had been so far little need to draw up a theory which 
would allow for the possibility of one man alone possessing the true art. 
What is significant is that in some places in Aristotle, the master- 
science undergoes a subtle change from its exalted state when
there is a shifting of values which seems to result in an
enthroning of ethics.or moral philosophy, with "nomothetics"
or political philosophy serving as its chief minister.6
The confusion evident here explains in part how easy it would be for 
theorists of Hellenistic times to come to surprising conclusions about 
the precise object of political science.
When Aristotle views politics as an art or as a technique for 
transmitting a moral code, his response to it is limited in a way that 
is not so apparent when he sees society as a functioning unit. For here 
he had the reality before him, and he was not able to reduce its 
complexity and variation to headings in a textbook of political morality. 
This meant that any political theory granting an active role to one 
element or one member of society and complete passivity to the rest was 
not feasible, in his view, except in a Utopian vision.
6 Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1958), p.356.
6Aristotle himself reduces the idea of such a theory to absurdity by 
pointing out how difficult it would be to distinguish between those who 
should rule and those fit only to be ruled (Pot. 1332b). Monarchy may 
well be the best form of government in theory, but in the world of 
imperfect beings with which he was familiar, there was little point in 
investigating the matter. Aristotle therefore protects himself from the 
charge of negligence by stating that if one man or group of men could be 
found whose excellent qualities surpassed those of the rest of the state, 
he or they would no longer be part of the state, but would transcend it, 
for Kara 6e twv toloutwv ouk eotu voyos (Pol. 1284a). Aristotle 
suggests that ostracism would be the solution in this case, though later 
(1288a) he changes his opinion and opts for resignation in such an 
unnatural situation: 'the only course left is to obey such a man and
for him to be sovereign not by turns but absolutely'.
Political theorists after Aristotle seem to be trying to do what he 
considered impossible by making such an arrangement the norm. Writers 
from Isocrates onwards describe a state in terms of the ruler who is 
above it, and talk of a law which is embodied in a person, and to which 
therefore the ruler need not defer. The establishment of monarchies in 
the Hellenistic world meant that a once-remote possibility — that an 
individual on a different.level from the rest of mankind should emerge 
to rule all the others — seemed to have become a reality.
Where political thinkers could use the theories of Plato and 
Aristotle, they of course continued to do so, for the respectable air 
these gave to conclusions already (we may suspect) determined by events 
was indispensable. In some ways, everything now seemed much easier.
When Aristotle defined rule as an art like shoemaking or carpentry, he 
was faced with a problem. No one would seriously consider taking turns 
at practising the mundane arts, yet in the important matter of governing 
the state, this alternation seemed to be required if all citizens were 
alike in nature despite differences in non-essentials. This dilemma 
could appear to be resolved when writers decided that Aristotle's care­
ful analysis of the grades in society and the part they played in 
politics was irrelevant. The one meaningful distinction then became 
that between the king and his subjects, for the king alone possessed the 
political art. If a king's rule obtained its character from his moral
7qualities, then moral philosophy retained its place in political thought, 
or, it may be, became a substitute for it.
The issues raised here lead us to wonder whether the form of 
political analysis we encounter from now on takes over so completely that 
the lessons of the polis were entirely forgotten. We need to see if it 
is possible to find any continuity in thought or if it is in fact a 
mistake to describe Hellenistic political theory and that of the Roman 
Empire as ’political' in the strict sense at all. Perhaps we may come 
to agree with Bosanquet that with the decline in the Greek city-state 
'the political or social philosophy of the great Greek time not only 
lost its supremacy, but almost ceased to be understood'. Is it true, 
as he goes on to claim, that from this time on till the rise of the 
nation states, 'men's thoughts about life and conduct were cast in the 
mould of moral theory, of religious mysticism and theology, or of 
j urisprudence'? 7
With the end of the city-state as a significant political force, 
the image of society as an organic whole lost much of its relevance if 
applied to a polis that was no longer self-sufficient. If writers still 
accepted the image as appropriate to an empire, even though it was less 
clearly suited to a society no longer bounded by the confines of the 
city-state, perhaps they were still theoretically committed to seeing 
political life as the natural means of achieving a fulfilled existence. 
What view did they have of society and its origins to support or be 
influenced by their specific recommendations on the rule of one man?
If there are elements common to both classical and Hellenistic 
political philosophy, we should expect them to differ in respect of the 
position they occupied in the whole, and in the precise meaning attached 
to each. This we might suppose to apply, for example, to the 
interpretation of law, freedom and equality. To present the law that 
found its personification in the ruler as the same as Aristotle's 
impersonal, impartial prescription of the state is no mean achievement! 
How was this done?
7 Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (Macmillan 
Papermac, London, 1965 reprint of 4th ed., 1923), p.8.
8The monarch as  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  has  g r e a t  need  o f  t h e  
powers  o f  p e r s u a s i o n  and r e a s o n ,  and t h i s  f i t s  i n  w e l l  w i t h  c l a s s i c a l  
p o r t r a y a l s  o f  t h e  6np toupyos  b r i n g i n g  i n t o  b e i n g  t h e  ha rm on ious  s t a t e . 8 
How d i f f e r e n t  was t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  from t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  one i n  t h e  p o l i s l  
We may wonder  i f  an i n c r e a s i n g  use  o f  t h e  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  Logos immanent 
i n  t h e  r u l e r  i s  e v id e n c e  o f  a more t h o ro u g h  p r o c e s s  of  m y s t i f i c a t i o n ,  
when men t u r n e d  from a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which  most o f  them were  p o w e r l e s s  
and endowed t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  power w i t h  a m e t a p h y s i c a l  d im e n s io n .
Though P l a t o  i n  t h e  R epub lic  i m p l i e s  t h a t  w i t h o u t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
e x t e r n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  s t a t e  c o u ld  n o t  a c h i e v e  t r u e  harmony,  t h e  d u t i e s  
o f  h i s  p h i l o s o p h e r - r u l e r s  t e n d  t o  be r e s t r i c t e d  to  e f f e c t i n g  changes  
w i t h i n  t h e  s o u l  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c i t i z e n s .  From t h e  a c c o u n t s  g i v e n  o f  
t h e  t a s k s  o f  t h e  monarchs o f  t h e  H e l l e n i s t i c  and Roman E m pire s ,  i t  seems 
t h a t  h e r e  too  t h e  m o ra l  e f f e c t  p r e d o m i n a t e s  — o r  a r e  more t a n g i b l e  
b l e s s i n g s  a n t i c i p a t e d ?
We s h o u l d  s e ek  t o  d i s c o v e r  w h e t h e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h i e s  o f  
t h e  t h e o r i s t s  bes tow ed  a b l e s s i n g  on a v iew o f  r u l e  a s  t h e  use  of  
i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  o f  w i l l  o r  m i g h t ,  a s  seems t o  be t h e  c a s e .  
P e r h a p s ,  t h e n ,  t h e y  would  have  c o n s i d e r e d  P o l y b i u s '  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  
emergence  o f  k i n g s h i p  as  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  i d e a l :  moil, 6n xw x o u o u x w  xpoiiw
BaouAeus eh povapyou Aavdaveu y c v o p e v o s ,  oxav m p a  xoö 6upoö na t  xhs 
uayuos pexaAaßq xqv nyepovuav 6 Aoytapos ( 6 . 6 . 1 2 ) .  A d e f i n i t i o n  of  
k i n g s h i p  l i k e  t h a t  g i v e n  i n  t h e  Suda wh ich  c o n t r a s t s  t y r a n n i c a l  
e x a c t i o n s  w i t h  income o b t a i n e d  ' w i t h  r e a s o n  and b e n e v o l e n c e '  g u v  Aoyu) 
nal (pcAavSpoonta (Suda B148) ,  i m p ly in g  t h a t  o n ly  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  v a l i d ,  
would  a l s o  e n c o u ra g e  t h i s  a t t i t u d e .  The q u a l i t i e s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  
v i r t u e s ,  o f  a k i n g  would  seem t o  b u l k  l a r g e  i n  t h e  w r i t i n g s  on k i n g s h i p ,  
and t h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  p o l i t i c s  had become a m a t t e r  o f  e t h i c s .  I t  had  
been  s o ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  f o r  an i d e a l i s t  p h i l o s o p h e r  l i k e  P l a t o ,  b u t  he  had  
a p p o r t i o n e d  p a r t i c u l a r  v i r t u e s  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s e s  i n  t h e  R e p u b lic , 
and A r i s t o t l e  had  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  v i r t u e s  o f  a good c i t i z e n  and a  good
Q
man need  n o t  c o i n c i d e .  The v i r t u e s  on which  most  f r e q u e n t  s t r e s s  i s
N o te ,  e . g . ,  P l a t o  s d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e s m a n  and h i s  t a s k  o f  
r e c o n c i l i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  e l e m e n t s  i n  s o c i e t y  i n  t h e  R o l i t ic u s  ( 305e ,  
3 1 0 e ) .
9 Pol. 1276b, oxl pev ouv evöe'yexaL noALxnv ovxa öTtouöauov pn 
xexx?iü6ac xqv apexqv x a 6 ’ qv axouöauos  ä v q p ,  (pavepdv.
9laid by the writers on kingship certainly appear to be those of the 
self-sufficient man, who would he just as actively virtuous if living 
away from his fellows. What effect would this have on political 
philosophy?
If we look for precedents for describing monarchy in images, we may 
remember Plato's auxiliaries who had been in the position of pupils, and 
in view of metaphors in which the Hellenistic and the Roman Emperors are 
described as educating those in their care, it may seem that there is 
clear continuity here. But the auxiliaries were eventually to govern in 
their turn, if judged suitable, so that the parallel quickly breaks down. 
We may suspect that the tutoring performed by the emperors fits more 
appropriately into the 'craftsman-material' image. Similarly, in the 
often-used 'father-child' analogy, because the child-subject never comes 
of age, the normal process of growth provides a defective comparison.
We need to look at the other images used, and discover their purpose, 
and, as well, to see if any of them are incompatible.
Parallels drawn between the rule of God over the universe and that 
of a monarch over an Empire tended to reinforce the idea that the 
subjects' role was essentially passive, just as was humanity's situation 
when it was confronted with the workings of providence. Many of the 
images used to give life to this analogy depended on the everyday 
language of craftsmanship, for the religious sphere was just as much 
indebted to this source as was the political. The particular trend of 
feeling and thought shown in, for example, Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus could 
provide a useful service to theorists of monarchy by offering an 
alternative to the limited background of the city-state, although the 
religious impulse to monotheism might itself be indebted to the 
direction taken by political thought and events for its metaphors.
We must see if there is any political reason for the frequent 
advice to monarchs in works on kingship to avail themselves of the 
services of philosophers. This may, in effect, be an attempt to broaden 
the ruling base and gain recognition for the claims of the wise to be 
practitioners of the political craft, or merely an attempt, without any 
theoretical justification from a particular view of society, to regain 
the lost dignity of those who were not monarchs. Certainly, the 
presence in a political discourse of a character who is very often the
10
writer's alter ego introduces a note that is somewhat foreign to the 
professed topic, and shows the conflict that can exist between the claim 
that the wise man is king and the assertion that a king is a wise man. 
Wherever the definition bestowing a royal title on a wise and virtuous 
individual is accepted, the monarchy that the writer is allegedly 
supporting is actually being undermined. When retirement can be held up 
as preferable to a life of public activity for the philosopher, the 
values of political life have been found wanting. But when writers 
advocated withdrawal from society, they may have seen this as moving 
beyond the confines of the state, or perhaps they were acknowledging 
that inactivity was the only sensible political stance for those who 
were now subjects rather than citizens. Did they reach this decision 
because in describing and justifying a monarch they were actually 
describing and justifying 'Embodied Law', an agent of God, the virtuous 
man or the sage, but not the true governor of a state?
After we have examined these problems, perhaps we may be able to 
determine what the transition from classical political ideals really is. 
Is the new product, as Ehrenberg has described a passage on kingship in 
the Suda, 'no more than abstract theory, deriving entirely from the 
spirit of the Polis, knowing nothing of the true nature of the 
Hellenistic state'?10 Is.it perhaps, in general, the exact opposite, an 
apology for individualism encased in a political framework, and hence 
concerned only marginally with social relations?
THE WRITERS
After the fourth century B.C., few people could any longer have an 
influence on public affairs, and this alone might seem a good reason for 
refraining from writing political treatises altogether. Certainly 
politics became less and less the absorbing business it had once been. 
Yet we know that many of the Hellenistic writers on philosophy counted a 
nepu TioAbTEtas among their works — Zeno and Chrysippus for instance 
among the Stoics — and at the same time essays on the monarchy abounded. 
Diogenes Laertius records Cleanthes, Spheres and even Epicurus as
10 Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek State (Methuen, London, 1969), pp.178-9.
11
authors of a K e p t  BntoLAeuas, but none of these has survived. Interest 
in this topic was unflagging; writers of the Roman Empire up to 
Themistius in the fourth century with his panegyric portraits of the 
monarch continued the tradition of providing a theory of kingship and a 
model of the king, undeterred by the fact that no monarch showed much 
enthusiasm for their more stringent injunctions, although his propaganda 
machine might well make use of the theory.
This investigation will be limited to those writers who, from the 
fourth century B.C. in Greek territory to the second century A.D. in the 
Roman Empire, expounded a philosophy of autocratic rule, or provided a 
general account of politics in which this form naturally occupied an 
important place. Historians who offered analyses of the state and 
government in the course of their works will not be used for independent 
evidence, as their aim was essentially to recall events, not to justify 
them or provide alternative ways of viewing society from that of the 
pragmatists who were making history. However, where incidental comment 
may serve the purpose of highlighting or providing insight into 
political attitudes, these works will be quoted. Historians such as 
Polybius, Diodorus and Dio Cassius, and such writers as Athenaeus and 
Diogenes Laertius are significant sources of material on events and 
attitudes before their own time.
The first writers to take monarchy as both an ideal and a 
realizable form of government for Greeks were Isocrates and Xenophon, 
and it is in their works that the overlap between the old ideas and the 
new should be greatest. In looking for answers from their works to the 
questions asked above, we should also attempt to determine how aware 
they were of the changes taking place and their implications, and to 
what extent they tried to reconcile the polts as an autonomous unit and 
the institution of monarchy.
Isocrates was born in 436 B.C. but his life as an orator belonged 
to the fourth century when he turned to oratory as a career after his 
family's financial losses in the Peloponnesian War. He was probably 
influenced by the prevailing sentiment that prompted Gorgias to deliver 
his Olympic Discourse on harmony among the Greeks, and he too responded 
to the pressing questions of the day with his own solutions. In public 
life he gave the orator a high place for it was his task to encourage
12
the citizens to follow the best policies.
There is disagreement over how much influence Isocrates had on 
subsequent political theory and practice. Welles assigns great 
significance to him as ushering in and partly causing monarchical 
government in Greek territory,11 but Ehrenberg believes this vastly 
overemphasizes Isocrates’ importance.12 Wickert in his article on the 
prinoeps describes Isocrates’ position thus: ’Der politische Denker und
Publizist, der vielleicht mehr als irgendein anderer ein Recht darauf 
hat, Vater des Hellenismus genannt zu werden.' This is because he has 
in a large measure formulated
die Forderungen, welche die Theorie und darüber hinaus die 
öffentliche Meinung überhaupt in der hellenistischen und dann 
in der hellenistisch-römischen Welt an den. Herrscher stellte.13
Isocrates' life encompassed the days when the Athenian Empire was 
at its height, and the rise of Philip of Macedon. He was equally ready 
to advise the Athenians on restoring the former glories of its 
constitution (with a rejuvenated Areopagus as the watchdog of its civic 
morality), to exhort Philip to unite the Greeks behind him in an attack 
on Persia, or to give precepts on kingship to Nicocles of Cyprus (in 
which case he was aware of being an innovator).14 He did not regard 
kingship as the only worthwhile form of government, but he could 
contemplate it as it existed in his day in relatively humble form, and 
make an early attempt to translate to it the values of the polis. What 
is important about his works for our purpose is that in them
11 ’The Hellenistic monarchy was not created by Philip or Alexander or 
their successors, it was created by Greek theoreticians and publicists; 
it was not designed to extinguish the Greek city but to preserve it', 
Article 'The Greek City' in Studi in onore di Aristide Calderini e 
Roberto Paribeni, Vol. 1 (Casa Editrice Ceschina, Milan, 1956), p.95.
12 Ehrenberg, The Greek State, notes on pp.277-8.
13 Article in P.W. 2223. Cf. the conclusions of Alfred Heuss, in
’Ursprung und Idee', Storia dell3 Antiohita, Relazioni del X Congresso 
Intemazionale di Soienze Storiohe, Volume 2 (Sansoni, Florence, 1955), 
p.211: 'Die von hier aus entwickelte Fürstenspiegelthik war nicht auf
die Philosophie beschränkt und fand deshalb auch ihren eindrucksvollsten 
Vertreter in Isokrates. Durch seinen grossen Ruhm hat er zur 
Popularisierung dieser Gedanken viel beitragen, obschon nicht anzunehmen 
ist, dass auch in seinem Kreis er ihr alleiniger Vertreter war.'
14 See To Nie. 8.
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’monarchical theory found a basic form’.15
Xenophon1s career as a soldier and particularly his service with 
the Greek mercenaries, who had in 401 supported Cyrus the Younger, 
confirmed him in the attitudes of the country gentleman who values above 
all things order and stability, but at the same time this experience 
gave him an awareness of forms of government other than the democracy of 
his native Athens. His friendship x^ ith Socrates developed his powers of 
reflection just enough for him to be prepared to question some accepted 
values. His banishment from Athens, probably after he had joined up 
with Spartan forces, could only have strengthened him in his belief that 
rule by an outstanding individual is best.
Xenophon throughout his writings maintains a keen interest in the 
working out of political problems, and in different works proposes a 
variety of solutions. His theory of monarchical government appears in 
the Cyropaedia and the Hiero most clearly, but elsewhere he expresses 
views which also accord with such a preference, or at least are no 
barrier to it. As a conservative Athenian citizen, however, he was at 
particular pains to describe the rule of one man in a way that would not 
offend his fellows. The result is a minimizing of the differences 
between types of government and a stress on the importance of individual 
action.
Aristeas, the author of the Letter to Philocrates, claims to be an 
official at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus (285-247 B.C.) in 
Alexandria, but it is clear that this apologist for the Jewish religion, 
who describes the translation of the Hebrew pentateuch into Greek, is 
Jewish himself. There is still debate over whether his intended 
audience was Jewish or Greek, whether, that is to say, Aristeas was 
hoping to give the Jews self-confidence and a sense of pride by 
recounting how their representatives from Palestine had been treated by
15 Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.136. Cf. Klaus Bringmann, Studien zu 
den politischen Ideen des Isokrates (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 
1965), p.108: ’Isokrates Stellung zur Monarchie ist in mehrfacher
Hinsicht geschichtlich bedeutungsvoll: nicht darin, dass er sie als
Institution in Griechenland verbreiten wollte oder dass er den 
hellenistischen Herrscherkult publizistisch vorbereitete, wohl aber in 
der deutlichen Neigung, in den bestehenden Alleinherrschaften Besitzende 
und Herrscher zu Verbündeten zu machen.'
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an emperor, or whether he wanted to catch the ear of any potentially 
sympathetic Gentiles.16
The letter has been variously dated, but for a variety of reasons
1 7there now seems agreement that it falls within the second century B.C. 
What is most important for our theme is the fact that Aristeas includes 
in his letter a record of Symposia at which, he claimed, the seventy-two 
Jewish translators had answered the king’s questions, some of which deal 
with topics which the king thinks especially important for one in his 
position. For this part of the work we must suppose a Hellenistic 
source or sources.18
Fragments recording the political sentiments of the early Cynics 
and Stoics survive in second-hand accounts and deserve some attention, 
although their use is limited by their paucity. Pythagorean (or rather 
pseudo-Pythagorean) texts, though difficult to date, are often helpful 
in conveying the tone of the theory of monarchy in its most extreme form. 
The writings on kingship are preserved in Stobaeus, and deal especially 
with the relation of the king to the deity.19
In his writings on political philosophy, Cicero provided what could 
be taken as a theoretical justification of the Roman principate before 
it came into existence. Whereas Aristotle’s vision had been bounded by
16 See Oswyn Murray, ’Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', JThS, N.S. 18 
(1967), pp.344-5, with references given there.
17 ’The author seems to have been a man whose knowledge of public 
affairs was moulded in the last years of the second century' is the 
conclusion of Oswyn Murray, ’Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.339.
18 'Der Brief des Aristeas ist zwar kein glaubwürdiger Zeuge 
geschichtlicher Vorgänge, aber über Zustände und Anschauungen der 
hellenistischen Zeit wohl unterrichtet. ... Wir haben hier einen 
ausführlichen Fürstenspiegel vor uns, der freilich jüdisch beeinflusst 
sein kann, aber in Wirklichkeit nur davon zeugt, dass damals die 
Anschauungen überall gleich waren', Wilhelm Schubart, ’Das 
hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri', Archiv für 
Papyrus forschung und verwandte Gebiete, 12 (1936), p.4.
19 E.R. Goodenough, 'The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship', 
YClSy.1 (1928), pp.55-102 dates the fragments to at least before 
Posidonius (following Theiler), or in any case to the Hellenistic 
period. Louis Delatte, in Les Traites de la Royaute d*Ecphante^ 
Diotogene et Sthenidas (Bibliotheque de la Faculte de Philosophie et 
Lettres de l’Universite de Liege, Liege, 1942), assigns them to the 
second century A.D. Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean 
Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Abo Akademi, Abo, 1961), considers 
Delatte's evidence inconclusive and believes the extracts can be dated 
on philosophic, historic and linguistic grounds to the third century B.C.
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the limits of the city-state, Cicero, who also lived in a period of 
profound change, already knew the Roman Empire before there was an 
Emperor, and could reflect this awareness in his writings. We might 
expect his conclusions to have given to his successors the ability to 
integrate the political reality and the theory of autocratic rule of the 
oikoumene more successfully than Greek theorists had done.
Cicero, despite his unenviable position as a novus homo, regarded 
his political activity — his service of the state, as he saw it — as of 
supreme importance. From the time when he first spoke under the Sullan 
dictatorship in defence of a man whose property one of Sulla's freedmen 
coveted, Cicero was certainly in the very thick of the conflicts that 
were raging in the Republic. The only exception to this was the time of 
his prudent sojourn in Athens — to study philosophy — after the youthful 
boldness of the Pro Roscio Amerino. His consulship in 63 B.C., with the 
Catiline conspiracy and its suppression the most noteworthy events of 
the year, convinced Cicero of his own indispensability, as well as of 
the need for the concordia ordinum of which he had spoken before.20 In 
the Pro Sestio this became the concordia omnium bonorum.
Yet Cicero was aware that this slogan was not of itself sufficient 
to institute a united front against any potential despot, and he soon 
found that his ideal, Pompey, would not be the man to lead such a 
coalition, although for a long time he kept alive a foolish hope that 
Pompey could yet be shaped to his wishes. The De Oratore, De Republica 
and De Legibus, all written, it appears, in the fifties, are works which 
display much learning and much careful thought, but there is no doubt 
that Cicero's political career was in his mind as he wrote, and the same 
is true, to an even greater extent, of the De Officiis composed in 44 
B. C.
20 'Das Jahr 63 bezeichnet ungefähr den Mittelpunkt der Übergangs­
periode, in der sich der politische Schwerpunkt von der Bedeutung der 
Stände zu der Macht der Einzelpersönlichkeiten verschob.' Hermann 
Strasburger, Concordia Ordinwn: Eine Untersuchung zur Politik Ciceros
(Borna, 1931, reprinted Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1956), p.43.
21 But this does not quite justify Strasburger's comment that 'für
die Feststellung des geistigen Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses muss scharf 
unterschieden werden zwischen Ciceros realpolitischen und seinen staats­
theoretischen Gedankengängen', Concordia. Ordinwn, p.l. Cf. the comment 
of Beranger: 'Ciceron n ’a pas ete un homme d’action, mais chez lui, la
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This fact of course makes these treatises more useful for our 
investigation than if they were completely theoretical and based 
entirely on Greek models, but it also means that we must not be 
surprised to find inconsistencies in these expositions on government and 
the ruler. These are the works we shall, in the main, be using, 
although when ideas expressed in a speech seem to have an application 
and significance apart from the particular political situation being 
covered, these will be referred to, in passing.
Philo lived in Alexandria at a time of its cultural and 
philosophical pre-eminence. As a Jew, and a wealthy one, he occupied an 
ambivalent position. Without Alexandrian citizenship, he could still 
play an important part in the affairs of the city as they affected the 
Jewish population. As Egypt was now ruled by deputy — a prefect of 
eques-rax\V. governed it as the emperor’s personal property — this meant 
that a Jewish community leader would sooner or later come into contact 
with imperial government, even if at one remove.22 As we know, Philo 
himself had the dubious pleasure of seeing Gaius’ government at first 
hand, when he led the delegation of Alexandrian Jews to Rome to seek 
redress of grievances, after anti-Jewish disturbances in A.D. 38.
Josephus refers to Philo as being famed xa ictvia (Ant. 18.8.1) and 
as Goodenough comments this is ’a strange statement to make of one 
entirely preoccupied with philosophic speculation’.23 He concludes that 
Philo must have been active in the public life of the Jewish TtoAuxeupot 
for a long time before he was entrusted with the charge of the 
delegation, but when he claims to find frequent veiled expressions of 
hostility to Rome in Philo's work, he is on less secure ground. Philo 
may well be accusing those rulers considered tyrannical (in, for example, 
Som. 1.81-92), but we cannot show that he opposed all of them
theorie n’est jamais restee de la speculation pure; chez lui, la 
politique ne se separe jamais de la morale; inversement la morale 
embrasse la politique'('Ciceron precurseur politique', Hermes^87 (1959), 
p.115.
22 'Philo's being a subject of the great Roman Empire, in a province 
of the emperor himself, was then a highly important part of this 
political setting', Erwin R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938), p.4.
23 Erwin R. Goodenough, 'Philo and Public Life', Journal of Egyptian 
Archaeology,12 (1926), p.77.
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indiscriminately.
Claudius was far less of a threat to the Jews than Gaius with his 
demands to have his statue set up in the temple in Jerusalem, even if 
the Jews of Alexandria were disappointed at their failure to obtain 
citizenship —  assuming that this was part of what they hoped to achieve. 
Goodenough shows Philo triumphing —  ’eventually they accomplished the 
impossible. He won from Gaius a niggardly toleration for the Jews’24 —  
but Tcherikover sees Philo’s mission as 'a complete failure’.25 
Certainly only the death of Gaius could free the Jews from fears about 
what position the changeable emperor might take up in regard to them.
Tcherikover finds Philo's ideas of reconciliation with the 
government and the Greeks 'directly in line with the ideas of 
Aristeas’,26 but in one respect at least, Philo did not have the special 
position of the Jews acknowledged as he would have liked, for the 
’traditional’ rights of the Jews were not taken by Rome to include full
2 7citizenship with the Greeks in Alexandria.
Philo, we can be sure then, had felt the full weight of the 
imperial rule, and must have come to a reasonable understanding of how 
it worked. His interest, of course, was in how this government affected 
the Jewish community, but as Legatio 50 shows, he was able to see Roman 
rule in a general way. His family's social and economic position must 
have made it seem reasonable for him to search for common ground with 
men of a similar background of other nations, and to deplore the 
fanaticism of those Jews who had little to lose by rebellion. His 
brother is known to us for his wealth — he could lend the always short- 
handed Herod Agrippa 200,000 drachmae without much prospect of repayment — 
and Alexander’s son, Tiberius Julius Alexander, pursued a career in the 
Roman public service which necessitated his abandoning his religion, as 
he became first procurator in Palestine, then prefect of Egypt.
Erwin R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, p.l.
25 Victor Tcherikover and Alexander Fuks, Corpus Papyrorum Judaicovum, 
Vol. I (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957), p.69.
26 Ih. , p .67.
27 See Victor Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews 
(Atheneum, New York, 1970), p.314.
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In philosophy, Philo is able to write with familiarity of the 
philosophical schools popular in his time, despite his obvious intention 
of using from them only what suits his apologetic purpose. At times, 
however, his own adoption of Hellenistic thought-forms is what strikes 
us most, and this is particularly so when he deals, directly or 
indirectly, with political theory. Philo’s patriarchs are hardly the 
same as those of the Pentateuch. Most consistently in the De Josepho and 
in a less secular way in the De Vita Mosis, Philo expounded a theory of 
sole rule, in the former case by deftly upgrading Joseph's situation as 
Pharaoh's right-hand man to that of (virtual) chief of state. Even in 
the other works, however, he frequently makes indirect political comment. 
Thus we are justified in using Philo as a witness in our analysis of the 
course of the theory of kingship.
Seneca's father, the Elder Seneca, was a man of wealth and a 
scholar from Corduba in Spain.28 Rome, however, was to be the place of 
his sons' education, where Seneca became interested in the school of 
philosophy founded by Q. Sextius, which would seem to have been a Roman 
— and very austere — form of Stoicism. Seneca's political career began 
late, perhaps partly because of his ill-health. It was interrupted by 
his exile under Claudius on a charge of adultery with Julia Livilla, 
Gaius' sister, behind which accusation we can perhaps see a wish to put 
out of the way members of an Anti-Messalina faction.
Seneca on his recall, due to Agrippina's intercession, in 49 A.D., 
quickly obtained the praetorship and appointment as Nero's tutor. At 
last he was becoming active in public life — and with a vengeance! He, 
alone of our writers, had what would seem to be a golden opportunity to 
influence a future ruler by constant association and counsel, and Seneca 
did his best. In the De Clementia he provides us with an officially 
acceptable exposition on the duties of kingship, but here as in his 
other writings he is more than simply a propagandist for the government.
We know that Musonius Rufus was greatly admired by Pliny (Ep. 3.11), 
but the latter tells us little about him.29 Tacitus and Dio Cassius,
28 For a detailed account of Seneca's background and life, see Miriam
Griffin's Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (The Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1976).
29 The various fragments, collected mostly by his pupils, tell us
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however, mention that he was banished by Nero in A.D. 65, Tacitus says 
because of his distinction as a teacher of philosophy (Ann. 15.71). He 
is also known to have been a friend of Rubellius Plautus, put to death 
as a possible rival by Nero in 62 A.D. In 69 we hear of Musonius as 
ambassador to the Flavian army outside Rome, preaching peace to the 
troops of Antonius Primus, behaviour Tacitus characteristically 
describes as intempestiva sapientia (Hist. 3.81).
With Vespasian in power, Musonius attacked the Stoic philosopher 
Publius Ignatius Celer for being involved in the downfall of Barea 
Soranus (Tac. Hist. 4.9), and was fortunate enough not to be exiled in 
Vespasian’s expulsion of the philosophers from Rome (see Dio 65.13.2) 
although he too was later banished, to be recalled under Titus, who 
appears to have been his friend. Musonius was thus well placed to 
comment on the nature of true kingship, a topic which must have been 
frequently discussed in his circle of friends and admirers, and an 
example of his teaching on this subject survives.
Dio of Prusa and Plutarch present the views of provincials who 
achieved success under the Empire (though not without considerable 
changes of fortune in Dio’s case).30 If a positive political value 
could be found in the Empire as a universal community, we should find it 
expressed in their work. Dio's preoccupation with the nature of 
monarchy is shown by the fact that he wrote five discourses directly on
little about Musonius himself, and at times even two philosophers named 
Musonius have been postulated, to account for alleged differences 
between the fragments preserved by Epictetus in Arrian's work and those 
coming down to us in the compilation of Lucius, and also to explain 
inconsistencies in details of his life (see the article 'Musonius the 
Etruscan’ by Charles Pomeroy Parker, HSCPhfl [1896 123-37). It is,
however, hardly necessary to assume such a coincidence to solve these 
difficulties, to the extent that they do exist. See, especially, Cora 
Lutz, ’Musonius Rufus "The Roman Socrates'", YClS. 10 (1947), note 85, 
pp.21-2, and A.C. Van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe (Van 
Gorcum, Assen, 1962), pp.5-11 and 158-9.
30 On their backgrounds, see C.P. Jones, Plutarch and. Rome (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1971), esp. pp.34-5. ’With Dio of Prusa Plutarch can 
profitably be compared. Both men, offspring of good provincial families, 
went to Rome as students of rhetoric in the early years of the reign of 
Vespasian; both men were again in the city under Domitian, and there is 
reason to think that both, who bitterly hated that emperor, returned to 
the East without his favour’, G.W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the 
Roman Empire (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969), p.110.
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this topic, and others such as On Law and On Opinion where his
3 1reflections give us useful supplementary information on his attitude. 
Plutarch was less exclusively concerned with justifying the emperor’s 
position, and his political precepts are directed mainly at provincial 
politicians (although he appears to forget this occasionally when 
describing the glory of their position). Still, his Advice to an 
Uneducated Ruler and many reflections on the rule of one man in The 
Lives, especially those on Alexander and Numa, show him just as aware as 
Dio of the need to provide a theoretical explanation and justification 
of the monarch's position.
Dio Chrysostom was born about 40 A.D. in Bithynia into a family 
with a tradition of local public service. Early in his life he became a 
sophist, and is known to have been an opponent of the Stoic Musonius 
Rufus. At some stage his attitudes changed profoundly, so that when 
Domitian expelled the philosophers from Rome (93-4 A.D.), Dio was among 
them. His years of exile from Rome and from his estate at Prusa 
introduced him to the life of the poor, and he himself adopted the Cynic 
garb and acquired something of a reputation for philosophy with those 
among whom he travelled.
After Domitian’s death, Dio returned to Rome and was well received 
by Nerva (see Oration 45.2). It is generally considered that this 
cordiality was imitated by Trajan,32 although the letters between Pliny
31 K.H. Waters, 'Trajan’s Character in the Literary Tradition’, in
Polis and Imperium, edited by J.A.S. Evans (Hakkert, Toronto, 1974) sees 
little historical value in these works: 'The orations of Dio should be
totally disregarded [as evidence on Trajan's character] ... since on the 
one hand they merely reflect the traditional quasi-philosophical view of 
the ideal monarch and on the other cannot be proved to have any direct 
connection with Trajan at all' (p.235).
32 For widely differing attitudes to the credibility of our sources on
Dio, note the view of Bowersock who refers to the story told by 
Philostratus (VS 17) of Dio accompanying Trajan in the Emperor’s golden 
chariot and giving him advice on how to rule (which Trajan could not, 
unfortunately, understand), and comments that although it is not 
necessary to believe this anecdote 'the relationship implied by this 
story is credible anyhow' (Greek Sophists, pp.47-8), and compare this 
with the view of K.H. Waters, 'Trajan's Character in the Literary 
Tradition', pp.237-8: 'The whole fictitious episode is part of the
sophistic hagiography to which Philostratus was addicted and which 
became quite fashionable in the second century'.
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and Trajan in which Dio figures give no indication of this. In any case, 
Dio was well aware of the political situation of his time, and one of 
his friends, a Roman consular, had been executed by Domitian (13.1).
Dio preached in many Greek cities on the need for concord within and 
between cities. His arguments here and elsewhere show Stoic and Cynic 
influences, and his speeches on kingship invoke many commonplaces from 
these traditions.
Like Dio, Plutarch was both an orator and a philosopher, although 
he did not adopt Dio’s Stoicism and, indeed, disapproved of Stoic 
philosophy strongly in some respects.30 His life, too, was without the 
reverses of fortune that came to Dio from his time in exile under 
Domitian. Some of his public duties were undertaken in the imperial 
service or as representative to Rome on behalf of his province, although 
municipal life also took up much of his attention.
Plutarch's birthplace may have been only a small town, but he did 
not live out his life in a provincial backwater away from contacts with 
the centre of the Empire. Plutarch travelled early to Athens and 
Alexandria, and later on, to Rome, to obtain the best education possible, 
or to take part in diplomatic missions. Many of his friends were Roman; 
others like himself were prominent Greeks who obtained citizenship and 
recognition from Rome. Many of Plutarch's Roman friends managed to 
prosper under Emperors from Nero to Hadrian, although some like Arulenus 
Rusticus and Nigrinus Avidius were put to death by Domitian and Hadrian 
respectively. From what we know of Plutarch's public life we can 
reasonably assume that he would have agreed with Seneca's conclusion 
that there was no reason for rebelling against monarchical government as 
such.34 He was realistic about political life in his own day,35 
although he probably gained considerable pleasure from looking back in
33 On this, see Daniel Babut, Plutarav&et le stoicisme (Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1969), passim.
34 'Die Haltung des Plutarchos gegenüber der Monarchie ist dieselbe 
wie die von Dion. Am ergiebigsten in dieser Hinsicht ist ad princ. 
inerud., eine Art von Fürstenspiegel', Jonas Palm, Rom3 Römertim und 
Imperium der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit (Gleerup, Lund, 1959), 
p. 38.
35 'Dion ist der Theoretiker und Redner, der am liebsten in 
allgemeinen Kategorien spricht; Plutarchos ist der Essayist, der mit 
beiden Füssen auf der Erde steht und in dessen Werken sich ein reges 
Interesse für die konkrete Wirklichkeit abspiegelt', Palm, Rom3 Römertum 
und Imperium, p.31.
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the Lives on the outstanding men Greece had produced in her days of 
glory.
PZiny the Younger grew up during the rule of the Flavians and at an 
early age began a career at the bar, shortly afterwards entering on the 
first of the senatorial offices. His progress up this ladder suffered 
no check during the reign of Domitian, although Pliny was closely 
associated with some of those who formed what has somewhat imprecisely 
come to be called the ’Stoic opposition’, and on Domitian’s death he 
laid a charge against the prosecutor of Helvidius Priscus who had been 
put to death under Domitian. In this way, under the safe regime of 
Nerva, he was able to show his solidarity with the 'dissidents’ of 
earlier years. Cases dealing with the behaviour of provincial governors 
also took up much of his time. For September and October of the year 
100 Pliny was consul and moved the vote of thanks which became the 
Panegyric > in which he 'hoped to encourage our Emperor in his virtues by 
a sincere tribute, and to show his successors what path to follow to win 
the same renown, not by offering instruction but by setting his example 
before them' (Ep. 3.18).36
In 111 A.D. Pliny was given a special commission as the emperor's 
representative in Bithynia and Pontus which had long been trouble-spots. 
The Panegyric and occasionally parts of Pliny's extensive correspondence, 
including the letters written to Trajan while Pliny was in Bithynia, and 
the imperial replies, can be a rich source of information on the way in 
which conscientious Roman men of affairs came to terms with monarchy.
The last example to be considered is the work of Aelius 
Aristides, or rather the Roman Oration — in which the ruler of Rome as 
well as his city comes in for attention — and the Eus BacruAea which 
Aristides may have composed, and which at any rate was written, most 
probably, under one of the Antonines.37
36 Durry comments, in his edition of the Panegyric (Les Belles Lettres, 
Paris, 1938) that 'la philosophie morale des stoiciens et des diatribes 
avait lance dans le monde tout un ensemble d’idees dont on retrouve ici 
la trace, sans qu’il soit possible ... de trouver une source dominante, a 
laquelle se referent toutes ces nobles pensees!' (p.40).
3 7 The arguments about the date and authorship of this work are set 
out by C.P. Jones, 'Aelius Aristides, Eus BaouAea', JRS^62 (1972)^ 134-52. 
He argues that the work shows evidence of having been composed in the 
reign of Antoninus Pius, very likely by Aristides.
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The career of Aelius Aristides spanned the reigns of Antoninus Pius,
Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. Though a provincial from a small town in
Mysia, he was able to exert influence in court as a famous orator of the
second Sophistic to obtain exemption from public office and the
liturgies expected of him, and later to obtain imperial assistance for
rebuilding Smyrna, his adopted home, after it was devastated by an
earthquake in 178 A.D. As a young man he had visited Rome, probably in
144, and delivered the Roman Oration, and perhaps at this time too, the
E ls BaöLÄea. These works show the point of view and interests of a
Greek visitor, but also possess the general character of hortatory
descriptions of rule. The Roman Ovation, to be sure, deals with the
theme of administration in an impersonal way,38 but this does not mean
3 9that kingship and the character of the king are entirely neglected.
Aelius Aristides, as a rhetorician summing up the sentiments of his 
predecessors, comes at a convenient stage for assessing the values to 
which he was the heir, and perhaps for finding conclusive answers to the 
questions we have put.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before we begin analysing the texts, let us briefly examine the 
historical situation in which the earliest of these works were written, 
and the ideas that had assumed importance at this time. The society of 
early fourth century Greece was one which placed a high value on a self- 
contained community where each man’s goal was to succeed as a citizen. 
This did not necessarily mean that the state was an harmonious unit. 
Clearly the contests for success would often lead to violence and
38 See ’Der Preis des Aelius Aristides auf das römische Weltreich’ by 
Jochen Bleicken, Nachr. der Akad. der Wiss. in Göttingen, Rhilol. Hist. 
Kl. (1966), esp. pp.226, 238-41, 255 and 259.
39 ’There are some ideas in the speech of Aristides which cannot be 
found, at least so clearly and so fully expressed, in any other work.
Such are the favourite views of the second century on the character of 
the enlightened monarchy and on the relations between the monarchy and 
the different classes of the population of the Empire; the 
characterization of the Empire as a coherent aggregate of free, self- 
governing city-states', Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the 
Roman Empire (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1957), vol. 1, pp.130-31.
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bitterness but still it was within this fairly close-knit group and from 
its approval that a man derived such importance as he possessed.40 (A 
woman of course, was never in this society in any significant sense.)
In the fourth century, before the rise of Philip of Macedon, inter-city 
hostilities seemed to pose no immediate, serious threat to the internal 
stability of Greek city-states, despite the effects of the Peloponnesian 
War on Athenian society and the impact of the war between Sparta and 
Thebes.
But there were examples showing the importance monarchy might come 
to have in the territorial monarchies of Dionysius of Syracuse and Jason 
of Pherae. Here the polis as an independent administrative unit no 
longer counted; rather, an empire not relying on a single city's pre­
eminence was the significant entity. In keeping with this change, one 
man and not a city assembly made the decisions.41
After the death of Alexander, the balance of power shifted to the 
new states and in particular to the kingdoms of the Ptolemies, the 
Seleucids and the Antigonids. These rulers had to govern many non-Greek 
peoples. Even the Antigonids' sway extended mainly over partially 
Hellenized Macedonians and others with still less contact with Greek 
culture. For them there could be no question of allowing popular 
participation in forms of government evolved by Greeks. These forms were 
inappropriate in Empires covering a vast amount of territory, and, with 
the Seleucids at least, many national elements. Greeks in such Empires 
or in their own now insignificant poleis in Greece could no longer be 
expected to view the polis as the centre of the universe, providing a 
pattern of government for all civilized men to follow.
As Ehrenberg notes, 'there were no citizens in the Hellenistic
40 'In den Kreis des städtischen Staates war das ganze Leben des 
Bürgers gebannt. Damit is die Verantwortlichkeit jedes Bürgers in der 
Sorge für das öffentliche Wohl verbunden; von diesem öffentlichen Wohl 
hing das Wohl des einzelnen Bürgers ab', E. Elorduy, Die Sozial­
philosophie der Stoa (Dieterich * sehe Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig, 1936), 
p.135. Note too the comments of Ehrenberg in The Greek State, esp. 
p.91ff. The funeral speech of Thucycides expresses the essence of the 
relationship between a man and his polis in ideal form (see Book Two, 
1.35-46).
41 See Isocrates Phil. 14-15.
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states’. Government was now xa ßcxauAuxa xpayyaxa.u 2 The important 
elements of royal rule included its unaccountability, and all the 
insignia of royal dignity, derived partly from Oriental tradition. 
Dignitaries were 'friends' of the king.43 Thus the way was opened for 
monarchy to become respectable: 'Now for the first time [it] left the
realms of the heroic past, of barbaric despotism or political 
degeneration, and became a tangible fact in the "Greek" reality of the 
day.’44
The historians of this change whose works we possess lived, in 
general, late in the Hellenistic era or under the Roman Empire. They 
came, for the most part, from cities, but what they recorded were the 
power struggles of empires in which city-states became from time to time 
involved, often to their cost. The protagonists were now kings, rarely 
(except for an Aratus) statesmen from a polis.
Long before the power politics of emperors became the main material 
for historians, however, attitudes likely to lead to approval of one-man 
rule were by no means uncommon in the cities. Strohm believes that 
monarchical tendencies were evident even in democratic Athens, and 
points to Pericles' position as rpoaxdxns.45 Ehrenberg claims that this 
is to misinterpret Pericles' position (and Stroheker agrees).46 
Certainly individuals like Alcibiades may have had visions of wielding 
supreme power, but what is important is that such visions did not become 
reality. However, the attempts made by such individuals to escape from 
the confines of the polis and its restrictions became more frequent as 
community loyalty weakened, and the activities of ambitious 
personalities may have prepared people more readily to accept the claims 
of, for example, Demetrius Poliorcetes.
42 Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.158.
43 See C.B. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period 
("L’ Erma" di Bretschneider, Rome, 1966, reprint of 1934 edition), 
letters 6, 11 and the notes there.
44 Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.177.
45 Gustav Strohm, Demos und Monarch: Untersuchungen über die Auflösung 
der Demokratie (Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1922), pp.7ff and 209ff.
46 See Victor Ehrenberg, 'Pericles and his Colleagues between 441 and 
429 B.C.', AJPh,66 (1945), 113-34, and Karl Friedrich Stroheker, 'Zu den 
Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik', Historia%2 
(1953-4), pp.389-390, esp. p.390 notes 2 and 3.
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Freedom became for many equivalent to 'persönlicher Anteil an der 
Herrschaft', and monarchy naturally came to be seen as 'einseitiges 
Herrschaftsverhältnis eines Einzelnen'.47 It is assumed that such rule 
is something all men desire (see, for example, Xenophon, Memorabilia, 
1.3.2, and the mention of those praying for xupavvtöa). This is a mark 
of the individualism of the time, and parallels in some ways the self- 
seeking of the city-states themselves, for whom as a body freedom 
frequently meant freedom to subjugate other cities.
This wish to develop the well-endowed individual free of all 
constraints was one element in Sophistic thought,48 and the political 
(in the 'power politics' sense) and technical advantages of monarchy are 
spelt out in the debate on the best form of government described, or 
rather invented, by Herodotus, under Sophistic influences (in Herodotus, 
3.80). This was not the only or even the dominant influence on 
subsequent theorising — such realistic pragmatism ill became idealist 
thinkers — but undoubtedly such ideas on rule could have given an 
impetus to the schemes pursued by the founders of the Hellenistic 
monarchies.49 The ethical side of kingship theory at this early stage 
with its emphasis on the duty to care for the subjects — a task whose 
performance separates the true king from the tyrant — may seem far 
removed from the claims that the strongest should prevail; yet in the 
stress laid on the person of the king as outstanding by writers
47 Julius Kaerst, Studien zur Entwickelung und theoretischen
Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum (Oldenbourg, Munich and Leipzig, 
1898), p.9. Strohm, Demos und Monarch, p.21, makes the same point: 'So
schafft sich der Machtwille das Gleichheitsprinzip, zerbricht es und 
drangt weiter. Der Machtgedanke muss letzten Endes zum monarchischen 
Gedanken werden, denn wer seine persönliche Autarkie sicher stellen will, 
wer nicht gehorchen will, um nicht zu Massregeln gezwungen zu werden, 
die seinem persönlichen Nutzen widerstreiten, für den ist die endliche 
Sicherheit erst dann geschaffen, wann er selbst der Höchste ist, der 
Stärkste, wenn er pdvos apyet, allein herrscht.'
48 And, as Stroheker comments, 'Zu den Anfängen', p.403: ' Dass diese 
Vorstellung von menschlicher Ungleichheit und die aus ihr abgeleitete 
Begründung einer hierarchischen Gliederung des monarchischen Staates 
einen überaus wichtigen Grundstein zu weiteren Ausgestaltung der Theorie 
darstellte, steht ausser Frage.'
49 Bringmann points out that 'die hellenistische Monarchie kam diesen 
"erzieherischen" Tendenzen insofern entgegen, als sie das Herrscherideal 
der "Fürstenspiegel" in die Terminologie der Diplomatie und der 
offiziellen Verlautbarungen rezipierte' (Studien, p.108).
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advocating monarchy we can see a continuation of this theme of 'to the 
victor belongs the spoils'. Here is then no Tiepu BaauAeuas, but we can 
see one stage of the process leading to it.50
Alexander, as an individual and as a myth, also made a substantial 
contribution. Diodorus Siculus, in the first century before Christ, 
drew a picture of Alexander with 'the typical virtues of the Hellenistic 
monarch, magnanimity, kindness, and love for his subjects' and implied 
that 'successful statesmen are righteous'.51 Alexander may or may not 
have merited Diodorus' description of him, but the qualities looked for 
in a king quickly became part of a stereotype, accompanying historical 
developments set in motion by Alexander himself.52
The advent of the Roman Emperors was not therefore an event 
occurring in an historical vacuum. Behind writers on monarchy of the 
first century were the experience of and the reflection on three 
centuries of Greek monarchy, which had taken a variety of forms but had 
prompted basically similar responses in observers. The tradition at 
Rome of powerful individuals in politics imposing their will on the 
state made monarchical government more likely to be acceptable in
50 Stroheker stresses that, as far as Sophistic theorising goes, 'auf 
jeden Fall wurde damit das- monarchische Problem noch nicht im Sinne der 
späteren Literatur Tftpu ßaouÄeLcxs eigenständig behandelt, sondern blieb 
völlig eingefügt in ein umfassenderes Schema der Staatstypen', 'Zu den 
Anfängen', 389.
51 See J.R. Hamilton, Alexander the Great (Hutchinson University 
Library, London, 1973), p.18.
52 For a clear exposition of the main points for and against seeing 
Alexander as the originator of the 'Hellenistic' view of kingship, see 
especially the later works of W.W. Tarn — 'Alexander the Great and the 
Unity of Mankind', P M , 19 (1933)^ 123-66, and his two-volume work, 
Alexander the Great (University Press, Cambridge, 1948), Appendix 25, 
sections 3 to 6 — and the article 'Alexander and the Stoics', AJPh558 
(1937), 59-82 and 129-51 by M.M. Fisch who shows the considerable change 
in Tarn's own views as the figure of Alexander comes more and more to 
dominate his picture of Hellenistic political theory and practice.
In the light of the evidence, we can only endorse Andreotti's comments 
('Per una Critica dell* Ideologia di Alessandro Magno', Historians 
(1956): 'La speculazione sulla forma monarchica di governo s’inizia ben
prima di Alessandro per esigenze critiche della societa ellenica dei 
secoli V e IV a. Cr., seguendo motivi maturati nella cultura greca 
contemporanea. Queste linee maestre della dottrina politica, specie per 
la loro essenza astratta ed universale, sono riprese e sviluppate per 
tutta la filosofia antica, dalla Stoa di mezzo a Dione di Prusa, ad Elio 
Aristide ed a Temistio' (p.295).
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practice, despite the reservations of the die-hards about acknowledging 
the new regime as ’kingship’. There was therefore no reason for wide­
spread hostility to monarchy as a form of government at this stage in 
the Roman or Greek regions of the Empire.
These developments in politics do not in themselves account for 
everything in the treatises written on kingship. We cannot assume that 
the works bore any relation to the reality of government. Still, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the existence of empires under the rule of 
one man, and the development of sentiments favourable to this state of 
affairs, had something to do with the form of government that theorists 
chose to write about! What is more debatable is whether Adam’s claim 
can be verified:
Diese Schriften sind weder einfach Ausdruck der historischen 
Situation, in der sie geschrieben wurden, noch entstanden sie 
unabhängig von der sie umgebenden Realität; sie spiegeln in 
eigentümlicher Weise die Bedingungen, auf Grund derer sie 
einerseits in der vorliegenden Form entstehen konnten, die sie 
ander|^eits aber auch auf ihre Art zu beeinflussen suchen, 
indem sie eine gewisse Modellvorstellung enthalten.53
Chapter One of this thesis, entitled ’Society and Kingship', looks 
at the attitudes to society of our writers, seeing if and how these were 
related to their espousal of monarchical government. Chapter Two, 'The 
Place of the Law in Kingship Theory’, examines how works on kingship 
reconciled the law and the ruler. Chapter Three, ’Qualities and 
Functions of Rulers', analyses the qualities deemed desirable in a king, 
and the characteristics regarded as typical of a healthy society, to 
find out what these tell us about the kingly ideal and its political 
significance. Chapter Four, 'Images of Government',shows how analogy 
and metaphor contributed to the picture of the ruler and his people. 
Chapter Five, 'Religion and Kingship', investigates the connections 
between the religious and political spheres, looking for instances of 
influence in either direction. Chapter Six, ’The Philosophic Man and 
the King’, attempts to discover how these two ideal types of the success­
ful individual reacted upon each other, and what the result may have 
been for political thought.
53 Traute Adam, dementia principis (Kieler Hist. Stud. 2, Klett, 
Stuttgart, 1970), p.ll.
In general3 in thinking about a society3 we start from these people 
in this place3 but it is very unusual to retain this simplicity. There 
is a particular human organization in a particular environment3 but we 
commonly describe and interpret it in terms of some leading element3 
which we see as its organizing principle. The difficulty is that this 
element can be very variously identified. For example3 a very large 
amount of ordinary social thinking has started3 in effect3 from the King. 
It is not these people in this place3 but the King of this place and his 
subjects. ...
You start from the King3 or from the existing social order3 and 
then everything that happens is related to that. Thus service at court3 
in the army or in the fields is the significant social activity3 and 
life outside such functions is conceived and regulated to such ends. 
Thinking about law and institutions is in terms of the more perfect 
functioning of this system3 and the significant image is that of the 
single organism3 in which each person in the society has rhis part to 
play
Raymond Williams in The Long Revolution.
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CHAPTER ONE
SOCIETY AND KINGSHIP
A political theorist is likely to hold an opinion on what form of 
political structures is best suited to human beings only when he also 
has come to a conclusion on the origin and nature of society. Holding 
to a particular account of the development of social relations and of 
the state of nature which may have existed before 'civilization’ may 
encourage people to adopt certain political attitudes to the problems of 
their own day, or beliefs they already hold may lead them to adopt a 
specific historical and social outlook. What is important is that the 
two are connected, and most theorists naturally appeal to an account of 
human nature to justify their conclusions, whether or not it was in such 
a theoretical way that they themselves were originally convinced of the 
rightness of a form of government.
This fact impinges on our topic of theories of kingship, since 
several of the writers examined offer opinions on how society developed 
and on the forms of government theoretically available, and we may well 
find in these sections of their works insights into the writers' 
attitude to monarchical government. How much validity is there, for 
example, in Valdenberg's claim that a basic pessimism about mankind in 
general gives rise to a wish for a ruler who will arrange all that is 
disordered in society and take upon himself the individual's burdens?1
Accounts of the life of primitive man frequently show it as a state 
in which government was unnecessary, either because each person was 
self-sufficient or because divine rule made mortal rulers redundant.
1 'Que le pessimisme soit logiquement lie avec l’idee monarchique et 
fournisse des conditions favorables pour son developpement — c’est ä 
peine si l’on en peut douter', Vlad. Valdenberg, 'La Theorie monarchique 
de Dion Chrysostome', R E G^40 (1927), p.lAA.
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Organized social life then appears as second-best, devised to meet a 
changed situation in which the most noteworthy factor is the difference 
between men. But where the emergence of the means of social inter­
course is seen as a natural and beneficent process, the emphasis is 
more likely to be upon man as a social being whose needs and sense of 
affinity with his fellows alike predispose him to undertake joint 
activities.2 3
The earliest speculation on the origin of society in ancient Greece 
to have survived shows the former view predominating. Hesiod’s golden 
race eni Kpovou ?jaav, ox’ oupavaj epßaouAeuev (W & D, 111) and apparently 
required no organization by mortals. This view of the past began to be 
countered by another which became increasingly popular in the fifth and 
fourth centuries.4 This claimed that man’s early condition had been far 
from enviable. Some great change must have brought man to form social 
relationships and given him the techniques of civilization. Was this 
the work of one individual, or of the majority of the people, or of some 
impersonal force (which could of course have been embodied in an 
individual)?
Protagoras, if we are to believe Plato, saw the development of 
political life as a process distinct from purely technical inventions. 
The latter, a gift from Prometheus, appeared on the scene early. The 
former was also a gift, or rather its components atöws and 6txn were
2 As a modern example of a man with very decided views on the relation
between society and inequality among men, we can cite Rousseau: ’Des
1’instant qu’un homme eut besoin du secours d’un autre, des qu’on 
s’aperqut qu’il etait utile ä un seul d’avoir des provisions pour deux, 
l’egalite disparut, la propriete s’introduisit, le travail devint 
necessaire ... etc.' (Discovers sur l* Inegalite) .
3 This is the line taken by Voltaire, for example, who claims 'loin 
que le besoin de la societe ait degrade l’homme, e’est l’eloignement de 
la societe qui le degrade' (from the article ’Homme \ Questions sur
l* Encyclopedie, 1771). Cf. his poem, Le Mondain, 'regrettera qui veut 
le bon vieux temps/ Et l’age d’or, et le regne d’Astree,/ Et les beaux 
jours de Saturne et de Rhee,/ Et le jardin de nos premiers parents;/ Moi 
je rends grace a la nature sage/ Qui, pour mon bien, m ’a fait naitre en 
cet age/ Tant decrie par nos tristes frondeurs’ (who no doubt included 
Rousseau).
4 'By the classical period of Greek thought the idea of a past Golden 
Age had been very widely replaced by the view of man’s early condition 
as ’’brutish" and ’’disorderly'", W.K.C. Guthrie, In the Beginning 
(Methuen, London, 1957), p.95.
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bestowed by Zeus 'to make political order possible and create a bond of 
friendship and union' (Prot. 322c). Men in general, granted such a 
boon, moved on from this point to make their own society in a 
co-operative effort not requiring a particular techne although each 
individual, by application, could improve himself.
Everything in this account of the original state of society 
encourages the belief that there is no need for one person to think for 
and rule over his less-gifted fellows. Society is in essence a good; 
without it, men would not long survive. Yet it is of course conceived 
of also as a remedy for previously existing evil. Man cannot, in 
practical terms, live alone, and once the procedure of political
activity had been set in motion, it would go on, we may assume
Protagoras to have believed, until it reached the sophistication of 
Athenian democracy with its own forms of decision-making and office­
holding. In Protagoras' views as we have them from Plato, there is no
concern with the forms of government that a society may adopt at various
stages of its history.
We also find an account in Diodorus (which probably goes back to 
Democritus or one of his contemporaries, perhaps Protagoras) which shows 
man's primitive state as unenviable, and describes how need was the 
primary spur to mutual aid, and how associations formed in fear drew 
men's characters into sympathy with each other's ways.5 Necessity had 
the assistance of the hands, speech and clearness of mental vision 
(^UXPS ayxtvora). in a fragment that survives, Democritus says that 
homonoia, the social harmony that enables joint actions to be taken, has 
brought the greatest benefits to man in society (fr. 250 DK). Despite 
this Democritus also believes that auxapKeua is important, and stresses 
that conviction and the persuasion of Logos are better guides to true 
virtue than law and necessity (fr. 181 DK). The latter are therefore 
second-best. Here, society and its institutions are not seen as leading 
to the ideal life for man. No detailed account of the actual develop­
ment of political institutions is given, although from what we can
5 Vlastos, in 'On the Pre-History in Diodorus', AJPh.^ 61 (1946), argues 
that the similarity between Diodorus' account of the emergence of 
society (with the stress on the role of necessity), and the fragments of 
Democritus on the subject — see e.g. fr. 144 DK — makes Democritus the 
likely source of Diod. 1.8 (pp.51-9).
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surmise of Democritus’ preferences he may well have granted the gifted 
individual a high place in government.5 6 It is unlikely, however, that 
he rated the ruling art of such significance and difficulty as to be 
reserved for exercise by one man, or a very few.7
The Anonymus Iconbl'ichi, which goes back perhaps to Democritus him­
self, perhaps to one of his contemporaries like Antiphon for its source,8 
also found necessity the spur to the formation of society. This is a 
reflection of the awareness at this time of man's social nature, which 
made the idea of the completely self-sufficient primitive untenable, 
even if the social bond itself emerged only through tension and fear. 
Once societies have been formed, it is to the advantage of their members 
that law and justice prevail, and that there is not rule by one 
individual. Early benefits and inventions are not ascribed by Anonymus 
to one outstanding person or hero-figure. Far from the original monarch 
being replaced by the law when he eventually becomes corrupt or proves 
unsatisfactory, it is the monarch, that is the tyrant, who emerges from 
the breakdown of law and justice.
In the works of Critias such as we have them there is a more 
cynical account given of the origin of society's mechanisms. For 
Critias, justice was derived from the need to change men from a 
disorderly and beastlike state: ?iv xP°v°Ss ox’ ?jv dxaxxos avOpmumv
ßtos/ xau ^pptwöps taydos UTippdxps,/ ox’ ouöev <$$Aov ouxe rots 
ea^Aotau pv/ out ’ ai) xdAaoya xous Manors eydyvexo. / xauetia you öoxouauv 
avSpwTtot vdyous/ $dadat xoAaoxds, tva ötxp xupavvos ?i. (fr. 25 DK) .
Plato revived the theory of the Golden Age, when he ascribed
5 See e.g. DK fr. 49: apyeo^at utco yepetovos, and fr. 75:
xpdooov apyeo-dau rots avopxotatv p apyeuv. Note also fr. 267: (puosp
to apyetv OLxncov xqj xpeaaovu.
7 He says, for instance, that uoAAot Aoyov yp yaDovxes £a)Ot xaxa 
Aoyov (DK fr. 53), which, as G.J.D. Aalders notes ('The Political Faith 
of Democritus', Mnemosyne, Ser. 4, 3 [1950], p.310), 'may imply that 
not only educated people are able to rule'.
8 On the 'Anonymus', see Andrew Thomas Cole, 'The Anonymus Iamblichi', 
HSCPh65 (1961), 127-163, where the claims made for various fifth 
century figures are weighed. The writer concludes 'the evidence points 
to the work of an Athenian follower of Democritus, much more influenced 
than his master by late fifth century rhetoric —  perhaps one of the 
second generation of Sophists' (p.155).
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degeneration to the development of more involved social bonds. This is 
described in most detail in the Republic in the account of the natural 
city's decline into a fevered city. This view also found favour with 
the Cynics (whose opinions Plato may here be partly parodying), as well 
as with the more extreme Sophists who viewed the introduction of law as 
a restraint on gifted individuals (like themselves). Although the 
Cynics held the unordered, primitive life in such esteem, Antisthenes, 
the founder of the Cynic school, wrote Lives of Hercules and of Cyrus 
the Great, who were certainly seen as rulers in some sense and hence 
part of an ordered political system.9 Antisthenes' heir, Diogenes, 
appears to have cultivated the image of the noble primitive far more 
consistently than Antisthenes did. Many of his comments make it clear 
that the results of civilization were not, in general, of benefit to 
man, as he saw it, but we have no information on what form of government 
or social organization Diogenes might have considered 'natural'.10
In the Politicus, Plato shows a transition from the Age of Kronos 
when men had no political institutions of their own, but 'a god was 
their shepherd' (271e), to the Age of Zeus where men had to develop their 
own social arrangements. This appears to put society as we know it in 
an unfavourable light, but Plato does suggest that the morally 
responsible individual may not have existed in the sheltered life under 
Kronos — and hence that initiative in developing various forms of social 
relationships may be one positive characteristic of civilization, how­
ever that is to be defined.11 Similarly, in the Laws, Plato
9 'Wie ist es nun zu verstehen, dass auch diese kynische Lehre doch 
allem Anscheine nach sich mit den Problemen des Staatslebens beschäftigt, 
insbesondere der Begründung der Monarchie ihre Aufmerksamkeit zugewandt 
hat? Das Haupt dieser Schule selbst, Antisthenes, hat mehrere Dialoge 
über das Königtum verfasst, die nach Herakles und Kyros ganannt waren', 
Julius Kaerst, Studien zur Entwickelung und theoretischen Begründung der 
Monarchie im Altertum, p.30. See D.L. 6.3 and 6.16.
10 Höistad's conclusion after analysing our sources of information on 
Diogenes is that 'the historical Diogenes represented a perhaps extreme3 
Socratic type of asceticism which is consistent with corporate and 
social ideas of an idyllic and eudaamonistic character, with the 
emphasis largely on educational ends', Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Carl 
Bloms, Uppsala, 1948), p.138.
11 Politicus 272b-d. Et yev xotvuv ol xpocptyot xoü Kpdvou, tapoüoris 
auxotg outu noAAhs ayoAfis «au öuvdyews tpos to yn yovov dv^pauiots otAAa 
xau dpptots 6td Aoywv öüvaadat auyytyvea^at, xaTCXP&vxo xouxots auyTtaotv
(ptAoaocptav, yexa xe dppdoov Mat yex’ dAApAoov oytAouvxes, Mat
35
acknowledges that the life of a man on his own is precarious, and that 
society is productive of good —  although the good is to be imposed on 
man’s essentially intractable nature. At the same time he again 
describes the simple life of the Age of Kronos, and suggests that if it 
is to exist once more, men will need godlike rulers resembling as much 
as possible the demigods who ruled them at that time. Plato's portrait 
of the shepherds left on the hills as survivors of one of the periodic 
world floods, and setting out to acquire the techniques of civilization 
(but comparative happy in their simple state [677a f f. ]) is in striking 
contrast to the other portrait of primitive man as a flock tended by a 
deity (see 713c-714a).12 In the first case man himself progresses in 
the arts and skills of society, in the second early man is truly a child 
of nature with no moral autonomy.
On the whole, Plato would seem to have acknowledged the need for a 
stratified social structure and the exercise of power by some over 
others, but saw this in many ways as an unfortunate necessity. That the 
very nature of men prompted them to social intercourse is never 
explicitly admitted. Rather, he maintains that, with divine protection 
gone, men need to be organized to overcome the defects that their vices 
will introduce, and this requires a particular art. Under its guidance, 
society may prosper,13 but the social structure will remain unchanged. 
The Republic is of course the work where Plato's expectations of the few 
and distrust of the many are most dramatically expressed.
A social compact such as we find hinted at in the Republic in 
Glaucon's speech would have involved the conscious coming-together of 
people seeking their preservation by the surrender of certain rights,
Tiuvdavo'pevou xxapa m a n s  (puaewg e ” u v d  x tg  t ö t a v  öuvayuv exouoa f ladero 
Ti öudcpopov Twv aXXwv eug auvayupyov cppovdaewg, euxpexov oil twv vOv ou 
tote yupta) xxpog e uöa tyovuav  öuecpepov* eu 6* ey xiLyxXdyevou ouimv döqv 
Hai tiotwv öeeXe'yovxo xxpog aXXqXoug n a i  xa § n p t a  [yu$oug]  o t a  6q xau xa 
vüv xxepu auxüv X eyovxa t ,  xae xoüxo,  wg ye xaxa xqv eyqv öd^av 
onxocpqvaa^au, holL yaX* euxpexov .
12 Of this account of the cyclic destruction of the earth, Guthrie 
points out (In the Beginning, p.67), 'it seems to be used only as a peg 
on which to hang some speculations about the origins and development of 
society from primitive times'.
13 See e.g. Laws 735 and 720 for the comparison of ruling with various
arts.
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and regarding this as the lesser of the two evils. Plato does not 
accept this account of the development of government, but clearly felt 
it was a challenge to be answered, and in fact his own version of 
the development of the simple society is in some respects similar to 
it.14
Those sections of the first speech against Aristogeiton (generally 
considered to be by Demosthenes) which have come in for close analysis 
on the grounds that they constitute passages from a lost work, On the 
Laws, are also significant for our theme because of the account given of 
society. The debate on the date of composition is still continuing, and 
while Gigante finds in it traces of Stoic and neo-Pythagorean influences 
impossible before the third century B.C., de Romilly sees nothing in it 
which would make a fourth century date impossible:
II ne parait pas exact de dire que l’eclectisme un peu 
livresque de certains passages soit impossible au IVe siecle: 
les discussions sur la loi etaient alors deja anciennes; et 
beaucoup de notions avaient ete pleinement elaborees des avant 
Platon: la litterature du temps suffit a le prouver.15
In general, we may say that the ideas about society expressed here were 
by no means original in the fourth century, but reflect opinions that 
were widely taken up from the late fifth century onwards.
For the author, nature in man is inclined to evil, since it is 
irregular and particular to each individual. Laws, however, are stable 
and aim at the just, the fine and the useful (Cont. Aristog.1.15-16). The 
word aiaxTOS generally employed, as de Romilly notes, to describe the 
life preceding organized and civilized existence16 suggests that the
14 It is interesting to compare Rep. 358-9 with Milton’s version of
this compact and the attitudes this displays (in 'The Tenure of Kings 
and Magistrates'): 'No man who knows aught, can be so stupid to deny
that all men naturally were born free, being the image and resemblance 
of God himself, and were, by privilege above all the creatures, born to 
command, and not to obey; and that they lived so, till [after the fall] 
they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury, and 
jointly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or 
opposition to such agreement.'
15 Jacqueline de Romilly, La Loi dans la pensee greoque (Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris, 1971), p.158. Cf. Marcello Gigante, Noyos BaauAeus 
(Edizioni Glaux, Naples, 1956), ch.20.
16 de Romilly, La Loi, p.165.
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writer sees no special advantages in primitive life, and does not 
consider that it offers any pattern of society to be imitated by his 
contemporaries. Man’s emergence into a life of law and order is not 
attributed to any one cause. Divine intervention, the decision of the 
wise or the agreement of the many are all possibilities suggested. A 
political position derived from this theory could therefore take a 
variety of forms and support the rule of an elite or of the Athenian 
democracy with equal consistency. What is certain is that, as 
individuals, men cannot be truly self-ruling.
To complete this brief survey of attitudes to society expressed 
before the rise of theories of kingship, we may summarize Aristotle's 
views. He is not concerned to present to us an historical or mythical 
Golden Age, but is more interested in describing the unchangeable social 
units of family and state. Only incidentally does he comment that men 
were originally ruled by kings {Pol. 1252b). Most important, therefore, 
for Aristotle is the fact that it is natural for man to live in society. 
His approach to government springs from this belief, except for 
occasional inconsistencies.
We are now in a position to inspect, firstly, the works of 
Isocrates and Xenophon to determine the extent to which the problems of 
society and its structures appear as important, and to see how their 
attitudes on kingship fit into the social framework they erect, or are 
at odds with it.
ISOCRATES
Isocrates does not indulge in the more imaginative reconstructions 
of early society, some instances of which we have just given. But he 
too makes certain assumptions on the manner in which man acquired the 
skills of civilization, confining his attention, for the most part, to 
the actions of the Athenians. Their united efforts brought about the 
kind of life enjoyed by the men of Isocrates' own day, and as de Romilly 
notes, 'non seulement la patrie donne le jour aux citoyens, mais eile 
les eleve'.17 This civilization came about because the city of Athens
1 7 Tb., p .131.
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demonstrated not only a love of the gods, but also a love of men, for 
Athenian citizens did not grudge sharing this wonderful gift of ordered 
life with others (Paneg. 29).
Isocrates tends to describe the development of society in a very 
specific way, not caring to present any general view of mankind, but 
wishing simply to account for the prestige of Athens, although 
occasionally he relates his remarks to a universal context. This is so, 
for example, when he attributes to ’philosophy’ the discovery and 
development of the civilizing gifts, education in affairs, and the 
cultivation of gentle manners {Paneg. 47). Almost immediately this 
becomes a source of confusion in Isocrates’ thought. ’ Powf oP sbcech 
the main element in philosophy as he defines it, is the particular and 
natural possession of men,18 but at the same time ’good and skilled 
powers of speech’ are outside the scope of the ordinary people (tols 
cpauAous) {Paneg. 48) .
Since this is so, the eulogies made in praise of Logos and its 
effects must be seen as recommending a particular form for the political 
institutions that depend on these qualities, and for relations in 
society in general. When we recollect that Logos alone distinguishes 
man from the beasts, we can see how control of society in Isocrates’ 
view could rightly be concentrated in those who were gifted with the art 
of persuasion. Mankind ’did not start out with the advantages presently 
enjoyed, but gradually joined together to bring this way of life into 
being’ {Paneg. 32). The change from living in the manner of the beasts 
(to dqptwöws Chv) to forming these human societies with their laws and 
crafts was due to the Logos (which gave decrees on what was just and 
unjust, fair and base) and not to humanity as a whole {Nio. 6-7).
Logos and the law appeared simultaneously when men began to gather 
together in cities {Antid. 82) but it is the former in which Isocrates 
has most faith. In this sense we may say: ’ll n’est pas contre la loi:
simplement, il regarde par-dela.’19 What is important is that man has 
progressed beyond the animal-like stage without needing divine
18 It corresponds to the impulse to civilization provided by XP£^a in 
Diodorus’ thought. See Diodorus 1.8.
19 De Romilly, La Loi, p.185.
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assistance, just as Protagoras appears to have implied in mythic form, 
but for the latter the political virtue which proceeds only by way of 
justice and wisdom must be shared by all men, for otherwise states could 
not exist. Isocrates makes no such avowal. Neither does he construct a 
primitive Golden Age or sigh after a lost state of innocence, despite 
his belief in the decadence of his own society.
Instead he recalls that in the early days of Athens' history 
neither oligarchies nor democracies were known, but monarchies governed 
the barbaric races and all the Hellenic states. Athens itself was most 
excellently governed by the ancestors of its present citizens who 'were 
as much superior to those who rule with absolute power as the wisest and 
gentlest of mankind may be said to excel the wildest and most savage of 
beasts' (Panath. 119-121). Their excellence consisted in the fact that 
they trained the multitude in the ways of virtue and justice and great 
sobriety. When Isocrates refers to a specific ruler, Theseus, he makes 
the same point. It was this particular individual who was responsible 
for collecting the inhabitants of Attica together and setting them free 
to compete with each other in virtue. He thus showed them that pgcöudv 
EöTiv cxya Tupavveuv Mac ypöev xe^P°v ÖLaMeuo^ac twv "aou 
TtoXcTeuoycvujv (Hel. 34) . The 'good old days' of Athens are then a 
paradigm for political life, and at that time men believed that the sole 
rule of an individual was more reliable and more truly shared than 
democratic rule over themselves (Hel. 36). This is highlighted by the 
gloomy account of pre-civilized life (that is^,before Theseus), when some 
sought to enslave others and rule them by force, and themselves lived 
dangerously with enemies within and without (Het. 32).
Part of the difficulty of obtaining a clear view of Isocrates' 
attitude to society and his belief about the part that the individual 
should play in it occurs because, as Mathieu notes 'il aime ä 
personnifier ses idees politiques en un heros ancien, Heracles,
Agamemnon ou Thesee'.20 This personification shows us instances of Logos 
in action and incorporated in particular people, and is at odds with his 
assumptions elsewhere of a 'wide dispersal of political arete'.21
20 Georges Mathieu, Les Idees politiques d3Isocrate (Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris, 1966), p.133.
21 E.g. in Paneg. 28, 105-6, but cf. Nie. 15-16. The phrase is from
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The best period of government of historical times,, Isocrates 
believed.*was in the pre-Marathon past of Athens and Sparta when the 
ruling citizens did not neglect the common good nor exploit their own 
advantage by disregarding the interests of others. 'They made it their 
care because it was theirs but rightly kept their hands from what was 
not' (Paneg. 76). 2 2 Men in those days were frugal and incorruptible 
(Areop. 24ff.). This, of course, was a time when, if Athens was no 
longer ruled by one man, still only a few outstanding citizens made the 
political decisions. This means that what corresponded to the Golden 
Age for Isocrates was not a time without law or government: only a few
laws were needed, however, as agreement in a few principles will bring 
accord on private and public matters (Paneg. 78).
This idyllic state was therefore necessarily strongly hierarchical, 
and is presented nostalgically by Isocrates. The simple life — though 
not too simple for the wealthy few, we may assume —  was presided over by 
simple government, but power and rule did most certainly exist. Each 
man, Isocrates implies, knew his place, and the poor depended on the 
beneficence of the rich, instead of making claim to a share of their 
wealth as a citizen's right. The duties of a ruler in this situation 
would not include becoming deeply involved in changing the structure of 
the society of which he was the head, or, even, of adapting himself to it. 
His tasks, therefore, would have to lie elsewhere.
XENOPHON
Xenophon has little interest in any of his works, except the 
Memorabilia, in making general statements on the nature of man, or the 
sorts of societies he should form, or in speculating on the origins of 
human institutions. The assumptions on which he proceeds are, however, 
fairly clear. He wishes to restore the virtues of the landowners in the
R. Johnson, 'The Promethean Commonplace', Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes525 (1962), p.13.
22 Cf. Paneg. 77:ou6e xcts dpaauxpxas xds aXApAmv e^nAouv, ouöe xds 
xo'Ayag xas auxwv naxouv, aXXa öeuvdxepov yev evdyuCov e£vau xaxws uito 
xojv tcoAlxlov dxoueuv n xaAwg uuep xhs ito'Aeoos duodvnaxe uv, yäXXov 6 ’ 
riaxuvovx ’ enu x o l s  x o l v o l s  dyapxnyaouv rj vöv citu x o l s  töuous xofs 
acpexepots auxmv.
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political arena, ’et c’est pourquoi il ne peut eprouver que de la 
mefiance ä l’egard des utopies de la Repüblique de Platon'.23 He has 
noted, to be sure, the instability of the forms of government men have 
devised, reflected on the number of monarchies and oligarchies destroyed 
by popular factions and on the fragility of tyrannies, and found it 
strange that animals are so readily taught to obey their masters, when 
man is not (Cyr. 1.1.3). He believes that the problem may be solved if, 
in fact, animal life is taken as a model.
When Xenophon turns to the past in disillusionment with the present, 
he sees, not the Age of Gold, but Socrates —  and Socrates looking to the 
ideal of a stable society, embodied to some extent in Sparta, but having 
existed also in Athens' past:24 Touyapoöv xoXXwv ysv yExavaoxdaEwv ev 
xrj ’EXXdöt yEyovuLujv (the Athenians) StsyELvav ev tt) sauxujv, uoXXol 6e 
UTiep ötnauov dviuXeyovres EitExpExov ehel v o l s, xoXXol 6e uko hpelxxo'vwv 
uBptCoyEvou KaxscpEuyov xpos e x elvous. (Mem. 3.5.12).
When Aristippus in the Memorabilia proclaims his belief that the 
life of the self-sufficient man is best, Xenophon comes close to putting 
forward through the mouth of Socrates a view of human nature which 
contradicts this anti-social outlook. There is, Socrates says, no 
middle road by which one can avoid ruling or being ruled, and simply 
pursue one's own freedom (Mem. 2.1.11ff.). Interestingly enough, the 
answer to Aristippus takes the form of the allegory of Prodicus on 
Hercules' choice between virtue and vice. Co-operation in the common 
good is the keynote of one speech, and shows the right way to restore 
the Athenians to their former position (Mem. 3.5.16).25 Acknowledging
23 Edouard Delebecque, Essai sur la vie de Xenophon (Librairie C. 
Klincksieck, Paris, 1957), p.410.
24 At the end of his life 'doutant de l’avenir, dequ par le present, il 
finit par se retourner vers le passe, et s’il y trouve, au lieu de l’age 
d’or, l’injuste condemnation de Socrate, du moins aperqoit - il une 
derniere fois la physionomie de l’homme incompris d’ Athenes ... pieux, 
juste, temperant, [etc.]' (ib. , p.493).
25 udxe 6e oüxoj HELOovxai xoCs a p y o u a t v ,  öl nau dyaXXovxat etil xw 
KaxacppovEtv xwv dpxdvxoov; q tio'xe ouxws oy o v o q a o u a u v , o" ys  avxu ysv  xou 
auvEpysuv Eauxous xa auytpEpovxa ETinpEcxCouatv dXXqXoug xau cpdovobauv 
EauxoCs yäXXov q xols aXXoLS av^pooxoLS, yaXuaxa 6e Kctvxoov ev xe x a i s  
tö d a u s  auvdöous xau xaüs Kouvabs ÖLacpspovxau xau TiXscaxas ö tnag  aXXqXoES 
öuxdbovxau nai Kpoabpouvxau yaXXov ouxw xepöa tV Etv  a x ’ aXXqXoav q 
ouv(jlkpeXouvxes a u x o u s ,  xobs 6e mouvoes coaxEp dXXoxpuous xPWdGV0L xspc 
xouxoov au ydxovxau nau xabs els xä xouauxa öuvdyEOL ydXLaxa xa ^Po u a u v 5
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the significance of government, Socrates says a man must have friends to 
help him make a career in public life (Mem. 2.6.26).
Such community participation in affairs of common interest is not, 
however, fully worked out — and this is even more true of the 
Cyropaedia where the portraits of Cyrus and his friends are not 
supplemented by information on the public and regular administrative 
side of government. The justification for this emphasis in Xenophon’s 
work is the importance for him of the individual, especially the ruling 
individual, in the state. The way in which the ruler relates to others 
is through the rewards he offers, and as Skard notes:
sonst hat ... die £U£pydxps-Idee, die Kyros vertritt, mit den 
griechischen Anschauungen keine Verwandtschaft; es ist 
durchaus ein euepyeTetv tous cptAous, nicht euepyexeLV xpv 
tcoAlv .2 6
The same point is made in another way by Höistad, stressing that 'the 
monarchic ideal which Xenophon constructs on this foundation necessarily 
remains on the plane of individual ethics without political or social 
facets'.2 7
However, Xenophon has something to say about the development of 
society and the important elements in it in the Memorabilia, where in 
the fourth book he describes the logismos by means of which men consider, 
and arrive at perception, and learn through remembering. This, too, is 
the source of the devices which increase enjoyment in life and ward off 
evil {Mem. 4.3.11). Common life, also, develops from the power of 
expression, along with laws and political activity {Mem. 4.3.12). We 
would like to know more about the logismos and its role, but Xenophon 
does not elaborate on these few comments. He is more at home describing 
the efficacy of mutual help in social relations at the direct level, 
using the analogy of the hands and the feet.28 Man's assistance to his
26 Eiliv Skard, Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe: Euergetes-
Concordia (Dybwad, Oslo, 1932), p.50.
27 Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.79.
28 See Mem. 2.3.18-19: vuv yev yap ouxws, ecpn, ÖLdxEbodov, woTtep el
xuj x g e p g, as 6 §eos gul xcp auAAayßdveuv aAApAotv exodncjev, dcpeyeva) 
xouxou xpdiioivxo xpos to 6taK0)Auetv dAAnAw, n el xw node 3ela yotpa 
Tteuouriyevm Tipos to auvepyeuv aAApAoLV, ayeAnaavTe toutou eyTtoötCotev 
dAApAw. oum av TtGAAn ayadua £ up xat xaxoöaLyovua tols gk’ Jxp£A£b^  
TiETiotnyevots gul ßAdßr} xPna$aLi
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neighbour results from the social instinct, but it is balanced by a 
hostile feeling which is just as natural: (puoet yap cx01JaLv ou
avdpmiioL xa ycv (puAtxa* öeovxat re yap aAAqAwv xat eAeouat Mat, 
auvepyouvxes wcpeAouat nau xouxo auvuevxes x^P^v e'xououv aAAqAous* xa 6e 
toAtp txa (2.6.21).
Xenophon’s wish is that the co-operative instinct will prevail 
among men, since äveu ... oyovoJas oux’ av toAts e6 toAuxeudeup, oux’ 
oCmos xaAws oCxri^eun (Mem. 4.4.16). As an ex-military commander on whom 
the responsibility of leading the Greeks to safety in the Anabasis had 
fallen, he places a high value on order in every sphere of life, 
regarding war, agriculture and politics as similar in this respect: eoxu 
ö’ ouöev oüxmg ... o(5x’ euxppaxov ouxe xaAov av^pmtots ms xd£ts (Oec.
8.3). It is therefore understandable that the leader or leaders in any 
group will have, and be expected to have, a great influence on those 
under them. This is for Xenophon the only way in which a society can 
function, even at the level of the household.- He is fundamentally 
pessimistic about the ability of the average person to function 
autonomously. The closest one can come to the ideal life is by living 
simply, in the manner of Socrates. Xenophon repeatedly praises him for 
his qualities of frugality and hardihood. The self-sufficiency that 
Socrates displayed, even though he is himself reported as criticizing 
the form it took in Aristippus, was of such a high order that he was a 
fine example of his own dictum that ’to want nothing is to resemble the 
gods’ (Mem. 1.6.10).
In some ways, Xenophon’s social analysis always remains superficial, 
and, as Hois tad points out:
It is remarkable that Xenophon, who as a military expert might
have been expected to appreciate that a totality is something
which transcends a mere aggregate of individuals, in the
2 9Cyropaedia never evolves the idea of the state, 
but regards society more as a group of individuals.
Neither Isocrates nor Xenophon took such an interest in the nature 
of society as to work out a coherent approach for examining its 
constituent parts or analysing its origins and the impulses that
29 Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.80.
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preserved it, as some of their predecessors and contemporaries did.
These two writers were unlikely to find in monarchy a form of government 
that conflicted with any cherished values of the state as they knew it. 
When they described kingship under its various facets, we may surmise 
that their attention would not be focussed on questions of actual 
political and social relevance.
ARISTEAS
The interests of Aristeas, the next writer whose work concerns us, 
were somewhat different, but did they include society as a complex 
functioning unit?
The writer of the letter to Philocrates does not refer to the 
Jewish equivalent of the Age of Gold in any of his work, nor does he put 
forward — as he has no occasion to — any account of life in the past, 
whether innocent or brutish. Of the present structure of society he has 
little to say. Nevertheless in the account of the justification of the 
Law by Eleazar it is stated that the whole reason for prescriptions 
about food and animals is to bring about justice and the habit of 
justice in social life (169) .
In the questions and answers of the symposia section of the letter, 
however, of most concern is the king's personal behaviour, and his 
relations with his subjects seem important only to the extent that they 
provide instances of this. Certainly the king is expected to display 
benevolence and mercy to his subjects, and he is advised to pay special 
attention to the various ethnic groups in his kingdom. The philosophy 
behind the letter, however, as Schubart remarks ' viel mehr den 
einzelnen Menschen als die Gemeinschaft in Volk und Staat betrachtet \30 
As an individual the king is quite clearly simply a man (263), so that 
however great the gap between ruler and ruled, it is of degree and not 
of kind. There are not two kinds of men, one fitted for ruling, one for 
being ruled.
The most far-reaching comment on men in general is given in answer 
30 W. Schubart, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal', pp.19-20.
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to the question 'why does virtue not receive a good welcome from most of 
mankind?'. The sage replies that this is because all men are by nature 
intemperate and have a penchant for pleasure, whence come naturally 
injustice and the wave of greed (277) . Such a gloomy view of man in the 
mass has inevitably an influence on one's outlook on society and its 
organization. Men for their own good must, it seems, be controlled 
from above — which means imposition of standards by earthly rulers for 
most, and deference to divine standards by the ruler.
HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES
The Stoics, despite the influence on them of Cynic doctrine, seem 
always to have retained a belief in man's social nature.31 Diogenes 
Laertius, at any rate, reports of them that they said the wise man would 
not live in solitude: holvwvlmos yap cpuaeu xau TipaxiLHOs (D.L. 7.123). 
Goodness and sociability go hand in hand, so that only the wise man may 
be able to live in the Politeia envisaged by Zeno (see D.L. 7.33). 
'Oyoudxqg is the basis of true friendship, and öydvoua as for the neo- 
Pythagoreans is essential for the welfare of any community (D.L. 7.124, 
SVF 1.263). Baldry claims that Zeno in his Republic with its ideal 
conditions was setting forth a vision of what might be and not 
describing an idyllic past, despite the primitive nature of some of the 
regulations.32 This does not mean that the early Stoics did not believe 
that their ancestors lived in a way more appropriate to the wise (who 
considered all but the good 'indifferent') than the sophisticated 
contemporary existence.33 One later Stoic, at least, Posidonius,
31 'Aussi oppose ä 1 ’individualisme qu’on peut 1 ’etre(Japprenant a 
l’homme ä se considerer non comme une simple partie (yepos), mais comme 
un membre (yeAos) d’un vaste organisme social, oil chacun a pour devoir 
de s’interesser au perfectionnement des autres, Zenon donne ä l’esprit 
purement negatif et frondeur du cynisme un espoir positif en meme temps 
qu’un caractere philanthropique', J. Bidez, 'La Cite du Monde et la Cite 
du Soleil chez les Sto’iciens', BAB (1932), pp.270-1.
32 See H.C. Baldry, 'Zeno's Ideal State', JHS.79 (1959), p.6.
33 As Bidez claims, though with some exaggeration, '1*ideal du 
Portique, d’apres les formules de Zenon du moins, nous ramenerait a une 
sorte d’age d’or oü le regne absolu de la Raison nous dispenserait 
d’avoir aucun autre droit que le droit naturel', Bidez, 'La Cite du 
Monde', p.272. This was of course theory, not practice. He also
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concerned himself with theories of society’s origin, and ascribed to 
philosophers both the political and the technical discoveries that made 
civilization possible (Sen. Ep. 90.5,7). This attitude clearly was not one 
involving praise of the simple life, and proves that the Stoic ideas on 
society as on other matters did not stand still after Zeno.
From the beginning, however, Stoic social theory had been more than 
simple advocacy of a primitive way of life; essential to it was belief 
that there were two kinds of men, the good and the base (see SVF 1.216). 
The good, obviously a minority, are blessed in every way and Stoics 
believe cpuAtav ev ydvous rot's anouöatous tovao, öua rqv opoodiriTa (D.L. 
7.124). The good and wise seem then to form a community only with each 
other. Their relation to the evil men making up the majority of 
humanity could only be as sovereign.34 Thus what looks at first glance 
like an assumption of the equal right of all to live as they please 
appears on closer inspection to do little to encourage belief in the 
equality of all men or to forward the claims of all to participate in 
government. The ’natural* man is not as common as one might expect.
To Polybius no philosophical label can properly be attached, but he 
does present a view of society in Book Six of his history into which the 
position of the monarch is also fitted, despite his interest in the 
mixed constitution of the Romans.35 He believes that the human race has 
already been destroyed many times. Social groups formed from the
comments, with similar lack of precision, ’toujours, depuis l’epoque ou 
Zenon se formait chez le cynique Crates jusqu’au siecle d’Epictete, les 
Stoiciens, dans leurs cites ideales, ont cherche un retour ä l’etat de 
nature’ (’La Cite du Monde’, p.287).
34 'The theory that there was a great difference in capacity among 
various individuals and that responsibility for the good of the whole 
should be placed upon those of greater capacity may have been accepted 
by the Stoics generally. At any rate it was held by Posidonius’, 
Margaret E. Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa 
(Augustin, New York, 1951), p.54.
35 F.W. Walbank, ’Polybius on the Roman Constitution’, CQ„37 (1943), 
refers to his reaching ’a frame of mind in which he recognized in the 
Stoic anaeyclosis a more adequate explanation [of the Roman 
constitution’s] development than in the mixed constitution of 
Dicaearchus’ (p.88), although T.A. Sinclair, A History of Greek 
Political Thought (2nd ed., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), 
claims that ’he betrays no real knowledge of Stoic doctrine and it would 
be a mistake to attach a label to him or to expect much philosophy from 
him’ (p.272).
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survivors of cataclysms were united simply because their weakness made 
joint action necessary. Virtue was not innate, but emerged as men 
learnt to use their reason and make decisions about what kind of conduct 
would benefit and what harm the community (6.6.4ff.). Naturally the 
first ruler was the strongest man, but sociability and true kingship 
developed together (6.5.10). Such kingship was monarchy based on the 
reason and judgement of the ruler. Polybius therefore saw the rule of 
one man as an off-shoot of the advance of society, though he did not 
expect it to endure unchanged in any community. What is important is 
his contractual view of all social groups and his pragmatic approach to 
the question of the best type of government; a king's position comes 
about only because he is of use to his fellows. He is therefore firmly 
embedded in his society, unlike his position in much of the theory of 
society we have examined so far.
Because Polybius has so few philosophical presuppositions, he can 
afford to consider the question of society empirically, and come to a 
different conclusion from the theorists'. Yet even he shows an interest 
in the personality of the ruler which partly draws his attention from 
the complex interrelationship of ruler and society.
For Epicurus and his followers, also, society was a product of an 
agreement, since 'there never was an absolute justice' (D.L. 10.150).
So only by using the capacity to make covenants (ouvdqKab) with one 
another for their mutual preservation can people know justice or 
injustice {ib.) . Self-sufficiency within this framework is each 
individual's best chance of happiness. An elite of the wise is still 
assumed, but such an elite is unlikely to have anything to do with 
public life (see fr. LVIII and fragments 81 and 87 Bailey). There is no 
logical relationship between the social outlook of the Epicureans and 
any particular form of government. 'Friendship' for them had no 
political meaning, and if society was all, it was the small intimate 
society of kindred spirits.
If the neo-Pythagorean writers on kingship took notice of the views 
of Archytas (or his later imitator and namesake), they would have been 
aware that he had definite views of the ideal society. The best 
condition for a polis is to be self-sufficient (p.86). This is actually 
a call for a Spartan existence, but the social implications are not
worked out. Education in the society's customs inculcates desirable 
social habits, bringing about harmony (p.88).
For Ecphantus, the most metaphysically inclined of our writers, man 
has achieved the highest development among the animals on earth, with 
the king being as it were the summit of human achievement (p.272 and 
p.244). The most significant fact about men is the existence among them, 
as in all the universe, of molvojvu (see esp. p.279). The (ptAua 
existing in political societies is a faint reflection of the oyovota of 
the universe (f>275 and cf. Euryphemus uepu Buou, V, pp.914-5).
The independent, direct imitation of the deity with no need of 
obedience, that quality so close to necessity, is the best way for 
mortals to achieve virtue (pp.277-8). One obvious way for men to come 
to self-reliance is for them to reduce the number of their wants, and 
this Ecphantus, like Archytas, advocates (p.279). This should abolish 
the need for government, but since men are weak, the principle of rule 
and subordination must come into play, and 'nothing unruled can be 
found' (p.274).
Diotogenes is concerned to show how the good man (i.e. the true 
king in particular) differs from unreasoning animals (p.266) and he too 
is interested in the harmony of the earthly rule (pp. 264-5). For this 
to come about, strangely enough, the king must be unlike other men, since 
he has to impose harmony from above ( b b .) . Like Ecphantus, Diotogenes 
and Sthenidas stress the need for rule and subordination throughout the 
cosmos (see esp. p.265 and p.271), but for Diotogenes justice is the 
basis of the harmony that results (p.269 and p.264), although we are not 
told what this justice implies for the subjects, since it seems to be a 
kingly rather than a human quality. The social doctrine of all these 
works has then no meaning apart from the theory of kingship in which it 
is embedded.
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CICERO
The theoretical basis of Cicero's attitude to society and its 
origins is inextricably linked with his attitudes as a Roman politician, 
but we can adduce a certain consistency of belief behind the shifts and
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argumenta ad hominem of his career. Thus he puts forward with 
considerable persuasiveness a view, owing much to the Stoics, which 
argues for the natural sociability of man, especially the wise man.
This quality derives both from traits man shares with the gods, and from 
the purposes for which men come together. In the first book of the De 
Officiis, Cicero claims society is founded on justice and service, and 
although desire for self-preservation and propagation of the species is 
strong in man as in the animals, the capacity to look to the future and 
plan ahead makes co-operation among humans more permanent (De Off.
1.11). Cicero in the De Republica is at pains to stress that the most 
powerful impulse to association in primitive man was not utilitarian 
(the wish for mutual protection) but because there is naturalis quaedam 
hominum quasi congregatio (De Rep. 1.39). 36 Cicero elaborates on this 
by saying what man is not: non est enim singulare neo solivagum genus
hoc (ib.), no doubt having in mind here those such as the Epicureans 
whose theories of social origins tended to see little positive value in 
the larger social units.37
In the De Legibus Cicero also sets forth the rationale behind a 
society governed by law when he describes men as bound together naturali 
quadam indulgentia et benivolentia3 tum etiam societate iuris (De Leg. 
1.35). This natural love for one’s fellow also appears in the De 
Finibus (e.g. 3.63). We can agree with Reesor that society as shown 
here
is based on three fundamental aspects of man, that he is by 
nature a social animal, that he feels a natural affection for 
his fellow men, and shares with them certain fundamental 
capacities .3 8
36 This emphasis probably derives partly from Panaetius. See 
Maximilian Schäfer, ’Des Panaitios avqp äpxtxos bei Cicero’, Gymnasium, 
67 (1960), p.508: ’Wir befinden uns also mit diesen Zusammenhängen 
zutiefst in panaitianischem Denken und sehen ihn hie[r]bei in Gegner­
schaft zu einer auch von Polybios (VI 5) vertretenen und von Epikurs 
Schule verfochtenen Ansicht, die erste Ursache des Sichzusammentuns mit 
andern sei ein Schwächegefühl wie bei Tieren, die sich einem stärkeren 
Leiter als Führer und Schützer der Herde unterstellten.'
37 Cf. Laelius 27: a natura mihi videtur potius quam indigentia
orta anricitiaj applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi3 quam 
cogitatione quantum ilia res utilitatis esset habitura.
38 Margaret Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa, 
p .52.
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Whom, though, does Cicero hold responsible for the development of 
society from its primitive state? This, after all, for many thinkers is 
the most important question to be asked about society, and on the answer 
they give to this depends their subsequent theoretical position. We 
need then to know if Cicero's account is one that shows a true concern 
for the integration of men into an harmonious state which uses the 
abilities of all.
The De Inventione puts before us a magnus vir et sapiens whose 
knowledge of the human potential leads him to persuade, ratione, other 
men, who, through the use of ratio and oratio become civilized (De Inv. 
1.2). In the Pro Sestio Cicero assumes that those primi virtute et 
consilio praestanti brought men together and led them from their 
savagery to justice and gentleness, and the comforts of town life (Pro 
Sest. 91). In the Tusculan Disputations the philosophers were the 
people who first created civilization (Tusc. Disp. 5.5; cf. 1.62). Not 
all men therefore were responsible for the emergence from barbarism. 
Rather, it was the work of an elite, however defined. Cicero obviously 
does not, however, believe that those excelling in force and strength 
began the process — differing in this respect from Polybius, for example.
In whatever guise society appears, speech is for Cicero crucial to 
its foundation. This is an obvious agent for change and communication, 
but Cicero makes it much more. We notice
how Isocrates (Ant. 235) equates 'sophist' with 'sage' and how 
Cicero similarly is quick to identify eloquentia with 
sapientia (cf. De inv. 1.5). This collocation of wisdom and 
oratory was, of course, common in the Hellenistic age.39
He constantly refers to the fact that language is the one advantage men 
possess over the animals (see e.g. De Orat. 1.32) and asserts through 
the mouthpiece of Crassus that no other force than human eloquence could 
have been strong enough out dispersos homines unum in locum congregare 
aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere 
aut iam constitutis civitatibus leges iudicia iura describere (De Orat. 
1.33). Speech is again the unifying force in the discussion on the 
origin of society at the beginning of the third book of the De Republica: 
(ratio) homines antea dissociatos iucundissimo inter se sermonis vinculo
39 S.E. Smethurst, 'Cicero and Isocrates', TAPA?84 (1953), p.300, note 
16.
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conligavit {De Rep. 3.3) and when Cicero is describing man’s debt to 
Providence in the De Natura Deorum, he waxes eloquent on the power of 
speech 'which has bound us together in the bonds of justice.law and 
citizenship. It has raised us from a life of brutal savagery’ {Nat. 
Deor. 2.148).40 In the De Legibus, the vis orationis is eonciiiatrix 
humanae maxime sooietatis {De Leg. 1.27).
Speech is one important expression of ratio.41 It gives man the 
ability to extend the influence of his mind over others posse dieendo 
teuere hominum coetus mentes allioere etc., but significantly Cicero 
considers that this gift, which nature has granted to all, appears fully 
developed in very few {De Orat. 1.30). Because of the facts of man's 
nature, certain structures and attitudes have grown up: apparet a
natura ipsa3 ut eos quos genuerimus amemus3 impelli. Ex hoc nascitur 
ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatia3 ut 
oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum3 quod homo sit3 non alienum 
videre {De Fin. 3.62-3). What then are the principles behind existing 
societies and governments? Firstly, their vinculum is ratio et oratio3 
quae docendo discendo3 communicando disceptando iudicando conciliat 
inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate {De Off. 1.50). 
The definition of man given in the De Legibus shows the same emphasis: 
animal hoc providum sagax multiplex acutum memor plenum rationis et 
consilii {De Leg. 1.22). The orator combining ratio and oratio in him­
self can therefore claim to be of considerable importance to the state. 
The individuals who are the medium of transmission of ratio are not 
visualized as being in any sense detached from the society they are
40 lam vero domina rerum . . .  eloquendi vis quam est praeclara quamque
divina: quae prinrum efficit ut et ea quae ignoramus discerc et ea quae
scimus alios docere possimus; deinde hac cohortamur hac persuademus3 
hac consolamur afflictos hac deducimus perterritos a timore3 hac 
gestientes conprimimus hac cupiditates iracundiasque restinguimus3 haec 
nos iuris legum urbium societate devinxit3 haec a vita inmani et fera 
segregavit.
41 'Genauer führt I 50 aus, wie ratio et oratio die menschliche 
Gemeinschaft binden. Mit ratio et oratio gibt Cicero oft das Wort Adyog 
wieder ... und bezeichnet damit richtig dessen beide Seiten, den Adyog 
ev6ucx§£Tos und den tpocpoptxds ... Die Redner feiern seit Isokrates Nik. 
5 und Antid. 254 den Logos als Gründer der staalichen Gemeinschaft ... 
und denken dabei an die Rede, die Überredung; hier schwebt Cicero mit 
Panaitios zunächst die Sprache als Verständigungsmittel vor (vgl. ND. II 
148)', Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum, p.19, note 1 (Teubner^1934, 
reprinted Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1967) .
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affecting, and the society itself is just as necessary as they are in 
any developments: urbes vero sine hominnm coetu non potuissent nee
aedifieavi nee frequentari (De Off. 2.15).
Cicero has no fear of the material benefits of civilized life, as 
some of the Stoics he followed did. In De Offieiis 2.60, he 
perfunctorily criticized extravagant expenditure, but much more in 
character is his account of how men have laboured together to produce 
all the comforts and conveniences of society. Such things are 
impossible sine hominum labore et manu (see 2.12-15 on this theme).
Only communis vita, teaching men to seek help from each other, could 
have brought about protection from the elements. Cicero includes the 
working of metals, importing and exporting goods, ductus aquarum3 
derivationes fluminum3 agrorum inrigationes3 moles oppositas fluetibus3 
portus manu faetos (2.14) among the benefits of society, thereby 
accepting that a complicated and sophisticated life is a necessary part 
of the fully human personality. Even if early man could have done with­
out a political order because of his few wants, as Plato, for example, 
had suggested in describing his first polis, obviously such a 
civilization as Cicero depicts could not.
One inevitable accompaniment of this kind of life is a social 
structure that arranges for the few to possess the highest works of 
men's hand and mind and the many to labour for the former select group. 
It is not therefore so surprising to find Cicero suggesting an 
alternative reason for the development of society to that of natural 
instinct: hanc ... ob causam maxume3 ut sua tenerentur3 res publicae
civitatesque constitutae sunt (De Off. 2.73).42 To avoid appearing too 
inconsistent, Cicero explains: etsi duce natura congregabantur homines3
tarnen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidiu quaerebant (ib.).
Cicero has little hesitation in dividing men up into those who 
should rule and those who should obey. He shows the wisdom of choosing 
'the best' to preserve the state: praesertim cum hoc natura tulerit3
42 'With all the fervour of a true Roman, Cicero believed that the 
mission of his country was to make the world safe for property', Charles 
Norris Cochrane in Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1957 paperback reprint of 1944 edition), p.45.
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non solum ut summi virtute et animo praeesse inbeeillioribus 3 sed ut hi 
etiam parere simvnis velint (De Rep. 1.51, cf. 3.36). The past, as the 
time of the foundation of the first society, can now be brought in to 
appear in one respect at least as a model for the present. The earliest 
form of government was monarchical, and the kings were the men who were 
most just and most wise. So long as most rulers were of this kind, we 
may infer, laws were unnecessary (see De Leg. 3.4).43 Even if virtuous 
rulers are no longer as plentiful as once they were, they are still to 
be hoped for, since the exercise of imperium is essential.
When Cicero deals with questions on the nature of government, it is 
this aspect rather than the social interrelationships that he brings 
into prominence, despite his interest in analysing man as a social 
animal. However, he never quite gives up his vision of the society 
where all the elements work together, for he is always ready to make 
vigorous protest against the self-sufficient individual who imagines 
that he can do without his fellows: nee verum est3 quod dicitur a
quibusdam3 propter necessitatem vitae3 quod ea3 quae natura desiderat3 
eonsequi sine aliis atque efficere non possemus3 idcirco initam esse cum 
hominibus communitatem et societatem (De Off. 1.158).
We should nonetheless compare with this his description of the out­
standing man, who by his own gifts brings about harmony in the society, 
not leaving this to his fellows’ natural sociability (De Rep. 2.69). 
Cicero’s political outlook was not, of course, strictly pro-monarchical 
by any means, but his social theory could certainly be brought to accord 
with this form. He believed that rule was itself a good and if his 
discussion on government covered all three forms of government and 
finally showed a mixed form triumphant, this does not mean that the 
figure of the prineeps, however defined, ever disappears from view in 
Cicero's writings on political theory.
PHILO
Philo's view of society almost always appears in the framework of
43 Whether men were obeying the best of their kind or the laws, 
imperium was necessary at all levels (see De Leg. 3.3).
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his view of the universe, and this is a universe where, far more clearly 
than is the case with the Stoics for example, who in many ways shared 
Philo's political views, the necessity for rule is ever present. The 
lawgiver, Philo explains, gives an exordium which excites our 
admiration, and which consists of an account of creation implying that 
'the World is in harmony with the Law and the Law with the World' (Opif. 
3) and that 'the man who observes the Law is by this fact a citizen of 
the world' (ib.) . The idea of interaction between the human and the 
divine that is developed, in various places, along with the theory that 
man, in his non-corporal nature, is'an imitation of the Word of God, 
demands a particular view of man's nature and society. Only a society 
which mirrors the divine order is acceptable or, even, truly human.
The ideal society which for Philo parallels the Greek Age of Gold, 
is in one sense that of the first man, associated with God but at the 
same time wise and a king in his own right, exercising his dominion over 
the rest of creation {Opif. 148). But what it was possible to state as 
natural to the first man cannot be affirmed in the same unqualified way 
for his descendants: 'As generation follows generation the powers and 
qualities of body and soul which men receive become feeble' {Opif. 141). 
For man the constitution can no longer be simply nature's right reason 
(6 xhs (puoews op$os Ao'yog, Opif. 143) but needs the addition of a human 
artificial arrangement (see e.g. Jos. 31).
Although Philo describes the existence of the first man in his 
solitary state in idyllic terms, he still considers sociability to be 
part of man's nature. Man is ayeAaoxuMov Mat auvvopov 4toov, 'and by 
nature ordered to harmony and social intercourse' (n cpuots ycvvqoaoa 
[man] tpog opovouav nat molvwvucxv exaAeae, Dec. 132). This is brought 
about by the Logos which brings men together into a harmony and mixture 
of customs {ib.). Nevertheless, man as he is also needs some external 
form of government, and Philo has no wish to provoke the Roman 
authorities by appearing to decry rule as such. The need for caution 
naturally tends to make his remarks on government very general, but at 
the same time as he describes political structures, he lets us see the 
drawbacks of their 'superadded' elements. Only rule that can be 
ascribed directly to the intervention of God, as was the case with the 
patriarchs' power, can be of real, worthwhile significance.
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The type of government actually adopted hardly matters to Philo, 
and certainly we find no exposition of the different forms that have 
developed. Instead democracy is described in such a way that the term 
can have little political meaning in the strict sense. It may appear as 
the opposite of both mob-rule or tyranny (Agv. 45-6) and may also 
describe government by a 'ruler and guide' for the 'congregation' of the 
herd (Age. 45). Abraham's attack on the nine kings can be described as 
due to his ambition to establish in the soul 'democracy, the best of 
constitutions, instead of the rule of tyrants and overlords, and 
legality and justice instead of lawlessness and injustice' (Abr. 242). 
The rule of each nation in turn over all the others can even be 
described as 'democratic' and 'best' (Immut. 176).
That order which is equality ev yev xrj xoö Ttavxog ouauqt, xuptojxaxa 
cpavotL, xdayos eaxuv, sv 6e aaxeouv n euvoywxdxp xau tioXlxcuwv apuaxri 
öqyoxpaxua, ev xe a3 awyaaev uyeua xau ev luxate; xaAoxaya^ua (Spec. Leg. 
4.237). Repentance can be described as the turning from mob-rule, the 
vilest of misgovernments, to democracy, the best-ordered form (Virt.
180). These are highly idiosyncratic applications of the word, quite 
different from the description in the De Josepho where the rule under 
the law of apyovxes ßouAeuxac xe xau ÖLxaoxat and the presence of the 
crowd (xa oyAa) introduce an element of reality into the account (Jos. 
63-4). Mob-rule in the De Fuga is however left behind for the orderly, 
regular government under a king (Fug. 10). This is in contrast to the 
De Josepho, where the people are the real 'king' and the statesman's 
real task is to serve them (Jos. 148). So, just as the absolute rule of 
one man may in some circumstances be termed democracy, that of the 
people may be called kingship.
Philo's views on the nature of man do give us more clues than this, 
however, as to the type of society which he favoured. Not only was he 
opposed to letting loose the worst elements which he believed to be 
present in most men —  hence he had little time for ochlocracy — but he 
also viewed lack of rule, anarchy, with great alarm, implying by this 
term not just self-rule, or primitive autonomy and independence (no 
longer, Philo believed, a real possibility), but the leaving of people to 
their own devices, when they are ill-equipped to take charge of them­
selves .
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Philo insists that if a city is abandoned by its rulers it becomes 
a prey to two very great evils, anarchy and lawlessness (Det. 141). He 
emphasizes elsewhere that lack of rule is a danger in whatever situation 
it occurs, for ’what is more fraught with confusion than want of 
government? Are not houses without a ruler full of offence and 
confusion? Are not cities left without a king destroyed by the opposite 
kind of rule? Do not countries and nations and regions of the earth 
lose their old abundant happiness when their governments are destroyed?'
(Som. 2.286-7). The strongest contrast between anarchy and order occurs 
when Philo claims that it is the nature of anarchy to plot mischief and 
of government to bring salvation, and chiefly so where law and justice 
(voyos x a t  6uxn) are honoured, and that means government based on reason 
(auv  Ao'yw) (Som. 2.154).44
This indeed is the important factor in all these examples — the 
necessity of the rule of reason. Most of the instances actually occur 
in arguments on the need for reason to rule the passions and the senses. 
Rule in actual cities of course is often the result of convention, since 
rules in different cities, countries and nations are laid down by human 
ordinance, by those who first embraced the apparent in preference to the 
true. This fact does not prevent Philo from again and again defining 
government as right reason at work. Even if it is true that 'political 
life is a thing varied and multiple, liable to innumerable changes 
brought about by personalities, circumstances, motives, individualities 
of conduct, differences in occasions and places' (Jos. 32),45 Philo 
still places great hopes in it.
Sometimes the language used may reflect a wish to flatter rulers, 
as when Philo talks of the general expectation, when Gaius came to the 
throne, that life under a guardian, a shepherd of the civilized flock, 
would now follow with the change (Legat. 20). In fact, however, the 
description is reminiscent of Plato's language on the semi-divine 
governors of primitive men in the Laws. The civilizing effect hoped for 
is very like that described in accounts of the development of society,
44 Ttecpuxe yap avapyda  yev exußouAov,  äpyn 6* e£vau awxppuov, xau 
yaAua§ ?j voyos moil 6uxn xexuyrixau* aüxn 6 ’ e a ru v  n auv Ao'yw.
45 TcouxuAov yap xoAuxe u'a xau TtoAuxpotov, yupuas  öaas  tv6ex°H ^v D 
yexaßoAds,  t p o a a k o u s ,  u p a y y a au v ,  a u x u a u s 5 tpd^ewv uöudxnau ,  xaupcov xau 
xditwv Öuacpopaus.
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from the fifth century on.46 Certainly the hopes raised in this case 
were soon clashed by Gaius' behaviour, but Philo’s expression of them 
shows that he can at least sympathize with the belief that the good and 
civilized life can come about only through government, especially 
government of an individual.
Rule based on reason is closely allied to man's habits of 
sociability and kindliness, yet it is in the ruler or rulers that reason 
— and presumably its social concomitants — must be present in the 
highest degree, since unfortunately man as a whole often falls far short 
in this respect and so TtXn^ ut 6e voyw cpuoewg nysyovos eE, avdyxris 6eu 
(Agr. 31). On the other hand, when Philo describes how the cities of 
Palestine came into existence, he shows the Jews, originally a farming 
people, eventually coming together because of increasing social feeling 
and friendliness, and building cities (Spec. Leg. 2.119). As Goodenough 
comments, Philo does not appear to regard this process as peculiar to 
the Jews, 'for he describes it as "quite what was to have been expected", 
though it was the absence of precisely these virtues [of sociability, 
etc.] which made city life in general appear to him in other moods to be 
the source of civic turmoil and lawlessness'.47
When Philo gives reasons why the Mosaic law could not be handed 
down in the city — among other things, human society is so corrupted by 
arrogance which leads men into mutual injustice, impiety and oppression 
{dec. 2ff.) — he is writing in his most pessimistic vein, and at the 
same time expressing the belief, dear to the Cynic-Stoic tradition, that 
the simple unorganized life may also be the most innocent. With this in 
mind, it is interesting to examine the few places where Philo allows 
himself to indulge in apocalyptic speculation on a Utopian consummation 
of history. The vision of the future when enmity between man and man, 
and man and the beasts will be at an end is described in the usual 
Utopian fashion: there will be abundance in harvests, fertility in men
and beasts, the taming of wild animals and so forth (Praem. 87ff.). 
Philo, however, gives no detailed account of an anomic community, and 
indeed supposes that there will be a Messianic ruler leading his people
46 E.g. in Polybius 6.7.1-2.
47 Erwin R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, p.82.
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at this time. His main concern, it seems, is to draw the lesson of the 
need for conquest over the beasts within, and for cultivation of the 
virtues.
The ideal life in the here and now is lived by such groups as the 
Therapeutae and the Essenes who reduce their wants to a minimum and 
embody the paradox that, although very poor by the world's standards, 
they consider themselves very rich 'judging contentment and frugality to 
be great abundance, as in truth they are' (Prob. 77). In what they can 
do without — 'all traffic, all commercial dealings, and all navigation' 
(Prob. 78) — they resemble the members of Plato's first city, as also in 
the fact that there are no masters and slaves among them, since the 
principle of equality prevails, in accordance with nature (seeProb. 79). 
There is therefore no private property in the strict sense. This life, 
Philo suggests, is most pleasing to God, as well as displaying love of 
one's fellow-men. It is free from the artificiality of constitutions 
and laws which are additions to nature. It is, then, the way men are 
meant to live, but it is clear that only a few can ever do so. Philo 
assumes that the Therapeutae will always have less enlightened friends 
or relations to whom to give up their wealth. For most men, Philo 
suggests another, less radical course. Abraham brought himself to do 
obeisance 'not out of any feeling of respect for those who by nature and 
race and custom were the enemies of true reason, but rather because he 
feared their power and formidable strength and took care to give no 
provocation and therefore won the prize of virtue' (Som. 2.90). So too 
must the Jews of the Roman Empire behave.
True social theory cannot be built out of such a situation. Advice 
given at such a time can only be provisional. More significant, there­
fore, are the descriptions of the best state, actually a 'political' 
account of the sage's soul (e.g. Abr. 261), where peace and good order 
prevail. As we have seen, however, while Philo is perfectly prepared to 
refer to such abstractions as these and to ascribe their existence to a 
patriarch or similar person who mediates divine favour, he does not show 
us any society exhibiting these qualities in operation. What we can say 
of him is that, unlike the Cynics, when he has decided that the simple 
life where the Logos is present to all directly is unrealizable, he is 
willing to go to the other extreme and sanction a large measure of
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external compulsion by government. Nevertheless, it is important to 
notice that he still hopes that the usual panoply of power and methods 
of worldly kingship can be discarded.48 Philo’s ideal would be rule by 
a king unlike any that the Hellenistic or Roman world had yet seen.
SENECA
Seneca's motive, in the De CZementia, for referring to a past 
Golden Age is, in the context in which it occurs, very clear. He is 
praising Nero for speaking in a way worthy of the publiea generis humani 
innoeentia {dem. 2.1.4). Innocence, indeed, had long been considered 
one of the chief characteristics of primitive man, and was often 
associated with a life where men were subject to no authority unless it 
was that of a divine or heroic being. To learn Seneca's true opinions 
on mankind in its infancy, therefore, we must examine his Epistles, 
where he deals with the question without any ulterior motive.
Here, in Letter Ninety, we find that philosophy is not an inborn 
attribute of man but must be acquired. Hence we may suppose that the 
fellowship of men, derived from the teaching of philosophy, is also 
something to be worked at, and is not innate {Ep. 90.3). Early man, it 
appears, far from being without a ruler, was under the authority of the 
best, that is, the wise {Ep. 90.5) in an idyllic relationship where power 
was never abused and subjects never rebelled. (Compare Seneca's account 
of the simple life of early man under the rule of Saturn in his Phaedra 
525ff. and see also the Ootavia 397ff.)
Perhaps equally importantly, expertise in rule and expertise in 
invention did not, in Seneca's view, go hand in hand, since the former 
was worthy of great thought, the latter the result of mere skill {Ep. 90 
11, 24). Seneca's own predilections emerge clearly in his rhetorical 
question: 'How, I ask you, can you consistently admire both Diogenes
and Daedalus?' {Ep. 90.14). The ideal life, even if it necessarily 
includes both ruler and ruled, is nonetheless simple, and it includes 
Cynic elements — although elsewhere Seneca is far more restrained in his 
advocacy of poverty.49 Although Seneca gives an account of government
48 See Mut. 152.
. Note 49 over page.
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by the wise in the Golden Age, later in the letter he appears to retreat 
from this view, and to adopt the notion that ignorance was the basis of 
the innocence of the first men, and that such ignorance was less worth­
while than the wisdom acquired after effort (Ep. 90.44, 46). In any case, 
there is clearly no possibility that the organization of primitive 
society could be applied to an age where men, if they are to live in 
accordance with nature, must now do so consciously and with effort. Any 
new Golden Age, therefore, needs its ’clement’ Nero, and we cannot 
indulge in visions of self-sufficient individuals dispensing with all 
formal institutions. Even for men a dis recentes, such a situation 
never existed (see Ep. 90.44).
The naturalness of government is therefore established, but this of 
course says little of the precise form it should take. Seneca himself 
is somewhat ambiguous about the principle of rule. No one can rule who 
is unable to be ruled, he writes (Ira 2.15.4). But then in talking of 
the Stoics and comparing them with other philosophers, he describes the 
former as suited to rule and the latter to obey, just as naturally as is 
the case, he claims, with men and women respectively {Const. Sap. 1.1). 
Seneca is here more interested in the matter of self-rule than of 
external government, yet man’s position in the universe means that he 
must obey its decrees, and so earthly government has to be fitted into 
the framework of a world of rational beings where hierarchy and 
differentiation are essential.
The most obvious characteristic of men of all times is gregarious­
ness, so that when Seneca comes to define man in the abstract, this is 
what he stresses. The Stoics wish hominem sociale animal communi bono 
genitwn videri {Clem. 1.3.2), and, again, man is sociale animal et in 
commune genitus mundum {Ben. 7.1.7). This is an important addition to 
the more often stressed Stoic view of man as a rational animal. But 
Seneca elsewhere defines man thus: in homine optimum quid est? Ration
hac antecedit animalia3 deos sequitur. Ratio erga perfecta proprium 
bonum est3 cetera illi cum animalibus satisque communia sunt {Ep. 76.9).
Sociability, however, may be rather different in application from 
what we might expect, since for Seneca, following Democritus, 'one man
4 9 See Vit. Beat., esp. 24-5 and Ep. 5.
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may mean as much as a multitude' (Ep. 7.10), which seems to contradict 
the argument of Letter Five:— Hoc primum philosophia promittit3 sensum 
communem3 humanitatem et congvegationem (Ep. 5.4). Seneca lays equal 
stress on both elements when in De Beneficiis (4.18.2-3) he notes that 
God has given man two things, reason and fellowship, which make him, 
from being a creature at the mercy of all, the most powerful of all 
creatures, 'and so he who, if he were isolated, would be a match for 
none, is the master of the world’.
On balance, it is clear, Seneca saw individuals as bound together 
in one way or another, either through possessing a similar nature or 
because of an instinct of sociability, but he did not trace the growth 
of the various social units in the meticulous fashion of an Aristotle.
He stressed that any damage to a part of the greater commonwealth harms 
the whole: nefas est nocere patriae; ergo civi quoque ... ergo et
homini3 nam hie in maiore tihi urbe civis est (Ira 2.31.7). We are all 
born for a life of fellowship (ib.). So too in the Ninety-Fifth letter 
to Lucilius, when discussing the duty of a philosopher to his fellow men, 
he emphasized the unity of the world in accord with Stoic tenets: orrme
hoc3 quod vides3 quo divina atque Humana conclusa sunt3 unum est; 
membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit3 cum ex isdem 
et in eadem gigneret. Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles 
fecit (Ep. 95.52).
This picture of the world can be felt to be true only in the 
appropriate social situation, where men are not subject to the selfish­
ness that greed, envy and fury can cause — and here we can refer once 
more to Seneca's picture of early man, and see what lessons it had to 
offer the civilized world. One factor to which Seneca attributes 
considerable significance is the absence of private property: in
commune rerum natura fruebantur; sufficiebat ilia ut parens ita tutela 
omnium3 haec erat publicarum opum secura possessio (Ep. 90.38). As well, 
any picture of the past of Rome itself was painted in the same austere 
colours: Scilicet maiores nostri3 quorum virtus etiamnunc vitia nostra
sustentat3 infelices erant3 qui sibi manu sua parabunt cibum3 quibus 
terra cubile erat3 quorum tecta nondum auro fulgebant3 quorum templa 
nondum gemmis nitebant, he comments ironically (Helv. 10.7).
Even in this society and that of the first men, there existed, as
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we have noted, authority and subordination; so rule in itself cannot be 
evil in Seneca’s eyes. He is more interested in determining the 
differences between good and bad rulers than in contemplating the 
structural differences between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. The 
use made of law is less important in assessing a ruler than are his 
kingly qualities or their absence. Seneca makes no attempt, as some of 
his fellow writers did, to claim that monarchy could in some way contain 
the best features of democracy. He has no need to, he seems to feel, 
since ’it is nature’s way to subordinate the weaker to the stronger' (Ep.
90.4) . According to this belief, it is reasonable to criticize Brutus 
if his act was caused by fear of the name of king, since a state reaches 
its best condition under a king {Ben. 2.20.2), because 'there is nothing 
dangerous in a man's having as much power as he likes if he takes the 
view that he has power to do only what it is his duty to do' (see Ep.
90.4) .
Certainly the loss of the 'good old ways' had partly caused the need 
for a strong hand, and Seneca may well have regretted the necessity. At 
the philosophical level, however, he did not do so, since he agreed with 
the assertion of Posidonius on the subject: iZZo ... saecuZo3 quod
aureum perhibent3 penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius iudicat. . . .  
hactenus Posidonio adsentior (Ep. 90.5, 7). What was good enough for 
the Golden Age, we may suppose, is good enough for the contemporary 
society. All that remains to be found is the sapiensl
MUSONIUS RUFUS
Although Musonius Rufus does not go into details on the sort of 
society he thinks best, at any rate in any of the surviving extracts of 
his teaching, he does display a fairly consistent approach to the nature 
of man and to man in society. He believes that man's nature is 
fundamentally noble (Stob. 2.9.8, p.183) Ttpos a p e r n v  y E y o v e v a u  tov  
av§pa)7tov. To go against this nature by returning evil for evil is to 
act like a beast, not a man, whereas the opposite sort of behaviour is 
nyepou  TpoTtou xau cpulavOpooTiou (Stob. 3.40.9, pp.536-7). In general we 
can say that to act out of consideration for oneself alone is to be non­
human and like the wolf or any of the wildest beasts Xuxou yq ö e v
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öuoupcpovxa pqö ’ aXXou §qp uo u twv aypLoaianjov y q ö e v d s  (Stob. Flor. 67.20).
Such a person has no part in common life or co-operation or 
justice. Of all the animals only the bee can be a true example for man 
in its sociability. These then are the qualities that form the basis of 
a human existence, and we may assume that Musonius saw them also as the 
foundation of political and social institutions. Man for him was not a 
creature to be coerced into goodness but a free agent, since all men can 
acquire virtue. Such is his conclusion in his non-political comments.
DIO CHRYSOSTOM
Dio's most comprehensive definition of man occurs in the Thirty- 
Sixth Discourse, the Borysthenic, where the meaning of ctvdpmnos is, he 
claims, known only to the man who has expert knowledge (6 eytetpos, 
36.19). This is not surprising since the definition 'man is a mortal 
animal endowed with reason' could presumably be fully comprehended only 
by those examples of man who fit the definition — and these, oddly 
enough, appear to be few. Logos then takes precedence over justice as 
the defining characteristic of man.
If Dio is unable to produce many instances of individuals or 
societies worthy of their partnership with the gods in the possession of 
reason, does he believe that examples could be found most easily in a 
particular form of society, past or present, or that a particular form 
of government encourages men to be worthy of their title? Is government 
in fact a good or a necessary evil?
Dio seems to believe that early societies showed a high proportion 
of the wise and prudent — for most men of earlier times were of this 
kind (1.8). Not only so, but the first human beings did without fire, 
houses and such 'necessities', and subsequent inventions were directed 
unnecessarily to making life more comfortable instead of promoting 
courage or justice. As a result, life became constantly less agreeable. 
Prometheus was therefore rightly blamed for his civilizing activities 
(6.25, and see too 6.28-9).50
Note 50 over page.
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This outlook, in clear contradiction to the view of Isocrates, for 
example, on the development of society, is a reflection of Dio’s Cynic- 
Stoic attitudes which stressed the need for self-sufficiency and 
simplicity. His comments on actual, if idealized, societies reinforce 
the impression that for him the ideal individual is one to whom 
government is unnecessary because he possesses of himself the controls 
it imposes on the ordinary members of society. The Scythians, although 
without houses or cultivation, are nevertheless able to play their part 
as citizens (TtoAuxeueo\>au) with justice and in accordance with law 
(69.6). In the Euboean discourse Dio describes the idyllic life of 
simple peasants whom he allegedly met on his travels during his exile.
To one of their number the polis assembly seems a strange and, Dio 
implies, useless body (7.23). Living free from taxes and the duty of 
public services would appear to be the ideal life in which freedom can 
flourish (see 7.28). The account of man which Dio provides in the 
Euboean discourse takes note of man's social needs but still allows for 
each individual’s claims to manage his own life:
Aeu 6n nou euodau x u v a  e rcuydAeu av , yr) i tavu xu upaws ynöe 
pqt^uymg cpepovxas x n v  e i s Ta a x u y a  xau 6oöAa amyaxa u ß p u v ,  . . .  
xauxT] . . .  ri xouvr i  xo avOpmuuvov y e v o g  a i iav  e v x u y o v  Mat 
o y o x u y o v  uno xo u  (puaavxog Ocou x a u x a  a py e u a  xau auyßoAa eyov 
x ou  x u y a a S a t  öuxaum g,  xau Aoyov xau eyueupuav  xaAwv xe xau 
a ua x pm v ,  y e y o v e v  ( 7 . 1 3 8 ) .
Elsewhere Dio expresses much more pessimistic conclusions: life is
difficult and full of deceit, wickedness, grief and countless other ills, 
and this is because of the folly and pride of men (32.15 and see 74.4). 
Indeed, in some ways men are worse than unreasoning animals, who are 
often gentle and helpful to their own kind (40.32 and see 40.40). 
Solitude, a life away from the company of frail humanity, may be the 
only safe course (74.23).
The folly of most people can be offset only by the appointment of a 
wise and prudent man as leader, and even the foolish and weak recognize 
that it is best for them to live under direction. Rule of the best 
is, after all, natural (2.71; 3.50). The man who, having managed his
own life admirably, endeavours by the persuasion of speech combined with
50 'In Or. 6, 25 and 29 we have a negative view of Prometheus. 
Prometheus' gift of fire to mankind has been a bane. Cynic allegory has 
utilised the myth to demonstrate its own pessimism about civilisation' 
(Ragnar Hoistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.57).
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goodwill and a sense of justice to train and direct a great multitude of 
men and to lead them to better things (4.124) would presumably be fit 
for such a task. Precisely how such a person would fit into the 
government structure is not clear.
Dio does refer to the typical forms of government and their 
degenerate opposites but without going into detail. Interestingly, 
though, he clearly considers democracy, although 'specious and 
inoffensive in name' impractical, since in it the self-control of the 
common people is expected to produce one day an equitable and lawful 
constitution (3.46). This sceptical outlook is typical of Dio's 
attitude to rule in all its facets. He does not believe then that man's 
original state of innocence can be taken into account when dealing with 
the problems of a sophisticated society. In fact he claims that xqj 
t c c x v t l yap nAefov d t e x 0,JÖL TPS eAeubepdas ö t a  xqv «axuav ou avbpajTiot that 
is, than slaves (74.9) and goes so far as to assert of mankind: ’E6bxouv 
6e yob navies acppoves, ms enos euTtetv (13.13).-
Here we find a Stoic with a deep sense of the harmony and fellow­
ship prevailing in the cosmos and a profound conviction that this should 
be mirrored in human relationships concluding paradoxically that the 
human race in general is not responsible enough to take its affairs into 
its own hands. The metaphysical justification of kingship — that only 
such a rule parallels God's rule over the cosmos — is therefore 
fortified by a utilitarian one. Those who possess Ttatöeua and Aoyos, 
the cure for man's ills provided by the gods (32.16), are likely to be 
the good men and preservers of cities whom society needs (32.3).
PLUTARCH
Plutarch's concern for the old values of the poZis appears 
frequently not only in the MoraZia but also in the examples of 
patriotism and statesmanship chosen in the Li-ves. His ideal society is 
never explicitly described, but clearly it would possess the qualities 
of restraint, simplicity and order {AgZs 7.2). The way Plutarch 
describes the reforms of Agis and Cleomenes suggests that in many 
aspects they conformed to his own ideals, and these reforms were an
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attempt to restore the much-admired (but inimitable) government of 
Lycurgus, the symbol for many Greeks of the Golden Age.51 Plutarch's 
description of the reigns of Agis and Cleomenes no doubt owes much to 
the work of Phylarchus, but Plutarch clearly adopted it with 
enthusiasm, adding his name to the long list of those for whom Sparta, 
in its legendary early days or as 'restored' later, was a model for 
political and social life.
Plutarch displays a similar concern for the simple life in the De
amove prolis
axpaxov yap ev exeuvous  [i.e. dumb animals] n cpuaug xau ayuyes  
x a i  aitAoüv (puAdxieu to Üö u o v, ev 6’ av^pmuous und toü Aoyou xau 
xhS G u v n ^ e ta s ,  o xouAauov uxo twv yupe<Jxöv ne i tov^e , t p o s  TtoAAa 
yuyvuyevn ödyyaxa xau xpuoeus  euu^d io ug  uouxuAq yeyove xau 
q ö e u a ,  i d  6’ ouxeuov ou TExnpnxe:. xau yq dauyaCwyev, el xa 
aAoya Cya T^ v Aoyuxmv yctAAov euexau it) (puaeu (493c).53
This devaluing of what separates man and beast, with the implication 
that the further man departs from his original condition, the worse he 
becomes, seems to put Plutarch on the side of those like the Cynics who 
saw man's best state as existing in the past, and viewed contemporary 
civilization with disfavour.
Certainly, there is some truth in this assessment of Plutarch, but 
it would be giving a one-sided account of his attitude to take up this 
aspect alone. For Plutarch, the nature of man is in many ways a given, 
and his metaphysical assumptions, with their stress on the dualistic 
forces contending throughout the universe, lead him to see man as such 
as inevitably prone to evil in part of his nature.54 This view
51 On idealization of Sparta see F. Ollier, Le Mirage spartiate (de 
Boccard, Paris, 1933 and 1943, reprinted in one volume by Arno Press, 
1973).
52 See on Plutarch's account of Agis and Cleomenes, F. Ollier's 
article, 'Le Philosophe stoicien Sphairos et l’oeuvre reformatrice des 
rois de Sparte Agis IV et Cleomene III', R E G^49 (1936)^536-70.
53 As Babut comments: 'On y trouve ... l’idee qu les animaux peuvent
servir d’exemples aux hommes et leur montrer ou est la veritable vie 
selon la nature, dans la mesure justement oü ils sont restes plus 
proches de la nature que l’homme’ (Babut, Plutavque et le stoieisme, p .74).
54 'Contrasts entre le pessimisme moral des Sto'xciens, associe ä un 
optimisme metaphysique, et l’optimisme de Plutarque sur l’homme, qui se 
conjugue avec le pessimisme de sa vision du monde', comments Babut,
Plutavque et le stoicisme, p.363, of Dion 47.4.
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predisposes Plutarch to be most concerned with the majority of mortals 
who are neither super-human sages on the Stoic model nor deep-dyed 
villains, like the traditional figure of the tyrant. He therefore 
judges men less harshly than do the followers of Stoic teaching, but 
also holds a less exalted view of the potentialities of human nature 
than they.
Man’s reason which, we have seen, Plutarch regards as a doubtful 
blessing, is not even, he believes, the best instrument for arriving at 
the truth, although he invests the ruler with the Logos of God in Ad 
PrLnc'ipem (780f). We may however suspect that here he was adopting a
common theme for rhetorical effect rather than expressing his own 
conviction. Through the mouthpiece of Mestrius Florus, he expresses the 
opinion that
oXmg 6’ 6 £qxwv iv exdöxt^  to euXoyov ex tdvxwv dvaupeu to 
Sauydatov onou yap o iris auxt'ag etuXeuTieL Xo'yog, exetOev 
apxtTat xo onropetv, xouxeaxu xo (puXoaocpetv• woxe xpotov xtva 
(puXooocpeav dvaupouauv ou xotg $auyaauotg autaxouvxeg (680c-d).
This wish to leave man, in some sense, with questions unanswered, 
a being open to awe and wonder, means that Plutarch does not believe 
rationalism alone can solve man’s problems. He is willing to rely on 
the communications of divine origin, and if these come through a human 
medium, that too is no doubt acceptable. Such a view is not likely to 
lead Plutarch to a profound analysis of political organizations to 
determine which form gives greatest scope to human reason and 
responsibility.
One characteristic that Plutarch has no hesitation in bestowing on 
man is sociability. This he sees originating in instinct: auxq yap q
Ttpoa6ex°h^vn xat Ciyroüaa (poXuav xaL oyuXuav xpeta ötödaxeu xo auyyeveg 
xtyciv xat Trepteteuv xat öuacpuXdxxeuv, mg acpuXoug xat ctytxxoug xat 
yovoxpdiioug Cnv yq öuvayevoug yqöe uetpuxdxag (479c) .
The love which we have for our children is then the basis of our 
social life and administration (see 495c), Plutarch claims. The larger 
organization builds on the smaller, elemental one, as for Aristotle, and 
is therefore a natural growth. The state is in essence a unity in which 
is expressed in a formal way the force that binds men together:
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cv yap XL npdyya nau ouvgx^S n rcoAug wcntcp C&ov ouh G^uaTccyevov 
auxou xaug na-9 ’ qAunuav yexaßoAaug o u ö ’ exepov cE, exdpou Tcjp 
Xpdv(j) yuvoyevov ,  aAAa ouyTia§eg aeu nau ouhcuov auxip xau Tiaaav 
5v Tipaxxeu Kara to kolvov n expaCev auxuav  Kao ydpuv 
a v a6exoy£Vov 5 ydypu av q uououaa nau auvöeouaa  xaug GTtunAoHaCg 
nouvojvua xpv evoxrixa öuacpuAdxxi^ (559a) .
There is, however, no particular form that a state must take. 
Plutarch asserts that a state cannot survive without belief in and 
worship of the gods, but that states could be found without walls, or 
books or kings or houses or property, and doing without currency, 
knowledge of theatres or gymnasia (Adv. Col. 1125d-e). The only general 
precept can be found in the law that always gives the first rank in the 
government to him who does what is right and recognizes what is 
advantageous (817d-e). In different places, Plutarch highlights the 
value of different forms of rule. In the Life of Dion, for example, he 
describes how Dion thought democracy better than tyranny, in the lack of 
a healthy aristocracy (Dion 12.2). When he advises an old man to 
retain his position in public life, he describes the cares, labours and 
occupations of the office of king (790a).
He has, then, no doctrinaire pronouncement to make, but prefers to 
emphasize in all situations and contexts man's need of his fellows, and 
the need for moderation and avoidance of excessive severity to others — 
or to oneself. Of a too strict regimen, he says:
oi) yap aacpaAdg ou6e paöuov oüöe ttoAutuhov o u ö ’ dvdpu)TtuHov dAA’ 
ooTpeou xuvog Coot) upoaeouKos q axeAdyous to dpexdoxaxov  xoüxo 
xau HaxnvayHaaydvov ev xpocpaüg nau duoxaug nau Huvqaeau nau 
qauxuaug *** £ l-S etiuanudv xuva ßuov nau axoAaaxqv nau 
povdxpoTidv xuva nau dcpuAov nau döoCov dtrooTaxw rcoAuxeuag 
naSuaaauv eauxoug xau auaxeuAaauv (135a-b).
Such an attitude may seem to be in conflict with the declarations on 
simplicity in life, but for Plutarch simplicity is never the same as 
austerity. Indeed men who maintain the severe demeanour and standards 
of old are almost out of place in a modern setting, and Plutarch appears 
to criticize them for inflexibility:
f) Kdxcovos dp x a u o x p o u u a , 6ud xpo^oov uoAAwv eituyevoyevq Buoug 
öuecp^opdau nau Ttovqpoug edeau öoCav yev e£xe yeyaAriv nau nAdog, 
ouh evqpyoae 6e xaug xP^daug 6ua Bdpog nau ydye^og xqg dpexqg 
dauyyexpov xoug Ha-deaxwau naupoug (Phoo. 3.2).
Moderation and diplomacy are the qualities Plutarch finds most use-
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ful in public life, even if, in a perfect world —  perhaps at the time of 
some long-ago ancestors —  these were not necessary. Plutarch does 
attempt to avoid the accusation of pandering to the evils of the day by 
describing how God governs the universe without force: ’not using
compulsion, but making persuasion and reason introduce that which must be'
(Phoo. 2.5). He is himself never tired of stressing the importance of speech 
in human society and he finds the traditional division of speech into 
evötd^exos and ev upocpopa, pointless, 'because the aim and end of both 
the speech in the mind and the speech in the utterance is friendship, 
towards oneself and towards one's neighbour respectively' (777b-c) . An 
orator's speech may even be, for Plutarch, as important as his character 
in achieving political ends: öqyaywy doc yocp n 6 lcc Aoyou TteL\)oy£Vu)V
eoxbv 'for leadership of a people is leadership of those who are 
persuaded by speech' (802e). Experts can help ordinary imperfect men to 
see the way that they should go, and divine power may pick out the 
gifted individual from his fellows. This is so even though mankind is 
naturally disposed to form social groups. Plutarch takes society as he 
finds it, and this leads him, for all his human sympathy, to concentrate 
on the figures of great and significant men, which in most cases means 
great leaders.
PLINY
For Pliny the world of the primitive society had little to offer 
his own day. When he refers to animal life it is to lay down the rule 
that power should not go to the stronger as with cattle (Pan. 38.7). 
Pliny's general attitude to the community shows nothing to contradict 
his specifically political pronouncements, even if it does not determine 
their expression. He believes individual views should be weighed rather 
than counted, a principle he would no doubt see as espoused by the 
ancients (see Ep. 2.12.5) and this probably requires that important 
choices be made by oerti electique (see Ep. 7.17.12 and cf. 9.5). Most 
people are easily led and behave as circumstances dictate (Pan. 44.8).
So clearly then some kind of authoritarian rule is the best solution for 
all.
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ARISTIDES
In the Romccn Oration, Aristides gives clear indications of his 
views on society. For him the life of primitive man held few 
attractions. The 'early days’ here refer in general to the time before 
Roman rule and are pictured as hard and boorish ßuos axAripos tus xat 
aypotxos (R.O. 101). Aristides mentions the legend of the Golden Race 
of men only to dismiss it (103). The reign of Kronos idealized by so 
many writers he depicts as one of violence and cruelty to be contrasted 
unfavourably with that of Zeus, which of course parallels the leadership 
of Rome on earth. What Aristides particularly deplores in the ways of 
former times is the untrammelled violence of rulers. He sees no 
pristine state where men could rule themselves.
The benefits of settled government are many, but Aristides is most 
impressed with the trade and commerce that converge on Rome as the 
centre of the Empire (llff.). A life of order and regulation allows 
communications to unite scattered sections and introduces the advantages 
of civilization (see 101). The life of nomadic Scythians is introduced 
when Aristides refers sarcastically to the peripatetic habits of the 
Persian kings, and is obviously unenviable (18).
Aristides does not of course wish to suggest that the benefits of 
orderly government have been paid for too highly; instead he claims 
that imperial government has also brought true freedom (36). Now 
citizenship is taken to mean xaSeoxrixe xouvp ins yns öppoxpaxLa u p ’ evt 
Xto aptoxtp apxovxL xai xoaynxri (60) . The test of citizenship is not 
ethnic, but as had been the case with Isocrates' ideal depends on 
character (63) . Aristides suggests that good government by definition 
implies a hierarchy with all fitting quietly into their proper places, 
and this the Empire of course displays. It is in fact a mixture of the 
three basic forms, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy (90). This 
assertion means that Aristides believes that all possible ideals for 
society can be achieved under the rule of one man.
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CONCLUSION
Almost all these writers accepted that some men were better than 
others just as automatically as they believed that men as a whole were 
superior to women. They considered that only if this fact were 
recognized in a society’s very structure could it function properly.
This view often but not always springs from a pessimism about humanity 
in general, although most writers have a high regard for the 
capabilities of man in the abstract, endowed with reason.
Most writers also claim that it is natural for men to live in 
society and see the instinct to associate with one’s fellows as commend­
able, but this is offset by their belief that the benefits of harmony 
and order were originally brought to men by demi-gods or mythical heroes, 
or were worked for by a few outstanding figures. Even the writers who 
most keenly advocate the simple life (e.g. Dio, and in some respects 
Philo) felt that the mental and moral failings of the majority suggested 
a need for guides in society to bring about — as peaceably as possible — 
the conditions in which humanity could develop. These men must be those 
few able to be truly self-sufficient and self-directing, and like the 
rulers who had led people from barbarism to civilization, they would 
personify the qualities of which the community had need. The ruler in 
this aspect is an individual outstanding because of high moral character 
and ability to harmonize society.
The socially useful qualities of atöws and ÖUMq which, for 
Protagoras, were granted to all have now become restricted to and 
embodied in the ruler alone. Because of this there seems to be no need 
for a writer to pursue his concern for the society any further by 
describing how the ruler in fact affects the state in its functioning 
and fits into its structure. His impact is chiefly moral, and hard to 
assess by ordinary criteria — but the writers supply us with no 
alternative way of determining if a particular society under a king is 
functioning as it ought.
VPnen your Majesty says, 'Let a thing be done, ' it3 s as good as done 
practically, it is_ done —  because your Majesty 's will is law.
W.S. Gilbert, The Mikado.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PLACE OF THE LAW IN KINGSHIP THEORY
INTRODUCTION
That use of the term voyos in Greek political life which may best 
be translated as ’law’ was the end-product of an evolution which had 
associated the word with a wide range of meanings.1 From being used to 
describe ’the way things are under Zeus' (e.g. in Hesiod, W & D 276ff.)2 
where the way of life of both man and beast is voyos, it could come to 
signify a type of order of nature.3 A meaning closer to that of 
’custom' emerges elsewhere (e.g. W & D 388, 'this is what is done on the 
plains'4) when ordering becomes that which is done over and over again. 
The sense of cultic tradition in Hesiod (fr. 322, mg he tioAus peC^crt,  
voyos ö ^ p y c t t o s  ctpuöTOs) , gives way in Theognis to a more secular sense, 
when it appears in his polemic against the 'upstarts' in the potis in 
v.290, and w.53ff.: Aaot öe 6p aAAot, oi tpoad’ ouxe öuxas r)6eaav ouxe
voyous (53-4). Ehrenberg's comment on this,'die voyot sind politisch 
geworden',5 may be too sweeping, but Ostwald's belief that they refer to
1 See Victor Ehrenberg, Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum (Leipzig, 
1921, reprinted Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1966), 
p,115ff.
2 xdvöe yap dv^pmuoLat vdyov öue'xa^ e Kpovdwv,/ ux^dau yev xau -Bripau 
Kai oL-ojvots Ttexepvobs/ eaSetv aAApAous, eiel ou 6uxn eaxu yex’ auxous/ 
dvdpmtouob ö’ 06mxe öuxnv, n uoAAov apLoxn/yovexau.
3 See Felix Heinimann, Romos und Physis (Basel, 1945, reprinted
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1965), p.62 —  'Lebens­
ordnung' used of voyos in 1.276. Ehrenberg, Die Rechtsidee, p.115, 
translates 'eine Art von Naturordnung'; 'eine gewisse Weise des Lebens, 
die zur eigenthümlichen Natur der einzelnen Arten lebender Wesen gehört 
und sie charakterisirt' is Rudolf Hirzel's definition {Themis3 Dike und 
Verwandtes [Leipzig, 1907, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim, 1966], p.366). 
Marcello GigantetN0M0Z BAEIAEYE, p.46, gives 'norma di vita'. Erich 
Stier, 'Nbyos BaouAeus’ in Ph%83 (1928), p.232, comments: 'Diese
Ordnung des Zeus wird als vdyos bezeichnet'.
4 oSxds tot iteötmv ueAexat vdyos.
Note 5 over page.
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a condition of orderly civilized society is still an acknowledgement 
that the position of the polls has now entered into the definition.5 6 
Heraclitus continues this process. The fragment that notes: ’the
people must fight for their law as for their city walls' (fr. 44, DK) 
was to be the first of many expressions of devotion to the constitution 
(’Staatsordnung’ — Stier)7 8of the polis by citizens who gave widely 
different accounts of what this constitution meant. It is important to 
recall that elsewhere (fr. 33, DK) Heraclitus himself defines voyos as 
obeying the counsel of one man, and that he also derives all human voyot 
from one divine voyos (fr. 114, DK):
By the late fifth century at the latest, law for a democratic polls
Qbecame a written and hence fixed expression of state order. Even in 
non-democratic states law was supported as a safeguard against tyranny. 
As Demaratus, the Spartan exile, told Xerxes, the Greeks whom the 
Persian king was attacking had a master in voyos, and this they feared 
much more than the great king's subjects feared him (Herod. 7.104).9 
Nomos had by now triumphed over thesmos as the term which would hence­
forth apply to individual pieces of legislation, while retaining a 
general meaning compounded of the nuances it had acquired in the course 
of its development.10
5 Die Rechtsidee, p.117. Gigante, NOMOE BAEIAEYE, p.47, says that 
the ölmoil and voyoo approved of here in opposition to the cxxpducXot 
voyot 'indicano solo una vita ordinata e civile’. Stier,'Noyos BaaLXeds’, 
p.236, claims v.290 shows that in Theognis' use of voyos there is no 
question of ’Laws', but of 'ein Leben in den geregelten Formen der
Sitte
6 Martin Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969), p.30. See also p.22 on 11.289-90.
7 'Noyos BaatXeus P • 237 .
8 For the arguments on the date of this change, see Ostwald, Nomos, 
p.59, and Part II, Chap. 3.
9 eXeudepoL yap eovxes ou xavxa eXed-öepoL euad* eiteaxt yap acpt 
öeaTidxns voyos. xov UTtoöetyatvouöt itoXX^  exi yaXXov n ot aot ad.
10 '[The] radical difference between the two terms suggests that the 
change from Oeoyos to voyos came about at a time when the Athenians were 
disenchanted with living under laws imposed upon them from above, and 
decided instead to consider as laws only norms which they had themselves 
ratified and acknowledged to be valid and binding', Ostwald, Nomos, p.55, 
and cf. Ehrenberg: 'Die deayot sind jetzt vdyou; das geschriebene
Gesetz usurpiert das Wort, das bisher nur das ungeschriebene der Sitte 
bedeutet hat' (Die Rechtsidee, p.122).
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The division of law into the written and the unwritten helped to 
establish the discussion about law at a philosophical level. Both forms 
appeared initially as manifestations of the divine will, but 
explanations of both in human terms become more common as the fifth 
century proceeds. Thucydides' unwritten laws obtain their force from 
men’s fear of public disapproval (Thuc. 2.37), and are quite different 
from those to which Antigone appeals (Soph. Antig. 450ff.), which have 
their source in heaven.
Law both written and unwritten became to some a burden, assuming 
the role of the tyrants by whose downfall it had triumphed. Nature, by 
contrast, was not thus arbitrary in her rule, and when law lost the 
respect it had formerly possessed and was seen with the eyes of the 
critic and not of the believer, it appeared to rest on no very stable 
foundation. Nomos, to vindicate its claims on man, needed to moderate 
its demands for exclusive consideration. Protagoras accorded it a role 
as a preserver of civic peace. Though the origin of law might not be 
divine nor its decrees immutable, it had still a useful and necessary 
part to play in the polis.
The challenge to which it began to be subjected in the fourth 
century was more subtle than that coming previously from the upholders 
of Nature. Of Plato one can say: 'Auch für ihn ist der alte vdyos ~ 
Staat nicht mehr vorhanden; die Hinrichtung des Sokrates, die die 
reaktionäre Demokratie auf ihrem Gewissen hatte, machte den Bruch 
endgültig.’11 Yet Nomos still appears, not merely as the öeüxepos tiäoüs 
of the Politious and the Laws but also in the Laws as associated with 
'opinion, diligence, reason and art' (892b).12 It can be dispensed with 
or grudgingly accepted as second-best by those as bold as Plato, but 
does not fail to keep turning up as catchcry or description of a 
government.
In the fourth century Athenian orators like Aeschines were fighting 
a rear-guard action to retain vdyos as the true ruler of the state and 
oppose it to the rule of the individual, seen as an evil, totally
11 Stier, 'Noyos BaarAeus'» p.253.
12 See Politicus 294-5 and Laws 875c for emphasis on the laws' 
failings.
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incompatible with voyog. In his speech against Timarchus, Aeschines 
made this antithesis clear: 6’ lote ... otl xct yev xwv önyoxpaxouydvwv
awyaxa Mac xpv TioALTEuav ot vo'you awCouau, xa 6e xwv xupdvvwv nau 
oXLyapxLKcov auLOxya xai n yexd xwv öuAmv cppoupd (Cont. Tim. 5) , and
Hyperides refers to the threat of being compelled to have a despot’s
xpoTtos as one’s voyos (6.20). A little later on he refers to the best 
political situation: o(u> yap dvöpdg ctneuAnv, aAAa voyou cpwvnv 
KupuEUELV 6el twv eüöaLydvwv (25).
The funeral speech by pseudo-Lysias (about 390 B.C.) shows how 
strongly men clung to the polis-law, when it describes how the early 
Athenians set up civilized society, 'having law as their king and reason 
as their teacher’ (19). The source of the Anonymus Iamblichi has not 
been conclusively determined, but the ideas expressed in it reflect 
attitudes common in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. It
supports the high value placed on law by the traditionalists. Homos and
'the just’ should rule,14 and without law and justice monarchy is likely 
to emerge. Only by acting in accordance with the law could the 
ambitious man hope to succeed within the polis framework. Law and 
monarchy are therefore incompatible, although law itself is often 
personalized, as here. This is important to remember as we trace the 
development of voyos through writers concerned exclusively or mainly 
with the monarchical form of government.
We may contrast these conclusions with those of the pseudo- 
Platonic Minos which offers several possibilities in the course of the 
dialogue. These range from the widely held belief that law is 'the 
resolution of the polis’ restated by the interlocutor as 'state 
opinion', through the suggestion that what people call laws are state 
treatises of kings and good men, to the a-political conclusion that law 
is 'the discovery of what is' (314c-317d). The Rhetorioa ad Alexandrum 
keeps its attention on the polis and the constitution. For its author, 
law is 'a joint agreement of the polis' oyoAoynya toAews molvov (1422a).15
13 For a useful discussion on this see W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists 
(University Press, Cambridge, 1971), pp.71-4 and 314-5 and the article 
'The Anonymus Iamblichi' by A.T. Cole referred to in Note 8, Chapter 
One.
14 Anon lam. ch.6 (p.100, Pistelli, Teubner edition of the 
Protrepticus of Iamblichus).
Note 15 over page.
77
Aristotle too gave a hint as to what was to come, though no doubt 
he was considering a purely hypothetical case. Although deeply 
concerned to expound the nature of polis constitution and law he too 
could envisage one man so much superior to his fellows in the state that 
he (Aristotle) had to admit Kara 6s xwv xolouxojv ouk eaxu voyog* auxot 
yap euau vo'yos (Pol. 1284a — Cf. his later claim that where citizens are 
equal it is neither right nor just for one man to be sovereign over all, 
whether there are to be laws, or whether there are to be no laws but ms 
auxov dvxa voyov [1288a].).
With the laws as they existed Aristotle saw limitations in the 
general nature of their prescriptions, but still found in them the 
advantage that they were unmoved by passion, unlike men (Pol. 1286a) . 
Politics 1287a with its equation of law ruling to God and Nous ruling 
shows how even Aristotle was inclined to personify this ’impersonal’ 
force. For Aristotle too there was still a basic incompatibility in the 
rule of one man and of law (Pol. 1287a-b).
ISOCRATES
We should not expect to find a detailed analysis of the value of 
law in Isocrates' works. He was too preoccupied with generalities to 
pay much attention to the ordering of society in detail and too 
concerned with giving advice to Hellas to develop a sustained theory on 
the best way to legislate on internal affairs. He does, however, make 
certain assumptions in his use of political terms, and his application 
to different situations of varying meanings of vo'yos is significant.
This is particularly so when he avails himself of the popular pair 
of antithetical terms voyos and (puous, for in these cases it suits his 
purpose to find fault with the law for its inflexibility and narrowness,
15 ’Plausibly assigned to the fourth-century rhetor Anaximenes of 
Lampsacus’ — T.A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought, p.255. 
Forster who translated the text in the Oxford Works of Aristotle 
Translated, vol. XI, thinks that ’this was in any case written shortly 
before 300 B.C. by a Peripatetic, contemporary with Theophrastus'
(quoted by Rackham, intro, to Loeb edition, p.261). 'Ouvrage anterieur
ä la Rhetorique d’Aristote et transmise parmi ses oeuvres’ is de 
Romilly’s conclusion (La Loi, p.126).
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just as Plato did in the Politicus, and as he showed Callicles doing in 
the Gorgias, That voyos which Hippias is recorded in the Protagoras as 
criticizing for its limited outlook Isocrates regarded as worthy of so 
little respect that he could sometimes dispense with it in theory 
altogether. When he gives advice to Demonicus,16 he praises the young 
man's father and model for preferring cpuous to vopos in his dealings 
with his friends (Dem. 10). Due order and strict adherence to forms and 
conventions are here inferior to standards at once more comprehensive 
and more vague.
In a strictly political context, Isocrates draws the contrast 
sharply, deploring, as he makes Athens deplore, a situation in some 
Greek cities, where citizens by nature could be deprived of citizenship 
by law (Paneg. 105). Indeed the passage occurs in a section of the 
Panegyrious devoted to a rhetorical and hyperbolic account of the benefits 
of the first Athenian Empire. We may therefore conclude that Isocrates 
was not in fact advocating that law be abrogated in favour of 'nature' 
throughout the common fatherland of Greece, but rather using a Sophistic 
theme for his own purposes, that is, to exalt Athens as the champion of 
freedom and equality. Despite this, the use of the expression shows 
that polis-law no longer commanded the respect it once had done.
The elevation of unwritten laws could also be at the expense of 
those that were written. Isocrates praises the Athenians for upholding 
ancient custom and ancestral law against the sacrilegious Thebans in the 
days before the Trojan War (Paneg. 55). He describes the same incident 
similarly elsewhere (Panath. 169), but in this case he adds that such 
custom and law do not come about through man's nature but are laid down 
by a divine power. This was what Sophocles had affirmed perhaps in 
response to those moderate Sophists of his day like Protagoras, who 
admitted the need for laws and customs, but regarded them as coming 
about through purely human contacts which varied from place to place. 
Just as, even earlier, Heraclitus had sought to bind human and divine
16 The Demonicus is here assumed to be by Isocrates, or at least to 
come from his school. On this point see Claude Mosse, La Fin de la 
democratie athenienne (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1962), 
p.388, who accepts it as genuine. Norlin's comment, in the Loeb edition 
of Isocrates, Vol. 1, p.3, is: 'The authenticity of the discourse has
been challenged ... but on insufficient grounds.'
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law together by deriving all human laws from one divine law (DK fr. 44), 
Isocrates rendered the traditions of a community sacrosanct by accepting 
their divine origin.
There is then a clear contrast in his thought between custom and 
written law. The former sufficed for the men of old, for a multiplicity 
of written regulations is unnecessary for good men of worth (Paneg. 78). 
Indeed, daily habits develop the right disposition in a man far more 
satisfactorily than law does. Isocrates contrasts justice in the soul, 
the portion of those who are well-governed, with the statutes inscribed 
on porticoes which should be unnecessary in a good city (Areop. 41). ”H§ri 
are more important than (Jjncptögaxa and can be acquired only by education 
(ib.). Isocrates can hardly be said to have a very high opinion of laws 
as they are. He approves of law in the abstract in its early sense, but 
not of individual items of often, to him, objectionable legislation.
Ancestral laws, however, acquire a sanctity due to their antiquity. 
They are also important as instances of the use of reason. For reason, 
which separates men from beasts, makes it possible to use persuasion 
instead of force, to found cities, pass laws and acquire the arts of 
civilization (Nie. 6). In the Panegyricus we see that Athens was the 
first to put an end to the lawlessness and discord prevailing among the 
Greeks and introduce the benefits all now enjoy, ’for she was the first 
to lay down laws and set up a polity’ (Paneg. 38-9).17 Her laws were 
for those who settled disputes with reason and not violence (Paneg. 40). 
In such accounts Isocrates grants a high place to Logos for its 
political and moral influence, but does not really show how the 
co-operative virtues become active as a result of its presence. We are 
not told if a contract was at the root of the social developments he 
describes, or if the eloquent persuasiveness of a few brought about the 
desired result in the rest. Here as elsewhere Isocrates prefers to 
speak in general terms.
17 As de Romilly notes: 'En passant de Lysias ä Isocrate, on decouvre, 
en effet, que ... la loi n ’est plus seulement parallele ä la raison: 
eile en est 1 * expression, ou, si l’on prefere, la traduction pratique.
Le pas n ’est d ’ailleurs pas franchi partout. Car il est des passages 
d’Isocrate ou l ’on voit seulement la loi se confondre avec la 
civilisation', de Romilly, La Loi, p.173.
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Written law, when compared with education in moral habits, comes 
off very much second-best, partly because Isocrates tends to see laws as 
made for evil-doers rather than for good men, who do not need them. Law 
for him is as it stands a punitive device, and not of itself a means of 
education arrived at by discussion and consensus (see Are op. 40-41).
His dissatisfaction with the process of decision-making at Athens is not 
surprising. It accords with his admiration for the poti-s of the days of 
Solon and Cleisthenes, when, as he saw it, the Areopagus was a powerful 
institution, exercising a moral charge over the citizens. The laws 
passed in this period do not come under the general condemnation. They 
were not like those passed in his own day, he claimed, full of confusion 
and contradiction. They were few, but adequate for those using them, 
just and profitable and harmonizing with each other. Those which 
concerned matters of joint activity were devised with special care 
(Panath. 144).
This suggests that Isocrates could at times have regard to the 
social aspect of laws, but the whole tenor of his argument shows that 
these laws were simply the expression of already-existing sentiments, 
and had no original contribution to make. They were therefore 'written 
down in a few days' (i b .) and Isocrates heaps scorn on those who imagine 
that the best men emerge from a state where laws are written with the 
greatest attention to detail (Aveop. 39).
Isocrates (or at least the author of the To DemonTcus), does use 
vopos in another sense, devoid of political or social meaning, but 
justified by the history of the term. A man's life, he explains, can be 
an example and his behaviour a 'law' for his son (Dem. 11). In a very 
similar way, a king’s behaviour has value because of the example it can 
provide to the subjects. This account of royal influence avoids the 
necessity of Isocrates' providing a thorough-going political theory of 
kingship, when he comes to deal, in the two Nicocles' speeches, with the 
relationship of ruler and ruled. Subjects obey the laws laid down by 
kings, but the monarch's way of life is a stronger law (Dem. 36). 
Isocrates stresses that this deference to the sovereign power can also 
hold for other forms of government. Just as one man who is a citizen in 
a democracy must pay court to the multitude, so one living under a 
monarchy should revere the king (ib.). Yet it is clearly easier to
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set up one man whose life is to be a law than to put forward a crowd of 
individuals of different habits and attitudes to serve the same purpose.
The constitutional problems associated with allocating to the 
citizens their appropriate functions in the state are bypassed, and good 
citizenship becomes a matter of adopting a private moral code in 
imitation of the ruler and deferring to his judgement in any matters 
affecting society. Isocrates assumes that not only should the moral 
habits of a city resemble those of its rulers, but that in fact they do 
so {To Nie. 31, cf. Nie. 37). This does not explain how subjects under 
a cowardly and self-indulgent tyrant could ever possess the courage and 
energy required to overthrow him! The words of the ruler are also to be 
imitated and regarded as laws {Nie. 62). The virtues which will be 
inculcated in this way appear to be those concerned with general 
courteous and sociable behaviour and trustworthiness, and Isocrates, 
speaking as Nicocles, does not hesitate to show the worldly advantages 
these will bring.
Though a king is expected to embody the law for his subjects as 
well as to lay it down in a more formal way {Nie. 56, and note the 
reference to tous voyoug tous ßaauXuMOUs), he is not himself impeded in 
his actions by law. Certainly it is fitting that the judgements of 
kings in matters of justice should be invariable 'like well-ordained 
laws' {To Nie. 18) but often Isocrates presents law as something 
restrictive, hampering corrective action, and^in particular, preventing 
prompt and innovative behaviour in the field of foreign affairs.
(Philip is fortunate in being free of the 'politics and laws' binding 
men in most states [Phil. 14-15, 127].)
Law has a positive meaning for Isocrates only as one step in the 
process of civilization, a step taken many centuries before his own time. 
Apart from this, only vopou or xa voptya in the broad sense are of value, 
whether these mean the customs of a country (as in Arehid. 1), the way 
of life of an exemplar who is generally a ruler, or the collective moral 
outlook inherited from one's ancestors. They do not find favour when 
they are the decisions of the community arrived at by discussion and 
incorporated into the written legislation. The emphasis is moral rather 
than political in the sense the polis would recognize. The law is not
Note 18 over page.
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personified as it was in the works of writers as different as Plato or 
pseudo-Lysias. It is, however, most effective when it is embodied in 
an individual or his actions. The description of the government of 
Theseus in the Helen shows very clearly and indeed almost prophetically 
how law could in the future be accommodated to the rule of one man and 
the language of democracy used to exalt monarchy. Theseus ’was so far 
from doing anything against the wishes of the citizens that he made the 
people master of the government' (nuptov ins TioXuieuas) . The people, 
however, believed that his sole rule was better than democracy, 'for .. 
so lawfully (voyuyws) and well did he administer the polls that even to 
this day traces of his mildness may be seen remaining in our 
institutions' (36-37). We may suspect that 'lawfully and well' are in 
Isocrates' view interchangeable, and that both refer to good order 
prevailing in the state rather than to any situation brought about by 
legislation.2 0
XENOPHON
Xenophon throughout his works maintains a keen interest in the 
working-out of political problems, and in different compositions 
proposes a variety of solutions suitable to the different situations 
under discussion. This explains in part why in a work like the 
Cyropaedia or the Hiero he advocates monarchical government as the ideal, 
while discussions in the Memorabilia or the Oeconomicus admit other 
constitutions for consideration.
In all these works, however, we do gain the impression of a mind 
pragmatic but with certain firm opinions — or prejudices — which will 
appear as elements in any political proposals he makes. Because of
18 It is appropriate to recall here de Romilly's comment quoted in
Chapter One, p.38: 'll n ’est pas contre la loi: simplement, il regarde
par-dela'(La Loi, p.185).
19 See p.76 on pseudo-Lysias and note Plato's Crito, passim.
20 'L’on voit ... que le respect du aux lois compte peu, en fait, pour 
un des ecrivains les plus avertis d’Athenes, dans lequel on se plait ä 
voir un prophete de l’unite grecque realisee ä l’epoque hellenistique 
sous l’egide macedonienne', Mosse, La Fin de la democratie athenienne, 
pp.388-9.
83
this, the conclusions he draws from an analysis of contemporary 
Athenian society and an account of an idealized Persia are not so far 
apart as we might expect.
The prevailing tendency among the more extreme Sophists of the late 
fifth century to undermine voyos for the sake of (puous struck no 
responsive chord in Xenophon, who did not meet the challenge to society 
that this posed head-on, but rather wanted to see both elements working 
together for the general good. In the Hi-ero, for example, voyos, here 
more closely resembling the compulsion of custom than law, completes the 
work of nature in instilling affection for a person into his kin (Hiero 
3.9). When both these forces, custom and nature, are lacking, as in the 
relations of a tyrant who hate rather than love him, such a ruler can 
hardly expect to gain the goodwill of his subjects either (i-b. and cf. 
Oec. 30). Obviously, Nomos has here hardly any contact with the 
political sense; it falls into the category defined by Ostwald as 
describing ’the sphere of human conduct or of conduct of the gods judged
I p 1by human standards .
Another meaning of voyos bringing it nearer to the sphere of public 
life, but not to any formal institution, is used to express the 
generally-held belief that when a city is captured the persons and 
possessions of those in it belong to the conquerors {Cyv. 7.5.73). This 
is of course no law or decree of the people, nor legislation from a law­
giver but rather customary behaviour sanctioned by use (cf. Thuc. 
3.66.2). Noyos for Xenophon can also suggest a state of law and order, 
without implying anything as to the form of government under which it 
exists. Those who have no care for the ’lawful' are associated with ot 
dvooumxaxou (Hell. 4.4.3) and contrasted with voytyot avdpojtou who feel 
proper horror at the violation of religious sanctions by the killing of 
suppliants at the altar. Even the exhortation of Thrasybulus to the 
assembly after the overthrow of the Thirty, encouraging its members to 
abide by the established vdyou?is really an appeal for a return to law 
and order (Eltiwv . . . oxt oüöev 6dou xapdxxeodat aXXa xols voyous tots 
apxotdots xPbtf^ au) and not a call to adhere to the statutes {Hell.
2.4.42).
2 1 Ostwald, Nomos, p .24.
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From Xenophon’s analysis of the right way to run a household we 
learn a little more of what he understands by voyog. A householder 
rules his domain as if it were a polis, and it is appropriate for him to 
possess tu qdoug ßaatXuMOÖ {Oec. 21.10).22 Yet his rule is not to be 
arbitrary, for he is to use the laws of Draco and Solon as examples of 
what he wishes the regulations on his property to be: laws placed for
the teaching of justice {Oec. 14.4). We discover therefore that the 
householder’s ’political’ rule is ethical rather than administrative.
The laws are merely a means to a moral end; the method of their 
establishment is of no essential significance. In fact, where Draco and 
Solon failed, in prescribing punishment for evil behaviour but not 
reward for good, the ’laws' of the King of Persia may be invoked as more 
satisfactory examples {Oec. 14.6-7).
For Xenophon, then, rule by regulations over private territory can 
be 'political' and 'lawful'. He therefore offers little hindrance to a 
transfer of terms from one sphere to another, if this can make his point 
more clearly, or help, in practice, to the attainment of the desired 
object, in this case the production of virtue. Nevertheless, he is aware 
of the way in which voyog was understood in the contemporary Athenian 
democracy and through the mouthpiece of Pericles, appropriately enough, 
provides a definition of law suitable to this form of government: law
is ’whatever the multitude, coming together and approving, has written 
up, declaring what is prescribed and what forbidden'. Hence this 
logically leads to the definition: ’whatever the ruling part of the
city, after deliberation, writes up as obligatory is called law' {Mem. 
1.2.42-3). Such a definition is not the final answer because the 
essence of lawfulness is still lacking and under Alcibiades' persistent 
questioning Pericles eventually changes his position and concludes that 
whatever anyone compels rather than persuades someone to do, whether he 
puts it in writing or not, is force rather than law {Mem. 1.2.45).
This means that 'law', simply because it is written, does not have 
unquestioned claim to our adherence.
While dismissing the claims to legitimacy of the tyrant and his 
decree, or the masses acting on a whim, Xenophon also deprives himself
22 Cf. Plato, PoZ'i't'icus, 259b-c and note Aristotle, Pol'it'ics 1252a, 
who disagrees.
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of any simple objective test of the lawfulness of legislation, for to 
discriminate between force and persuasion might be of considerable 
difficulty. Since he does not accept a criterion like joint decision­
making to distinguish true and false law we conclude that this did not 
impress him as the most important fact about the law.
When intent on expounding the duties of a citizen with regard to 
the civil authority, Xenophon is willing to overlook the problems 
involved in determining legality. He accepts that the lawful is the 
just {Mem. 4.6.6, ’those obeying the law do what is just', and 'I say that 
the lawful is just’23 and 'covenants which the citizens have made on what 
is prescribed and forbidden are laws’ — Mem. 4.4.12-13. But such 
acceptance does not bind him to any form of government and the same 
definition appears in the account of the education of Cyrus.24 Every law 
considered as a fait accompli confronting the citizen was to be obeyed 
and especially by the prince who has prescribed the law for all {Cyv. 
1.3.17-18).
The presence or absence of law is important in determining if a 
particular instance of one-man rule is kingship or tyranny; the former 
is rule over willing subjects, in accordance with cities’ laws —  how 
arrived at we are not told; the second, rule over unwilling subjects 
and not in accord with the laws but just as the ruler wishes {Mem. 
4.6.12). This certainly implies a measure of consultation in the making 
of the laws, or else Xenophon must have envisaged the legality of a 
particular decree being determined only after its implementation, when 
the response of the subjects to it could be gauged.
Agesilaus of Sparta is the example Xenophon provides of the king 
who obeys the laws of his country 'preferring to rule and be ruled law­
fully at home rather than having the greatest power in Asia’ {Ages. 
2.16). Xenophon elsewhere expresses his praise of the king for this: 
'among the greatest benefits to his country I place this, that he was 
clearly particularly obedient to the laws' {Ages. 7.2). This occurs in
23 cpnyt yap cyw to vdyt yov  ö t xabov  e Z v a e. TApa to auTo Xeyets, w 
ZwMpaTes, vdyuyov T£ xau öuxauov e£vau ;  "Eymye, ecpn.
24 See e.g. Cyr. 1.3.17: to yev vdyuyov ötnatov e^vau, to be avoyov
StOtLOV .
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a list of the private virtues of the king; that is, his willingness to
abide by the law is a quality of his character, not a description of his
rule in constitutional terms. This obedience was clearly demanded on 
occasions by diplomatic expediency (see Hell. 5.4.13) and its 
significance appears to be derived more from the wholesome example it 
provides for the subjects — who, after all, would want to disobey when 
he saw the monarch obeying? — than from its demonstration that the 
ruler adheres to a fixed constitution.
Xenophon develops the relationship of the ruler and the law in a 
slightly more abstract way in the Cyropaedia. Cyrus, he says, saw that 
men appear to become better on account of written laws, but a good ruler 
he considered a ’seeing law’, ftAeuwv voyog, because capable not only of
giving orders but of seeing a disorderly person and punishing him
(8.1.21-22). These tasks are not, in a monarchy, distributed to 
different people, and even the first, xdxxeuv, is a personal activity 
rather than a social one.
Clearly the 'seeing law’ is just a metaphor here, and has not 
reached the stage of being a personification. The king carries out the 
tasks performed at Athens by the servants of the law, that is to say, 
the citizens in their various capacities. Xenophon does not suggest 
that the ruler can be termed a law because of the example of his own 
life, as Isocrates does, though we might have expected it from his 
account of the ruler's task. For him the 'seeing law' has more the 
character of a nomophylax, as described by Xenophon himself:
eöuöaoxov 6e [my wife] oil xau ev xaüg EUVoyouyEvaug noXeatv 
oux apxEtv Soxel xoug uoAuxatg, av voyoug xaAoug ypdcjjwvxau, 
aAAa xat voyocpuAaxag TipoaatpoOvxau, ouxuvEg ETtLOxoTiouvxEg xov 
yev Ttotouvxa xa vdytya ETtauvoöouv, av 6e xug uapa xoug voyoug 
tiolt), cnyuouau (Oec. 9.14).
This may be an indication that euvoyua is more important than voyot are; 
what is to be desired is the orderliness which Solon obtained for Athens, 
before vo'you became 'laws'.
In keeping with this loose definition of voyog is Xenophon's stress 
on the educative function of law, ignored by Isocrates. Laws come first 
in a list (comprising laws, teachers and rulers) of the elements 
necessary for producing honourable men (Cyv. 3.3.53). The laws will
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grant a free and honoured life to the good, and a wretched, painful and 
unlivable one to the base, while the teachers and rulers will show and 
teach and accustom the citizens to do what is right. As a result such 
sentiments will be ’engraved' on men, a more significant achievement, we 
may assume, than the engraving of regulations on stone (3.3.52).
The educational scope of the laws presupposes a particular 
structure of society, and indeed Xenophon explicitly states that the 
majority of the laws are for teaching especially two things — ruling and 
being ruled (C y r. 1.6.20). In Aristotle's Politics this learning is 
necessary for all the citizens (e.g. 1261b: oil yev yap apxououv ot 6’
ctpxovxat Kara yefpog mottp av aAAot yevoyevot) , even if Aristotle 
considered it unfortunate that men do not naturally fall into clear and 
exclusive categories of those suitable to rule and to serve. Xenophon 
had no such problem, as he believed that they did.
Unlike some of the orators of his day, Xenophon could not be 
satisfied with showing law as the work of men. He stressed the 
significance of the Delphic Oracle’s pronouncement that the best way to 
please the gods lay in obeying the city (Mem. 4.3.16). The unwritten 
laws also derived their sanction from the gods. For they were the very 
ones Xenophon has Socrates prompting Hippias to define as ’those held in 
every country in the same way' and ’I think that gods place these laws 
for men' (Mem. 4.4.19). Xenophon is concerned to prevent a decline into 
relativism, whether the laws being attacked were written or ancestral, 
and Socrates is his exemplar here: tpoetAeio (Socrates) yaAAov tols
voyots eyyevojv ano^aveuv n uapavoywv Chv (Mem. 4.4.4). Xenophon can 
be quoted to appear as a staunch upholder of law only so long as the 
process of popular law-making is not seen as necessary for the 
definition. For him only force, vaguely defined, invalidates 
legislation, but this is a moral and not a political judgement.25
’Selon toute vraisemblance, il s’agissait, pour Xenophon, 
d’attendre le moment oü le triomphe des idees philosophiques se 
traduirait dans l’ordre politique par 1 *etablissement de lois qui 
seraient conformes aux exigences de la justice et de la raison. A ce 
moment serait vraiment realisee l’identite du vdyuyov et du Suxatov. 
Jusque lä il fallait apprendre aux gens ä respecter toute loi pour elle- 
meme, parce qu’elle etait la loi, les habituer ä une discipline', Jean 
Luccioni, Les Idees politiques et sociales de Xenophon (Ophrys, Gap, 
Paris, 1947), p.132.
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We need to remember that at the very time when Isocrates and 
Xenophon were, however unwittingly, setting voyos off on its new path, 
Athenian orators who clung to the old image of the polis continued to 
use voyos in the civic sense. If the views of such men had been 
universal and had persisted, political writers of the following 
centuries would have formed an opposition to monarchical government and 
its propaganda, or else had their catch-cry banned. Then, voyos could 
only with difficulty have been taken over as a key-word in writings on 
kingship. We can say, therefore, that Isocrates and Xenophon had 
provided ’law' with a future, by extending its meaning and detaching it 
from its context in the pot-is and its constitution.
ARISTEAS
The unofficial influence that might be exercised by the writing of 
such a treatise as the Letter of Aristeas to Philocrates — and writers 
like Aristeas appear to have been uniformly sanguine in temperament — 
was the only way in which a man could follow in the tradition of the 
citizens of the po'i'is, for whom the guarantee of a share in shaping 
policy had itself been provided by the law. The first reference to 
voyos in the text clearly sets out the special Jewish character of the 
work. Law is now the divine law written in Hebrew characters, of 
supreme significance as the religious expression of a people, and 
including in its literature a whole history (3). Certainly the history 
itself was taken as an account of the results of obeying or disobeying 
the divine commands, but to term the whole of this ’law' is to use the 
word in a way unknown to the Greeks.
The law established by God, the sovereign master and creator known 
to others as Zeus (15) , is a description of the Torah more 
comprehensible to the Greeks as an equivalent of voyos. Neither 
Sophocles nor Plato would have quarrelled with ascribing to the law a 
divine origin. Isocrates, as we have seen (Panath. 169), recognized a 
voyos of this kind. Jewish law is linked to the kingship of Ptolemy by 
way of a god who is responsible for both. This suggests that the law 
can in some way be compared with a political structure, paralleling but 
not excluding institutions such as monarchy.
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Eleazar's parting advice to the seventy-two translators contains 
the remark that living rightly consists in keeping the laws (127) . Such 
a remark, however, does not enlighten us as to the content of the laws 
nor show whether xa voyuya were limited to the injunctions of the Torah, 
but the equation of the law with living rightly was nothing new to Greek 
thought. Right reason is nevertheless introduced not as the law 
immanent in the universe as with the Stoics but as a reality behind the 
prescriptions of the Torah (161).
We should expect the law of the state to be more prominent in the 
questions put by Ptolemy on the duties of kingship than in the 
narrative that precedes or follows the symposia section, and this is 
the case, though Aristeas is tactfully imprecise in the injunctions he 
records. The king, to avoid lawless acts, must recollect that it is God 
who has given legislators their thoughts for the sake of preserving 
human lives (240) . This implies that the ruler should exercise a 
general benevolence in his commands rather thän that he should adhere to 
his own law.
Aristeas does record explicitly that kings should follow the laws 
(279) — the result will be that they will be doing what is just and so 
be able to redeem the lives of men — but there is nothing which gives 
flesh to this bare injunction. It is clear however that the result of 
the king's following the laws is more moral than political.26
Elsewhere there is little constitutional restriction shown on the 
king's power. Appeals to his love of glory and wish for praise are the 
only ways of ensuring that a king to whom everything is permitted (253) 
will not give way to anger and use his power of life and death cruelly. 
Similarly one respondent tells the king that monarchs have no need to be 
deceitful. Since they may do as they wish, no harm can come to them for 
revealing the truth (206). Certainly, public opinion seems in some way 
to take the place of a formal constraint on the king, and ?i$os XPhGT°/v 
and a suitable education ensure, one supposes, that the king will keep
26 Only if we take 'laws' in a less than formal sense is Schubart's 
following comment true for the Letter: 'Zwar gibt ihnen der König
Gestalt in seinen Gesetzen, die er auch selbst zu achten hat, und er 
sorgt dafür, dass Gesetz und Recht im Lande herrsche; er ist Schöpfer 
des Rechts, Diener des Rechts und Schützer des Rechts' (Schubart, 'Das 
hellenistische Königsideal *, p.6. He is commenting on justice-related 
qualities.).
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the laws he has made for others (see 290).
The slight stress laid on law by Aristeas reflects the position of 
voyos in Ptolemaic Egypt:
Le monarque hellenistique legifere, non pas par des lois 
voyou, mais au moyen d’ "ordres", Ttpoaxdyyaxa, ou de 
"reglements", öuaypdyyaxa. A quelques exceptions pres, les 
actes normatifs du roi, lois par excellence, ne sont guere 
qualifies de voyou.27
Nomoi there were, both voyou xhs X^PaS and voyou xoAuxumo u,28 but these 
were effective only because the sovereign was prepared to countenance 
their operation in cases where his regulations did not apply. Nomos 
here would be better translated in its early sense of custom, so long as 
this implies the binding power of a rule of conduct (perhaps even 
written) stopping short of that belonging to an actual work of state 
legislation.
The voyos tioAuxumos xwv ’ Iouöctdwv29 was probably of more relevance 
to the Jews in Egypt than the prescriptions of the king. Those men 
abiding by the law of Moses (i.e. the Torah and its interpretation) 
would describe it by the word voyos only when the latter had lost its 
link with the polis. The king is connected only indirectly with these 
rules of the second rank by confirming their validity.
Aristeas sees the royal office as involving the exercise of virtues 
which all men may possess, though in a varying degree. Thus while he 
does not set specific limits to the king's power, neither does he 
proclaim him law incarnate. His concern is not to give an account of
27 Joseph Modrzejewski, 'La Regle de Droit dans l’Egypte Ptolema.ique' , 
in Essays in Honor of C. Bradford Welles (American Studies in 
Papyrology, New Haven, 1966), p.150.
28 'The native law ... was translated into Greek and then confirmed by 
the king. In contrast to this, Greek law was composed of the voyou 
itoAuxuxod, the laws of the citizens of the three Greek Poleis and the 
numerous Greek Politeumata', Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p.215.
Cf. Modrzejewski, 'La Regle de Droit', p.150, 'il faut distinguer les 
regies, pratiquees par la population autochtone du pays conquis, voyot 
xrjs ywpas, des regies importees en Egypte par les immigrants.
L’adjectif tioAuxuhos s’impose’.
29 Tcherikover and Fuks (CPJ, p.36), refer to the 'possible hint of 
some "political law" of Jews' in their document No. 128 (i.e. P. Ent. 23 
on pp .236-8).
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kingship in metaphysical or mystical terms nor to describe the 
structures of society in which kingship finds its place at the summit.
He hopes that moral excellence in the ruler will assure the happiness 
and well-being of the subjects, and in the elevation of the quality of 
justice, he finds a substitute for the rule of formal law.30
It is interesting to notice that, whereas in the fourth-century 
speech Against Aristogeiton, law was a gift of God (among other things), 
in Aristeas many other entities are so described (as e.g. love, the 
ability to do good and abstain from evil, universal popularity, the 
glory of kingship, the possession of intelligence and the ability to 
judge).31 All the items, except the glory of kingship, could belong 
just as appropriately to the private individual as to the monarch. So, 
too, we may note that when Plato used the term Seoyog he did so 
metaphorically to refer to the unwritten laws or universal customs which 
bound the state together. When Aristeas uses the same image, it is much 
more abstract. Now it is cpLAav^pwitua that is the ’bond of goodwill' 
(265) —  and the change to this quality is typical.
HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES
The Stoics may be considered partly responsible for the free use of 
vopos from the third century B.C. on. Euvoyta for Zeno was the object 
of political organization, and voyog was the ’pasture’ —  vopog — on which 
the human herd was nourished in common (Plut. Mo t . 329b). It was also, 
and more significantly, the right reason penetrating all things, one 
with Zeus, being the ruler of all that is (D.L. 7.88), as Chrysippus 
noted.32 The reason or Logos is natural law ( ( p u a e u  vdyog —  SVF 2.528). 
Diogenes Laertius reports this: ’by nature and not by convention,
justice as well as law and right reason exist’ (D.L. 7.128). In fact,
30 See e.g. 189, 209, 212, 232, 259, 267, 279, 280, 292 for references 
to justice.
31 See e.g. 229, 231, 225, 224, 276.
32 'Besonders innig wird nun aber von der Stoa der Zusammenhang 
zwischen der Menschennatur und der allgemeinen Natur oder Weltvernunft, 
die Harmonie zwischen den Bedürfnissen und Forderungen menschlicher 
Gemeinschaft und der im Weltall geltenden gemeinsamen Ordnung betont', 
Kaerst, Studien, p.64.
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Chrysippus began his book on the law with the words: 6 voyos udvTwv
soil ßctauAeus §£lgov Tz xa l  av^pmudvoav Ttpayyaioov (SVF 3.314). This is a 
development of Pindar’s much-quoted verse33 which first elevates what is 
now universal nomos into a person. The poleis too are no longer the 
small, self-contained political communities (these are called poleis but 
are not so) but ötouöaoov . . .  n tcoAls xau 6 öfjyos dareudv tu auaxqya xa t  
uAh§os dv$pakwv utco vdyou Öuouxouyevov (SVF 3.327). Both these 
tendencies show how the early Stoics could come to support a universal 
monarch, if he was seen to embody nomos.
The Epicureans took little account of political life, except to 
warn against it, and conclude that laws were made for the sake of the 
wise, to prevent them from suffering harm (fr. 81, Bailey), but from the 
beginning the Pythagoreans had concerned themselves with questions on 
the best type of government. The neo-Pythagorean writers were the heirs, 
perhaps we should say the illegitimate heirs, of a tradition which made 
much of law. Even in their most extravagant descriptions of kingship 
they remembered this and paid deference to voyos. But what exactly is 
this voyos? The work of Archytas, ’On Law and Justice', described how 
the law exercised an educative and harmonizing influence on men (p.82). 
This law was not a matter of written regulations, however. Archytas 
deplores these as much as did Isocrates (see p.86). It was closer to 
custom and at the same time in accord with nature (pp.83-4). On one 
occasion he writes that the living law is the king, and the inanimate 
law the written one (p.82). This is susceptible, as Armand and Louis 
Delatte note, of two interpretations, one understanding the king as him­
self the embodiment of the law, the other, as interpreter and upholder 
of the law.34 Archytas goes on to say that the ruler follows and abides 
by the law, thus developing the moderate side of his statement.
What of the neo-Pythagorean writers on kingship? For Diotogenes, 
the basis of the monarchy is most lawful and just, but he too describes 
the king as living law or lawful ruler, evincing the same ambiguity as 
we met in Archytas (p.263). At the end of this extract, he again 
describes the king as voyos ey4>ux°S accompanying it with the account of
33 voyos 6 Tiavxwv ßaauAeus ^vorrmv xe xau ddavdxwv.
34 See Armand Delatte, Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne
(Champion, Paris, 1922), pp.84-5, and L. Delatte, Les Traites, p.245.
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him as apyav exwv avuucu^uvov (p.265). Ecphantus too sees the king and 
the law as interchangeable terms (p.274). This in the context seems to 
suggest a common task for king and law of bringing about euMoapta (just 
as it exists in the universe) which implies nothing avapyov being found 
(p.274). Diotogenes, in his extract On Holiness, stresses, again like 
Archytas, that laws should be found in the habits of the citizens, not 
on houses and doors (p.36). Throughout, the educative and persuasive 
rather than the public, compulsive side of law is emphasized by these 
writers, and only in association with the ruler.
CICERO
Cicero, somewhat like Isocrates and Xenophon, lived in an age of 
transition from a time when law was assumed, at least in theory, to be 
the basis of government, to an era of autocratic rule. Cicero also 
provided arguments for monarchical government while still maintaining 
the importance of the law/i^e.e^./^ ffep 1
Law, indeed, was for Cicero a most necessary concept in political 
life. It was the basis of the Roman state, and the laws that state 
possessed, together with its way of life and customs, were, in his view, 
the cause of its supremacy (see De Rep. 5.1-2). It may therefore appear 
difficult for Cicero to reconcile his theorizing on the rule of one man 
with his belief in the law’s impersonal sway over the lives of men, yet 
he certainly made the attempt.
His serious analysis of law as such shows awareness of the profound 
difference between law in states (including the Roman Republic) and the 
law of nature (see e.g. De Leg. 1.42ff.). Under another aspect, Cicero 
sees law as one means of bringing about for the many what the teachings 
of philosophy effect for the few, that is, correct behaviour {De Rep. 
1.3). Laws are here seen as superior in impact (see too De Rep. 3.7).
Cicero could attack law as it existed, on many counts: lam vevo 
illud. stultissirmm, existimare omnia iusta esse quae seita sint in 
populorum institutis aut legibus {De Leg. 1.42). Not only may the 
written law of states be objectively no true law, but a law may in some
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sense exist even if a state takes no account of it:
nec quia nusquam erat scriptum_, ut contra orrmis hostium copias 
in ponte unus adsisteret3 a tergoque pontem interscindi 
iuberet3 idcirco minus Coclitem ilium rem gessisse tantam 
fortitudinis lege atque imperio putabimus {de Leg. 2.10).
This purism does not appear in dealing with the actual laws proposed in 
the De Legibus. As he acknowledges, nihil habui sane (aut) non multum 
quod putarem novandum in legibus {De Leg. 3.12), and indeed there is 
little attempt to connect the specific laws with the ideas on law in 
general given in the prooemia by showing their logical derivation from 
the principles expressed there.
Law, as Cicero describes it, in its essence is what connects men 
with the gods in communio iuris {De Leg. 1.23); 'it is highest reason 
inborn in nature, ratio summa insita in natura, ordering what should be 
done and forbidding the contrary. This exists in man — confirmed and 
perfected by mind' {De Leg. 1.18). In Book Two, Cicero is even more 
dogmatic: law is not something worked out by the talents of men, nor
anything decreed by the people, but something eternal, ruling the whole 
world by the wisdom of command and prohibition {De Leg. 2.8). This is 
of course the Stoic definition, and appears in expanded form in the De 
Republica: 'True law is right reason, in accord with nature, applying to 
all men, unchangeable and eternal. By its commands, this law summons 
men to the performance of their duties, by its prohibitions it restrains 
them from doing wrong.’ But, unlike the laws of states, its commands 
and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon 
the bad {De Rep. 3.33).
Further on in the De Legibus Cicero brings law down into the sphere 
of civic life when he describes how laws were discovered by individuals 
eosque qui prirrrum eiusmodi scita sanxerint, populis ostendisse ea se 
scripturos atque laturos, quibus illi adscitis susceptisque honeste 
beateque viverent {De Leg. 2.11). Such rules drawn up and put into 
effect were called laws. Any judgement about which pieces of 
legislation merit this title must be subjective.
Cicero expresses his awareness of the gap between the law as it 
exists in states and the true law most clearly in the De Officiis, where 
he describes the ius gentium and the ius civile. The former in his
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account of it becomes the equivalent of the law of nature and like it 
does not apply at the level of the civitas, even though ideally it 
should do so {De Off. 3.68-9); the gap between ideal and reality is 
due to depravatio consuetudinis.
Because, then, Cicero sees law as the substance of which human 
affairs retain only the shadow and images (ib.), it is easy for him to 
dismiss actual law from his considerations of the ideal. Law on earth 
is an imperfect representation of a divine reality, which only some are 
able to grasp; these privileged individuals may be observing the ’law', 
while ignoring the law of the state. As Wirszubski notes:
It seems that the political experience both of his own and of 
the preceding age led Cicero to the conclusion that legality 
did not alone suffice to secure the freedom and well-being of 
the State and its citizens. He thought the constitution ought 
to have a moral basis and a moral purpose, and, as such, it 
ought to have permanent validity irrespective of political 
expediency or the changing moods of the people.35
A person possessing such an insight would guide his life non Quiritium 
sed sapientium iure {De Rep. 1.27).
We can see then how Cicero could unite the civil leaders and the 
laws in a bond where the leader's character became itself a law:
Videtis igitur magistratus hanc esse vim ut praesit 
praescribatque recta et utilia et coniuncta cum legibus. Ut 
enim magistratibus leges, ita populo praesunt magistratus, 
vereque did potest3 magistratum legem esse loquentem, legem 
autem mutuum magistratum {De Leg. 3.2).36
Despite the radical assault on the position of positive law that 
this passage seems to contain, we may agree with Lepore, when we take 
the subsequent amplification into consideration, that
35 Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas (University Press, Cambridge, 1968), p.85. 
As Smethurst comments of both Cicero and Isocrates, 'even when 
discussing specifically political problems they adopt a moral rather 
than a legal or constitutional standpoint' ('Cicero and Isocrates',
pp.306-7) .
36 G.J.D. Aalders, 'N0M0Z EMIYXOE'in Politeia und Respublica {[edited by
Peter Steinmetz], Palingenesia A, Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1969), 
minimizes the significance of this passage: 'Nicht nur ist hier der
Magistrat an die Stelle des Königs getreten, sondern der Magistrat ist 
auch die Verkörperung von Gesetzen, die von anderen geschaffen und die 
schriftlich fixiert worden sind' (p.327).
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tutto questo sviluppo mostra chiaro ehe non puo identificarsi 
qui la legge con 11 singolo ed il suo arbitrio, ma ehe d’altra 
parte ogni ordinamento astratto ha bisogno dell’ interprete e 
dell’ incarnazione individuale e concreta di esso.37
Cicero expresses the task of public figures in a more mundane but 
essentially similar way in Pro Cluentio (146) : legum ministri
magistratus_, legum interpretes iudioes.
The moral impact of the magistrates may well lie outside the 
interpretation or application of a particular law. In the De Officiisy 
Cicero expresses the belief that it is desirable that those at the head 
of the state be like the laws which are led to punish, not through anger, 
but through a sense of justice (1.89, cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1287a-b). 
This is no radical devolution of power to officials enabling them to be 
their own law henceforth. But if this wish were to be fulfilled in an 
actual system of government, statesmen might then acquire much of the 
sanctity of the law which they were allegedly merely imitating.
In De Republican Cicero has the advocates of aristocracy explaining 
that a leading-citizen does not impose laws on the people which he does 
not obey himself, a moderate and conventional view, but the princeps also 
'puts forward his own life as a law to his citizens’ (1.52). We note 
that here the principes of section 51 have coalesced into one 
person, no doubt under the influence of the preceding phrase, virtute 
vero gubernante rem publicam. To maintain a clear distinction between 
ruling and being ruled, Cicero sets the one over against the many. (We 
may compare this with the description of the man looked for in 2.69, who 
provides an example in his own person, instead of issuing formal 
legislation.)
The origin of law as Cicero describes it also goes further in the 
direction of providing one individual for our admiration. In the De 
Officiis, Cicero shows justice originating under one just and good man, 
while laws were discovered to replace this method of government, when 
the monarchy failed to maintain its high standing (2.41-2). With a 
slightly different emphasis, he explains in the De Republica that there 
was nothing so 'kingly' as the explanation of justice, which included
37 Ettore Lepore, Il princeps ciceroniano e gli ideali politici della 
tarda repubblica (Nella sede dell’ 1st. ital. per gli studi storici, 
Naples, 1954), p.283.
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the interpretation of the law which private citizens were once
O Qaccustomed to seek from their kings (5.3).
We may think that if laws replaced personal absolute rule, they 
were an improvement on it, but Cicero, like Plato in the Volitions, 
describes the transition as an unfortunate necessity, but one which need
q qnot be binding in an ideal situation. Neither, it seems, did these 
laws need to apply in moments of crisis. In the Eleventh Philippic, 
Cicero asked by what law or right Cassius' activity in Syria could be 
justified, and himself supplied the answer:
Eo quod Iuppiter ipse sanxit3 ut omnia quae rei publicae 
salutavia essent3 legitima et iusta haberentur. Est enim lex 
nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorwn tracta ratio3 
imperans honesta3 prohibens contraria. Huic igitur legi 
paruit Cassius3 cum est in Syriam profectus3 alienam 
provinciam si homines legibus scriptis uterentur eis vero 
oppressis suam lege naturae {Phil. 11.28).
Traditional definitions of magistracy break down, for in conservanda 
civium libertate3 esse privatum neminem (De Rep. 2.46). Law, then, as 
we meet it in Cicero, can be no bulwark against or obstacle to the rule 
of one man.
PHILO
'Law is nothing else than reason prescribing what should be done 
and forbidding what should not be done' (Praem. 55). This Stoic
38 'Non credo s’abbiano a spendere molte parole per dimostrare quel
ehe e chiarissimo a chi abbia seguito la scorsa delle dottrine degli 
altri filosofi e storici: qui si ha appunto ehe la funzione piü tipica 
della regalitä e 13explanatio aequitatis , lo stesso ehe interpretatio 
iuris (per ciö ehe non vi sono leggi prima e all’infuori dei re), e ehe 
i privati chiedono al re ... il ius: e il re quindi e interprete, e
arbiter litis, giudice, ehe non ve n’e altri privato, e tutto si attua 
per mezzo di risoluzioni regie’ (Filippo Cancelli, 'SullJ origine del 
diritto secondo un motivo ricorrente in scrittori ellenistico-romani, e 
Cicerone: "de Re Publica" 5.3', Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris,
37 (1971), p.336.
39 Omnes antiquae gentes regibus quondam paruerunt. Quod genus 
imperii primum ad homines iustissimos et sapientissimos deferebatur (De
Leg. 3.4). Note too De Off. 2.42, referred to above, which clearly shows 
law as a poor substitute for monarchy.
98
definition of law occurs fairly frequently in Philo’s works, and shows 
how he had adopted one important element of the contemporary Graeco- 
Roman culture. It fails to show the way in which he modified it to 
embrace the Jewish law, or rather to apply to this law alone. The 
result of this modification had little influence on contemporary 
political thought. Yet it is important to consider this process, for it 
is merely the most dramatic instance of the many reworkings of themes 
taking place in the centuries of the Hellenistic and Roman Empires.
Whether Philo was initiating his fellow-Jews into the deeper 
mysteries of the Torah, or writing an apologetic work for sympathetic 
Gentiles, the Law was his constant concern. The books of the Exposition 
of the Law, probably written to reveal to non-Jews the treasures of the 
Pentateuch,4 0 deal with many topics, cosmology, the principles guiding 
the Jewish nation and their application in rules and ethical attitudes, 
the sanctions attached to these prescriptions, and the incarnation of 
the Law in persons. For all of these, Law is the term covering the 
right order which has been imposed by God, the supreme lawgiver, and 
mediated through the Logos.
In the De Opifieio Mund'i the stage is set. As Philo noted else­
where (Vit. Mos. 2.37), 'the making of the universe constitutes the 
beginning of the laws'. Here then we see man and universe both created 
after a pattern and subject to a law. This law is in Stoic terms right 
reason, but for Philo this does not mean simply cosmic harmony. It 
signifies also a divine ordinance and this presupposes a personal 
director (see Opif. 143). This aspect of the law of nature, the source 
of all law, had not received such stress in the writings of Hellenistic 
philosophers, if we may judge from the fragments of their work that we 
possess. Rather, Nomos and the deity had tended to become 
indistinguishable.
Plato identifies the Lawgiver as Creator and Father transcending 
every virtue and excellence {Opif. 7-8) . This transcendence does not 
deter Philo from using the language of political theory to emphasize the 
overriding control of God, who, like a charioteer or a helmsman, directs
40 On this, see Erwin R. Goodenough, 'Philo's Exposition of the Law 
and his De Vita Mosis', HThR, 27 (1933), 109-25.
99
each thing where he wills 'according to law and right' Kara vopov xau 
6lmnv (Opif. 46). Philo's law then is a personal communication from 
God. Pre-classical Greece had regarded law as a gift of a god or hero. 
What Philo claimed for the Jewish law, however, was uniqueness as the 
revelation of the will of God, as well as universal applicability.
When a contrast had developed in Greece in the fifth century 
between written and unwritten laws, polis laws often appeared second- 
best. As the prestige of the cities declined in the next century, it 
was not surprising that unwritten laws should come to refer no longer 
to local custom but to a natural or cosmic right order. Thus the Stoics 
discerned a law of nature in what was the true polis of men, the entire 
cosmos, the home of all that was mortal and immortal. Only by living in 
accordance with it could man attain to virtue and hence happiness.
In Philo's justification of the order followed in the Pentateuch, 
he stresses the specifically Jewish addition to this point of view. 
Moses, he says (Vit. Mos. 2.48), began his account with the creation of 
the universe to show that the same person, the father and creator of the 
world, was also truly its lawgiver, and that the man who obeys the laws 
will take pleasure in following nature and being in accord with the 
universal order. A little later, Philo explains that to describe an 
earthly city's origin, as Plato did, for example, and prescribe laws 
appropriate to it is to demean law. The genesis of the 'megalopolis', 
i.e. the universe, was, however, suitable as a starting point, as the 
laws to be described later were the very image of the constitution of 
the universe (see Vit. Mos. 2.49-51).
The Greeks had turned to a supra-terrestrial law as the norm partly 
through dissatisfaction with the actual laws of cities. Philo is able 
to turn this to good account by asserting with the backing of non-Jewish 
sources that civic laws were full of error. The exception was, of 
course, the law of Moses. It was Philo's aim to demonstrate that 
the law of God handed down by Moses reflected the nature of the 
universe, and to reveal the failings of all man-made laws, which are 
mere additions to nature, excesses without avail (see Jos. 30-31, and 
cf. Mut. 104) .41
41 Jos. 30-31: eon 6’ n TtXeove^ ta xat  ^ npos aAApAous aiu,öTta, 6t as
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His attack on the actual laws in force among other peoples makes 
much of their liability to change. Philo also uses his discussion on 
the nature of the politician in De Josepho 28-31 to express his scorn of 
the laws, so-called, passed by the crowd, the real ruler, because it is 
not content with the law of nature. A Sophist condemning all civic laws 
as unnatural could not show more distrust of the processes of society 
than Philo seems to evince here. Yet Philo does not despair of 
organized society, simply because his scepticism in one respect is 
caused by his certainty as to the right way to run the state. The task 
of the politikos as described in De Somniis 1.220-224 is difficult and 
his life is defiled simply because his soul has not been host to the 
biblical guidelines which are the source of well-ruled cities.42
The Law of Moses, as a positive law, might appear to outsiders 
simply as a useful, if somewhat idiosyncratic, set of instructions 
delivered by a tribal god to his people. As such, it did not affect 
non-Jews, except for rousing their antagonism if they experienced its 
exclusiveness. Philo realized only too well that for the Jews to bring 
upon themselves the dislike and prejudice of the people with whom they 
had to live was to threaten their very existence. He did not write 
merely for prudential reasons, however, but because of his philosophical 
inclinations he could sympathize with the Hellenistic thinkers who had 
seen law as a metaphysical reality rather than a set of rules. It was 
clear that his main task was to find a way in which the written law of 
Moses could be equated with the law of the philosophers.
Philo, like the Stoics, saw positive law as an insufficient guide
oux apxea$evxeg rots xps cpuaews deayoug xd 6d£avxa auycpe'petv xotvf) xotg 
oyoyvwyoatv oydAoug xauxa voyoug euecppy toav. uoxe etxdxwg xpoa§pxat 
yaAAov ail waxa ye'pog TioAuxetau ytag xpg xaxa xpv cpuauv upoa^pxat yev 
yap oil xaxa udAeug voyou xou xpg cpuaewg opdoü Adyou, TipooSpxp 6d eaxt 
xoAuxtxog avpp xou ßuoüvxog xaxa cpuauv.
Mut. 104: o&xog xat av-dpcoTteua dedwv Mat e§p vdywv xai ßeßpAa eepwv
Kai dvpxa adavaxwv Kail ouvdAwg xd öoxetv xoö edvau upoxtya. xat 
euuxoAypaag auxoxeAeuaxog eilg xpv xoö ouyßouAou uapepyexau xa£tv, 
ucppyouyevog xtp aocpw [yp] dvaöuödaxeuv a yova yavdavetv a£uov, "xa 
Ttpoaxayyaxa xou $eou xau xov voyov" (Exod. 18,20), aAAa (yp) xa xpog 
aAApAoug avdpooTtiov ouyßdAaua, xpg axouvwvpxou oyebov auxua xouvwvdag.
42 Cf. Praem. 65-6: odxog eoxiv 6 aauvpg olxog, 6 xe'Aeuog xat ouveyps 
ev xatg ppxatg ypacpatg xau ev xaug xa-d ’ utovouav aAApyopuaug, os eAaßev 
a§Aov, xa^arcep editov, pyeyovuav xwv xou edvoug cpuAwv. ex xoube xou 
olxou xPov°tS eug TtoAuavdpooiidav etubdvxog euvoyou uoAeug exxdodpaav,
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for right living, and accepted their conclusions on the pattern of 
behaviour to be found in the cosmos.43 He shows his readiness to adopt 
their terms but alter their reference most clearly in his use of the 
expression 'unwritten laws'. For him they generally refer to laws that 
are not in the Decalogue, or else, by extension, to individuals. He 
endeavoured to describe the patriarchs in a way that would win the 
approval of the Gentiles, by showing that these untutored men of virtue 
did, without the law, what the law commanded. Hence the law, when it 
came, was truly the law of nature, yet the same could not be said of the 
divergent views of other races.
Thus in the introduction to De Decatogo he explains how he will 
pass from describing the patriarchs — the founders of the Jewish nation 
and themselves unwritten laws — to give an account of the written laws 
{Dee. 1). Here we have the expression 'unwritten laws' used in the same 
ways as at the end of the De Abrahamo: toloutos 6 ßbos tou npmxou xau 
apxnybxou tou edvous eaxtv, ms yev evlol (pnuouou, voyuyog, ms 6’ 6 m p ’ 
eyoü Adyog e6eu£e, voyos auxog mv xat deoyog aypacpog (Abr. 276). Else­
where (e.g. Spec. Leg. 4.149-150, Virt. 194), Philo suggests that the 
lives of the virtuous contain in themselves examples of good conduct, or 
unwritten laws.
This is Philo's own contribution to personalizing the laws, but he 
also avails himself of the notion of living law, which had come into 
common use in political discussion. This refers once to the patriarchs (Abr. 
5) and is in the same vein as the description of them as unwritten laws. 
When applied to Moses, however, the political element —  political, that 
is, in the broadest sense — appears. Because his duty as legislator or 
as king is the same as that of the law, to command what is right 
and to forbid the opposite, it is reasonable, Philo concludes, to term 
him 'living law' (Vit. Mos. 1.162 and 2.4). Indeed, the political gifts 
are effective only in association with the tokens of divine approval
öuöaoxaAeCa cppovyoemg xau öuxauoouvng xat, oatoxnxos, ev otg xau n xhg 
aAApg ctpexfjg yexoutotriöLS yeyaAoupeumg ötepeuväxat.
43 See e.g. Abr. 16: u o X X a  ycv odv ol voyo^cxai, noAAa 6e ol uavxaxou 
vdyou Tipayyaxeuovxab nepc tou xas 4>uxcts xmv eAeudepmv eAitdömv xPh0T^v 
avaitAnaau• 6 6’ aveu uapauveaems 6uxa tou xe:Aeuo§nvaL yevdycvos eueAitus
aypacpm yev vo'ym 6c itaAuv auxoyadeu xyv dpexpv xauxriv TiemLÖeuxciL, ov 
y cpuoug ednxe .
102
and providence such as the gift of prophecy.
If law can be embodied in one man, it cannot be brought about 
simply by the agreement of the members of the community. Philo insists 
on the need to believe that the laws are not the inventions of a man, 
but quite clearly the oracles of God {Deo. 15). Law may therefore be 
described as divine (see Opif. 143, Migv. 130, where the law is defined 
as divine reason) and in this way we may see an individual who has God's 
favour described as ’either God or his Logos or divine law’ {Jos. 174). 
This occurs to be sure in a remark of Joseph's brother, and is an 
expression of wonder, not a statement about God or law as such, but the 
closeness that it implies between person and abstraction shows how 
strong was Philo's tendency to personify law, while placing it in a 
context where its cosmic significance was most fully displayed. This 
could only reduce the direct social impact of law.
Elsewhere the laws and customs of human contrivance are measured 
against those of nature. They are generally found to be far inferior 
but in association with right reason may have apart to play in fitting the 
individual for life. Law in the polis sense is not present here, so 
poses no threat to the adoption of monarchical government as an ideal. 
But law in the senses we have examined, though occasionally identified 
with or coming through individual leaders, still maintains a certain 
independence because of its religious basis. This very fact, however, 
also meant that for Philo it could easily be detached from its social 
setting, and so was unlikely to appear in opposition to the ruler who 
claimed to act in accord with it.
Philo, as a Jewish writer, was not able to vest a Gentile monarch 
with the authority of the law of the patriarchs in his theorising, but 
he could go very close to this in the Legatio and clearly found no 
difficulty in the idea on political grounds.
SENECA
From Seneca, we receive a very different kind of evidence, and as 
our first Roman theorist of the Empire, what he has to say about law is
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of particular significance. For him, law was far from being a univocal 
term, and of its various meanings not the least important was that 
derived from the Stoic philosophy he espoused. This law of nature is 
indeed as much his concern as any state law despite his political 
involvement. It may refer to the structure of the universe (Cons. adHelv. 
6.8), where all is movement, and thus explain the process of death in 
mankind.44 In fact Virtue recognizes difficultas temporum as a law of 
nature (Vit. Beat. 15.5). It is then part of the wise man’s task to 
recognize nature’s rule — natura enim duee utendum est (Vit. Beat. 8.1)
— and as a good Stoic, Seneca saw this not simply as accepting the 
inevitable but as a positive step towards virtue: ab ilia [natural non
deerrare et ad illius legem exemplumque formari sapientia est (Vit. Beat. 
3.3). This link between an amoral decree about man’s destiny and the 
behaviour expected of man allows the law of nature to acquire an ethical 
content and to appear in some cases almost the equivalent of unwritten 
law (in the sense used, for example, by Sophocles and Xenophon). No one 
departs from the law of nature and sheds the man in him to such an 
extent that he is evil merely for the sake of being evil (Ben. A.17.3).
Law in this sense has little connection with political life and 
consequently it is not surprising to find that the distinction between 
the Empire and the world where the law of nature holds sway is often 
stressed: officia civis amisit? Hominis exerceat (Tranq. A.A). This
is quite different from the attitude common in the days of the Republic 
when the Stoic oikoumene and the Roman Empire were seen as coterminous.45 
Seneca goes so far as to acknowledge two commonwealths: duas res
publicas animo complectamur_, alteram magnam et vere publicam3 qua dii 
atque homines continentur ... alteram„cui nos adscripsit eondieio 
nascendi (Otio A.l).
In the De Clementia, the political essay addressed to Nero, Seneca 
cannot maintain this division and must therefore turn to an idealized
44 Cf. Cons. adHelv. 13.2: si ultimum diem non quasi poenam3 sed
quasi naturae legem aspieis ex quo pictore me turn mortis eieeeris3 in id 
nullius rei timor audebit intrare.
45 'Prima che "Romano", Seneca si sente "uomo": prima delle leggi
positive di Roma vi e la legge di natura, che stringe fra di loro tutti 
gli uomini proprio in quanto sono uomini', Italo Lana, Seneca e la 
politica (Giappichelli, Turin, 1970), p.Al.
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portrait of the ruler. In his endeavour to fit him into the cosmic 
framework adopted elsewhere, he describes the character of the ruler and 
explains that his power is not harmful, if adjusted to the law of nature, 
and this we have a right to expect, as nature herself fashioned the king 
{Clem. 1.19.1-2).
We can see that Seneca’s aim is to remove monarchical rule from the 
area of political debate and conflict, where a variety of forms of 
government could compete for approval. Had he been a consistent 
advocate of the tranquil life of retirement, he would have had no need 
to develop such a theory. State rule and the rule of the cosmos would 
have been kept strictly separate, the one governed by imperfect human 
law or the will of one man, the other by the law of nature which is the 
law of God. Only Seneca’s preoccupation with the status and value of 
political activity compelled him to use the rhetoric of politics to join 
the two spheres.
Law in the sense of a body of regulations for a state is not given 
any basis in nature. Before such laws existed, one man was both the 
leader and the law to his followers: eundem habebant et ducem et legem
(Ep. 90.4), for it is nature’s way that the weaker should submit to the 
more powerful (ib.). This is a theme going back to Plato and common in 
Pythagorean political thought. The best person and thus the most power­
ful is of course the wise man, and for Seneca such an individual played 
the part assigned to the demigods in Plato’s Age of Kronos. Law 
embodied in a person, then, makes its appearance at the beginning of 
man's history. Law by itself develops not from man's sociability but 
from the vices of men whereby a kingdom became a tyranny and law is 
needed to repair the situation.45 It is therefore a remedy for a 
failure on the part of society (cf. its introduction in the Poli-tdcus) 
and here too the wise make up for the deficiency.
46 'Die hellenistische Theorie der Gesetze als einem "notwendigen 
Übel" entspricht also ungefähr derjenigen Senecas. Aber die Begründung 
ist jeweils eine andere: Der hellenistische König bleibt nach wie vor
vollkommen und "sündlos"; Nachlässigkeit und Fehlerhaftigkeit der 
anderen Menschen machen die Gesetze nötig. Bei Seneca liegt es 
entsprechend dem bisher Beobachteten, besonders der Betonung des 
Leistungsprinzips, durchaus im Wesen jenes Urkönigs, dass er den Weg zum 
Schlechten einschlagen — und zum Tyrannen werden kann', Adam, Clementla 
principis, p.56.
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Lawgivers such as Solon and Lycurgus bestowed benefits on the rest 
of mankind, through a fixed body of laws, so that law is the result not 
of nature but of art. Yet the social hierarchy can still be said to 
maintain the natural order —  the wise prescribing for the less wise —  
and the wise man is the means of bringing the law of life to light and 
making life conform to universal principles (Ep. 90.34). Art therefore 
builds on nature: nature does not work its will unaided. Indeed nature
as it applies to man always needs to be interpreted in a specific way 
which takes account of reason, and its meaning is thereby changed 
considerably.
Seneca tends to downgrade law as legal prescription at the same 
time as he elevates custom. The conventions of human life are more 
binding than any law {Ben. 5.21.1). Here Seneca sees law as inevitably 
restricted in its range. We may compare Aristotle's comment that the 
law in itself has no power to secure obedience save the power of custom 
{Politics 1269a). Law also fails to account for a large portion of the 
moral life {Ira 2.28.2), for the principle of duty has a far wider 
application than that of law. Seneca is the typical Stoic here when he 
exclaims at the multitudes of demands laid upon man by a sense of duty, 
by humanity, generosity, justice and integrity, qualities all outside 
the statute books.
Though Seneca views written law primarily under its negative aspect: 
leges a scelere deterrent3 praecepta in officium adhortccntur {Ep. 94.37), 
he concedes it may yet have an important role in leading to right behaviour 
if it not only commands but also teaches. What shows this is that 
states with defective laws will have defective morals {Ep. 94.38). Here 
the pedagogic role of the law makes it similar to a ruler whose task is 
also to educate rather than to command.
Laws that win commendation from Seneca are not those developed in 
the life of the forum. The benefits bestowed on mankind by Zeno and 
Chrysippus were greater than if they had carried laws and in fact they 
did so, not for one state but for the whole of mankind {Otio 6.4).
Again we see here that actual governments and external regulations are 
unimportant when placed alongside the moral injunctions which accord 
with nature and are brought into prominence by philosophy.
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Because state law is so limited, one of the main prerogatives of a 
king is his power to preserve life by actually breaking the law. He 
alone can do this, while everyone is able to break the law to destroy 
life {Clem. 1.5.4). The personal intervention of the ruler supplements 
the deficiencies of the law, just as for Aristotle the application of 
equity makes up for the lacunae in the law.
Paradoxically, however, Seneca also claims that the law is derived 
from the ruler, for Nero is told that he can bring it into the light of 
day {Clem. 1.1.4). The image is of the ruler bringing forth laws into 
light from darkness, and the immediate reference of Seneca's remark to 
Nero is no doubt to the transition from Claudius' reign to his 
successor's; yet we should not ignore the connection thus made between 
the ruler as source of law, and the philosopher who is also the means of 
bringing into view the law of nature {Ep. 90.34). Seneca is still far 
from making the ruler the embodiment of the law and indeed he does not 
precisely attribute to him the functions of a legislator. The monarch 
is to make use of law — considered as a good — and transcend it when it 
is seen as a limitation on truly kingly actions.
Certainly Seneca does not look to law to effect the smooth 
functioning of state machinery. The task of the lex is to inspire, as 
law of nature, the man seeking true wisdom, so that he becomes contented 
with his situation, and shapes his actions accordingly {Ep. 90.34). If 
these actions are to be political, they may be so in an informal way, 
and just as fruitfully, Seneca believes, as when they are related to the 
exercise of an official position. No king need then fear lex as his 
rival, unless he clearly transgresses the law of nature, a possibility 
which in theory Seneca does not admit, even though his examples of evil 
behaviour in the case of Gaius and other rulers are many.
Musonius Rufus enjoyed the favour and suffered the displeasure of 
several monarchs. Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch and Pliny the Younger were 
contemporaries who all took part in some way in public life under the 
Empire. These later writers were to witness further instances of 
unworthy rulers who quite clearly did not abide by the law of nature. 
What response did this fact evoke in them?
♦
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MUSONIUS RUFUS
Musonius Rufus comments on the king's relationship to law just once 
in his speech to the 'king' of Syria, but this is a most important 
instance for us. He tells how the king needs to be blameless and 
perfect since he must be living law 'as the ancients called it'. This 
involved euvopuav yev nat oyovotav \ir\xuvu>\icvov, avoyuav 6e xau axaotv 
dteupyovTa (p.283) and the way to arrive at this state is of course 
through learning, coupled with possession of an outstanding nature 
(p.284). There is nothing here about any other practical information 
that the king should possess, or about his subjects and how he should 
relate to them by means of the laws. For Musonius the personal law that 
is the ruler is all that counts.
DIO CHRYSOSTOM
Dio, as well as writing specifically on kingship and tyranny, also 
composed essays on law and custom; so that we find in his works 
allusions to the position of law in a variety of contexts. Immediately, 
we are confronted with contradictions, but it is not surprising that the 
value of law varies between Orations 75 and 76 which are very much in 
the style of compositions of the New Sophistic school, made to order to 
express a particular point of view. For on the one hand we find law as 
necessary to public life, as öudvoua is for the sanctity of the 
individual (75.10), while,on the other, in Oration Seventy-Six law is 
necessary only because all men are not good, and a weakness in law is 
that it cannot bind kings as custom does (76.4 — a piece of special 
pleading if ever there was!). The simplicity attributed to law in one 
essay is a quality of custom as opposed to law in the other (see 75.4 
and 76.4) .
In a wider sense, law derives its importance from being closely 
linked with the reasoning element. Just as someone without reason is 
not in fact a man, neither is there a polis without the element of law, 
and lawfulness presupposes an intelligent and ordering power (36.20).
In the universe as a whole, this reasoning power is most manifest, under 
a rule of the most righteous and perfect, and with Tuyns tc dyadqs nau
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öauyovog oyoi'ou kül tpovouag the world is guided, and man also, since he 
has a common nature with the universe, for they are both ordered by evl 
■deoytji xai voytp, and share the same polity. This is therefore the true 
source of voyos, allied here with the more lofty word Scoyos which
strongly suggests the imposition of a decree. A man becomes voyuyos as
well as OeocpuXns nal Moayuos by defending and not opposing this polity 
(1.42-3).
Like Isocrates, Dio sees cpuaus as making up for the omissions of 
the law — boys share citizenship with men, being citizens by nature
though not performing the duties of a citizen or having a share in law
(36.23). In this respect law needs supplementing, although it is not 
shown competing with a standard that is more objective and therefore 
superior. Yet to establish the laws of nature as the true guide for 
man (see 80.5) is to decry the laws made by man. Even the laws of 
Solon and Draco, of Numa and Zaleucus were far from perfect, and to 
claim that justice resides in laws made by men themselves strikes Dio as 
ridiculous; he makes the contrast as impressive as possible. On one 
side is the law of nature, abandoned and slighted by men, on the other, 
tablets and statute books and inscribed pillars treasured for the 
legislation they contain, and this Dio believes is a proof of the folly 
of men (ib.).
When Dio discusses the requirements and characteristics of the 
polis, he defines it in typically Stoic terms, as a mass of men dwelling 
in the same place and regulated by law (36.20), but he does not then 
explain whether this refers to the divine law of the cosmos or that made 
by man. Neither does he propose that the two may be harmonized in 
actual legislation as Cicero had done.
Laws exist because of orders and regulations, but Dio does not 
suggest that they should be arrived at by consultation or after 
ascertaining the popular will. The very general sense in which Dio uses 
the term means that he can accord a life following justice and the laws 
even to the Scythians despite their lack of the other marks of 
civilization, and their nomadic life (69.6). He is not interested in 
describing their social structure and showing how this can be so, but 
wishes simply to present a Stoic point of view on the, to him, useless
109
accretions of sophisticated urban life. He can then hardly place much 
value on formal political structures of the city or empire.
In the essays on kingship, law is placed under the control of the 
king, but is not described consistently. Because the king is greater 
than the laws, he has a need of the most scrupulous justice (3.10, cf. 
62.2-3). This indicates that he cannot be called to account for his 
actions by any tribunal in the state, but only by his conscience or by 
divine justice. Further on in the same essay Dio explains this even 
more frankly: äpxn is the lawful ordering of and caring for men in
accord with the law, kingship is unaccountable dpxh where the law is the 
decree of the king (3.43). Nothing, it seems, could be plainer. Law 
under a monarchy bears no resemblance to a ödyya toAewc;, and is clearly 
used by an extension of the political meaning of the fifth and fourth 
centuries B.C. An individual has ousted the community. Such a 
conception of law needs a supporting mythology to compensate for its 
detachment from its roots, and in the first discourse on kingship Dio 
provides it. Here kingship has as her right-hand man voyos, also called 
right reason, counsellor and supporter, apart from whom it is not right 
for Monarchy, Justice, Good Order and Peace to do or contemplate any­
thing (1.75) .
This expresses a metaphysical not a constitutional reality. It may 
provide a standard for distinguishing the king from the tyrant, but this 
must be arbitrary. We should note that the associates of ’Lady Royalty, 
child of Zeus’, are precisely those mentioned in Hesiod as the Horae, the 
offspring of Zeus and Themis. The early language of personified and 
deified virtues and vices serves as a substitute for political comment.
In Discourse Fifty-Six, the atmosphere is quite different. Here 
Dio rejects the definition of kingship as irresponsible ruling and 
ordering of men, and argues that power-sharing was the basis of 
Agamemnon's rule and of the Spartan kings' (56.5ff.). This is hardly to 
provide constitutional precedent for limited monarchy, however, although 
Dio attempts to make Nestor's advice seem part of a regular process of 
consultation. More typical of Dio's attitude is his remark that for a 
king to transgress the divine order is worse than for a private citizen, 
for it is the duty of a ruler to look to the voyos and $eoyos of Zeus
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and order and rule justly and well (1.45).47
The good king may act in accordance with his own, presumably just, 
laws, but no doubt Dio believes it is important to stress adherence to 
more intangible prescriptions, as these are more basic, since a 
regulation as such has no intrinsic worth.
PLUTARCH
Plutarch refers to the structures of the polis more frequently and 
in more detail than does Dio. In his discussion in An Seni RespubZica 
Gevenda Sit, for example, a democratic and lawful polity is envisaged as 
under the direction of a man who is accustomed to being ruled for the 
public good no less than to rule (783d). This sounds like the 
definition of the good citizen in Aristotle, but has not much relevance 
to the Empire and its sole ruler, and indeed the Empire is not what 
truly concerns Plutarch here. The municipal government to which he 
referred fulfilled in some ways the role of the Classical poZZs 
government, but it was wishful thinking for Plutarch to describe the 
magistrates' function as ruling. Nomos in any case may in Plutarch be 
used to mean simply a correct procedure for conducting any political 
contests which are unwarlike; these are accomplished 'by law and reason 
with justice' (voyw nal Aoy^) y e r a  ölhtis, 784f.). For Plutarch often 
indicates by voyos the general and early sense of custom and habit, such 
as the 'law' whereby older men are called upon to speak first (784c). 
Nomos does clearly still retain its connection with justice (as e.g. its 
use in 817d-e shows), but its task can then mean granting office to the 
man acting justly rather than the working out of the definition of the 
just through a coherent piece of legislation.
When used by Plutarch in an elevated sense, voyos is no 
prescription of any actual political body; the Logoi of philosophers, 
if they are engraved firmly in the souls of rulers and men in government, 
and control their actions, acquire the force of laws (779b). Indeed the
47 Thus we cannot agree with Valdenberg's sweeping comment: 'Tout
montre que Dion professait la legalite du pouvoir royal, sa soumission ä 
la loi' (Valdenberg, 'La Theorie monarchique', p.159).
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Logos of the philosopher is a law chosen by him {Stoic. Repug. 1033b) .
We can see than that there is little need for a law inscribed on stone, 
if the soul of the ruler has been influenced in the right way. In his 
advice to an uneducated ruler, Plutarch expands on the role of this 
voyos which is 'king of all'; it is not written down in books or on 
wood, but is a living Logos within the ruler, always dwelling with and 
guarding him and never allowing him to be bereft of its direction (780c). 
No doubt Pindar would have been surprised to find his phrase on law as 
king of all, mortal and immortal, used in this context!
When Plutarch brings voyos onto the political scene in his 
theoretical works on rulership, he does so in a very personal way.
Noyos and öuxri are associated, for öuxri is the end of voyos, which is 
itself the task of the ruler, but here the ruler is not enlightened by 
philosophers. Rather he is effective because he is the image of God who 
orders all things (780e).48 In a yet more detailed account of Zeus' 
part in the correct governing of the world, Plutarch describes Zeus him­
self as Dike and Themis and the eldest and most perfect of laws (781a-b). 
This way of expressing the relationship perhaps obviates the risk — 
evidenced in Anaxarchus’ reported comment to Alexander — that Dike, 
Themis and Nomos may appear as subservient to Zeus, and dependent on his 
arbitrary will, rather than being absolutes which he too must obey. For 
once the first claim is accepted, every act of a king also may well be 
considered as righteous and just (ib.).
Elsewhere {Alex. 52.3, see also 52.4), Plutarch records Anaxarchus 
as urging the king to consider himself the law and the determination of 
what is just. This may be safe in the case of Zeus whose law is 
unchanging, but Plutarch could see the dangers in proclaiming the theory 
of absolutism so openly, even though many of his own comments on Nomos
4 8 Plutarch may be more captivated by the image here than by the 
reality behind it, but Babut's objection that Plutarch elsewhere 
considers this idea un-Greek does not prove he found it unsuitable in 
all circumstances for his own day. (Babut comments: 'On y lit que le 
souverain est 1’image du Dieu qui administre l’univers ... mais cette 
idee, qui rappelle la conception stoicienne et pythagoricienne, si 
repandue ä l’epoque hellenistique, selon laquelle le roi est comme 
1’incarnation de la loi ... traduit-elle vraiment les vues de Plutarque? 
On peut en douter, d’autant qu’un passage de la Vie de Themistocle la 
presente comme etrangere ä 1’hellenisme', Babut, Plutarque et le 
stoicisme, pp.85-6.)
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could also lead to this identification of the monarch and the law.
Nomos has a different meaning when Plutarch uses it to describe the 
benefit that might have resulted to the world had Alexander lived 
longer. ’One law’, he says, ’would have governed all mankind, and they 
would have looked towards one standard of justice as a common source of 
light’ (330d). Here the voyos is still intangible and has little to do 
with that voyos which ruled the polis, though it has clearly a social 
content lacking in the philosophical interpretations of it, since it 
refers to a system under which all men would have similar treatment.
In general, however, even for Plutarch with his interest in civic 
affairs, voyos was not an immutable common agreement owing its origin to 
the people or anything like this, but rather a word to conjure with, 
particularly useful when it lent credence and validity to monarchical 
claims.
PLINY
On his accession to power Trajan appeared as the restorer of order 
and internal peace and justice after the turmoil of Domitian's reign and 
the caretaker regime of Nerva. He was therefore an ideal object on 
which Pliny and his fellows could lavish all the hopes of legality in 
the imperial administration. Domitian had employed all the devices of 
the tyrant. Trajan must naturally appear to be the exact opposite. It 
followed from this that he had to have law on his side.
Thus, in cutting out the internal ills of the state, Trajan, with 
farsighted strictness, was deemed to be taking care 'that the state 
based on laws should not appear to be overthrown by laws' ne fundata 
legibus civitas eversa legibus videretur — in this case those of which the 
delators had taken such advantage in Domitian’s day (Pan. 34.2). Pliny 
is at pains to stress that respect for the laws remains. Reform has not 
meant that the laws to punish evildoers are no longer enforced. But now 
it is the laws, an impersonal force, and not the informers, which are 
feared, and this is as it should be (36.2).
The pvinoeps is to set an example in his respect for magistrates
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and for the authority of the laws, and to encourage moderation in those 
lodging complaints (Pan. 60). This is more the behaviour of a first 
citizen than of a monarch, and Pliny's continued emphasis on Trajan's 
position as consul brings his role within the framework of 
constitutional forms. In this way reverence for the laws presents no 
problems about whether the ruler is above these prescriptions or not.
'Did someone approach him as a prince (Trajan) answered that he was a 
consul' (77.3). Yet there is no compulsion on the princeps to assume 
this figure, as Pliny elsewhere makes very clear: 'You have subjected
yourself to the laws, Caesar, the laws which no one drew up for a 
princeps' (65.1).
Pliny records the revolutionary sentiment 'never heard before' that 
the princeps is not above the laws, but the laws above the princeps, non 
est princeps super leges sed leges super principem, but reduces the 
significance of this by presenting Trajan in the next phrase in changed 
robes of office: idemque Caesari consuli quod ceteris non licet (ib.).
Only as consul is he thus bound! Again, on Trajan's departure from the 
consulship he swore that he had, while holding that position, done 
nothing against the laws (65.2). Trajan receives similar praise for a 
decision which does not display respect for the established law of the 
state so much as for the law of nature. The removal of death duties 
from an extra category of newly-made citizens — in the case of a father 
inheriting from a son — is hardly as great an example of conformity to 
nature as Pliny tries to make it appear (see 38-9). It is not 
likely to be found high in the Stoic order of activities for the 
virtuous man, but it does express a belief in the value of kinship, a 
value the 'father of his country' would be expected to exemplify.
The way the subjects obey the emperor is the same as the way in 
which they obey the laws. Pliny does not subsume the laws under the 
person of the emperor — this would be essentially un-Roman — yet the 
implication is that the monarch's wish is law, even though Pliny assumes 
that the fulfilment of that wish will be to the subjects' benefit. Just 
as the emperor's moderating effect on the desires and passions is 
granted a status akin to law, so law itself is not that in the statute 
books but a living entity!49 Laws 'live with us and amongst us' and 
also exercise a personal moral influence (Pan. 24.4). When law is
. Note 49 over page.
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connected to the person of the ruler, it may be put to bad use, but this 
does not diminish its general fair fame.
Whether the emperor allies himself with the laws within a 
constitutional framework, or performs tasks which have the virtues of 
laws, for Pliny there is no conflict of law and ruler. A good emperor 
issues good laws and abides by those already in existence when these are 
worth preserving, but he is obviously not shackled by them. The 
question of whether the emperor is above the laws or not, raised and 
answered by Dio (differently in different places), is never brought up so 
starkly here and for obvious reasons. Pliny cannot eulogize Trajan 
without reference to the laws as they still had reassuring associations 
in his day for Romans at least. A denial of absolute power in the 
princeps would be undiplomatic, yet an outright acceptance of the 
principle that the ruler was ipso facto above the law would sweep away 
the necessary facade of republicanism. Law such as Pliny refers to can, 
however, present no real challenge to monarchical government.
ARISTIDES
Aelius Aristides in his work in praise of Rome has little reason 
for giving an account of the laws prevailing in the Empire or of their 
position in relation to the emperor, but his occasional references are 
nonetheless illuminating. There is a casual mention of the law of 
nature which decrees that unjust rule will produce evil consequences for 
those who use it (Z?. 0. 20). The laws of the state may also be 
significant. Aristides illustrates Alexander’s failure to exercise rule 
over an empire in a settled way by asking rhetorically: 'what laws did
he ordain for each of his peoples?' (26). The imposition of laws is 
therefore a mark of true kingship, and as such was reserved in its 
finest development for Roman rule.
49 'Wahrend im Hellenismus und sogar noch im I. Teil bei Seneca den 
Gesetzen, so weit es ging, juristische Verbindlichkeit zuerkannt wurde, 
tritt nun der Princeps weitgehend an die Stelle der Gesetze', says Adam, 
dementia principis, p.116, and although this is not a sufficiently 
balanced view of what Pliny says, it seems justified by what he implies 
of the prerogatives of the princeps.
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The advantage of a large Empire is that there may be common laws 
for all (R.O. 102). We notice that, in the exaggerated terms of a 
eulogy, but obviously without fear of assaulting cherished myths, 
Aristides can comment, of 'the present great governor', 'one would say 
that justice and law (Somuoauvriv Mat voyuyov) are in truth whatever he 
decrees' (107).
CONCLUSION
From the beginning of its use in Greece voyos, as we have seen, had 
a variety of meanings — just as lex was to have in Rome, although to a 
lesser extent. It looked for a time as if developments in the polLs 
were to make the meaning of 'written law', an impersonal entity, triumph 
over the others, but this tendency was soon reversed. Noyos, once the 
catchcry of the democracy, was taken up by the supporters of monarchy 
and came to mean the transcendental law, often described as the Logos, 
to which the king gave life — which he in fact embodied — or, at the 
very least, the body of legislation promulgated by the king.
We may see in the early tendency to personify voyos a precedent for 
this later unorthodox use. It was almost as if the theorists had from 
the beginning felt uneasy in dealing with an abstraction and were more 
comfortable talking about a 'law' that was actually flesh and blood. So 
law, which we might think of as at the opposite end of the spectrum to 
absolute monarchy, became in the end its helpmate.
Certainly then that people must needs be mad or strangely 
infatuated3 that build the chief hope of their common happiness or 
safety on a single person; who3 if he happen to be good3 can do no more 
than another man; if to be bad3 hath in his hands to do more evil with­
out check3 than millions of other men. The happiness of a nation must 
needs be firmest and certainest in full and free council of their own 
electing3 where no single person3 but reason only3 sways.
Milton, The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth
(p.226, Everyman edition of Milton's Prose Writings).
Whenever man is put over men3 as the better nature ought ever to 
preside3 in that case more particularly3 he should as nearly as possible 
be approximated to his perfection.
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France
(p.189, Penguin edition).
From my own chosen masters.then3 Scott and Homer3 I learned ... a 
most sincere love of Kings3 and dislike of everybody who attempted to 
disobey them. Only3 both by Homer and Scott, I was taught strange ideas 
about Kings3 which I find for the present much obsolete; for3 I 
perceived that both the author of the Iliad and the author of Waverley 
made their Kings3 or king-loving persons3 do harder work than anybody 
else.... I observed that they not only did more3 but in proportion to 
their doings3 got less than other people ...
Ruskin, quoted p.26 of The Conservative Tradition
(edited R.L. White)•
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CHAPTER THREE
QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF RULERS
INTRODUCTION
In the treatises we are examining the writers describe the ideal 
king and very often praise a particular monarch, who is the recipient of 
the work, for living up to the ideal; in doing this, naturally enough, 
they mention the qualities they consider it desirable for a ruler to 
have. We might expect to find also a precise account of his tasks and 
duties, but these occur surprisingly rarely.
When Herodotus began the theoretical discussion of types of 
government among the Greeks with his 'Persian debate’, he defined 
certain elements that he deemed indispensable to the forms of government 
he described. Even if the institutions associated, for example, with 
the TiAqdos apyov are 'embodied in but not identical with democracy', 
and if the taovoycri resulting is 'not a form of government but a 
political principle',1 what Herodotus does stress is that under such a 
manner of rule the actions would not be the same as those performed 
under a monarchy. He shows the difference by describing the 
institutions appropriate to government by the people — sortition, 
accountability of magistrates, public deliberation (3.80).
Alongside this, however, Herodotus provides an account of monarchy 
which dwells on the personal qualities of the ruler, rather than on the 
means by which his power is exercised. The effectiveness of the 
monarch depends on his being 'the best man for the job'. Thus we must 
already 'in der damaligen Diskussion für den vorbildlichen Monarchen 
eine durch Dikaiosyne und Sophrosyne bestimmte ethische Grundhaltung
i Ostwald, Nomos, p.112, p.lll.
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annehmen'.2 Technical skill is no less important as an argument in 
favour of monarchy. If the ruler is the best man for the position, his 
judgement will need to be in keeping with his character; his control of 
the people will be beyond reproach, ’his measures against enemies and 
traitors kept secret more easily than under other forms of government'.3
Aristotle in the Politics gives us a schematic account of forms of 
government when in Book Three he analyses the various influences at work 
to bring about a particular constitution and emphasizes the importance 
of qualities such as noble and free-birth, wealth, justice and political 
arete to the state, because uv tcoAls ouveoxqxev,  ev xodxots dvotyHatov 
touetaBat xqv dycptaßqxqaLV (1283a) .
Just as rule of more than one is aristocracy and rule by the many 
is polity so long as the good of all is aimed at, one-man rule for the 
benefit of the whole community is kingship. This to be sure brings an 
element of subjectivity into the description, though the subsequent 
introduction of 'rule over willing subjects in accordance with the law' 
into the definition offers a more precise standard (Pol. 1285a). 
Aristotle also lays down guidelines on the choice of a king and here the 
criterion is the potential ruler's private life: (ßeAxtov) Kara xov 
auTou ßtov enaaxov Mptvea^at xwv BaauAewv (1271a).4
Yet he does not, of course, leave it at that. For him only a 
society of a certain kind is suitable for absolute monarchy; only a
2 Stroheker, 'Zu den Anfänge', p.395. Cf. p.388: 'So erscheint es
naheliegend, Sophrosyne und Dikaiosyne schon in den Anfängen der 
sophistischen Diskussion als die von uns postulierten ethischen 
Fundamente jener Gnome einzufügen, die den vorbildlichen Monarchen als 
aptaxos zu seinem Werk befähigten^wahrend umgekehrt der "Tyrann',' dem sie 
fehlten, zu denjenigen zählte, die nach Protagoras als Krankheit des 
Staates auszumerzen waren.'
3 öuyajxd xe äv ßouAeüyaxa ent öuoyeveas ävöpas oüxw ydAtaxa (Her. 
3.82). Note also eym ... yvojyriv qyeotg eAeudepwBdvxas 6td eva dvöpa xo 
xouoüxo TtepuaxeAAeLV (ib.) .
4 Montesquieu's comment on the deficiencies of Aristotle,in particular
in describing monarchy, is worth noting here: 'L’embarras d’Aristote
paroit visiblement quand il traite de la monarchie. II en etablit cinq 
especes; il ne les distingue pas par la forme de la constitution, mais 
par des choses d’accident, comme les vertus ou le vices du prince; ou 
par des choses etrangeres, comme l’usurpation de la tyrannie, ... Les 
anciens, qui ne connoissoient pas la distribution des trois pouvoirs 
dans le gouvernement d ’un seul, ne pouvoient se faire une idee de la 
monarchie' (De V  esprit des lois, XI, 9).
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community which can be governed by free people who are leaders with the 
ability and virtue for political rule is fitted for aristocracy; and 
clearly one where the people have the political capacity to rule and be 
ruled in accord with the law which allots offices on a basis of worth to 
those who are well-off should have a ipottteta. A monarchy, then, 
appears to be for a less developed society where the divergences in 
excellence are more profound among men (see Pol. 1286b).
In the theory of government worked out in the city state at this 
period, therefore, monarchical rule.was assessed in constitutional and 
political terms. A king should be good — to be a true king, a 'god 
among men', must be good — but his position still depended on the 
existence in the kingdom of a certain sort of society. Virtues, however, 
were important in any theoretical discussion of government and citizen­
ship, since it was the duty of the state to cultivate them in the 
citizens, and it was assumed that such virtues varied according to the 
positions occupied. Ruling naturally entailed special responsibilities. 
What is important to notice is that Aristotle concludes that the virtue 
of a good citizen differs from that of a good man because it is partial. 
This division is, significantly, overcome where the ruler is the citizen 
referred to, ’since we take it for granted that the good ruler is both 
good and wise’ {Pot. 1277a). That rule is being used for the good of 
the subjects is of course a difficult matter to determine unless all a 
ruler's actions and motivations are examined. In any case the stress 
falls here on results rather than on the political process by which 
these results were achieved.
The virtues the ruler possesses should be those which are most 
appropriate to him for his task, so that he will owe his position to his 
acquired or innate characteristics. Aristotle stresses this very point 
in the Ethics: ’the friendship of a king for his subjects expresses
itself in benevolence, in which he excels them, for doing good is his 
business' (1161a).5 For Aristotle the virtues had the best field 
of operation in the public sphere, and private life and its transactions 
were a poor imitation of this, necessarily limited in their scope of
5 ( p u X u a  (patvexat . . . ß a a u X e t  yev tpos ß a a u X E U o p c v o o s  ev uxepoxf)  
Euepye atas *  ex) yap tcolel xoxis ßaauXEUopEVOus, E t u e p  aya$os mv 
ETtLpeXELTClL CtUTWV , " V ’ EX) TtpdxXWaUV, OJOTIEp VOpEUS TtpoßdxoüV.
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action; but he was in most cases realistic enough to describe the 
situation as he knew it in the polls,where the virtues were exercised in 
an atmosphere of competition, and justice rather than beneficence was 
the most relevant quality.6 7
In suggesting that ruling on a full-time basis alone gave scope for 
true goodness, Aristotle was considering an ideal case, or else seeing 
the citizen from the standpoint of his (temporary) position as ruler in
*7a polity. This is not quite the same as concluding that the monarch is 
the only worthwhile 'representative* individual, embodying all the 
virtues, and needing subjects for no other reason than that without them 
as passive recipients of his beneficence his qualities would have no 
realization in fact.
The way in which a monarch is described obviously reveals much 
about the political theory of the writer. In the lists of the 
characteristics required in a king which we will be looking at, we may 
see a disenchantment with that side of political life of which writers 
from Herodotus onward had attempted to give an account. There the 
centres of power in a state and the structures of society were just as 
important as the ruler's personal qualities, but in this concentration 
on the individual the very function of rule may be described in a way 
that diminishes the element of power; sole rule may then even come to
6 Note C. Spicq's description of the typically kingly virtue,
philanlhropia: 'Elle unit sens politique et generosite. ... Sa valeur
essentielle est la bienveillance (euvoua ,  cpuXoqipdvriaus) , et parce qu’elle 
est d’abord et de faqon preponderante l’apanage des dieux et des rois, 
cette philanthropic est bonte condescendante vers les sujets, les 
malheureux, les victimes', 'La Philanthropie hellenistique, vertu divine 
et royale', Studia theologioa, 12 (1958), p.188.
7 Note the comment of Eiliv Skard, Euergetes-Concordia, that 'die Idee 
des ßaouXeus euepyexqs  in der Philosophie lässt sich nicht verfolgen; 
(but) Zwei Stellen aus Aristoteles sollen hier stehen' (p.56 note 1).
He then quotes Pol. 1285b: xexapxov ö ’ eiHöos y o v a p x ta s  ßaauXuxhs au
Kaxa xous qpwuxous ypo^ous  exououau xe xau Tidxpuau yuyvo'ytvau xaxa 
vdyov.  öua yap xo xous upmxous yeveadau  xou xXq^ous euepyexas  xaxa 
xexvas h itdXeyov, n öua xo auvayayeuv  n Ttopuaau x^Pa v » eyuyvovxo 
ßaauXeüs cxdvxwv xau xoüs tapaXayßdvouou Tidxptou, and 1310b: kingship
xax ’ d^Lav ydp eaxuv ,  q x a x ’ uö tav  dpexqv n xaxa y e v o s ,  n x a x ’ 
e u e p y e a u a s ,  n xaxa xaöxd xe xau ö d v a y tv .  dxavxes  yap e üepyexqaavxes  h 
öuvdyevou xas tdXeus h xa eövq euepyexeuv exuyxavov xns x ty n s  xau x q s ,  oil 
yev xaxa tdXeyov xwXuaavxes öouXeue tv ,  waxep Kdöpos,  ou 6 ’ eXeude-  
pmaavxes,  watep  Küpos, n xxuoavxes  n xxqadyevoL x^Pa v » watep oil 
Aaxeöabyovutov ßaa tX eus  Hau Maxeödvwv xau MoXoxxwv.
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be called a servitude, or a station which must not be left, as we shall 
see.
We may feel that a writer who uses such language is more concerned 
with describing a good man — believed to be perfectly displayed in the 
ruler — than in showing a politician at work. To the problems of 
fourth-century democracy writers offered the 'unico moderatore’:
La soluzione si ottiene deducendo logicamente dalla perfezione 
etica le virtü e le qualitä pertinenti alia cura di uomini — 
giustizia, moderazione, filantropia, benevolenza. L’immagine 
del sovrano viene costruita con tratti immobili ed eterni, 
senza nessum riferimento storico e senza nessuna seria 
prospettiva di articolazione costituzionale nello ambiente 
contemporaneo.8
The characteristics and functions examined below are those which appear 
most frequently linked to the position of the ruler, even though they 
may often be recommended for others too.
Thus the representatives of the polis whom we are considering refer 
in their works to the qualities they believe desirable in citizens in 
general, but both Isocrates and Xenophon also provide eulogies of dead 
rulers — of Evagoras of Cyprus and Agesilaus of Sparta respectively — 
and ’advice to a ruler’, in the To NToocles and the Hiero. These works 
are notable for their loose internal structure, brought about mainly by 
the inclusion of lists of virtues and civic acts drawn from the stock 
wisdom of the day, particularly, in Isocrates’ case, from the gnomic 
poets. To these compositions of both sorts with their descriptions of 
civic virtues and kingly qualities we shall now turn. We shall be 
trying to assess how important, in the writers’ view, these personal 
attributes are in government. This should help us to understand their 
attitude to the function of rule and to determine whether the community 
retained any of its former significance for theorists.
ISOCRATES
In the To Nicocles, Isocrates does at least give us a clear
8 Andreotti, 'Per una Critica dell’ Ideologia di Alessandro Magno’, 
p.287.
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description of his view of kingship in his definition of the ruler's 
task, with which he believes no one would wish to quarrel. A king 'puts 
an end to a city's misfortunes, preserves it (ötacpuAdoaet) when it is 
doing well, and makes it great when it is small' (To Nie. 9). We are 
not told how a ruler is to do this, nor is the basis of his power 
discussed, but it is important to keep this account in mind, since such 
precision about the royal duties is rare.
The virtues that Isocrates recommends to young men are piety to the 
gods, reverence for parents, moderation in all aspects of life (Dem. 
13-14), modesty, justice and self-control ( a u o x u v n ,  öuMauoauvq and 
ooocppoouvq) , respect for friends, obedience to laws, self-improvement in 
matters of learning, courtesy and the like {Dem. esp. 15, and 20-40 
passim). Such virtues, while appropriate for a private citizen, are, 
Isocrates implies, also those of a king, for he advises Democritus to 
'imitate the character of kings and follow their ways' {Dem. 36). The 
purpose of such a course of conduct in the subjects is the winning of 
esteem and favour ( c uvoloi) rather than their personal moral development.
Certainly the qualities Isocrates recommends to the ruler Nicocles 
are similar to those above — piety, truth and justice {To Nie. 17ff.), 
urbanity and dignity {To Nie. 34) and again he has Nicocles claim, as 
royal virtues, justice and temperance {Nie. 29ff.). Advocacy of these 
traits is of course mixed in with advice of a more utilitarian kind, and 
even the encouragement to virtue is reinforced by appeals to self- 
interest. But Isocrates nonetheless considers such qualities an 
important part of a ruler's qualifications: ooovuep raus XLyats xwv
aAAoav Ttpo^ xeuS, xoooöxov wau toils apexabs auxwv ö l o l ü g l s  {To Nie. 11).
There is a responsibility on a ruler, simply because he is a ruler, 
to display virtue. Thus in the model ruler, Theseus, Isocrates sees 
oufho ril\j and beneficence as two elements of equal importance, the one 
granting him the right to rule (xfj yev e^ououqt xupavvwv)  the other 
endearing him to the people (tabs 6’ t u t p y e o t a L S  öqyaywywv,  Het. 37).
His wish is for monarchy to be able to function without the use of force 
or fraud — a highly unlikely possibility. This idealism reappears in 
Isocrates' discussion on activities that are politically efficacious, 
where he tells the Athenians in The Deaee that virtue and its elements 
are most effective, whether for gaining money, reputation or anything
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else, or happiness in general, and recommends the usual virtues, piety, 
moderation and justice on these grounds (Peace 63 and 31-2).
Isocrates' account of Evagoras' life tells of his wonderful 
achievements but also stresses just such qualities, although courage and 
wisdom, goodwill and self-control here complete the list (Evag. 23, 
43ff.). Isocrates had frequently referred to the Athens of former times 
as beneficent, and owing its elevated position among the Greeks to that 
fact, but he applies this quality to the monarch, especially Philip, 
with such frequency that Skard comments that it cannot be denied 'dass 
die eüepyexqg-Idee ein Grundgedanke der ganzen monarchischen Agitation 
des Isokrates gewesen ist'.9 The term carried no odious political 
connotations, and so Isocrates could advise Philip: cpnyt yotp XPhva  ^ae
xoug yev "EAAqvag euepyexeuv ,  Maxeödvwv 6e ßaouAeueuv, xwv 6e ßapßdpwv 
mg TiAeuaxwv apyeuv (.Phil. 154). 10
Philanthropic1 also appears as a kingly quality. The king must be 
(puAdvdpmTiog xau (puAoTtoALg (To Nie. 15) . Philip must show the Greeks xqv 
(ptAav^ pwTiLav Mat xqv euvouav and again Ttpadxqxa Hau (pLAavdpwTiuav (Phil. 
114 and 116) .* 11 One of a king's main tasks is to create harmony (note 
etg oyovouav 6e Maxaaxqaag [Panath. 77] and xPh ••• tong opdwg 
BaöLAeuovxag ... xdg TtoAetg ev oyovouqt Tieupaadau 6tdyeuv [Nie. 41]).
While Isocrates stresses the king's need for a certain measure of 
skill, at times he also appears to rate personal excellence above this: 
'Rule yourself no less than others' —
nal  xoöB’ nyoö ßacruAtMwxaxov, av yn6cyLqt öouAeu^g xmv qöovmv,
9 Skard, Euergetes-Conoordia, p.55.
10 Cf. Evag. 45, xoug yev cpuAoug xaug euepyeauaug uep’ aüxqj uououyevog,
xoug 6’ aAAoug xri yeyaAo^uyd^t xaxaöouAouyevog, and note Skard's comment 
(ib. p.58) that 'es ist etwas ganz verschiedenes, über Barbaren und über 
Hellenen zu herrschen; ... Man hat wohl angenommen, dass das Wort 
tüepyexcLV hier [in Phil. 154] nur ein Euphemismus sei; ... aber das 
Wort eiJEpycxetv enthält keine Unklarheit, wir haben hier keine 
Umschreibung; euepyexeüv heisst: euepyexrig sein. Die zwei anderen
Worte — ßaabAeueuv, apytEV — sind ganz klar, enthalten staatsrechtlich 
unzweideutige Begriffe; dasselbe lässt sich von dem Wort EnepyexeCv 
sagen'.
11 'Medio saeculo quarto a C. n. cpuAav^pmuda primum significat amorem 
divinum in hominem, deinde hominis —  Max’ e£c>xhv principis —  in hominem'
S. Tromp de Ruiter, 'De vocis quae est (ptAavdpmuua significatione atque 
usu', Mnemosyne, N.S. 59 (1932), pp.283-4.
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ot A Act xpaxqs  Ttov ercuSuy uoov yctAAov q xwv xoAuxoov ( To Nie .  29) .
Here we f i n d  a c o n c e r n  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  m o ra l  e f f o r t  t h a t  can e a s i l y  be 
d e t a c h e d  from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  o f  t h e  a d v i c e ,  b u t  
t h e  emphas i s  may a l s o  r e f l e c t  I s o c r a t e s ’ b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  r u l e r ’ s example 
had a  p o w e r f u l  im pa c t  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t s .  He e x p r e s s e s  
t h i s  view f r e q u e n t l y  a s  a g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e .  The e a r l y  A t h e n ia n s  
e x c e l l e d  t h e i r  n e i g h b o u r s ,  and t h e i r  k i n g s
?iaav od n a uöeuaavxes  xo 7iAq§os ev apexrj xad öuxauoouvq xad 
tcoAAt) aoocppoadvT}, xau 6u6d£avxes  uiv öuwxouv, aitep eyoo 
cpavedqv av uoxepov edpqxws q ’ melvol Ttpa^avxes, oxu naaa 
uoAuxeua epuyq toAecos eoxu (P ana th . 138) .
So,  l e t  a s i n g l e  man a t t a i n  t o  wisdom, and a l l  men who a r e  w i l l i n g  to  
s h a r e  h i s  i n s i g h t  w i l l  r e a p  t h e  b e n e f i t  (Paneg . 2 ) . 12
Th is  m ora l  im p a c t  e x p l a i n s  why i t  i s  so m ons t rous  f o r  t h e  worse  to  
r u l e  t h e  b e t t e r  ( s e e  To Nie .  14) even i f  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  i n  which  ’ the  
b e t t e r ’ e x c e l  have  l i t t l e  d i r e c t  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  
t h e  s t a t e .  R u le ,  f a r  f rom b e i n g  u n a l l o y e d  s e l f - i n d u l g e n c e ,  i s  r i g h t l y  
s e e n  as  a b u r d e n  —
oAdyous Ttovobg TtoAAas pqiaxoovas xxooyevos, aAA ’ ou 6ua yuxpas 
pqSuydas yeyaAous itovous uuoAeoudyevos (Evag. 4 5 ) .
Theseus  d id  n o t ,  l i k e  o t h e r s ,  hand  o v e r
xous yev xovous aAAous xcov 6 ’ qöovoov auxos yovos onteAauev, 
aAAa xous yev xuvöuvous uöuous ei toueuxo,  xas  6 ’ aupeAeuas 
auaauv eus  xd xouvdv duteöuöou (HeZ. 36,  c f .  Feace 9 1 ) .
A good k i n g  l i k e  E va go ras  l e f t  o u t  ’none o f  t h e  t h i n g s  which  a r e  
a d v a n ta g e o u s  f o r  k i n g s  t o  p o s s e s s ,  b u t  f rom each  k i n d  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
p i c k e d  o u t  t h e  b e s t ’ —
Mai öqyoxuxds yev oov xq xou TtAq'Sous ftepaTieuqi, tioAuxuxos 6e xrj
12 Cf.  To Nie.  31: yq xous yev aAAous d^dou xooydoos Cqv, xous be
6aauAdas dxaxxoos, aAAa xqv aauxou aoocppoauvqv napdbeuyya xous aAAous 
xaddaxq ,  y uyvwaxoov , ox i  xo xqs rcoAecos oAqs q$os oyououxau xous dpyououv.
Note a l s o  Areop. 22: 6ua xauxqs  mxouv xqv tioAu v , oux f-6 aTiavxoov xas  apyas  
xAqpouvxes aAAa xous ßeAxdoxous xau xous uxavooxaxous dtp’ exaaxov xcov 
epyoov upoxpdvovxes • xououxous yap qAxuCov eaeodau  xau xous aAAous, odou 
Tiep av coo u v ol xcov rpayyaxoov e r u o x a x o u v x e s , and N ie .  37: ßouAdyevos • • •
Ttapdöeuyya xaxaoxqoau xdv xporcov xdv eyauxou xous aAAous toA uxaus ,  
yuyvuioxcov, dxu cpuAeu xd itAq-dos t v  xodxous xous Euuxqöeuyaou xov ßuov 
öudyeuv ,  ev ods av xous apyovxas  xous auxcov opooou ö u a x p u ß o v x a s .
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i n s  TidXews dxns ßuoLMnoeu, öTpaTnytKos 6e xfj upos xoug 
xlvöuvous eüßouXua, xupavvuKos öe xtp Tiaau xouxols ßuacpepeuv 
(Evag. 46) .
Th is  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  l e a d e r  e n a b l e  him to  be a l l  
t h i n g s  to  a l l  men, so t h a t  he  can  b y p a s s  t h e  no rm a l  p r o c e d u r e s  and 
t r a n s c e n d  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  government  by which v a r i o u s  i n t e r e s t  
groups  s e e k  t o  r e a l i z e  t h e i r  a im s .  H is  t a s k  o f  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  w i l l  
e f f e c t i v e l y  t a k e  him o u t  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  a s  i t  took  Theseus  who 
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  demos a t  t h e  head  o f  government  on ly  to  f i n d  h i m s e l f  
c a l l e d  upon to  gove rn  (HeZ. 3 6 ) .  Under  a l l  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i f  w e l l - r u n ,  
man can l i v e  w e l l  (Panath. 1 3 2 ) ;  how many p e o p le  govern  i s  n o t  f o r  
I s o c r a t e s  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n . 13
I s o c r a t e s  l i k e s  to  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a k i n g  can r u l e  w i t h o u t  much use  o f  
f o r c e ,  s i n c e  he n a t u r a l l y  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  p e r s u a s i o n  i s  t h e  b e s t  way to  
a c h i e v e  r e s u l t s  ( s e e  To Nie .  24 w i t h  t h e  e ncou ragem en t  t o  r u l e  xtp Ttdvxag 
nxxaaOaL xns ans  ö u a v o u a s ) . T h i s  a v o i d a n c e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  i s  
s t r i k i n g  i n  one who i s  i n  many ways so d o w n - t o - e a r t h  and p r a g m a t i c .
XENOPHON
Xenophon ' s  c o n c e r n  t h a t  men i n  power s h o u ld  be v i r t u o u s  i s  even  
more n o t e w o r t h y  t h a n  I s o c r a t e s '  and he  shows c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  t h e  v a l u e s  
he e s p o u s e s ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  s e t t i n g  i s  d e m o c r a t i c  Athens  w i t h  S o c r a t e s  a s  
t h e  h e r o ,  o r  t h e  c o u r t  o f  H i e r o  o r  A g e s i l a u s  w i t h  one-man r u l e  t h e  norm. 
The q u a l i t i e s  Xenophon l o o k s  f o r  must  i n c l u d e  t h e  v i r t u e s  s i n c e  r u l i n g  
i s  f o r  him n o t  m e r e ly  a s k i l l ,  b u t  an a r e t e  a s  w e l l  {Mem. 4 . 2 . 1 1 ) .
These d e s i r a b l e  t r a i t s  c o n s i s t  o f  p i e t y ,  j u s t i c e ,  s e l f - c o n t r o l ,  
c o u r a g e ,  wisdom and p a t r i o t i s m  and such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a s  u r b a n i t y  and
13 But  s e e  P h i l .  107 where  I s o c r a t e s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  p e o p l e s  
need  d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  gove rnm e n t :  nituaxaxo ( P e r d i c c a s )  . . .  xous yev
"EXXqvas oux e tS ta y e v o u s  uuoyefveuv xas yovapy^as ,  xous 6 ’ aXXous ou 
öuvayevous aveu xqs xouauxqs Öuvaaxeuas ölolmclv xov ßuov xov acpexepov 
aüxwv. T h i s  i s  no d oub t  an example  o f  I s o c r a t e s '  d i p l o m a t i c  
i n t e r c e s s i o n  on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  Greeks  and t h e i r  s p e c i a l  p o s i t i o n .  P h i l i p  
was n o t ,  p e r h a p s ,  f o r  a l l  I s o c r a t e s '  p r a i s e ,  q u i t e  t h e  i d e a l  r u l e r  he 
c o u ld  a c c e p t  as  a n o t h e r  Theseus  f o r  A t h e n s ,  and i n  any c a s e  many o t h e r  
A t h e n ia n s  would h a r d l y  have  a c c e p t e d  P h i l i p  i n  t h i s  r o l e .
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f o r e s i g h t .  These were p o s s e s s e d  by A g e s i l a u s  whose c h a r a c t e r  and deeds  
a r e  b o t h  d e s c r i b e d  much as  I s o c r a t e s  d e s c r i b e d  Evagoras ' .  14 The k i n g ' s  
p o s i t i o n  as  s e t  f o r t h  by Xenophon i s  s h a r p l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from t h a t  o f  
mere c l a i m a n t s  to  t h e  t h r o n e ;  k i n g s  and r u l e r s  a r e  n o t  t h o s e  who h o ld  
t h e  s c e p t r e s  o r  t h o s e  who have  been  s e l e c t e d  by a p a r t i c u l a r  body o f  
p e o p l e  o r  have  had t h e  l u c k  o f  t h e  l o t  o r  go t  t h e i r  way by u s i n g  f o r c e  
o r  d e c e i t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h o s e  who know how t o  r u l e  {Mem. 3 . 9 . 1 0 ) . 15 The 
d u t i e s  t h a t  a p p e a r  most  i m p o r t a n t  r e f l e c t  Xenophon’ s own p r e o c c u p a t i o n s .  
' I t  i s  . . .  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g  t o  f i n d  t h a t  he t e n d e d  t o  r e g a r d  the  
p rob le m  o f  government  a s  one o f  s e c u r i n g  and m a i n t a i n i n g  d i s c i p l i n e ,  and 
t h e  good c i t i z e n  as  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h e  good s o l d i e r ,  o r  r a t h e r  t h e  good 
o f f i c e r . ' 16
The two t y p e s  o f  a c t i v i t y  b e l o n g i n g  n a t u r a l l y  t o  t h e  r u l e r  a r e  
e n c o u r a g i n g  v i r t u o u s  a c t i v i t y  and r e w a r d i n g  t h o s e  who p e r f o r m  i t  (and  i n  
g e n e r a l  a ux p ... p CTtLyeAeua dta xa PL/Ta)V yLy ve x a t )  and p r o n o u n c in g  
c e n s u r e  and p u n i shm e n t  {Hiero 9 . 2 ) .  Such a f u n c t i o n  o f  c o u r s e  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  t h e  r u l e r ' s  p o s s e s s i n g  a l l  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  v i r t u e s  h i m s e l f .
I n  p i e t y ,  h o n e s t y ,  s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e  and c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  o t h e r s  he 
s h o u l d  be a model  f o r  a l l  ( s e e  Cyr. 8 . 1 . 2 1 f f . ) .  The k i n g  i s  chosen  n o t  
so t h a t  he may t a k e  good c a r e  o f  h i m s e l f  b u t  so t h a t  t h o s e  u n d e r  him may 
p r o s p e r  {Mem. 3 . 2 . 3 ) .  T h i s  o f  c o u r s e  i s  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  A r i s t o t l e  u s e s  to  
s e p a r a t e  t h e  good i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  k i n g s h i p  from t h e  bad one o f  t y r a n n y ,  
b u t  Xenophon, u n l i k e  A r i s t o t l e ,  makes no a t t e m p t  t o  a n a l y s e  t h e  s o c i e t y  
t h a t  c o u ld  p ro d u c e  t h e s e  forms o f  gove rnm en t .  'E s  i s t  f ü r  s e i n e  
Anschauung b e z e i c h n e n d ,  d a s s  das  H a u p tg e w ich t  immer a u f  d i e  P e r s ö n l i c h ­
k e i t  des  H e r r s c h e r s  f ä l l t . ' 17 T h e r e f o r e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  p e r fo rm e d  by t h e
14 Compare Ages.  3-9 and summary, 11,  and Evag. 43:  ev xouauxaus 6 ’
eTtLyeXetaLS auxov Maxaaxpoas ouöe Tiept xwv Kara xpv pyepav CMaoxpv 
TipoouunTovT wv ouöe Tiepu ev ite itAavpy e'vws z Z \ z v , aAA ’ ouxw -öeocpLXws moil' 
(ptXav^pojTtoos ölwmcl xpv tioAlv waxe xous eLoacpuMVoupevous yp yaAAov 
Euayopav i ris  apyns  CnAouv p xoi^s aAAous xps uit’ cmelvou  SaaLXeuas’ a i a v x a  
yap xdv xpd^cw 6 l£x£aeaev ouöe'va yev aÖLMwv, xous 6c xPrlaT0 )^S xuywv, x a i  
acpdöpa yev ontavxwv ctpxwv, voytyms 6e xous e^ayapxdvxas  MoXaCwv.
15 BaauXcLs 6c moil äpxovxas ou xous xa OMpitxpa exovxas ecpp e£va,L, ouöe 
xous ÜTid xwv xuxovxwv a tpeOevxas ,  ouöe xous MXppw Xaydvxas, ouöe xous 
ßuaaayevous ,  ouöe xous eComaxpaavxas, aXXa xous eTttoxayevous apx^LV.
16 T.A.  S i n c l a i r ,  A History o f  Greek P o li t ica l  Thought, p . 1 7 1 .
17 S ka rd ,  Euergetes-Concordia, p . 4 9 .
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ruler are done for friends, and not for the poZis in general.18 
Xenophon attributes to Agesilaus the belief that it was the task of a 
good king to benefit his subjects as much as possible (Ages. 7.1).19 
Cyrus was called father at his death and clearly this is a title of a 
benefactor more than of one who is grasping (Cyr. 8.2.9). The tyrant 
Hiero is advised to surpass all in deeds of benefaction (Hiero 11.14); 
unsolicited generosity to anyone brings the benefactor the favour of the 
recipient (Ages. 4.4). The display of phiZanthropia is commendable in 
general (note Cyr. 1.21, c^ uxhv 6e cptAavdpwnoxaxos, cf. 1.4.1) and kings
especially may hope to obtain the goodwill of their associates in this 
2 0way.
The ideal king is more concerned to lead the citizens to every 
virtue than to lead them against their enemies (Ages. 10.2). He must 
therefore as a first step to this exercise control over himself: this
for Xenophon as for Isocrates is a precondition for rule over others. 
Agesilaus, for example, judged himself less by his rule over others than 
by his rule over himself ('Lb. ) . This self-control entitles a 
ruler to set himself up as an example, and the sight of one who may do 
as he pleases exercising self-restraint inspires subjects to emulation 
(Cyr. 8.1.30). Thus we see how ’the state reflects the character of the 
leading citizens’ (Ways and Means 1.1)21 and 'whenever the leader becomes 
better the habits [of the state] improve, and whenever he degenerates 
[they become] baser' (Cyr. 8.1.8).
18 As Skard (ib. p.50) also notes: ’Es ist dies mehr das Ideal eines
freigebigen und leutseligen Junkers als das eines Königs.’ Höistad 
makes a similar comment (Cynic Hero and Cynic King, p.79): ’The
monarchic ideal which Xenophon constructs on this foundation necessarily 
remains on the plane of individual ethics, without social or political 
facets. The euepyexns-idea, which Cyrus represents, is non-political: 
it is exclusively euepyexeüv xous cptXous, never euepyexetv xqv toAtv ... 
Thus the eulogy of Cyrus becomes a eulogy of the good man rather than 
the great prince.’
19Gottlob Barner, Comparantur inter se Graeci de Regentiim Hominim 
Virtutibus Auctores (Schirling, Marburg, 1889), shows how frequently the 
idea of ’doing good’ and ’benefiting’ appears in Xenophon, commenting: 
’Virtutes iam regis quales sint, copiosius explicatur apud utrumque' 
(i.e. Xenophon and Dio, p.22).
20Cyrus had his favoured courtiers to dine with him otopcvog mOTiep 
xau xots muolv eytoteuv xtva Hat xouxo euvotav (Cyr. 8.2.4).
21 oitouot xtves yap av ol Tipooxaxau wot, xotouxot nau ou tnt ’ auxous ms 
cut xo tioAu yuyvovxab.
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Indeed the right to rule itself depends on a man’s being morally 
superior to those ruled, and Xenophon has Cyrus proclaim that he does 
not think it suitable for anyone to rule who is not better than his 
subjects (C y r . 8.1.37).22 He seems to believe that there is a special 
type of person whose moral and intellectual character fits him for 
rule. For such a person, governing may well bring satisfaction but it 
is hardly a source of pleasure as generally understood.
Agesilaus is at the service of the laws (ydluoxa xotg voyotg 
Aaxpeuwv, A g e s . 7.2), and Cyrus believes a ruler is distinguished not by 
his easy life but by his forethought and love of effort (C y r. 1.6.8).
True rule can therefore be considered in some measure a burden imposed 
by a sense of duty, and thus as far as possible unlike the tyrant’s way 
of conducting affairs (see Mem. 2.1). Cambyses and Astyages can be 
contrasted on the grounds that one practised kingly behaviour, the other 
tyrannical {C yr . 1.3.18). Rule in accord with law over willing subjects 
alone is entitled to be called kingship but there is no hard-and-fast 
way of assessing when this occurs.23 What is clear is that persuasion 
is the preferred method of obtaining compliance (see Mem. 1.2.10 and 
1.2.45) and Xenophon, like Isocrates, shrinks from the realities of power 
politics. Xenophon’s ’king’, in short, is no rounded political figure, 
working within a complex social structure, but simply a noble individual.
ARISTEAS
The questions and answers on kingship that appear in the Symposia 
of Aristeas’ letter deal almost exclusively with the king's private 
behaviour and only occasionally refer to external matters, when, for 
example, the approved way of having public buildings erected or of 
organizing the army is discussed. Even here however the problem is
22 See e.g. Cyr . 1.6.25: Mat ini xwv upa^ewv 6c, qv yev ev 3epeu mat, 
tov apyovia 6eu xou qAuou uAeovexxoUvxa cpavepov e£vaf hv 6e ev 
Xetywvt, xou ^uyous’ hv 6e 6ua yoy^wv, xwv tovwv itavxa yap xauxa eig 
to (ptXeta-daL utio xwv dpxoyevwv ouAAayßdvet.
23 See Mem. 4.6.12: BaauAetav 6e xau xupavvuöa äpyas yev aycpoxepag
qyetxo e£vau, ötacpepetv 6e aXXhXmv evoytCe. xqv yev yap exdvxoov xe xwv 
avdpwuwv xau xaxa voyous twv toXewv apyhv ßaauAeuav hyttxo, xqv 6e 
axovxwv xe xau yq xaxa voyoug, aXX’ ouwg 6 dpywv ßouXouxo, xupavvuöa.
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posed in terms of the correct moral attitude. Yet there are after all 
different types of moral behaviour. How similar are the injunctions on 
conduct given by the seventy-two Jewish sages to those provided by 
Isocrates and Xenophon (taken as precursors of the counsellors of kings 
of the Hellenistic Age)? What definition of kingship did they assume?
Firstly, the importance of justice as a royal and private virtue 
has clearly not declined, but it is here applied to rather strange 
situations.24 Thus the permanence of the works of a king is ensured by 
his granting justice to the builders (258-9), and for success in war one 
needs justice and an appeal to God (193) . Justice is important in 
dealing with legal pleas and a just king will of course be impartial 
(291, 191) . But this is the closest that an answer comes to connecting 
this virtue with a particular part of the administrative process. In 
general justice is assumed to be an element in all the contacts of a 
virtuous and well-educated king with his subjects:
Da steht denn an erster Stelle die Gerechtigkeit, aus der 
Platon alle übrigen Tugenden gerade im Hinblick auf den Staat 
abgeleitet hatte; 6uxcu,oöüvn oder to öuxauov, xa  ÖLHara  sind 
der Kern aller Herrschertugend.25
Other areas of life in which justice is to be exercised could be 
the concern equally of the private citizen. In some cases this interest 
in improvement of character in all aspects can be accounted for by 
seeing the origin of a particular question-and-answer not in a treatise 
on kingship itself, but in the writer's need to make up the number of 
questions by adding some on general topics (see e.g. 212 and 232). The 
king comes closest to being a representative of justice and its 
dispenser in a concrete way in the account of how he should fit in with 
the multitudes, of diverse origin, in his kingdom ( ta pyL yo iv  oyAmv ovtwv , 
267). Here the ruler by means of justice assumes the proper role for
24 Oswyn Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.355, notes how 
the 'common idea' that 'the king's aim should be justice in every action 
(189) and thought (212)' is 'surprisingly little emphasized', and 
suggests that this may be because in Egypt 'the notion of absolute 
justice required qualification to meet a situation where more than one 
system of law applied'. Perhaps too there was a certain reticence among 
the Jews about involving the king with this attribute so much associated 
with Jahweh, even though the king was advised to imitate God in other 
respects. He should be just but not Justice itself.
25 Wilhelm Schubart, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal', p.6.
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each. What is really being sought here is a harmonizer and reconciler 
rather than a judicial officer, and this question shows evidence of the 
Jewish composition of the letter in its concern for those elements of 
the society which are alien to the rest.
Equality is recommended, but purely as a means to avoid personal 
temptations to pride, so such advice would be appropriate to any man in 
high position. The stress on the fact that the ruler leads men as a man 
(and hence should preserve equality) — ’God humbles the proud and the 
gentle and humble he exalts1 (263) — though reminiscent in some ways of 
Isocrates' advice, seems to be derived more from the common Jewish 
expression of this sentiment.26 It is a frank avowal of the chances and 
changes of fortune that may befall the great, and somewhat at odds with 
the deference to the powerful shown in most of the answers.
Other qualities invoked include those suitable for all men — 
temperance and piety, for instance — but also that particularly 
recommended to monarchs by Isocrates and Xenophon — self-control. It is 
once more the touchstone of the kingly nature, supplying the definition 
of the essence of kingship; for kingship is ruling oneself well (xotAwg 
äpxetv cauTou, 211). The 'highest rule' is 'having power over oneself 
and not being carried away by one's desires' (221-2). Attention is 
here directed away from the ruler's public duties to such an extent that 
a private definition of rule has taken over.
That the ruler is the source of all bounty is one of the chief 
motifs of the Letter. In this respect it resembles the official 
documents of the Ptolemies which detail the acts of beneficence of the 
monarch. In view of the frequency with which the philanthropi-a of the 
prince is praised in them 'il est clair qu’aucun "philosophe" n’est 
responsable de la mise en valeur de cette vertu du Souverain, ni meme de 
sa precellence sur toutes les autres qualites'.27 This characteristic 
appears to be the most 'kingly' quality mentioned (and see e.g. 208,
288) and yet the sentiments expressed often apply just as well to any
26 Cf. N.T. Luke, 1.51-2: öueaxdpittaev unepncpavous ÖLavotqt xapötag
aüxüjv xadcCAev Suvaarag ano dpdvmv xau •ojjwoev touiglvous, and note also 
the sources for such expressions in, among other places, 2 Sam. 22.28; 
Ps. 147; Job 12.19, 5.11; and 1 Sam. 2.7-8.
27 Spicq, 'La Philanthropie hellenistique', p.185.
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2 gman in comfortable circumstances. Obtaining goodwill of subjects or 
friends is still of primary importance (190, 205) . There is a certain 
acknowledgement that the king's position of itself demands exceptional 
displays of generosity, and ETtLELHELa is closely linked with this (see 
207 on this quality).29
The intellectual qualities which are important in rule are 
mentioned comparatively rarely: possessing an acute intelligence and
being able to judge each detail 'is a gift of God' which will enable the 
monarch to be aware if he is being deceived (276) , but most references to 
the powers of perception are more concerned with the paternal caring 
role of the king. His mind must be occupied with the care (ettyeXeLa) 
of his people, and good counsel ( e uBouAloi) consists in correct action 
with deliberation, having in mind the ill results of the opposite course 
(245, 255).
The king's constant study of official journals has in view the 
people's amelioration and preservation —  ETictvdpSwoLg mocl ö t a v o y n  (283, 
cf. 240). 3 0 Care and watchfulness ( y e p t y v a  Mat (ppovxtg)  are needed to 
ensure that no wrong be inflicted on the people by those set over them 
(271). The support of friends is ensured by foresight for the 
multitudes over which the king rules (190) . This care resembles the 
attitude of pity for the failings of the weak; the king is to deal with 
the subjects and wrong-doers as one would wish to be treated onself, and 
to admonish the good very gently (207).31
28 See Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.350, note 2 for a 
list of questions and answers not specifically applicable to kings.
29 Cf. 290. The king is great and ou xoaouxo v  xij 6 o^ t^ xf)S apxns Mat 
it A o UT(p Ttpoaxwv, oaov etile lhel ,^ wai  (ptAav^pmuLot he surpasses all men. 
See the comments of Hans Kloft, Liberalst as Principis (Böhlau, Cologne 
and Vienna, 1970), pp.30-31, and, for historical instances of royal 
beneficence and care, see e.g. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the 
Hellenistic Period, Letter 25 with the mention of cpLAavBpwTtELV, and 
euvolcx (of subjects towards the kings, clearly because of gratitude for 
favours) and Letter 52, where (ptAdv-dpumog and upovoLa are used with a 
very concrete sense.
30 See 240. The king will do nothing lawless, but knowing oil rag
etilvoCotg 6 §Eog eöwme tolg voyo§£xnoaoL Tipog to oioCsa^aL xoug BLoug xwv 
av§pcoxwv he will follow these impulses. (Note also 273.)
31 See Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.360, note 1, on 
instances of the use of e u l e l k eLot, ÖLHctLoouvri and euepyeolcx, all of 
which qualities are related to God and thence to the ruler.
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These attributes of themselves suggest that the king is indeed to 
be like a god on earth whose task is to think for his subjects and to 
care for their needs; that he should also by his example affect their 
moral lives is not stressed. Only once are patience and gentleness 
advocated as a means of turning wrong-doers from wickedness and leading 
them to repentance (188). The Hellenistic monarch appeared to Aristeas 
far more as an individual abstracted from the task of positively 
improving them by his example and precept than were the ideal monarchs 
described by his Athenian predecessors in this genre. The ruler's 
character, however, is of immense importance to himself.
When the essence of being a king (avaYxauoxaxos xpoxos BctauXeuas) 
can be defined as 'being incorruptible, sober and a lover of justice' 
(209), 'given to the exercise of self-control' (211), we are a long way 
from Aristotle and his definition — the rule of one man aiming at the 
common good, and based on merit (Pol. 1279a, 1310b), and 'sovereignty 
over the greater part of affairs with the subjects' consent' (1313a). 
These considerations may be implied in Aristeas' answers but they are 
not what constitutes kingship for him. Still less, incidentally, is the 
possession of the art of ruling —  Plato's alternative definition of 
kingship offered in the Pol'it'ious — relevant to the Hellenistic monarch 
we meet here.
The 'greatest thing' in kingship — the subject of the last question 
— does, appropriately, involve the subjects, pointing to the results of 
the actions and attitudes previously recommended to the ruler: 'for the
subjects to subsist always in a state of peace and to procure justice 
quickly in their suits' in this 'greatest thing' (291). Such a 
situation requires an orderly administration and a considerable 
bureaucracy, as well as all the virtues advocated previously. Yet the 
former are not described in the advice on governing. It should be noted 
too how limited these aims are in comparison with those of Plato and 
Aristotle for whom the state by government action was to bring about the 
good life for each citizen.
Ultimately for Aristeas kingship exists; it is not an 
institution which can be questioned. He is not interested in 
theoretical discussion about forms of government. If we ask 
the question, what is the justification for the existence of 
kingship, Aristeas' answer is given indirectly.32
Note 32 over page.
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We may indeed conclude that although at one level kingship exists for 
the benefit of the subjects, the king's main care is to behave well in 
that state of life to which it has pleased God to call him. Similarly, 
references to what would constitute bad behaviour in an unfit ruler 
apply just as suitably to a bad man.
HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES
The Hellenistic Empires by their very existence provided food for 
thought for political commentators as well as leaving for posterity 
considerable material on the practical business of running a kingdom and 
disseminating propaganda. Polybius worked within this framework of 
particular political and social views, and himself described the 
qualities of kings and the essence of kingship in his systematic account 
of the development and downfall of various constitutions. Not every 
monarchy, he asserts, can be truly called kingship, but only that 
voluntarily accepted by the subjects, where they are governed rather by 
an appeal to their reason than by fear and force (6.4.2).
A king is expected to display particular traits and here too the 
contrast with the tyrant is maintained, for it is the part of a tyrant 
to do evil and make himself master of men by fear against their will: 
it is that of a king to do good to all (5.11.6). This doing good is the 
exercise of a benefactor's role which we have encountered as one of the 
frequently-mentioned traits, and consists in beneficence and humanity, 
euepyeaua Mat (ptAav^pmuta, which merit the people's love (ib.).
Kingship in fact takes its origins from the help rendered by the 
strong to the weak (6.6.8). Yet the constitution by which a country is 
governed, if it is a good one, should itself determine the fortunes of a 
state and the king should be one of many virtuous men. When the high 
qualities of the leading men alone are responsible for a state's success,
32 Murray, 'Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship', p.359.
33 Thus, Cleomenes was ouAAqßönv qycyoVLHOS Hat ßaauÄLHOS tt) (puoet 
because he was, among other things, avqp yevoyevos xat tpos ras oytAuas 
etuöe^uos xau Tipos tpayycrroov ouxovoytav eucpoqs (Polybius, 5.39.6).
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this is in Polybius' eyes a ground for assessing a constitution as a 
failure (6.43.4ff.). But he still maintains that the constitution 
itself should be largely concerned with the implantation of particular 
qualities in the citizens and should advocate fortitude and temperance, 
which are of course also recommended to kings (6.48.4).
Diodorus Siculus, writing at the end of the Roman Republic, records 
the traits allegedly required of the early kings of Egypt in the first 
volume of his universal history. The king must be self-controlled and 
just, noble-spirited, truthful, beneficent, mild in exacting vengeance, 
but more than equalling a benefactor in his return of benefits (1.70).34 
When he describes Alexander (Book 17, passim) he shows him uniting all 
the virtues of the chief — especially (puXav^pwTtta. 3 5
The ideal put forward here bears a certain resemblance to the image 
of the king displayed by the documents of the royal chancelleries, but 
this suffers from a limited point of view: 'Si tratta di caratteri
immutabili, ehe vengono a delineare il reggitore ideale, in virtu di 
un’analisi dottrinale e non per successivi apporti dell* esperienza 
storica.'36 This conclusion of Andreotti disagrees with that of Skard, 
who does not distinguish sufficiently between theoretical and historical 
validation of monarchical government. The attribution of these 
qualities to the ruler brings about only the former: the realistic
definition of kingship observed in the Suda is totally at odds with the 
theory (see Suda B147 A).
34 'It is obvious that the account [in Diodorus 1.70] is based on an 
idealized "philosophical" view, appropriate to the Ptolemies rather than 
to their Persian or Egyptian predecessors' (Hadas, introduction to 
Aristeas to Philocrates, p.43). Anne Burton, in a recent commentary on 
Book One of Diodorus, takes a different view, and sees the 'idealistic 
representation' of the king's life as 'Egyptian not Greek in origin'
(Diodorus Siculus Book I: A Commentary [Brill, Leiden, 1972], p.209).
35 See Robert Drews, 'Diodorus and his Sources', AJPh, 83 (1962), 
p.392 for references to Alexander's virtues. (Drews here gives the 
original of Hamilton's remark on Diodorus' attitude to successful 
statesman, quoted in the Introduction, note 51.)
36 Andreotti, 'Per una Critica', p.287, note 138. Andreotti believes 
that the corruption of the fourth-century democracy called for an ideal 
ruler whom no actual monarch could reasonably be expected to personify. 
See note 8, this chapter.
37 In discussing Isocrates' contribution to the political debate,
Skard comments, of philosophical justifications of monarchy already
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Cynics and Stoics also put forward the picture of the king but 
somewhat ambiguously. We find that Diogenes is reported as referring 
to the Persian king as ’the most wretched creature’ (Dio, Or. 6.35), 
while the sage is described in terms that Isocrates, for example, would 
apply to the king, and this probably reflects fairly accurately the 
attitude of the historical Diogenes. Epictetus comments of Diogenes, 
the model of Hellenistic Cynicism,
aye, Atoyevqs 6* oux etpcXeu ouöeva, os ouxws nyepos ?)V xat 
(pLXavdpmtoss mare uitep xo\3 xotvoö xwv avdpwTimv xoaouxous 
tdvous xau xaXabTimpuas xou amyaxos äayevos ävaöe'xtcjDai,;
(Epic. 3.24.64).
Antisthenes recommends that irovog which kings are elsewhere encouraged 
to assume as a good, instancing the trials of Hercules and Cyrus, the 
former the epitome of the benefactor, the latter of the ideal king (D.L. 
6.2). This account refers to qualities which the idealistic definition 
of kingship in the Suda also stresses:
n BaouXeua xxqya xmv x o l v w v , aXX ’ oü xa 6riydota xhs "BaaLXeuas 
xxqyaxa. 6to xag avayxns xau ye§’ uBpewg etaTipd^ets wotep 
xupavvuxas otxoXaatas yuaeuv 6eu, xas 6e auv Xoyy xai 
(puXav^pwtLa xmv etaqjopwv duauxpaets wanep xnöeyovuav xtyav 
(Suda B 148) .
The theorists could also be encouraged in the belief that kings 
might themselves share these views by the recorded comment of Antigonus 
Gonatas that 'kingship is an honourable servitude' (Ael. VH 2.20).
worked out, 'die Schwierigkeit lag eben darin, in den Traditionen des 
Volks Anhaltspunkte für die neue Institution zu finden'. He concludes: 
'Solche Anhaltspunkte zu finden, dazu hat Isokrates ausserordentlich 
beigetragen.' In this way, he believes, Isocrates gave monarchy not only 
'ein hohes Ziel und damit eine moralische Berechtigung' but also 'eine 
geschichtliche Legitimation' (p.66, Euergetes-Concovdid) . In the 
paragraph that follows this, however, Skard modifies this conclusion, 
admitting that neither Alexander nor his Hellenistic followers employed 
euepycoLa as the basis of their rule. He maintains simply: 'Wer über
das traditionsreiche, unglückliche Griechenvolk regieren wollte, musste 
als ein suepyexps erscheinen, — das hat Isokrates nicht nur dem Philipp, 
sondern auch den späteren Mazedonierkönigen und noch den römischen 
Erobern verkündigt' (ib.).
38 The exaggeration of royal power and prestige was by no means to 
their liking, and as Kaerst points out, 'die Philosophie, die ja die 
Sorge für das Wohl der Unterthanen für die Aufgabe des Alleinherrschers 
erklärt hatte, hat sich dagegen gewandt' (Julius Kaerst, Studien, p.59). 
Kaerst cites on this the 'Cynic-Stoic' fragment of kingship in the Suda, 
which is quoted later in this text.
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Alexander may appear as the model in some accounts. Strabo, relying on 
the Cynic Onesicritus who accompanied Alexander on his expeditions, 
records the alleged praise of the Macedonian by the Gymnosophists: 
yo'vov ... auTov ev ouAoug (ptAooocpoövTa —  ’he was the only philosopher in 
arms, and they concluded that it was the most valuable thing in the 
world that those who should happen to be wise should have the power to 
persuade the willing and to compel the unwilling to practise self- 
control’ (Strabo 15.1.64). The king's moral role had for Onesicritus 
eclipsed everything else. Eratosthenes, third-century head of the 
library at Alexandria, who expressed the view that the Cynic-Stoic 
Aristo and the sceptical Academic Arcesilaus were the greatest 
philosophers of his day (Strabo 1.2.2), seems to be the source of the 
description of Alexander preserved in Plutarch (Fort. Alex. 329ff.)39 
where the Cynic flavour is strong. He refers too to the conquest of the 
willing by Logos, of the unwilling by force of arms, and —  more 
significant for our investigation —  describes Alexander as molvos . . . 
■öeddev appooxns nat ÖLaAAaxiris twv oAwv (329c) . Plutarch a little 
further on cites Eratosthenes directly, using, with reference to the 
king, the Cynic phraseology aöudcpopa usually associated with the 
imperturbable wise man, and referring to the king as nyeywv xotvos kai 
ßctouAeus (prAdvOpconos (329f-330a) .
Among the Pythagoreans with fragments preserved in Stobaeus, the 
writers on kingship were not the only ones to provide definitions of 
rule. Kallikratidas described the eu l o t o tuxct dpyd as for the benefit of 
the ruled alone, and to be distinguished from political and tyrannical 
rule, which served respectively both ruler and ruled, and ruler alone (V. 
pp.683-4). There is a continual concern for finding a form of 
government that will meet this essentially moral requirement.
Hippodamus (V. p.913) shows the good and prospering citizen possible 
only where there is euvoyuct and in his Tiepu uoALxetas explains that 
kingship is the best form of government because it is the form which 
imitates the divine, but because of the difficulty of keeping it pure
39 See Eduard Schwartz, 'Hekataeos von Teos’, Rhein. Mus., 40 (1885), 
p.254, but we should note the reservations of Ernst Badian, 'Alexander 
the Great and the Unity of Mankind', Historia, 7 (1958), esp. pp.432-5, 
and see too Baldry, 'Zeno's Ideal State', p.13, and his The Unity of 
Mankind in Greek Thought (University Press, Cambridge, 1965), pp.114-20.
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and not a prey to xputpd hcxi, u8pes he prefers a mixture of constitutions 
(pp.35-6).40 Archytas, whose writings may take us back to the fourth 
century, also brings in evidence for the concern of Pythagorean thought 
that the ruler rule not for his own sake but for those under him 
(p.218). He stresses too that his account of the qualities required in 
a ruler applied to a ’true’ king.41
The three writers on kingship develop these suggestions, describing 
the king in detail. The qualities they ascribe to him contain little 
that is new and are also found in the official texts of Hellenistic 
monarchies. The king’s tasks according to Diotogenes are three: 
leading an army, executing justice and giving due attention to the gods. 
Knowledge of the task is important (note eTitoxadeeg , eMyadwv, 
eKAoYLöctyevos). The ruler must be ayeywv, eTtuaxdxag Mau öayeoupydg of 
the auaxaya (p.264). A religious element enters with the juridical 
functions which are connected closely with the idea of bestowing 
benefits (ib.). The king’s worth is indeed judged by his possession in 
outstanding measure of arete, not by his wealth or power or the strength 
of his army (p.266). Diotogenes tells us that arete is important 
because it alone is the preserve of good men (ib.) ; in other words the 
qualifications of a king are the same as those of a good man.
The same extract emphasizes the king’s need for self-control as a 
prerequisite for his controlling others. Superiority in virtue is in 
fact part of his proof of fitness for rule; from it derives his ability 
to impose harmony on his subjects (p.265 and cf. pp.268-9). He must 
also display his kingly qualities (and hence appear neither too harsh 
nor too gentle, avoiding extremes) by giving an impression of majesty, 
being gracious (which involves being just, equitable and merciful,
4 2p.268) and inspiring fear and awe. These are semi-divine attributes,
40 See Armand Delatte, Essai sur la politique pythagovicienne , 
pp.154-5 on Hippodamus.
41 AeC 6e xov aAaduvov apyovxa yq yovov CTtLaxdyovd xe xau öuvaxov ?iyev
nepi xo xaAwg apyev, aAAa Hau cpu AavdpwTrov (Archytas, p.218), and cf. 
Aristoxenus in VP 183: oüxe ydp oüuav ouxe tuo'Alv ex) itoxe av ouxridnvab
yn UTiap^avxos aAqdevou dpyovxog Hau Mupueuovxos xqg apyns xe nau 
eTiuaxaauag eKouauws.
42 Note x^PtCovxa yev eauxov ano xwv dv^pwnlvwv naSe'wv, auveyyuCovxa 
6e xous §eoCg (p.268).
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designed to call forth a response of reverence and not simply obedience 
in the populace (pp.267-70). Diotogenes describes the true (p.266) and 
perfect (p.264) and good (p.269) king, and whoever does not possess the 
characteristics given here is in theory no ruler. Yet despite the fact 
that all kings are supposed to behave as Diotogenes describes (the word 
6tu of the ruler’s obligations is very common in these extracts) this 
does not make the writer wary of the possible corruption of monarchical 
government, but rather enables him to show up his ideal in yet brighter 
colours.
For Sthenidas the wisdom required for rule is the chief quality 
necessary. Its effects will be a mixture of private and public virtue 
if the ruler makes himself yeyaXo'(ppovd xe Kat dycpov Mau oXtyoöeda and 
shows taxpuMav Sud^eatv (p.270). The divine component of rule while 
accounting for the importance of particular attributes such as gentle­
ness and caring shows up once more the cosmic dimensions of the ruler’s 
qualities, so that there is little point in the writer’s describing the 
ruler as an exemplar for his subjects. The justification of kingly rule 
also implies a judgement about human society and presumably about 
society in the universe: ouöev 6e dftaouXeuxov xaXov ou6e avapyov
(p.271). Rule and subordination are not an unfortunate necessity, but 
an ideal which is in fact attained.
Ecphantus goes into the situation of the king more deeply. For him 
the king is one who rules with virtue (p.276) of which euvota is an 
important part (ib.), but what this can mean is described in very lofty 
terms: (d> yev wv ßaouXqa ypqyot euXtxpuves xe Mat dötdcpdopdv evxt Mat
6t’ UTtepßoXav 9ctdxaxos öuaecptMxov dv^pakto (p.273). The king is self- 
sufficient (pp.279 and 277), so that he can command his own life by the 
same virtue as that with which he commands men. This means that he is 
actually independent of his subjects, even though his connection with 
them is elsewhere shown as important. Thus one of the most important 
tasks of Ecphantus’ king is setting an example to be followed (pp.277-8). 
By wielding his influence the king can secure obedience, but this is a 
term the writer finds distasteful, for a deed of obedience is very close 
to being one of necessity, and the use of force and necessity must 
diminish zeal for imitation, since the bond of goodwill must be lacking 
(p.278, cf. Polyb. 6.4.2).
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Ecphantus too sees the ruler as a harmonizer (pp.275-6) who is 
effective because he possesses all the looked-for virtues. By means of 
(ppovcurus he has justice, self-control, fellow-feeling and related 
qualities (p.279). That the king be truly king is also demanded (p.278), 
which is an acknowledgement that there may be tyrannical and false 
rulers. The qualities of the ruler must determine into which category 
he will fall. This highly theoretical description of monarchical 
government could be called a 'soft sell' for it does not even pretend to 
come to grips with the problem of power, and Ecphantus mentions the true 
king without pausing to consider that a false king, despite his being a 
'bastard usurper', may not, unfortunately, always succumb to that vertigo 
allegedly assailing those who climb without warrant to a lofty height 
(p.273).
CICERO
Before looking at Cicero’s account of one-man rule, we need to 
consider whether he is really describing monarchy in all the examples 
where he appears to do so, and if so, whether his theory does have any 
practical application, or indeed is meant to refer so directly to the 
current political situation that its importance as theory is minimal. 
Cicero differs from most of our other writers on monarchy, who lived 
under monarchical government or were disaffected members of a democracy, 
in not seeing the institution of kingship as the obvious solution to 
every political problem. But where he expresses a view of rule in which 
his terms show that commenting on one-man rule is the most natural way 
for him to talk about government, even if this form is not itself under 
discussion, we can take this as evidence of the impact of a particular 
theory of government which it is important to discover and record.
Cicero's expressions of opinion about what we may term, as a 
comprehensive expression, the princeps have lent themselves to a wide 
variety of interpretations. He has been taken to be the originator of a 
programme of monarchical government which Augustus took over (by e.g. 
Reitzenstein),43 a claim strenuously denied by Heinze who sees princeps
43 R. Reitzenstein, 'Die Idee des Principats bei Cicero und Augustus', 
Nachrichten der kön. Ges. der Wiss. zu Gött. (1917), 399-436 and 481-98.
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as a generic term;44 as intending Pompey to fulfil the role of princeps 
(Meyer);45 as at any rate suggesting that the state needed one man 
either to set right its wrongs and then retire into private life (see 
Gage)46 or to exercise a permanent but not precisely explained influence 
on government (this is Magdelain's contention).47
The terms by which Cicero denotes political leadership are many — 
princeps, moderator, rector, etc. — but the difficulty lies in deciding 
how these terms, which may have a variety of meanings, are being used in 
any context. Yet it is important to note that the words frequently 
appearing in association do gain a certain stability of meaning in 
similar contexts. Thus we find that
il termine princeps e presente in tutto lo sviluppo unitario 
del pensiero politico ciceroniano a partire da questo momento 
(the composition of De Rep. 2.51) come perfetto equivalente 
degli altri termini con cui si designa l’uomo politico.48
Princeps can nevertheless have two basic meanings, the one indicating
superiority of rank, the traditional epithet applied, for example, to a
leading figure in the Senate, the other signifying priority of
initiative, and so appropriate to one who acts on his own, and not as
4 9part of the government.
The earliest coherent accounts of the princeps appear in the De 
Oratore, and have often been used to support the view that what Cicero 
is referring to is an actual head of state, with a particular and 
precise position in the government, but this is hard to substantiate, as 
the expression associated with it (auctor consili publici) is elsewhere 
combined with senator bonus (e.g. in De Orat. 1.215) and so Cicero is
44 R. Heinze, 'Ciceros "Staat" als politische Tendenzschrift', Hermes, 
59 (1924), 73-94.
45 Eduard Meyer, Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompe jus (3rd 
ed., Stuttgart-Berlin, 1922, reprinted Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell­
schaft, Darmstadt, 1963), esp. p.l89ff.
46 J. Gage, 'De Cesar ä Auguste', RH, 177 (1936), 279-342, esp. p.324.
47 Andre Magdelain, Auctoritas principis (Les Beiles Lettres, Paris, 
1947), Chapter One.
48 Ettore Lepore, It princeps, p.34.
49 See Hendrik Wagenvoort, 'Princeps', Ph, 91 (1936), 208-21 and 
323-45, and note also Lepore, Il princeps, pp.35-6.
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probably not hinting here at an outstanding individual acting on his own 
authority.50 To accept that Cicero was not contemplating absolute rule 
by an individual prinoeps either within the framework of the 
constitution or outside it does not mean, however, also denying his 
concern to emphasize the importance that one respected citizen could 
have for affairs of state, even if simply by way of example.
When we come to the De Republica, we need to consider Cicero's 
intention in each section and in particular to distinguish between those 
places where the ideal civis is presented, especially with Scipio as 
model (e.g. in Book Six and the end of Book Two and what remains of Book 
Five), and the so-called excursus on monarchy (Book One, 54-65). Pöschl 
tends to discuss this section as if it were on the same basis as the 
other arguments given for one-man rule, or the preceding constitutional 
discussion, which approach Lepore rightly, it seems, rejects.51 He 
holds that here we have an account of a different order, which is not 
looking at the dictatorship for instance as the embodiment of the royal 
qualities idealized in the abstract. The excursus on kingship might 
seem to deal unambiguously with the rex whom the Romans knew only as the 
unmourned kings of their ancient history, but the influence here is 
probably from political theory, in particular from Academic and Old 
Stoic sources. Here 'non si fa ancora sentire prepotente l’attrazione 
pratica delle monarchie ellenistiche e 1*influenza della loro 
propaganda' .5 2
The figure of the princeps appears in the rest of the De Repvblica 
with a number of associated terms and differing connotations, but though 
L. Brutus, for example, auctor et princeps (2.46), and Plato, princeps 
ille (2.21), are instances of men leading by priority in initiative,
50 As Lepore, 11 princeps, points out, p.49, and see as well pp.46-8 
for his arguments against Wagenvoort on this.
51 ' In 1, 60 la necessitä dell’ unum imperium ha, a nostro awiso, 
identico valore generale di necessitä di un fondamento unitario 
teoretico principio dell’ ordinamento della res publica, senza ehe se ne 
possa ne debba ricercare 1* incarnazione istituzionale prammatica, sia 
essa la monarchia storica, la dictatura, o qualsiasi altra', Lepore, II 
princeps, p.91. Cf. Viktor Pöschl, Römischer Staat und griechisches 
Staatsdenken bei Cicero (Berlin, 1936, reprinted Wissenschaftliche Buch­
gesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1962), pp.30-35.
52 Lepore, II princeps, p.83.
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they are hardly helpful in showing what Cicero had in mind for his 
elusive 'statesman'. More useful are the titles which appear in 
discussions on the search for the leading man — tutor and procurator 
(2.51), rector (2.51; 5.6; 6.1; 6.13), moderator (1.45; 5.8), gubemator 
(1.45, in gubernanda re publica; cf. 1.52 virtute vero gubernante r.p.), 
conservator (2.46, in conservanda libertate; 6.13, conservatores; 2.64 
and 1.12, conservare) , paene divinus vir, summus vir , vir ingenio et 
virtute praestans53 (1.45, 54; 2.46) prudensSk (2.67). These terms 
occurring in a variety of texts can be more easily explained as the 
equivalent of the tcoAltlmos of Greek theory than as uniformly pointing 
to an absolute ruler.55 Scipio Africanus is told of the reward that
53 Lepore concludes on praestans vir: 'Vedremo ... che da questo
momento esso diviene sinonimo perfetto di princeps, in tutti e due gli 
usi' (Lepore, II princeps, p.60).
54 'L’accento batte sul vir prudens come prototipo del princeps rector 
a sottolineare fuori degli ordines il valore della (ppdvnots individuale', 
Lepore, Il princeps, p.106.
55 'Finora ... va tenuto presente che giä l’esame lessicale ha 
riconfermato ancora una volta la vicinanza del nostro princeps al 
hoAltlmos della tradizione greca, estendendo questo carattere a 
quicumque "erit rector et gubernator civitatis" (II, 51; si pensi del 
resto all’uso del plurale p.es. in VI, 13) e a ciascun "optimo" (III,
36), implicitarnente escludendo un’ interpretazione monarchica o di 
preminenza del singolo’ (Lepore, Il princeps, p.76). There is a 
surprising degree of concurrence among writers more recent than Reitzenstein 
and Heinze about this picture of the princeps (although not all see in 
this figure evidence of Cicero's political perspicacity, as Lepore seems 
to do). Thus Gage comments: 'll semble done tres probable que Ciceron
a bien trace le portrait ideal de l’homme d’Etat en quelque sorte 
predestine, qui, sorti du cercle des principes , les depasserait et 
s’imposerait ä tous par son autorite, prendrait par une sorte de droit 
naturel, en cas de trouble, la direction de l’Etat et, le cas echeant, 
recevrait a sa mort, dans l’au-dela lumineux du monde supralunaire,
1’immortalite siderale promise ä ses pareils ... il semble bien que 
Ciceron n ’ait nullement prevu le "principat" comme une institution 
permanente. L ’important est que, chaque fois que l’Etat aura besoin 
d’un pareil tuteur, il le trouve', 'De Cesar ä Auguste', pp.322, 323.
Compare Beranger's comment (Ciceron precurseur politique', p.lll):
'Si le tyran offre un type exclusif, son antithese prend une figure 
proteiforme. Il incarne des vertus diverses qui, emanations de la 
Vertu, justifiaient chacune isolement la montee au pouvoir: protecteur,
sauveur, restaurateur de l’Etat, fondateur, bienfaiteur, simple citoyen 
au nom de tous, pere. Or, ces qualites, reconnues ou revendiquees, sont 
celles que Ciceron attribuait au citoyen par excellence, voue au service 
de l’Etat ideal', and see also Pierre Grenade, 'Remarques sur la theorie 
ciceronienne dite du "principat"', Melaiiges d3 Arch. et d3 Hist. , 57 
(1940), esp. p.42, and Martin^van den Bruwaene's article 'La Notion du 
prince chez Ciceron', in his Etudes sur Ciceron (Desclee de Brouwer, 
Brussels, n.d.), p.71, note 1.
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will come to 'alt those who have preserved, aided, expanded their 
country’ (6.13) and the titles of tutor et procurator are granted to 
'whoever will be rector and gubemator of the state' (2.51). These 
expressions then show us something of what will be expected of the 
leader, whatever position he holds.
Cicero gives initially a very simple definition of kingship: cum
... penes unum est onmium surnma rerum, regem ilium unum vocamus, et 
regnum eius rei publicae statum (1.42). In the excursus he describes 
rex as nomen quasi patrium (1.54) and the outstanding quality of king- 
ship he considers to be caritas (1.55), but good kings also display 
diligentia (1.54), potestas, iustitia and sapientia (2.43). Self- 
control means that he who rules does not impose laws on the people that 
he does not obey himself (1.52). His life shapes the nature of the 
state: talis est quaeque res publica3 qualis eius aut natura aut
voluntas qui ill am regit (1.47). Cicero thus believes that any leading 
figure should be able to leave an example to his subjects to follow: 
suam vitam ut legem praefert suis civibus (1.52). This in Book Two of 
the De Republica is extended to embrace the idea of the ruler as a 
person bringing harmony out of discord and offering himself as a mirror 
to the citizens (ut sese splendore animi et vitae suae sicut speculum 
praebeat civibus, 2.69).56 The king's self-rule is for Cicero the 
precondition of his ruling others (1.52), and the parallel 
between rule over self and rule over others is drawn in such a way that 
self-control and the advantages of kingship are considered 
complementary (see 1.60). Not surprisingly, then, Cicero firmly 
pronounces that those eminent virtute et animo should rule over the 
weaker (1.51). For some men servitude is useful in restraining their 
base instincts (see 3.36).
These qualities which the ruler should possess and which can no 
doubt be considered desirable attributes in any statesman are also 
elements in the character Cicero draws of the public-spirited Roman he 
hopes his son will be. Roman society, even at this stage of its history, 
still tended to describe the individual's life by reference to his
56 'Von besonderem Interesse ist hier, dass die Prinzipatsidee mit 
concordia in Verbindung gesetzt wird, indem das Vorbild des Princeps die 
Eintracht schaffen soll' (Skard, Euergetes-Concordia, p.96).
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political activity. Thus he attempts to show how to men like Scipio, 
government is an opus left them by their ancestors, the pvocuvatio atque 
administvatio vei publicae (De Rep. 1.35), and this is so whatever their 
official position may be at any particular time. Ratio is the means by 
which the statesman brings about the desired effect in the state.
The king or kingly figure is frequently contrasted with his 
opposite, the tyrant. Cicero is aware of the danger of the king’s 
degeneration.57 Only his virtuous character prevents him from being a 
tyrant — simul atque enim se inflexit hie vex in domination iniustiovem, 
fit oontinuo tyvannus (2.47-8), cum vex iniustus esse coepit, pevit 
M u d  ilico genus, et est idem M e  tyvannus (1.65) . The tyrant is the 
epitome of the anti-social, and stands outside human nature (De Off. 
3.32). Cicero does admit on occasion that freedom and kingship itself 
are incompatible (see De Rep. 1.47; 2.43)58 and accepts that this is a 
genuine disadvantage, just as is the loss under a monarchy of commune 
ius et consilium (1.43).
The T t o X b i L M O s  was for Plato the same as the 8 o ,c h , X l x o s  (see esp. 
Rolit. 393d), for when he marked off the expert he needed to show only 
one individual. A practitioner has a task to perform on an object, the 
object for the statesman is the body politic, and so to speak of more 
than one person would be nonsense. Cicero in the theoretical parts of 
the De Republica seems to have much the same view.
We cannot help noticing Cicero’s concern for society as a whole, 
his wish, most clearly expressed in his favourite phrase, concovdia 
ovdinum> and, as he came to see this as too narrow, in concovdia omnium 
bonovum, that all parts of the state would ’pull together' for the 
common good. But Cicero, in his philosophical speculation on government, 
involved as he is in finding his ’statesman’ is more interested in 
determining the character best able to perform the functions of ruling 
than in considering precisely how he will emerge in Roman society.
57 De Rep. 2.43: ea~fovma civitatis mutabilis maxime est hanc ob
causam, quod unius vitio pvaecipita in pevniciosissimam pavtem f a c M i m e  
decidit.
58 De Rep. 1.47: nulla alia in civitate, nisi in qua populi potestas
summa est, ullum domicilium libevtas habet; 2.43:desunt omnino ei populo 
multa qui sub vege est, in pvimisque libevtas. Note also De Rep. 1.55: 
hac (libevtas) orrrnes caveve, sive vegi sive optimatibus sewiant.
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PHILO
For Philo more than for any of the writers we have considered in 
this chapter so far, the qualities of an individual confirmed him as 
ruler or disproved his claim. Philo's starting-point differs from that 
of those writers on kingship who in theory at least saw their work as a 
political treatise. His political reflections appear only incidentally, 
except when he is recording historical events in the Legatio ad Gaium 
and the In Flaccumy and in the more or less consistently political 
interpretation of the De Josepho. His comments on the correct behaviour 
for man are, naturally, part of his main theme, and apply far more 
importantly to the life of the virtuous individual than to that of the 
king. We have then to see whether this behaviour is also presented as 
suitable and necessary for the monarch, and whether there are extra 
'kingly' qualities necessary if he is to perform his task well.
The assumption behind Philo's discourse is that this world is 
itself ruled monarchically by God. Not surprisingly Philo's definition 
of the king on earth takes account of this fact, and is considerably 
broader in scope than those we have previously come across. The king is 
the living law (and the law is a just king) and the king and lawgiver 
have the task of superintending not only mortal but also divine matters 
(Vit. Mos. 2.4-5) .
The virtues of men in general are of course derived from the 
Decalogue, but Philo interprets these in such a way that in many cases 
they take on the familiar forms of Greek virtues: 'each of the ten
pronouncements separately and all in common incite and exhort us to 
wisdom and justice and godliness and the rest of the company of virtues' 
(Spec. Leg. 4.134). The basis of morality is right reason (Opif. 143), 
for Philo a divine law under which the first man followed God step by 
step in the highways cut out by the virtues (Spec. Leg. 4.144). In 
practice, while piety, wisdom, prudence or temperance are uged on all, 
justice is found to need a separate exposition because of its social 
effects (see Spec. Leg. 4.136-238).
In the De Virtutibus, Philo discusses the need for courage, 
humanity (cptAavSpontta, which he places next to piety), repentance (where­
by men turn to the pursuit of piety and justice, and become 'temperate,
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s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d ,  m odes t ,  g e n t l e ,  k i n d ,  humane,  s e r i o u s ,  j u s t ,  h i g h -  
minded ,  l o v e r s  o f  t r u t h ,  s u p e r i o r  to  t h e  d e s i r e s  f o r  money and 
p l e a s u r e ' )  and t r u e  n o b i l i t y  ( V i r t .  182 and p a s s i m , c f .  l i s t  1l i t .  Mos.
2 . 1 8 5 ) .  E l s ew h e re  P h i l o  b r i n g s  fo rw ard  t h e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s o c i a l  v i r t u e s :  
'D u r i n g  t h i s  span  [ o f  l i f e ]  wha t  can be mee t  f o r  you to  do b u t  to  s t u d y  
f e l l o w - f e e l i n g  and g o o d w i l l  and e q u i t y  and hum an i ty  and what  e l s e  
b e l o n g s  t o  v i r t u e ? '  (Spec.  Leg.  1 . 2 9 5 ) .
The r u l e r  i s  i n  a l l  c a s e s  one who p o s s e s s e s  t h e s e  v i r t u e s .  J u s t i c e  
and e q u a l i t y  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  him ( V i t .  Mos. 1 . 3 2 8 ) .
Indeed  they  may be  t h e  v e r y  b a s i s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  and i f  he i s  to  be 
p e r f e c t  a t  h i s  t a s k ,  a l e g i s l a t o r  s h o u ld  p o s s e s s  a l l  t h e  v i r t u e s  f u l l y  
and c o m p l e t e l y  ( V i t .  Mos. 2 . 8 ) .  Yet  some v i r t u e s  a r e  more c l o s e l y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n s  and o t h e r s  have  l e s s  a f f i n i t y .
What a r u l e r  such  a s  Moses d i s p l a y s  i n  abundance  i s  t h e  r an g e  o f  v i r t u e s  
mos t  becoming to  him:
xaöxa 6 ’ fiaav e y x p a x e t a c ,  x a p x e p t a t ,  amcppoauvat, a y x t v o t a t ,  
o o v d a e t s ,  eT t taxhya t ,  n o v o t ,  xaxoT tdSe ta t , qöovwv UTtepotjjtaL, 
ö t x a t o a u v a t ,  upoxpoTtat Ttpog i a  ßdAxtaxa ,  (J^dyot x a t  xoAaoets  
ayapxavovxwv v o y t y o t ,  e i a i v o i  xay x t y a t  xaxopSodvxwv itaAtv 
auv voytp ( V i t .  Mos. 1 . 1 5 4 ) .
Only tow a rds  t h e  end o f  t h e  l i s t  do we n o t i c e  q u a l i t i e s  b e l o n g i n g  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  p u b l i c  l i f e ,  and P h i l o  c l a i m s  t h a t  t h e y  a l s o  a r e  
i n t r i n s i c  to  t h e  k i n g l y  c h a r a c t e r .  L e g i s l a t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  a k i n  t o  l o v e  
o f  h u m a n i ty ,  o f  j u s t i c e  and g o o d n e s s ,  and h a t r e d  o f  e v i l  ( V i t .  Mos. 2 . 9 ) .  
P h i l o ' s  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  v i r t u e s  depends  l a r g e l y  on showing th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  men t o  t h e i r  f e l l o w s ,  which  t h e y  p r e s e r v e ,  and t h i s  
c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  h i s  emphas i s  on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  
i d e a l  q u a l i t i e s  o f  Moses.
Community v a l u e s  such  as  harmony and f e l l o w s h i p  a r e  b a s i c  i n  P h i l o ' s  
work on ly  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n t e x t s ,  and e q u a l i t y  i s  t h e n  t h e  o b v io u s  
r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  common n a t u r e  o f  a l l  men ( s e e  Spec.  Leg.  4 . 2 3 7 ,  c f .  1 6 6 ) .
The r u l e r  s h o u l d  p r o c u r e  t h e  g o o d - w i l l  o f  h i s  s u b j e c t s ,  b u t  P h i l o  does 
n o t  s t r e s s  h i s  a c t i v i t y  i n  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  harmony and u n i t y  i n  t h e  
s o c i e t y  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  L eg a t io  i n  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  o f  Augus tus  
( 1 4 3 f f . ) . 59 The r u l e r  h a s  a s p e c i a l  c a p a c i t y  f o r  h i s  t a s k ,  b u t  t h i s  i s
59 But  s e e  Abr.  261:  a t  yev yap  aAAat B a a t A e ta t  Ttpos av^pooucov xa9 CoravTat^
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a divine gift more often than a skill or art, except when rule becomes 
the profitable shepherd's art (see Praem. 54 and Jos. 2).
The ruler's task of improving his subjects seems at first glance to 
rank high in Philo's list, but the use Philo makes of the king or law­
giver as the model for the people suggests that future generations are 
the ones who benefit rather than the ruler's own subjects (see Vit. Mos. 
1.158-9 and Virt. 70). Only rarely does he bring into prominence the 
reforming role of the ruler, and then in a vague way, with reminiscences 
of Aristotle's 'outstanding man' (see Praem. 113-4).
The effects produced by the exercise of the ruler's beneficence 
could hardly count as moral improvement, for the emphasis in these 
instances is on the character of the giver and on the gratitude which 
the generosity will produce in the recipient. The tone of Speo. Leg. 
4.184 is typical: the ruler should preside over his subjects like a
father over his children so that he himself may be honoured in return 
as by true-born sons, 'and therefore good rulers may be truly called the 
parents of cities and nations in common'. Ruling for the material 
benefit of subjects is the way Macro advises Gaius to wield his power 
(Legat. 51), and this is the type of behaviour Philo praises in the gods 
and heroes whom the emperor wrongly fancied he was imitating {Legat. 
81ff.). Language applied to God but couched in terms of earthly 
government illustrates Philo's ideal of the ruler as benefactor.
Rulers, by showing oeyvoxris, öcuvdxqg and eucpycöLa will induce in 
the subjects auöwg, cpoßos and euvoia {Praem. 97) 6 0 which when blended 
and harmonized in the soul render subjects obedient to rulers. Once 
more, then, the very qualities of most social impact are made to 
function, it seems, simply to legitimate the rule of one man and not for 
their importance in the structure of society. When Philo discusses the
itoAepous xau axpaxedaug  xau xaxobg d y u d q x o tg ,  otTtep avTeitbcpepouauv 
dXXqXoxxovouvxeg o i  öuvaaxeuwv ecpueyevou, TieCas note LiuiLxac; xau vauxuxag 
öuvdyeug euL T c c x tC o v re g • xqv 6e xou ao(pou BaauXeuav opeyeu d e o g ,  qv 
xapaXaBwv 6 OTtouöauog ouöevu yev auxuog yuvexau xaxou ,  Tiaau 6e xoug 
UTiqxooug ayabrnv xxqaewg oyou xau xPn°ewS, e tp nvqv  xau euvoycav 
xaxayyeXXwv.
60 Cf. Diotogenes, p.267, where the qualities oeyvoxag, xPhGTdTaS and 
öcLvdxag are necessary to the good king, and note the comments of Louis 
Delatte, Les Trai-te s, p.264, who describes the Philo extract as ' le 
parallele le plus exact qu’on puisse rapprocher du texte de Diotogene'.
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ruler's use of these qualities, much of the concern for fellowship 
evidenced in his general ethical discussion has vanished.
The spiritualizing of rule so that it becomes more a matter for a 
king of self-rule than of ruling others (or rather so that the second is 
seen to come about only as a consequence of the first) does appear in 
Philo, but limited to the sphere of sexual ethics. To this Philo 
attaches considerable importance in the De Josepho. Along with skill in 
the shepherd's craft of tending others and in household management, both 
foreshadowing rule of a kingdom, self-control appears as a necessary 
characteristic of the statesman, but with a restricted scope {Jos. 54).
The ruler's source of authority derives initially from his 
character (Abraham is admired for his nature xeXetoxepas  ouons n xaxd 
avdpwTtov, Virt. 217), and this the subjects generally acknowledge as 
justification for his position. Moses was appointed by God with the 
free consent of the people who were to be governed by him; he did not 
attain power with troops or weapons (Praem. 54). The lawgiver can 
indeed be termed a god %eog 6e 6 autos oSxos axe aocpos wv Mat 6ta  tout’ 
apywv xavxos acppovos {Mut. 128) . Rulers are therefore of a higher 
nature than ordinary men, and should naturally exercise control over the 
latter, though in a responsible way:
xouxwv dud v x w v  qyeywv e y t t p o x o v e u x o  Mwuabs Tqv apxnv xau 
ßaauXetav Xaßwv oux wauep evtot xwv ent xas öuvaaxeuas 
d d o u y e v w v  OTtXoug xaL p q x a v h h a öLV uintuxaus xe xaL ueCtxaCs xau 
v a uxuxaüs öuvayeaov ,  a X X ’ apexqs cvexa xai x a X o x d y a ö u a s  xat 
xns tpos auavxas euvouas, ?i X P ^ P e v °S otet SuexeXet, xau tpoaexu 
xau xoö cpuXapexou xau cpuXoxaXou %eo\j ye pas a^uov a u x y  
t apaaxovxos {Vit. Mos. 1.148).
The only problem is in testing and selecting the person best fitted by 
nature to command {V'irt. 54) .
The need to separate the true king from the false claimant appears 
continually in Philo's writing. The conclusion may be that only God has 
the qualities to satisfy the requirements. All human rule is only a 
poor imitation of his kingship. On the other hand Philo does 
occasionally describe the true earthly king (as in the account of Moses 
— see above, Vit. Mos. 1.148). The principle is boldly laid down. Real 
wealth is the abundance of virtues which we must believe to be true and 
equitable sovereignty, ruling in justice over all, in contrast to the
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bastard governments which have no right to the title (Abr. 25). Rulers 
in the true sense (mg dAq^mg) are those who perform the actions of noble 
men, filling the cities (because of their nature and their muöeua op§n) 
with plenty and abundance, with order and peace (Spec. Leg. 2.21-2).
The connection between the ruler’s personal behaviour and these public 
benefits is taken for granted but not explained.
Another way in which the king is 'marked off' from false claimants 
is by contrasting him with the tyrant and describing the qualities of 
both. An account of God as king, with qualities the opposite of the 
tyrant's, provides the example for earthly rulers: invested with a
gentle and lawful rule, he governs all the heaven and the cosmos with 
justice, combining ruling with caring (Provid. 2.2-3).
Freedom may appear as opposed specifically to bad monarchical 
government. The definitions of freedom show that in one sense, freedom 
and slavery can correspond to conditions where there are, as guardians 
and rulers, respectively laws and harsh and difficult masters (Prob.
45). Freedom may also be something possessed only by the wise man, and 
the foolish man is therefore a slave, in accord with Stoic doctrine (cf. 
Sob. 57). When Philo deals with the position of the Jews under Gaius he 
defines these terms by reference to the character of the ruler:
6ouAou 6e auxoxpdxopog ou UTinxoou, xau et yqöevog exdpou xmv 
Ttpoxepmv 6ca xo auv CTtyeuxeya Mac yexa voymv apxt^v, aAAct xou 
Tauou imaav exxexyriydvou xfjg I’UXPS nyepdxqxa nal napavoydav 
eCnAmxoxog — voyov yap qyouyevog eauxov xoug xmv exaoxaxou 
voyo^exmv mg xevag pqaeyg eAuev — . qyeCg 6e ou yovov ev 
öouAoug dXXa xau 6ouAwv xoug dxcyoxaxoLg eypacpoyeOa xou 
dpxovxog xpenovxog elg öeaudxqv (Legat. 119).
This shows that absence of servitude may be possible under a monarch, 
depending on his nature, but Philo does not consider the external 
manifestation of liberty especially important. This also implies, how­
ever, that he is not too concerned if 'the multitude who are like cattle 
require a master and a ruler, and have for their leaders men of virtue', 
presumably the wise as counsellors, but actual kings 'are more often in 
the position of the sheep than the shepherd' (Prob. 30-31). True king- 
ship may well end up being rule of the better element in the soul, and 
whoever has this is free.
Although Philo never directly questions that man's social nature
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determines his life, his ambivalent feelings about the effects of men on 
each other in the public sphere mean that he does not invoke the king 
as a permanent agent of cohesion, apart from the influence he wields 
through his private character.
SENECA
The qualities Seneca expects to be present in a candidate for 
imperial office are set out most clearly in the De Consolatione ad 
Marcellam where he describes Marcellus (Augustus’ nephew and chosen 
successor who died in 23 B.C.) as adulescentem animo alacrem_, ingenio 
potentem_, sed frugalitatis continentiaeque in M i s  aut annis aut opibus 
non mediocriter admirandae3 patientem laborum3 voluptatibus alienum3 
quantumcumque imponere M i  avunculus et3 ut ita dicam 3 inaedificare 
voluissetj laturum (2.3). This is a typical portrait of the ideal ruler, 
and here Cynic traits predominate. Other accounts of the way people in 
general are expected to behave do not dwell so one-sidedly on the 
isolated, self-contained individual. Not only are patience, fortitude 
and perseverance, and every quality that pits itself against hardship 
and subdues fortune desirable virtues, but so too are ’liberality, 
moderation and kindness’ (Vit. Beat. 25.6-7).
In the De Clementia, Seneca notes the characteristics to be looked 
for in a king, describing him as benevolent in action (e.g. 1.19.9), as 
clement (passim) and moderate (e.g. 1.11.1).61 He exercises, in other 
words, the qualities desirable in any man of position like Seneca him­
self, only with vastly wider scope for good or ill.
The moral element in government means that a ruler is able to 
influence the whole state. Beneath the sway of a good and merciful 
ruler, iustitia3 pax3 pudicitia3 securitas3 dignitas florent^ ... 
opulenta civitas copia bonorum omnium abundat {Clem. 1.19.8). This can 
be explained by the fact that tradetur ista animi tui mansuetudo 
diffundeturque paulatim per omne imperii corpus3 et cuncta in
61 Cf. Cons, ad Polyb. 12.3: Illo mode rante terras et ostendente
quanto melius beneficiis imperium custodiatur quam armis; and on 
clemency, Cons, ad Polyb. 13.2, with the reference to Claudius' 
clementia3 quae ex virtutibus eius primum optinet locum.
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similitudinem tuam formabuntur — all things will be moulded into your 
likeness (2.2.]). The De Clementia takes it for granted that the ruler's 
task is to cure the moral ills of the state. Clementia is important 
because displaying it is the best way for a king to do this.
While Seneca indicates that this virtue is peculiarly suited to the 
ruler (1.3.3) — nullum tarnen clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut 
principem decet — he also stresses that no other virtue is more seemly 
for a man, for none is more human (1.3.2). There is a certain tension 
between the 'regal' quality of such-condescending benevolence — which 
justifies its possessor in his power — and the need for all men to 
acquire it and thereby lessen the ruler's prestige in this area, as we 
might suppose. The ruler's greater capacity to save others means, how­
ever, that he can be the best exemplar of the virtue (see 1.5.3).
Despite Seneca's concern for the development in the king of a sense 
of his position and his introduction of a mystical element into the 
discussion in the De Clementia, he does not here stress that the king 
needs self-rule if he is to be qualified to rule others. Perhaps this 
is because there is considerable discussion of self-rule in the 
expositions of the correct behaviour in the sage, and the characters of 
king and sage bear a close resemblance.
Significantly, Seneca presents kingship as an eternal reality, 
certainly, but one which is a task for the king to take up as an 
individual. He makes frequent use of the paradoxes which other writers 
on kingship employ only in passing (except, that is, for Dio Chrysostom). 
The statio which the ruler must not desert applies also to the private 
citizen ('the noble soul, ... taking care to conduct itself honourably 
at the point of duty where it is placed' — in hac statione qua positus 
est [Ep. 120.18]) and to the public servant {[non licet tibi] assidua 
laboriosi officii statione fatigatum corpus voluptaria peregrinatione 
recreare — Cons, ad Polyb. 6.4). This concept implies the presence of 
self-regulation in the individual who keeps to his statio^and has 
obvious Stoic derivation. Seneca's ruler, therefore, has his duty put 
before him in a number of guises:
Beobachtet man, wie stark das Motiv der statio in der 
stoischen Gemüts-und Gedankenwelt verankert ist, so wundert 
man sich nicht mehr, wenn man feststellen müsste, dass eben
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dasselbe Motiv auch auf die stoische Lehre von den Pflichten 
eines Fürsten eingewirkt habe.62
The worldly kingdom itself is, ideally, unimportant. Among the 
rulers of the Golden Age of early man, officium erat irrrperare3 non 
regnum (Ep. 90.5). Rule is indeed a burden — ingens tibi onus imposuisti 
(Clem. 1.1.6).63 It may even be described as a servitude: servitus est3
non imperium is a statement he agrees with (Clem. 1.8.1),64 and later 
explains: est haec summae magnitudinis sevvitus non posse fieri minorem 
(1.8.3). This too does not apply only to kings. It is a general 
precept, for ’a great fortune is a great slavery' (Cons, ad Polyb. 6.5). 
But the restrictions placed on those who are to exercise their power 
rightly are in theory enormous, though self-imposed. They stem from the 
ruler's conscience and in no way derive from any external imposition.
If they did so, there would be no longer a true monarchical government, 
in Seneca's terms.
Seneca also describes the rule of the king as a aura. As Beranger 
notes 'avec oura, le cas se complique'.65 Here we may believe that 
Seneca is referring to an official position, but his actual expressions 
and the use of the term in analogous situations in other writers 
suggest that in this case too the emphasis is moral rather than 
institutional. Is3 cui ourae sunt universa (Clem. 1.13.4) is a general
62 Erich Köstermann, 'Statio principis', Ph.^87 (1932), p.436.
63 Cf. Cons. ad. Marc, and the reference to the onus imperii which 
Augustus had begun to place on Marcellus (2.3).
64 The precise meaning of honourable servitude is a much debated issue.
For different approaches, see H. Volkmann, ’”Ev6o£os öouAeua als ehren­
voller Knechtsdienst gegenüber dem Gesetz', Ph, 100 (1956), 52-61, and 
'Die Basileia als evöo^os öouAeua: Die Beitrag zur Wortgeschichte der
Duleia', Historia, 16 (1967), 155-61, and J. Beranger, 'Grandeur et 
servitude du souverain hellenistique', Etudes de Lettres^l (1964), 3-16. 
Adam in Clementia principis, pp.27-30 and p.120,attempts to show 
Seneca's nobilis servitus to have a different sense from the Hellenistic 
counterpart, but we agree with Griffin, Seneca, p.145, that she has not 
proved her point.
65 Jean Beranger, Recherches sur Vaspect ideologique du principat 
(Reinhardt, Basel, 1953), p.187. Beranger refers to the use by other 
writers of cura• Tacitus and Pliny often use the word in this sense (on 
Pliny see later). Cf. also Philostratus, Life of Apoll. 5.29.3 and 8.7.6, 
for (ppovxus used in the same sense. 'La legitimite ne repose pas sur
des institutions, mais sur la valeur morale du souverain' (Beranger, 
ib. , p.195) .
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description of the king which Seneca develops by introducing the notion 
of the parts of the state, of which the ruler is one. But precise 
details are not forthcoming. The king is firmly based when 'all men 
daily find his concern to be vigilant for the safety of each and all’
0Clem. 1.3.3).
The autonomous individual may be found in the person of the 
philosopher, but, in general, freedom under a monarchy has to be defined 
in a special way, if it exists at all. Marcus Brutus could be held to 
blame for having hoped that liberty could exist where the rewards both 
of supreme power and servitude were so great (Ben. 2.20.2). This very 
revealing passage shows that 'servitude' does not come only to the 
monarch chained to his duty, and indeed Seneca suggests that a true 
Stoic should not be upset about this. What is important is the nature 
of the ruler, since there is no better condition a state can reach than 
being under the rule of a just king (ib.). Thus a tyrant may be painted 
in the darkest colours in order to demonstrate how different the good 
king is from him: Quid interest inter tyrannum ac regem (species enim 
ipsa fortunae ac Hcentia par est)3 nisi quod tyranni in voluptatem 
saeviunt3 reges non nisi ex causa ac necessitate? Mere names mean 
nothing, for tyrannus ... a rege factis distat3 non nomine (Clem. 1.11.A 
and 1.12.1), and the most significant difference is in the mercy 
displayed by the one, not in the institutions of government at all.
The king's qualities and functions are therefore those of the out­
standing Stoic individual, and as such Seneca depicts him in his 
descriptions. In such a philosophic sphere Seneca feels at home and 
this too is his way of avoiding confrontation with unpalatable realities. 
The king is simply in the position of any man striving after virtue: 
his kingship complicates this task, but does not alter the nature of the 
difficulty of achieving this object.
It is then easy for Seneca to claim to justify kingship in its 
original form as being that system where men 'entrusted themselves to 
the control of one better than themselves' (commissi melioris arbitrio> 
Ep. 90.A), for nature, as he says, has the habit of subjecting the 
weaker to the stronger (ib.) and here weaker and stronger seem to be the 
equivalent of worse and better.
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MUSONIUS RUFUS
Musonius Rufus believes that philosophy teaches and trains the king 
in the qualities he most needs. These are justice, moderation, courage 
and reason, which all mankind should possess {passim). The king’s task, 
in which these virtues assist him, is to be a saviour and benefactor of 
men (p.280). Rule need not however mean rule over others in all cases, 
since the title of kingly person may belong to one who has only a couple 
of subjects, or who rules only himself (p.285). Yet Musonius retains 
the idea that the king should impose good order and harmony on society 
(p.283) although he gives no actual suggestions on how this should be 
done.
DIO CHRYSOSTOM
Of all our writers on kingship, Dio Chrysostom gives perhaps the 
most thorough account of the qualities a monarch needs. His definition 
of kingship given in 3.45,’a form of government where we have a city or 
a number of peoples, or the whole world, well-ordered by one good man's 
judgement and virtue', shows a difference in emphasis from that given a 
little earlier, 'kingship is irresponsible government where the law is 
the king's will' (3.43).66 The transition from this initial factual 
account to the morally-weighted one is made without comment, but is 
indicative of Dio's approach in general.
A king, to do his 'well-ordering' with 'judgement and virtue', 
needs to be made 'just, prudent, temperate and humane' (1.6). The field 
for such virtues in a king may be more extensive than those of private 
citizens — having to do with war and peace, concord, honour to gods and 
care of men {ib.) . Similar lists appear in the other discourses on 
kingship. Oration 2.26, for example, demands that the ruler be humane, 
gentle, just, lofty and brave in character and above all take delight in 
bestowing benefits. Elsewhere the pre-eminent kingly virtues can be 
reduced to two —  courage and justice —  but this is simply a succinct 
version of Homer's ßaauAeus t ’ otya^ os xpaiepos t * acxPITns (2.54).
6 6 Cf. Aristotle, Vol. 1287a, 9-10.
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The need for a ruler to rule himself before he undertakes to rule
others requires mention in a special category. It constitutes the theme
of Oration 62, ’On Kingship and Tyranny’: ’If a person cannot guide a
single soul and that his own, how could he be king ... over unnumbered
thousands ...?’ (62.1). Diogenes tells Alexander that if he is self-
controlled and knows the royal art of Zeus, there is nothing to prevent
his being a son of Zeus (4.21). This approach is consistent with the
Cynic element in Dio’s philosophy in that the self-reliant, self-ruling
man emerges in strong colours, qualified to rule by his character, and
6 7indeed ruling in fact even if his only subject is himself.
Dio does, however, bring his speech back to the original theme of 
ruling peoples, by making the common assertions about the king’s duty to 
care for and improve his people: 'the good king looks upon himself as
being king (ßaauXeueLv) not for the sake of his individual self, but for 
the sake of all men' (1.23). Helping men is his god-ordained duty 
(3.55), and a king is expected to try to elevate his subjects morally as 
well as materially, although Dio emphasizes this aspect to different 
degrees in different discourses. In 3.7 he conceives of the king’s 
moral influence as a more or less inevitable side-effect of his holding 
power: ’ VThen a man governs and holds sway over all mankind, his prudence
avails to help even the imprudent ... his temperance serves to restrain 
even the intemperate' and so on with the other cardinal virtues. The 
most ambitious claim to reform, where a man 'having managed his own life 
admirably, endeavours by the persuasion of speech combined with goodwill 
and a sense of justice to train and direct a great multitude of men and 
to lead them to better things', occurs in a context which leaves the 
political authority of such a person unclear, which perhaps betrays 
Dio's lack of concern on this point (4.124).
The king's goodwill and solicitude are to be exercised in a rule 
that he holds because God has everywhere appointed the superior 'to care 
for and rule the inferior', which means that 'for the foolish he has 
made the wise to have care and thought, to watch and plan' — upovoeuv h c x u
67*We find several traces in Dio of one feature of [the] individual- 
ethical TiauöeLa, namely the social-ethical corollaries: dpxttv eauiou=
apxttv av$pw7ta)V. This eyMpdreta = apxn in its widest meaning is teach­
able, and this is the aim and purpose of Cynic TtaLÖeua' (Höistad,
Cynic Hero, p.179).
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KpoßouXeueLV (3.62). The paternal care and indeed tenderness that Dio 
calls for are necessary because 'the shepherd's business is simply to 
oversee, guard, and protect flocks, not, by heaven, to slaughter, 
butcher and skin them' (4.44). The 'shepherds', to justify their claim 
to rule, need training for the task (see 49.2),68 but, granted their 
permanent superiority in this as in other fields,there is little danger 
of failure.
The titles granted to God as the king's model reveal the public 
face of monarchy, showing what functions 'must at the outset be inherent 
in the royal function and title' (1.41). Such duties are those which 
impel the king to protect the weak and bring men into unity, just as 
Alexander proclaims that the king, as well as displaying the common 
virtues of a good man, must also take delight in bestowing benefits, 
which activity approaches more nearly to the divine nature (2.26). The 
titles of saviour and protector of men are gained when a ruler carries 
out his tasks well (see 3.6). Yet the motives behind acts of generosity 
of the kindly and humane king are not necessarily altruistic. Dio 
emphasizes now the love won by this behaviour (1.20), now the fact that 
whereas other functions of royalty are obligatory, that of benefaction is 
alone voluntary and b] essed , that is, at the ruler' s whim (1.23) . Viewed in 
this light such acts lose much of their universality and fail to emerge as a 
consistent organized substitute for rule based on justice and consultation.
The paradoxical description of rule as a burden not only suggests 
that such irksome duties as fall on his shoulders should be borne more 
nobly by a king than they would be by a private citizen (3.5 and 4.24) 
but that the larger portion of all burdens will fall to him because of 
his kingship, and that he should embrace them with open arms: 'He is
actually more fond of toil than many others are of pleasure or of 
wealth' (1.21: cf. 62.3).69 The ruler who does accomplish his task is 
weighed down by cares (3.55), but can console himself with the 
reflection that he is following a noble precedent. Hercules toiled and 
struggled to win eventual fame (8.28), while Diogenes the Cynic bore
68 Cf. 4.21: eav pev yap amcppmv xau xqv xou Alos CTtuaxapevos
Tcxvnv xqv ßaacÄLKnv, and 2.44 ßaauAuxriv mbdeuatv.
69 As Beranger comments on the use of the word uovog (Reohevches,
p.179): 'Les fatigues, physiques et morales, que comportait l ’exercice
du pouvoir sont evoquees avec complaisance'.
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w i t h  i n s u l t s  j u s t  as  Odysseus had done from th e  s u i t o r s  ' f o r  he r e a l l y  
r e s e m b le d  a k i n g  and l o r d '  ( 9 . 9 ) .  Dio does no t  p r o p o s e  t h e  Cynic  l i f e  
i n  i t s  e x t e r n a l s  as  a model  f o r  r u l e r s ,  b u t  does  use  s i m i l a r  e x p r e s s i o n s  
a b o u t  t h e  s o l i t a r y  i n d i v i d u a l  and t h e  monarch immersed i n  t h e  c a r e s  o f  
an Em pire .
The e f f e c t  o f  t h e  k i n g ' s  l a b o u r  on h i s  s u b j e c t s  i s  u n i m p o r t a n t  i n  
c o m pa r i son  w i t h  what  h i s  e f f o r t s  t e l l  us  a b o u t  him as  an  i n d i v i d u a l  
d i s c h a r g i n g  h i s  d u t y .  I f  he f a i l s  to  f u l f i l  h i s  t a s k  he may be c a l l e d  
no t r u e  k i n g  b u t  a s l a v e ,  even  though h o l d i n g  o f f i c e  ( s e e  e . g .  1 4 . 1 8 ) .  
Th is  o f  c o u r s e  i s  f a r  f rom b e i n g  a p o l i t i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  b u t  s tem s  from 
D i o ' s  b e l i e f  t h a t  ' i n  e v e r y  r e s p e c t  human b e i n g s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  
d e p r a v i t y ,  a r e  f a r t h e r  removed from a s t a t e  o f  f reedom '  [ t h a n  any fo rm a l  
s l a v e r y  would b r i n g  a b o u t ]  ( 7 4 . 9 ) .  Freedom b e l o n g s  to  t h e  k i n g  h i m s e l f  
i n  a s p i r i t u a l  s e n s e  — 'y o u  w i l l  n e v e r  be k i n g  u n t i l  you have  
p r o p i t i a t e d  y o u r  a t t e n d a n t  s p i r i t ,  and, by t r e a t i n g  i t  as  you s h o u ld ,  have 
made i t  commanding, f r e e - s p i r i t e d  and k i n g l y '  ( 4 . 7 5 ) .  Tha t  i s ,  f reedom 
a p p l i e s  most  t r u l y  to  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  who, 'enamoured  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i n  
t h e  s p i r i t u a l  s e n s e '  ( vopxoe töoGs a u x o v o y ta s  epwxt ,  8 0 . 3 ) ,  can  be f r e e ,  
and i n  t h e  m i d s t  o f  s u b j e c t s  i n d e p e n d e n t .  Only o t  (ppovtyot can  be f r e e  
i n  t h i s  way and can do a s  t h e y  w ish  ( 1 4 . 1 7 ) .  Thus freedom must  be d e f i n e d  
as  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  what  i s  p e r m i t t e d  and what  f o r b i d d e n ,  s l a v e r y  as  
i g n o r a n c e  o f  t h i s  ( 1 4 . 1 8 ) .  When Dio u s e s  t h e  ' p o l i t i c a l '  s e n s e  o f  f r e e ­
dom he s t i l l  l i n k s  i t  c l o s e l y  to  m o ra l  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  f o r  i t  i s  a b s e n c e  o f  
v i r t u e  in  t h e  A l e x a n d r i a n s  t h a t  makes Rome l i m i t  t h e i r  f r e e d o m . 70
The same l a c k  o f  c o n c e r n  a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e m s e lv e s  
a p p e a r s  when Dio a n a l y s e s  democracy i n  te rm s  a p p r o p r i a t e  to  monarchy as  
i f  on ly  t h r o u g h  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  one man can  p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  
p r o c e e d  ( 3 2 . 2 5 f f . ) . 71 The t e rm s  t h a t  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  do n o t  d e s c r i b e  the  
s t r u c t u r e s  o f  gove rnment  b u t  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  so 
t h a t  p r e s e r v a t i o n  can come o n l y  from g u a r d i a n s  and l e a d e r s ,  w i l l i n g  
s t e w a r d s  d e l i g h t i n g  i n  t h e  c i t y ' s  o r d e r .  A demos must  a c q u i r e  t h e s e
70 See 3 2 .5 1 :  Freedom i s  n o t  a d v a n ta g e o u s  f o r  t h e  A l e x a n d r i a n s  and so
God h a s  g i v e n  them Tiatöaywyous xoug cppovtywxspous xrjs koAcojs.
71 I n  3 2 .2 7 - 8  Dio e x p l a i n s  t h a t  democracy i s  o f  two k i n d s ,  one good,  
a c c e p t i n g  f r a n k  s p e a k i n g  i n  i t s  c r i t i c s  and g r a t e f u l  to  t h o s e  vouSexouot  
Hat ö t ö a a n o u a t  . . .  ov (dem ocracy)  eyw x t ^ q y t  xps  d e t a s  Hat ßaa tAtnyg  
cpuaeojs, and t h e  bad k i n d ,  more common and r e s e m b l i n g  a t y r a n t .
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traits if it is to possess a ’divine and kingly nature' (32.26-7).
Dio distinguishes monarchy and tyranny, true and false kingship, by 
means of the character of the ruler, and is emphatic that there will 
never really be a foolish or unjust king (62.7). He refers to the^true* 
king (1.15; 2.69), the ’ideal' and ’good’ king (1.11, 12; 3.25), the 
'good' shepherd (3.41). The tyrant, by contrast, is one unworthy to 
rule (2.75). Lists of the qualities displayed by kings and tyrants (see 
1.11-36 and 3.39-41) set out the contrast in personal ability and 
inclination and show that 'the man who does not possess the right 
qualities, i.e. a character firmly formed along individual-ethical lines, 
is not a basileus at all, however great his power as regards external 
things'.72 Dio's descriptions of the benefits of concord and unity in a 
state occur not in his essays on kingship but in the speeches addressed 
to fractious cities. He contributes little that is original to this 
theme and does not introduce the emperor as reconciler of intra-city or 
even inter-city disputes, except in an ironic way (32.69-71).
PLUTARCH
In Plutarch's Life of Solon the friends of the statesman are 
described as urging him to seize absolute power and not to be concerned 
for the name of the thing 'as if the virtues of him who seized it would 
not at once make it lawful sovereignty' (ßaaLÄcua) (Sol. 14.4).
Plutarch does not claim to agree with this view, and yet in one of his 
pieces of advice on statecraft he gives an account of government to the 
uneducated ruler which assumes that the ruler himself is responsible for 
the working out of wisdom and law in the state, and therefore presumably 
the source in some measure of these qualities (see e.g. 780e) . The 
rulers' functions must however be related to the fact that they 'serve 
god for the care and preservation of men' (780d) .
With his task so defined, the ruler’s personal qualities will 
necessarily bulk large in a description of his office. Not surprisingly, 
then, we find Plutarch liberally scattering throughout his political
72 Höistad, Cynic Hero, p.187.
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works lists of virtues and gifts of intellect possessed by the good 
ruler or exemplified in the lives of former rulers, particularly 
Alexander the Great. Plutarch shows Alexander’s superiority to Darius 
not by stressing his military strength but by pointing out that he 
excelled 'in virtue and greatness of soul, in courage and justice’
(339b), precisely the qualities which he believes should be possessed by 
all men.
The long list of virtues given later shows the same concern for 
all-round excellence with a certain-stress laid on those qualities most 
likely to win the esteem of the king’s associates:
euaeßetav xept -öeoug, xuaxtv xpog (ptAoug, euxeAetav, 
eyxpaxetav, eyxetpLav, acpoßuav xpog davaxov, eu^uytav, 
cptAav^pwxuav, oytAuav euctpyoaxov, a^euöeg ?jdog, euoxa^etav ev 
ßouAatg, xayog ev xpa^eotv, xpwxa 6o£qg, xpoatpeatv ev x(p xaArn 
xeAeauoupyov (342f) .
Almost everything is here that could reveal the good man, except, this 
time, justice. That Plutarch does not consider these traits most 
fitting for kings alone is clear from his attribution of individual 
virtues possessed by Alexander to various renowned figures, not all 
kings, and two indeed, Pericles and Thermistocles, the statesmen of a 
democracy (see 343a) .
The gentler virtues naturally predominate in the instructions 
Plutarch gives to municipal 'statesmen' (see especially 823f and 824d-e) 
and so could not be taken on their own as indicative of what Plutarch 
expected of a ruler holding supreme power, yet on occasions he appears 
to forget the distinction, and in the middle of describing polis 
dependence on the emperor refers to local rule in the same grandiose way 
as he had defined the task of government for the uneducated ruler, when
it had been appropriate to employ the language of monarchical 
7 3government.
Enumerating the virtues of Alexander in 332c, Plutarch sums up by 
saying xav epyov ex xaawv eotxe xwv apexwv yeyetydat and then slips into 
a discussion of the virtue of the wise man, without having explicitly 
granted Alexander this title, though clearly implying his right to it.
73 See e.g. the description of the politician in 823f: m ... xoti 
Aoytxoö xau xoAuxtxou ayqvoug extyeAeLav tyttv 6 deog eöwxev.
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The ascription of virtues in this way was more or less perfunctory, 
but Plutarch does relate the ruler's character to his duties in a more 
detailed fashion and attempt to show its importance. The whole 
personality of the ruler is involved, as appears when he explains the 
situation in the Ad Princtpem, 'just as a rule, if it is made rigid and 
inflexible, makes other things straight, when they are fitted to it and 
laid alongside it, in like manner the sovereign must first gain command 
of himself, regulate his own soul and establish his own character, then 
make his subjects fit his pattern' (780b; cf. Num. 20.8, Mo t . 800b and 
Cleom. 13.1). Command then is in the first place self-command which 
Plutarch sees as ultimately producing a moral effect in the society.
This comes about because of the incapacity of the masses to rule them­
selves and their lives, so that in many cases political rule means 
thinking for the people who are unable to make their own decisions about 
their physical and moral welfare. Kqöeyovua emerges as an important 
attribute of the ruler (812b; 823a) along with care and concern 
ercuye'Aeua Mat (ppovius (787b; cf. 817d) .
EußouAua is a common component in the lists of qualities, combining 
the notions of intellectual endeavour and the putting of this to public 
use (see 776e-f and 326e),74 Its importance is explained by Plutarch in 
his essay De Fortuna where it emerges as the source of eyxpdxeua and 
amcppoouvn for pleas in court, of x a p i e p u a  and avöpayadua  in dangers, and 
of euvoyua and öuxauoouvri in public affairs (97e). Plutarch in fact 
grants considerable scope to the intellectual faculties in his 
political advice. The basis of political activity he defines as 'choice 
of policy arising from judgement and reason' ( 7 9 8 c ,x p u o u s  xau A d y o s ) • 
Therefore kings must have accepted reason as a ruler over them before 
they can benefit society (779e) .
The An Sent also stresses the need for mental endowments in those 
guiding others. These servants of Zeus are to provide counsel, fore­
sight and speech to their city, for they hold royal rank in the states
74 Ouöe yap uöuwxas o u ö ’ ouxoupous o u ö ’ ä n p d x io u s  n£uouv euvau Sewv 
y a S n i a s ,  aXAa ßaauAeus ,  ous eußouAuag eyyevoye'vng wai öuxauoauvns x a i  
XPnöTOTrixos xau yeyaXocppoouvns, n a v i e s  eyeXXov w(peAri§doeö§au xau 
anoXauaeuv ou XP^PeV0L (776e-f) ;npog ayayoug 6uvayeug xau aneupa  (pbXa 
xau no iayous  a nepaxous  nau ne ' ipas  a i o ^ e u i o u s ,  eußouAuqi xau avöpeua  xau 
xapiepuqt  xau omcppoauvij napaneynoyevos  (326e) .
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in accordance with their wisdom (789d-f). We may assume that in this 
respect Plutarch saw their duties as similar to those of monarchs. He 
himself says a little further on (790a) that the office of king is the 
most perfect and greatest of political offices, and has the most cares, 
labours and occupations. Public service in general though not 
presumably making such onerous demands requires zeal, forethought for 
the common good and wisdom (817d) . The mental habit of public men 
consists in deliberation, wisdom and justice and experience of the right 
times and words (792d) .
The intellectual qualities are attributed to Alexander along with 
moral excellence, to account for his success (e.g. ötdvoLa, cptAooocpou 
auveaug, cppovnya) . 7 0 Plutarch does not believe that good intentions 
without the right training and mental capacity will suffice for either a 
leader in a polis, or an emperor. In this sense he is close to the 
earlier writers on politics such as Plato and Aristotle, and part of his 
justification of monarchy depends on this capacity being assumed to be 
present in the claimant.
One of the terms most frequently employed in Plutarch for denoting 
socially-approved behaviour is cptAdvdpwuog which is combined with other 
words to develop a special meaning in a particular context. Certainly 
kingship provided instances where this virtue was most appropriate, e.g. 
xexvwv de Kat cpuaewv ayadwv au^netv euyeveua xat xtyri Hat cpuAavdpajuta 
ßaatAemg exxaAeuxat (333e). However its meaning has no restricted 
political application. Plutarch does attempt to display it as a public 
virtue (see 796e) —  although in 823a it has a private reference —  but 
here it does not refer to one man ruling alone, and in the Lives it is 
generally applied to the activities of heroes (note too Mov. 172b where 
Artaxerxes pronounces a course of action ßaatAuxov xat cptAavdpwuov and 
cf. 178b where, so long as another rules, Philip tells Alexander, 
Alexander himself should be cpuAdv-Öpwuos and thus gain popularity) . 
Renoirte, in her discussion of the significance of this quality for
75 See 343a: xqv 6 ’ ’AAe£dv6pou cpuatv, etTiep ex tioAAwv auvqpyooe xat
auve^nxev apexwv 6 yevvqoag 6eog, &p’ oux av etxouyev eyttv cppo'vriya yev 
xo Kupon, awcppoauvnv 6e xqv ’AynauAdou, ouveatv 6e xqv 0eytoxoxAeous, 
eynetpuav 6e xqv ^l Althiou, xdAyav 6e xqv Bpaatöou, öeuvdxnxa 6e xat 
uoAtxetav xqv lleptxAeous; and 338e ouxoj ßaouAtxajs exo'ayqae xat auyxa^ms 
eödxpuaev, max’ aTtuaxov auxou xo omqjpov ev xm (pLAav^pmuaj yeve'o^au xat 
Aaßetv äötxtas eyxAnycx xqv (and note too 332c and 331b ff.).
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Plutarch notes that for him 'eile est meme une vertu morale autant 
qu’une vertu sociale ou qu’un principe politique’.76 It is therefore 
well-suited to be a substitute for the values his society could not 
preserve under a monarchical government.
In Moralia 824, Plutarch shows the limits of what can be desired 
and perhaps brought about by any subordinate ruler; harmony and 
reconciliation in the population (824d). Though Plutarch's object here 
is partly to show provincial officials how to avoid attracting the 
unwelcome attention of the central authority, the ideal of freedom from 
disturbance is also offered to rulers in general. For all of them the 
value of freedom in any other sense was gone and social cohesion was to 
take its place, though in fact this ideal too was hard to realize. 
Plutarch's actual description of government confirms the intimations we 
gain from these hints. He implies that a monarch accepting reason as a 
ruler over him as he recommends will be a slave to duty (779e).77 
Alexander had a kingly and god-like task (&§Aov) the object of which was 
to order all men by one law and to render them submissive to one rule 
and one customary manner of life (342a) . His achievement was important, 
not the manner of his arriving at it. It is therefore perfectly natural 
for Plutarch to write that the behaviour of Augustus became more kingly 
and useful to the people (SqywcpeAeoxepa) towards the end of his life 
(784d), for these terms are not in his view contradictory.
Alternatively, Plutarch accepts that even in an apparent democracy, one 
person may be in fact the sole ruler (802c, where he copies Thucydides' 
description of Pericles).78
76 Therese Renoirte, Les '‘Conseils politiques " de Plutarque
(Publications Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain, 1951), pp.55-6.
77 Cf. Suet. Tib. 24.2 onerosctm iniungi sibi servitutem. Plutarch was
doing no more than espousing the imperial theme here: 'll [Tiberius]
sentait que la monarchic reposait sur des bases extra-constitutionnelles. 
La valeur de la personnalite legitimait la position. La depense 
d’energies, spirituelle, morale, etait enorme. La pensee seule ecrasait 
l’homme' (Beranger, Rechevohes, p.177). Plutarch describes Alexander as 
well aware of the burden involved in rule: It was 'most noble and royal
to undergo pain and labour' {Alex. 40.2). Note also 782a-b with the 
account of the king xqv tepu auxov euxuytav Mat Aayupoxqxa Mau öuvayuv
oos xmAuatv apexrjs Hat aaxoAuav Bapuvoyevos and 790a where Plutarch says 
of kingship tAedaxas cppovxtöag extt tovous äaxoAdas.
78 See the comment of H. Weber, Die Staats-und Reohtslehve Plutavohs
Von Chaivoneia (Bouvier, Bonn, 1959), p.31: 'Nicht selten verleiht das
Gewicht seiner Persönlichkeit der eingeführten Staatsform einen anderen
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Towards the end of the ’Precepts of Statecraft’ he discusses two 
values important in political life —  freedom and concord. The first, he 
admits, must be limited by government from Rome —  so one of the chief 
catchcries of Greek politics is now no longer meaningful. The second 
still rests in the hands of the municipality to produce, unless of 
course the citizens are to have harmony formally imposed on them from 
above. Such a harmony Plutarch takes account of only as regards the 
local scene. He could refer to Alexander's aim of being a governor and 
reconciler of the whole world as a suitable object for a king to strive 
after, but did not apply this vision to the Empire that he knew.
He thus left out of consideration one of the most statesman-like 
activities which would seem an obvious element in any discussion on 
kingship and its justification. His attention was instead on the ruler 
as an individual and on his virtues and abilities. The very thesis of 
'On the Fortune of Alexander’ is that great men rule by right of virtue 
rather than fortune (337d). The statesman is .the natural ruler of the 
state (813c), but does not need to hold office to be entitled to the 
name of statesman, so long as he is xotvwvtxos Hat cptXdv$pu)tog xocl 
(ptAoTioXts Mat xnöeyovLHOS xat tioXctlxos aXpdms (796e, and see 791e for 
the converse case where a king is no true ruler).
PLINY
In the Panegyv'Le, Pliny does not set out to provide a theory of 
kingship. Rather, his assumptions about rule emerge from his recording 
of the qualities which he praises Trajan for possessing. He does not 
give a precise definition of monarchical government —  his desire to adhere 
to the diplomatic view of the pvinceps would have made it difficult to 
specify it as monarchy and to acknowledge the implication of doing so —  
but on occasion he provides a fairly comprehensive list of the ruler’s 
duties. The true care of a prince is
reconciliare aemulas civitates5tvmentesque populos non impevio
magis quam vatione compesoere; intercedeve iniquitatibus
Charakter, so dass auch mit einer weniger geeigneten Staatsform die von 
der Gottheit vorgezeichneten Staatsziele erfolgreich angestrebt werden 
können.'
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magistratuum3 infectumque reddere quidquid fieri non 
oportuerit; postremo . . .  omnia invisere omnia audire3 et 
undecumque invocation statim velut adesse et adsistere! (80.3).
The account of duties given earlier (4.4) is less ambitious and more 
traditionally 'Roman’.79
To carry out the impressive assignment of ruling an Empire the 
ruler needed many qualifications to which Pliny refers haphazardly 
through the speech. Trajan is castus et sanctus and 'like the gods' 
(1.3), not differing in this respect from any noble-souled subject. So 
too the references to the emperor's humanity, duty, clemency and 
restraint, moderation and courtesy evoke qualities that all should 
possess (see 2.6-7). The very virtues that proclaim Trajan a princeps 
(4.6) are those well becoming a Roman of the old school — and this was 
indeed the light in which it was most convenient for him to be seen.
His moderation and frugality appear not as instances of conquest of self 
from which external rule could flow,but as examples of good behaviour in 
keeping with his general character as a Roman gentleman.
Yet the outward effect of the emperor's character, Pliny assures us, 
is felt also by the subjects: 'We are deeply in your debt and doubly
so — for your own character and even more for the improvement it has 
made in our own' (41.4). Trajan's actions indeed were directly geared 
to this end: amas constantiam civium3 rectosque ac vividos animos . . .
foves et attollis (44.6). Pliny exploits this theme for the emperor's 
credit but does not make it the basis of his justification of Trajan's 
position. Neither does he relate Trajan's talents to his moral 
excellence, except in military matters.
Trajan's actions in public life are naturally important in a speech 
that must refer to the record of government. Some of the instances 
cited are hardly what we would expect. Trajan's table manners, we are 
told, are an instance of humanitas (49.5); so too may his tact to the 
senators be (71.5). dementia  and mansuetudo appear in practice to mean 
the emperor's punishing without vindictiveness the informers of previous 
reigns, and his remission of inheritance tax for certain categories of
79 'I often used to wonder ... what great gifts should be proper to 
the man whose word or gesture of command could rule land and sea and 
determine peace or war.'
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newly-made citizens (35.1; 38.5). These are not everyday acts in the 
administration but special cases. The emperor's generosity 
(liberatitas) is referred to frequently; it is shown by his increasing the 
number enrolled to receive the food distribution and his arrangements of 
this procedure (28.4; 25.5), and by his gladiatorial shows (33.2; 34.3), 
in other words by the 'bread and circuses' which kept the masses 
quiescent. Clearly Pliny does not set his sights too high here.
Benignitas is used in similar contexts —  for the export of grain, 
the opening to the public of imperial gardens (32.3; 50.7), and again 
with reference to the tax removal (39.3). Magnitude) (see 61.4-5) and 
indutgentia (69.6) ring the changes on the same theme of the emperor's 
generosity. Pliny has no doubt that the emperor's task can most 
fittingly be described as a burden, a care, or a post. His recourse to 
these expressions is significant because 'onus, labor, statio et les 
notions connexes suggeraient invariablement un comportement, une 
activite, une pensee, bien distincte d’un emploi technique, magistrature 
ou function'.8 0
The burden of supreme power was taken up by Trajan only at the 
state's most dire need (5.6). Who, asks Pliny, would voluntarily 
shoulder your burden of responsibility? (44.4). The cares of state 
(48.1) are so extensive that they require almost divine capacities (see 
80.3), yet there is a certain informality in the term, as can be seen 
from Pliny's rhetorical question: Quis nostrum idem curae3 idem sudoris
insumit? (77.6, cf. 44.4: ourae tuae motes). All men have a eura to 
attend to, even if cura can be associated with patientia as an instance 
of princely concern for another (86.5).81 The ruler's statio inevitably 
involves him in difficulties (nec te prospera et laeta stationis istius3 
sed aspera et dura ad capessendam earn oonrpulerant, 7.3; cf. pro 
laboriosa ista statione, 86.3). Throughout, the emphasis is on Trajan's 
personal efforts in a trying situation.
With such a concept of good government in mind, there is nothing to 
prevent Pliny's defining tyranny and principate in terms of the moral
80 Beranger, Recherohes, p.187.
81 See Beranger, Recherohes, p.217: 'La cura rei pubticae n ’est point
une institution. C’est un etat d'esprit.'
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value of each: a true prince is most welcome to those who can least
endure a tyrant (dominum, 45.3). At the beginning of the speech the 
contrast is put thus: ’ We are talking of a fellow-citizen, not a tyrant
(tyranno), one who is our father not our overlord (domino) (2.3).
Pliny was fortunate in having a foil for Trajan in the figure of the 
Arch-tyrant, Domitian. At the same time, he had to show how the 
principate could be described as legitimate government or tyranny 
according to the character of the office-holder, not by employing any 
more objective test.
The amount of freedom left to the subjects must also be seen as 
depending on this personal element, however at odds with the former 
meaning of the word libertas this use of it may be. Pliny, in fact, 
uses the word in various senses. The libertas associated with 
securitas in 27.1 shows the attenuated notion of the concept, reinforced 
by Pliny’s references to Trajan’s injunctions to the citizens to be 
free: ’You exhorted us to resume our freedom' (66.2), ’you bid us to be
free and we shall be free’ (66.4), 'he will always understand that in 
making use of the freedom he granted we are acting only in obedience to 
him' (67.2, cf. 78.3 and 87.1). Freedom in the political sense cannot be 
recovered, and Pliny does not fear to say so —  ’the rewards of virtue 
are now the same under an emperor as they were in times of liberty' 
(44.6; cf. 57.4 and 69.5). There is an awareness of paradox in eodem 
foro utuntur principatus et libertas (36.4).
The way in which the ruler is chosen and his methods of rule 
determine how much freedom is permitted, as well as the whole tenor of
82 'Ni Auguste, ni Tibere ne voulaiant du dominus: ... Mais les usages 
submergeaient les intentions. Pline le Jeune, dans le Panegyrique, joue 
du theme avec complaisance [in 2.3; 7.6; 85.2]. Ce qui ne 1 empeche pas, 
quand il ecrit ä Trajan, de commencer ses lettres par <demine' (ib. p.37).
83 ’How very different is this concept of freedom —  if indeed it is 
freedom which is enjoyed at an emperor’s bidding —  from that which Livy 
had in mind when he wrote that libertas "suis stat viribus nec ex alieno 
arbitrio pendet"!’, Wirszubski, Libertas, p.168.
See too, on this, Adam: ’Der Gegensatz zwischen principatus und
libertas, zwei Erscheinungen, die Tacitus als res olim dissociabiles 
bezeichnete, wird von Plinius kaum empfunden: ... Indem auf solche Weise 
die entscheidenden Kriterien nicht mehr in politischen und staatsrecht­
lich fassbaren Institutionen, sondern in moralisch-ethischen Kategorien 
gesehen werden, nimmt es nicht wunder, dass Plinius im folgenden sogar 
erklärt, gerade der Principat des Trajan bedeute ein resumere libertatem 
(66,2; vgl. 78,3)' (Adam, Clementia principis, p.114).
167
the reign. To choose a successor a ruler should judge that person 
’closest and dearest' whom he finds to be 'the noblest and nearest to 
the gods' (7.5). Trajan returns to Rome as emperor — but still 'one 
among us all, (par omnibus) the greatest of us simply because you are 
the best' (21.4).84 In conformity with this selection on moral grounds, 
rule is exercised by persuasion of various sorts — 'all honour to your 
noble wisdom ... for this has enabled you to see an accepted custom take 
the place of what used to be an arbitrary decree' (quod anted vis et 
imperium3 nunc mores vooaventur, 46.5). No doubt Pliny believes that 
imperial rule in the right hands displays the workings of that 'natural' 
law which does not reduce the human race to the level of the animal 
world, where power and authority go to the stronger (38.7).
The result of such government is peace and concord and so disoant 
invioem capiant (gentes) quanto libertati discordi servientibus sit 
utilius unum esse cui serviant (32.2).85 Such qualities as were once 
important in public life are now no longer truly public for the ruler 
who possesses them most perfectly thereby affects the citizens only in 
their personal lives and not as active members of the state.
ARISTIDES
Aelius Aristides specifies in the speech on kingship what qualities 
he considers most becoming to a ruler; indeed he says in the beginning 
that he is going to speak iepu tou §euou Mat (pbXav^pwuou ßaatXews (p.98). 
The king is praised for his piety, justice and philanthropy (p.101) and 
the writer gives examples of the king's manifestation of all the key 
virtues, including moderation, self-control and intelligence as well as 
those already mentioned (p.l03ff.). As part of his care for his 
subjects the king displayed foresight (tcpovoloi, pp.103, 107), and in
84 The weakness of judgement of the majority of mankind — and hence 
their need for a leader of a different quality — appears in Ep. 5.9.7:
Est omnino iniquum3 sed usu receptum3 quod honesta consilia vet 
turpia3 prout male aut prospere cedunt3 ita vet probantur vet 
reprehenduntur. Inde plerumque eadem facta modo diligentiae modo 
vanitatis3 modo libertatis modo furoris nomen accipiunt.
85 Note the claims made for Trajan as protector in the letters of 
congratulation on his anniversary in Epp. 10.52, and 10.102.
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general he surpassed all other kings in every good quality (p.112).
This is no doubt the reason why he rules (Aristides in fact says TidXat 
xout(|) nab 6t apexqv xouxo xo yepas u)(pebAexo, p.100).
It is to the king’s credit that his character has not changed from 
the time when he was a private citizen (pp.101, 107) and, conversely, 
that even before he assumed office he was worthy of it (p.99). One of 
the main ways in which the king proves his worth is his refraining from 
the cruel and avaricious behaviour of his predecessors (pp.100-101 and 
103-4). Aristides implies that the .king was concerned to be a king 'in 
truth’, that is one patterned after the king of the universe (pp.106-7), 
and that he knew he would achieve this only by being approachable, 
humane and courteous (p.106). The king can grant the citizens the free­
dom taken from them by a previous ruler (p.105), but clearly this 
quality means little more here than freedom from fear. These qualities 
suit the king when he is fulfilling his function in a personal, 
individualized way, but tell us little of how he administered the state.
CONCLUSION
The writers we have examined for their attitudes to the function of 
the ruler are concerned first and foremost with the ruler’s personality 
as a pre-eminent individual. What they expect of him is, in general, 
what they would expect of anybody making efforts to be virtuous. In 
most of the definitions of kingship there is mention of acquiring 
knowledge or self-control or some other virtue appropriate to humanity 
as a whole, although particularly suited to one with responsibility for 
others. The king, then, has a wider field in which to exercise such 
qualities, and so more may be required of him. His functions, important 
as they are, are still described as if they were carried out in an 
informal, person-to-person basis, and are often made to appear 
unrewarding and difficult, rather than the opposite. Some elements of 
glory may creep in — this is so especially with the Neo-Pythagoreans and 
Plutarch — but such ’rewards’ are generally connected with the character 
of the ruler and are not intrinsic to his office.
What is striking here is the similarity in the writers' views on
169
the qualities considered desirable in a ruler. This is not simply a 
matter of earlier writers influencing later ones, for different 
traditions are involved. Rather, over an extensive period of time, a 
consensus had become established among theorists about the 
characteristics of the ideal ruler. (This does allow for individual 
differences. Thus we notice Dio stressing Cynic traits in some parts of 
his works on kingship.) The unanimity of view heightens the impression 
that the moral concern is paramount. There is considerable overlap here 
with the official ’government' view of a ruler, and we are often unable 
to determine who is the originator and who the imitator, but what we can 
say is that here the meaning of ’political’ has been narrowed down until 
it means something quite different from that which had applied in the 
world of the polis.
These groups within a society can he distinguished according to 
whetheri like an army or an orchestra, they function as a single body; 
or whether they are united merely to defend their common interests and 
otherwise function as separate individuals. In one case an aggregation 
of impersonal units to form a body with a single purpose; in the other 
case a suspension of individual activities for the purpose of rendering 
mutual aid. ... The point I am making is that in the more primitive 
forms of society the individual is merely a unit; in more developed 
forms of society he is an independent personality.
Herbert Read, Anarchy and Order, pp.36-7.
The plainest exposition of national personality is this — that <x 
nation fulfils the great condition of a person: namely, that it has
unity of acting, and unity of suffering; with the difference that what 
is physically single in the one, is joint, or morally single, in the 
other.
William Gladstone, The State in its 
Relations with the Church.
The people are the masters. They have only to express their wants 
at large and in gross. We are the expert artists: we are the skilful
workmen, to shape their desires into perfect form, and to fit the 
utensil to the use. They are the sufferers, they tell the symptoms of 
the complaint; but we know the exact seat of the disease, and how to 
apply the remedy according to the rules of art.
Burke, speech on Economical Reform, 1780.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IMAGES OF GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
From the time when Homer described the king as 'shepherd of the 
people'1 the essence of political structures had been given shape in 
Greek thought by a variety of images, more or less appropriate to the 
actual situation. Some terms concentrated on the figure of the ruler, 
introducing the ruled simply to complete the definition as in the 
shepherd metaphor above. Others sought to convey the truth about 
society as a whole, and to show how the various elements in it fitted
rtogether. Thus the comparison of the state with the human organism was 
being used in the fifth century to show the interdependence of the 
parts, and in particular the effect of stasis in the body politic.2
It was perhaps natural for analogies and metaphors to develop a 
life of their own and continue to be used even when no longer applicable, 
but this meant that such language could itself determine how a situation 
would be viewed, regardless of the actual constitution or institution
ounder scrutiny. Society and family were commonly compared, but a
1 See e.g. Iliad, 2.105; 2.254.
2 We may note Sophocles, Antig. 1015: Mau xaöxa xhs ans ex cppevos
voaeu tioAl s ; Herodotus, 5.28: (Miletus) voaqaaaa is xa yaAuoxa axaau,
and Thucydides, 8.64: ail tioAc l s  ... xps onto xwv ’A^qvaLwv
utiouAou euvoyuas ou Kpoxuynoavxes • This analogy can also be used, of
course, as a substitute for thought when applied too rigidly — cf. that
by Francis Bacon in Essay 29, 'Of the true Greatness of Kingdoms and
Estates' (Essays, Everyman edition, p.95): 'No body can be healthful 
without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly, to a 
kingdom or estate, a just and honourable war is the true exercise.'
Note, however, Diderot's conclusion in the article on peace in the 
Enoyolopedie: 'La guerre est un fruit de la depravation des hommes;
c’est une maladie convulsive et violente du corps politique; il n’est 
en sante, c’est-a-dire dans son etat naturel, que lorsqu’il jouit de la 
paix.'
Note 3 over page.
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change in the structure of the former, if not paralleled by a change in 
the latter, meant that an interpretation based on this comparison was no 
longer appropriate. A return to monarchical government from a 
democratic form of rule could revive the metaphor. This might then 
become a substitute for any analysis of society and the function of its 
parts able to reveal the position of the monarchy more adequately.
Aristotle uses analogies that describe society and others which 
concentrate on the individual. In the Politics he stresses the need for 
the happiness now of the whole (1329a),3 4 now of the part (1264b),5 but 
always before him is the task of finding a solution for possible 
conflict between the individual — especially in an official capacity — 
and the state. He takes structure and processes seriously. Though in 
one sense they are means to an end — that is, the good life — not only 
the end-product but the methods used to attain it must be scrutinized, 
to see that dissatisfaction does not arise from the form of government 
itself.6
Aristotle’s polis is not a purposeless biological organism — it is 
much more than that —  but he can still make use of the image.7 He also 
employs the language of household rule, despite initially denying the 
validity of such language in a political context (see 1252a, and cf. 
1259b),8 and the household could of course provide examples of rule
3 Cf. Solon's description of himself 'spreading his strong shield over 
both sides', a non-combatant standing outside and above the conflict of 
parties (Anthol. Lyvica Graeca, Vol. lyfr.5.5). This of course contra­
dicts the injunction Plutarch records him making in his laws, that a 
citizen not stay neutral in any civic dispute.
4 eu6adyova  6e xoXuv oux els  yepos  tu ßXe^avxas 6eu Xeyeuv auxfjs ,  aXX* 
eds xavxas  xous xoXdxas.
5 aöuvaxov 6e euöauyoveöv oXqv, yn xa'vxwv n yn xwv xXedaxwv yepwv n 
xuvoov eyovToov xnv euöauyovdav .
6 He explains t h e  problem in Pol. 1332b: xo xe yap daov xauxov xous
oyodous ,  xau xa 4exov ydveuv xnv xoXuxedav xyv auveaxpHUoav xapa xo 
ödxauov.  yexa yap xwv apyoyevoov uxapyouau vewxepuCeuv ßouXdyevou Ttdvxes 
ou xaxa xnv x^Pa v » xoaouxous xe e£vau xous t v  xqj toXuxEuyaxu to tXn§os 
max’ e£vau xpeuxxous xdvxmv toutgjv ev xu xwv aöuvdxwv eaxuv .
7 E.g. in 1253a: xau xpdxepov 6e tt) cpuaeu uoXus n ouxua xau exaaxos
nywv eaxuv .  to yap oXov Ttpdxepov avayxauov eJvau  xoü ye'pous* ava upou -  
yevou yap xou oXou oux eaxau xous ouöe x e ^Ps HP oywvuyws.
8 oaou yev ouiv ouovxau xoXuxuxov xau ßaauXuxov xau ouxovoyuxov xau 
öeaxoxuxov e^vau xov auxov ou xaXws Xeyouauv (1252a). (See over page.)
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which were kingly, such as of a father over his children (note Ethics 
1161a) . In his analysis of the relationship of the soul to the body and 
intelligence to desire, Aristotle finds instances of absolute and royal 
rule, and if this political account of the person is valid, it will 
very likely also seem to have relevance to the government of a 
community, and to encourage the adoption of these forms of rule as ideal.
To describe society and the way it is governed simply in personal 
terms is to ignore the intricacies of constitutional forms and official 
positions important for their own sake and not merely because of those 
who hold them. A new impulse had been given to such descriptions when 
ruling came to be seen as an art or science — a xey^h — by thinkers as 
different as Protagoras and Plato.10 An individual could determine to 
acquire this skill like any other, and exercise it on his fellow- 
citizens as a carpenter or sculptor would work with his material. The 
helmsman and the charioteer are favourite examples of those holding such 
an unchallenged authority.
To see rule as nothing more than a skill was an extreme position to 
adopt; in most cases moral considerations gave the metaphor a different 
turn, and showed the practising politician as a regenerator of his 
fellows because of his ethical superiority. His rule would then be 
effected principally by precept and example. The ruler becomes the 
teacher of his subjects, who possess a certain dignity and importance 
because they are capable of profiting from instruction, but who must 
always remain his pupils. If they could be expected one day to be the 
equal of the ruler ethically or intellectually, there would be no 
justification for the ruler’s retention of supreme power, and his task 
as teacher would be restricted to passing on the correct values to the 
next generation.
xau yap yuvauxos apx^t Hat xexvmv, ms sAeudepwv yev aycpouv, ou xov 
auxov 6e xpoxov xqg aPXPSs aAAa yuvatxos yev xoAuxuxms xexvwv 6e 
ßaobAtxws (1259a-b).
9 See 1254b: q yev yap (^ uxh xou awyaxos apyet öeoxoxuxqv apxpv, 6
6e vous xns ope^erns TtoAbxtxqv q ßaauAtxqv.
10 See Plato’s Protagoras 319a: rApa, ecpqv eym, euoyat aou x(£> Adytp;
öoxets yap you Aeyeuv xqv xoAuxLxriv xe'xvnv xau utLayveta^au Tiotebv 
avöpas ayadoug TioAtxag.
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The r u l e r ’ s c l a i m  may be f o r t i f i e d  by t h e  r e v e l a t i o n  t h a t  h i s  
p o s i t i o n  i s  n a t u r a l 11 ( j u s t  as  much as  t h e  examples  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  t h e  a n im a l  o r  i n s e c t  w o r l d ,  where  one c r e a t u r e  e x e r c i s e s  
u n c h a l l e n g e d  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  o t h e r s  i n  t h e  g r o u p ) . T h i s  i d e a  was 
f a m i l i a r  t o  t h e  S o p h i s t s ,  b u t  t h e  a n a l o g y  a l s o  came to  be u s e d  to  r e f e r  
t o  e t h i c a l  s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s  by p h i l o s o p h e r s  opposed 
to  t h e  S o p h i s t i c  v i e w p o i n t .  The h e s i t a t i o n  o f  A r i s t o t l e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i n  
Pol.  , 133 2 b ) ,  and even  o f  P l a t o  i n  t h e  P o l i t i e u s 12 on th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
d e t e r m i n i n g  who t h e s e  s u p e r i o r  b e i n g s  were  was n o t  s h a r e d  by t h o s e  who 
f o l l o w e d  them. T h i s  t e n d e d  t o  t u r n  p o l i t i c s  i n t o  e t h i c a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  by 
an e l i t e  o f f e r i n g  a q u a s i - m y s t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n .  By 
e xam in ing  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  t h e  r u l i n g  power and t h e  images i n  
which  th e y  a r e  c l o t h e d ,  we may be a b l e  to  d e t e r m i n e  how t h e  c h o i c e  o f  
m o n a r c h i c a l  government  was j u s t i f i e d ,  and on how r a t i o n a l  and c o n s i s t e n t  
a  b a s i s  t h i s  was done .
ISOCRATES
B a s i c  t o  I s o c r a t e s '  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  government  i s  h i s  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  
p a r t  p l a y e d  by Logos. I n  i t s e l f ,  t h i s  does  n o t  e n t a i l  government  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d .  I t  i s  a p o s s e s s i o n  o f  hum an i ty  i n  g e n e r a l ,  and i s  a 
s i g n  (onyeCov) and an image (euöwAov) o f  a m e n t a l  and s p i r i t u a l  s t a t e  
(Nie. 7 ) .  I t  i s  i n  f a c t  one o f  t h e  main images r e l a t e d  to  t h e  g o v e r n i n g  
p r o c e s s  t h a t  I s o c r a t e s  u s e s .  He c r e d i t s  Logos w i t h  b e i n g  t h e  one 
s o c i a l i z i n g  f o r c e  among men, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  them from t h e  b e a s t s  — toüto  
( i . e .  e lo q u e n c e )  yovov it, ontdvTmv rmv 4(pmv töuov eepuyev eyovTes (Paneg. 
4 8 ) .  More t h a n  t h i s  i t  makes p o s s i b l e  p e r s u a s i o n ,  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
c i t i e s ,  c r a f t s  and l a w s .  (We may compare t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  p o l i t i k e  
teehne i n  t h e  myth i n  t h e  Protagoras .)  Most  i m p o r t a n t  o f  a l l ,  Logos 
d e t e r m i n e s  what  i s  j u s t  and u n j u s t ,  what  b a s e  and f a i r ;  i f  t h i s  were 
n o t  d e c i d e d ,  no s o c i a l  i n t e r c o u r s e  would be  p o s s i b l e  (Nie. 6 - 7 ) .
11 Note G o r g i a s ’ p ronouncem en t  (He 1. 6 [DK f r .  1 1 ] ) :  uecpuxe . . .  ou to
xpeuoaov uitd tou qoaovos xwAuea^ou,, aAAa to ?iaaov uuo too x p e ta a o v o s  
äpxeadou, xau dyea-öa t ,  x a i  to yev xpeuoaov pyeCa^au ,  to 6e fiaaov e7iea§au.
12 See P o l i t .  301d -e :  Nüv 6e ye ouote  oux e o t l  yuyvoyevos ,  ms 6p
epayev, ev Tals  noAeau BaatAeus o£os tv  aynveaev eycpueTau, to te  awya 
eudus xa t  Tpv (^uxnv öuacpepmv e u s ,  6e t  6q auveA^ovTas auyypayyaTa ypacpeLV, 
ms e ooxev ,  yeTaöe'ovTas Ta Tfis aArideaTaTris TtoAuTeuas tyvn.
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This broad view is constantly being narrowed to make Logos refer 
specifically to rhetoric; on this criterion xwv 6e Adywv xwv xaAws xat 
xexVLKws exoVTwV P^xov xous (pauAots, aXXa c^ uxhs ex) cppovouons epyov
ovxas (Paneg. 48). If men’s culture is manifested in speech, it is 
clear that they must have been educated liberally (Paneg. 49).
Education, then, puts men in possession of the tool of Logos, and just 
as Isocrates advocates the development of the intellect and powers of 
expression in a general way, so he believes those speeches to be the 
best which teach men in power how they should deal with the people, and 
teach individual subjects how they should be disposed to their rulers 
(Nie. 10). The former task is the more important, for those educating 
private citizens benefit them alone, but anyone turning those who rule 
over the multitude to a life of virtue will help both groups (To Nie. 8).
There is no doubt that Isocrates believed that the arts to help man 
on the path to virtue were education and diligence (naLÖeuats, 
enup^Xeua, To Nie. 12, cf. Antid. 209-14). He endeavours therefore to 
implant in the monarch a desire to ’learn his job’ by practice and 
theoretical study (To Nie. 35). Not surprisingly, many of the precepts 
given here are such as would be appropriate to a private citizen. Care 
of the soul as an athlete cares for his body is the king’s primary duty 
(To Nie. 11), and the analogy used is the same as the one put before 
Demonicus, encouraging him to pursue virtue for his own improvement by 
developing his soul with moral precepts (auouöauous Adyous, Dem. 12). 
Only so, no doubt, can the king perform his functions of putting an end 
to the state’s distress, preserving it in prosperity and making it great 
when it is small (To Nie. 9), for when a man has acquired the art 
appropriate to the mind (here (jjuxn) his mind is able to fulfil its task, 
as the Antidosis puts it, deciding on personal and public questions 
(itepe xwv l.6lu)V xau nepu xmv xoovwv, Antid. 180).
For the ruler’s greater enlightenment, Isocrates compares the rule 
of a king to rule over horses or dogs (To Nie. 15). This resembles the 
use other writers make of the image of the shepherd-king, and shows that 
Isocrates too felt no inappropriateness in the language Plato made 
current in the Politicus. In his frank-speaking, Isocrates sees himself 
as doing his duty by the state, and this too he sees as an art. The 
only cure (cpappaxov) for ignorant souls is for the spiritual physician
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to blame them with the use of Xoyos for their evil-doing, just as if
applying the therapy of cautery or cutting (see Peace 39-40). This
comparison is applied to a democracy, but would fit far more
1 3appropriately in a state under monarchical rule.
We might say the same of Isocrates’ attitude to the sovereign 
offices in the state in the Areopagiticus. Here Isocrates approvingly 
records the opinion of those in the pristine democracy: ’They believed
that the rest of the people would reflect the character of those who 
were placed in charge of their affairs’ (Areop. 22). This makes sense 
only when the rulers do not need to depend on the populace for election 
and approval and when their numbers are few. This belief in the 
pedagogic function of rule sets up almost as great a gap between the 
teacher-ruler as model and the pupil-subject as imitator as does the 
view that the counsellor of the people is a physician. Appropriately it 
reappears in the Panathenaicus, this time applied to the early kings of 
Athens. The kings 'trained the multitude in virtue and justice and 
great sobriety’ (Panath. 138). Similarly, because ’the manners of the 
whole state are copied from its rulers' (To Nie. 31) the king must make 
his behaviour an example (itapdöeuYpa) to the subjects. (The same idea 
is repeated in Nicocles 37.) The image is the one used in the Demonicus 
where a son is urged to pattern himself on his father (Peru. 11) . The 
same work also recommends imitation of the king's behaviour (Dem. 36), 
so that the king is clearly a father-figure as well as a teacher.
In works addressed to Athens, Isocrates proclaims that every polity 
is the soul of the state (Panath. 138, Areop. 14), having the same power 
over it as the mind does over the body. This is another way of saying 
that as the sovereign power is so will the state be. It does not apply 
to one form of government more than to any other —  we may note the 
impartiality of Demonicus 36 on this point —  but the comparison lends 
itself more naturally to government in a few hands or in the hands of 
one rather than to a democracy with changing personnel and conflicting 
views. It is a static outlook, for the 'mind' it describes affects the 
'body' while the reverse does not appear to be true. It is also a
1 3 The capacity for independent, decisive action in a monarchy is one 
reason for Isocrates' admiration of Philip's government which could 'get 
things done', and this would apply particularly to punitive action. See 
Phil. 14, 15, 127.
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narrower view than we find, for example, in the Antidosis where the 
influence is that of the older generation upon the younger by way of 
education (174) and so the whole way of life is the example to be 
followed and not simply the attitudes of an elite.
Mutual co-operation among all sections of the community does come 
in for praise —  Isocrates has Nicocles explaining that the success or 
failure of the whole depends on each of the parts —  but he goes on to 
say that the subject should therefore be no less careful of his, the 
ruler's, interests than of his own. Public affairs then are not truly 
public (see Nie. 48-9 and cf. Peace 120 where Isocrates suggests that 
the state should cultivate virtues, just like an individual). At a 
theoretical level, Isocrates can advocate the use of elements from 
different forms of government in combination or even refer to government 
in a democracy in personal terms proper to sole rule. Thus (our 
ancestors) resolved that del xov pev dppov ojentep xupavvov Maöioiavai xas 
apyas (Areop. 26). Personalizing rule in this way naturally leads to 
seeing government as an individual.
The net effect of these ways of describing the relationship between
ruler and ruled is to give the impression that what is important inä© Touch
government is not(the form that it takes but the character and guidance 
of those in authority; that the art of ruling is a specialist skill, 
and that much of the task is to do with bringing about right conduct.
XENOPHON
A former pupil of Socrates as Xenophon was could hardly fail to see 
ruling as an art. This attitude naturally implied criticism of most 
people taking part in public life for having failed to acquire the 
necessary skills. To advocate the rule of experts is to advocate a 
hierarchy, and Xenophon was prepared to accept this. He went even 
further for he defined political and ruling excellence in general as the 
fairest virtue, the greatest art (n KaXAcoxn apexn Mai yeyuaxri xtxvr0 
because it belongs to kings and is called royal (Mem. 4.2.11). This is 
a curious outcome for a discussion on politics in general, especially as 
these words are put into the mouth of a Socrates who was a loyal if
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critical member of the Athenian democracy.
If abstraction from the real society became the hallmark of later 
political theory, this example shows that the process started early.
The adjective ’kingly’ can however be used in a non-political way (which 
may be implied in the usage above), for elsewhere in the Memorabilia 
Socrates contends that kings and rulers are not those who hold the 
sceptre nor those elected by anybody at all, nor those chosen by lot nor 
those using force or deception, but those knowing how to rule 
(cTiLOTayevous a p y t t v ,  Mem. 3.9.10). This is similar to Plato's 
conclusions expressed most emphatically in the Gorgias (see 463-4) and 
followed through in the Republic and subsequent works, and is no doubt 
in accord with the historical Socrates' belief in the importance of 
knowledge in every sphere of life, and his contempt for the ignorance of 
the practitioners of politics.
Rule if it is an art is also much more than a mere technical 
process —  and here the element of personal ethics comes in. Even the 
laws seem designed by their authors to teach. What they teach is in one 
case justice (Oec. 14.4) , in another the ability to rule and be ruled 
(Cyr. 1.6.20). The ruler’s influence is of course even easier to 
describe in personal terms, and Xenophon stresses the inculcation of 
standards of conduct by those in charge. He explains that the rulers 
must be teachers, who will not only promote virtue in accordance with 
the laws but also show that the way to happiness lies through virtue 
{Cyr. 3.3.53).
The lack of concern with defining political terms in a political 
way appears clearly in the Oeconomious where household management 
becomes a polis ’writ small' despite the fact that this transgresses 
Aristotle's carefully drawn boundaries. Here (13.5), the householder 
explains that whoever is able to make men fit for rule is also able to 
teach them to be in sole charge (öeöTtoTuxous av^pwTtwv) and whoever can 
do this can make men kingly. Kingly ?)§os is defined as the ability to 
inspire a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel in 
one's subordinates, and so is the greatest thing in any task performed 
by men. Because it is an art it needs to be taught, although Xenophon 
insists that the right sort of nature is also a prerequisite and so too
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is a divine element (Oec. 21.10-12). 14
The portrait of the king presented to us is as much that of a 
father as a teacher. Xenophon has Chrysantas reflect on this (Cyr. 
8.1.1), and throughout the last book of the Cyvopaedia has examples of 
paternal care on the part of Cyrus and the response this aroused in the 
subjects (Cyr. 8.1.44; 8.2.9; 8.8.1). These are comparable to the 
instance given of paternal concern for a son's improvement where a 
father will look to his own character to ensure that the model of 
behaviour he provides will be as good as possible (7.5.86).
Xenophon frequently invokes the image of the shepherd-king, citing 
Homer as his authority, when he has Socrates describe the ideal ruler- 
general as shepherd of his people. The similarity is in the type of 
care necessary in both cases, for
woxep xov Tiouyeva 6eu ctuyeAeua^au, otuos aw at re eaovxau at 
oues Mat xa euuxnöeua e£ouau Mat, o5 even a xpecpovxau, xoöxo 
carat, ouxw Mat tov axpaxnyov eutpcAe ta^at 6eu, Studs a wot xe 
ot oxpaxtwxat eaovxau Mat xa eTtuxqßeua e^ouau Mat, ou eveMa 
oxpaxeuovxat, xoöxo carat (Mem. 3.2.1).
The same point is made in the Cyropaedia where Cyrus remarks on the 
resemblance between the tasks of a good herdsman and a good king, both 
having as their object the happiness of their charges (Cyr. 8.2.14).
The definition of happiness for both groups of 'herds' would come from 
the herdsman who knows what is best for animal or human stock. This 
aspect comes out more clearly in the beginning of the Cyropaedia where 
the intractability of the human herd is compared with the docility of 
their animal counterparts who have no objections to being 'fleeced' for 
the benefit of their master (Cyr. 1.1.2). Perhaps we should balance 
this view with the sobering consideration of a 'herdsman', such as 
Critias, whom Socrates is recorded as chiding for being so unbusiness­
like as to kill his herd (see Mem. 1.2.32).
In general the descriptions of the kingly craft under various
Xenophon shows the principle of 'rule of the best’ at work in all 
the arts and crafts in Mem. 3.3.9: ’Emclvo yev önnou o£o$a, o u  ev
Havre Tipayyaxu ou avdpwtou xouxous yaAuoxa edeAouou neu§eo§au oos av 
nywvxau ßcAxuoxoug cuvau. Mao yap ev V004), ov av qywvxau oax^oMwxaxov 
e£vau, xoux(D yaAuoxa ueuSovxau,  Mao ev ttAoud ou ttAc ovxcs, ov av 
MußepvqxuMwxaxov, Mau ev yewpyua, ov av yewpyuMwxaxov.
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aspects show it in an idealistic, one might say sentimental, light, 
which may prevent us from perceiving it as essentially a justification 
of the possession of sovereignty, but Xenophon does provide this 
explicitly as well: a king is so by nature ( (puoet)  just as there is a
natural (cpuoyevos) leader of the bees in any swarm (Cyv. 5.1.24). This 
is going further than Isocrates’ essentially pragmatic justification of 
sole rule would have taken us, and is a pointer to the attitude that 
subsequent writers were to adopt.
The criterion of expertise, by which actual holders of power could 
be judged and found wanting, contains the potential for a radical attack 
on the status quo. The result may be the emergence of opposition to a 
particular government — on moral and intellectual, not political 
grounds, be it noted — or the development of an a-political outlook such 
as that taken by the Cynics. This is of little help in making the 
ultimate choice of a form of government or in showing how the government 
should work from day to day, or what consultative procedures, if any, 
should be adopted. Xenophon himself does not balance his account of 
rule as an art by any description of society in terms of the parts of a 
whole working together.
ARISTEAS
In the Letter of Aristeas there is little development of imagery as 
the form of question and answer at the symposia does not allow for a 
coherent account of the ruler and his task under a metaphor. What is 
noticeable, however, is the great stress Aristeas lays on the value of 
imitation in political affairs. This appears initially (in the first 
question-and-answer, 187-8) in the relationship advocated between God 
and the king when the king is urged to imitate God's mercy. This 
parallel between the rule of God in the cosmos and of the king in Egypt 
is frequently drawn. God is a benefactor of mankind; the king by 
looking at his works will behave in the same way (190). Specifically in 
lawsuits he will not rouse the hostility of the loser but demonstrate 
the indulgence of God (191-2).
The simple practice of piety leads (210) to the reflection that
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imitation of the deity is necessary for the king. This should apply to 
all men but the writer shows an exclusive connection between the deity 
and his mortal representative (see 254). Only in the debate on the 
appointment of magistrates is a subordinate described as imitating his 
royal master and thereby improving himself (280).
Here then the objects of care exist not even as sheep to be 
protected or a ship of state to be steered or children of a fatherly 
king, although this last relationship is implied by the attitudes 
recommended to the king. All the writer's concern is for the king’s 
private growth in virtue. In his position in life he has certain duties 
to perform which exalt him above all other men and impose obligations on 
him. In questions on the treatment of foreigners and of minority groups 
in the kingdom (e.g. in 257, 267) we have a glimpse of social problems 
of which a Jewish writer would be particularly aware. The principles 
proclaimed enjoining equality and positive discrimination in favour of 
foreigners are strikingly out of the line of concern of most writers on 
kingship and of Aristeas himself elsewhere. Allegorization of kingship 
— it is really 'mastery of self' (222) — is common in the Letter and 
leads away from involvement in the political expression of rule just as 
much as the 'political' imagery we have analysed so far.
HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES
Hellenistic theorists on politics who belonged to a particular 
philosophical school — Cynic or Stoic, in the main — have not left us 
enough of their works to provide examples of their use of imagery to 
bolster political theory. Only some hints remain. The Stoics 
specifically describe the kingly craft as an eitböTqgri, which does not 
require the man possessing it to rule over many (SVF 3.618). The use 
that Diogenes the Cynic makes of the motifs of the physician and steers­
man is to compare his own skill in imparting virtue and in governing men 
to such professions as these, where knowledge can command obedience 
(D.L. 6.29). Just as those with these skills are obeyed even in slavery 
in matters where they are the experts, so should the true ruler be.
182
This does not tell us about the king, however, but about his Cynic 
replacement. Yet it does show that rule in its most esoteric sense 
appeared to Cynics as an art, and whoever possessed it, whatever his 
actual status, was entitled to be served, simply because of his ability. 
This ability also implied a capacity to teach (see D.L. 6.30 and 7.48). 
The comments of the Stoics, similarly, give the impression that if any­
one is to be compared to a craftsman of any sort, it is their wise man, 
who is not only king but also ouxovoyLHos etc., as well (SVF 1.216).
Zeno seems to have regarded the well-run state as a herd, if we are 
justified in seeing Plutarch, Fort. Alex. 329b, as applying directly to 
his ideal state.15 There is no clear mention of a shepherd, however, 
and we must be wary of assuming that here we have a full-blown instance 
of this analogy.
Homonoia is to the Stoics of this time an eTiuaxiiyn molvojv ä y a d w v  
(SVF 3.630), and we assume that it can therefore be brought about in a 
society only from outside by one who possesses this knowledge. From the 
little information we have we can tentatively conclude that there were 
no images employed, in the philosophies which had anything positive to 
say about political life at this time, which were at odds with those we 
have considered so far.
Our neo-Pythagorean writers were not behindhand in expressing their 
theory on the monarchy in becoming imagery. They had the example of 
pseudo-Archytas in the t i e pl voyou xai öuxaLoauvris where the writer notes 
that the ruler must be understanding, powerful and a lover of men, for 
it would be strange for a shepherd to be a hater of his sheep 
( y LOOtpdßaTos, p.218). Ruling people requires many skills and Diotogenes, 
referring to the king’s epya,  stresses the learning involved (note 
CTiuaxadeLS, exya^cjov, exXoyLadyevos, pp.263-4). He compares the ruler to 
a helmsman, a charioteer and a doctor, all of whom are skilled in vital 
tasks (p.264). God can rightly be called a ’rearer and teacher' of all, 
says Sthenidas, and the king should copy him in adopting these roles 
(p.271). Diotogenes depicts the polis as a lyre which the king must
15 Alexander fulfilled Zeno’s ideal that yq xaxa TioXeuc; yqöe önyoug 
OLMajycv löuols exaaxoL bumpLoyevou Suxauous, aAAa navxas avdpmuous 
nywye-öa önyoxas Kai TioXuxas, etg 6e ßuog ri xai xdoyos, watep ayeXqg 
auvvoyou voyip h o u v ^ auvxpeipoyevqg (Mor. 329a-b) .
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play on expertly (p.266).
These writers eagerly seized on the well-worn comparison of the 
king and the head of a household (Sthenidas speaks of the king's display 
of naxpuKav örd^eatv, p.270), and Ecphantus refers directly to his close 
relations to his subjects, 'like that of a father to his son and of a 
shepherd to his flock' (p.276). Diotogenes offers Zeus' benevolence in 
his capacity as father of gods and men as an example to the king (p.270).
The only comparison with the animal world is when Ecphantus shows 
that the true claimant to the throne is like the eagle who alone can 
face the sun (p.273). This means that whoever is of the royal species 
is born so, and a usurper cannot fail to be detected, and so the status 
quo everywhere is vindicated. The state of society as a whole is 
referred to only indirectly (and then as potis) , most noticeably in the 
metaphor of the lyre mentioned above. For all the emphasis on Motvwvua 
the body politic does not appear in these works on kingship. The 
writers display, however, in extreme form the concern we have already 
found in other theorists to describe government under a variety of names 
drawn from other fields of life where hierarchy and authority prevailed.
CICERO
The imagery of government and its task in Cicero is one of the most 
striking examples of the adoption of Greek-derived expressions and 
attitudes to explain a political point of view. Clearly these images 
were used because Cicero saw them as the most appropriate to reveal the 
nature of rule in Roman society also, and they easily took root in the 
new atmosphere, as Lepore describes:
Non ci sembra ehe le serie semantiche individuate e i sinonimi 
adoperati rivelino [sic] altro ehe un uso metaforico di alcuni 
termini, spesso mutuato dall’ambito e dal linguaggio 
filosofico greco, ma assimilato perfettamente dalla esperienza 
linguistica romana.16
The language employed by the Greek political theorists whom Cicero 
followed was, as we have seen, best suited to depict one-man rule, and
16 Lepore, It princeps, pp.44-5.
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he himself uses terms not originally from the sphere of government both 
to reinforce a message in the speeches, or to provide an explanation in 
the more theoretical texts. We may say that in general the terms lead 
to the view that ruling is an art calling for intelligence yet also 
requiring practical applications.
Such titles as conservator, custos, rector, moderator, tutor, 
procurator, gubemator and so on appear more or less significant at 
various stages of Cicero's career and his theoretical development. That 
Cicero and his hearers always considered the origins of these terms when 
applying them to the political sphere is unlikely, but enough of their 
basic meaning survived for Cicero to make extended metaphors by using 
such expressions as the helmsman's guiding the ship of state (the helms­
man of course being gubemator) .
This particular term in fact appears early in use in Rome, but it
is only with Cicero that it acquires an association with political life.
In the Pro Roscio Amerino (80 B.C.) it appears as a recurring metaphor
(e.g. 22, cum unus omnia gubernet; 51, homines qui ...ad gubernacula
r.p. sedere debebant; 131, cum solus rem publicam regeret orbemque
terrarum gubernaret [with reference to Sulla]).17 From the year 62
onwards the term becomes even more common, and we may expect that,
corresponding as it does to the Hußepvniris of Plato (Rep. 488d), it will
1 8apply particularly to the individual who holds most power.
Conservator, custos and their variants appear notably in the year 
of Cicero's consulship, not surprisingly in the speeches against 
Catiline5where the notion of preservation from threats to Roman liberty 
and safety and the implication that Cicero himself could alone repel 
the danger made the use of such words appropriate and effective.
Regere when it appears in works before the De Republica has no 
specific reference to one-man rule, but rector first becomes important 
in the De Oratore in association with auctor consili publici} showing its
17 Cf. Pro Murena (delivered in 63 B.C.) 74: tu ... gubernacula rei 
publicae petas ...? and 83: totam rem publicam vos in hac causa 
tenetis3 vos gubernatis.
18 £ L y£ÄÄ£ L T (j) OVTt V£(1)S dpXtMOS £Ö£ödotL, 0TUi)g Ö£ XUß£pVnG£L £CCVT£ 
TLV£S ßouXmVTaU £CXVT£ yq, PPT£ T£xvqv T0UT0U yqx£ y£X£TTlV 0tdy£V0U 
Suvaxdv £^vau Aaß£bv aya «au iqv HUßEpvqTtHqv (Rep. 488d-e).
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underlying meaning of one who initiates action. Moderator like rector 
comes from a verb generally used to indicate fatti morali, psicologici, 
pedagogici119 while tutor and procurator, rare before the De Republica, 
still retain enough of their original meaning to warrant the insertion 
of quasi when they occur there (2.51, cf. De Orat. 3.3: quasi parens
bonus aut tutor fidelis, said of a consul).
The De Republica provides the most ample development of these terms 
in a context which may well seem to demand that they refer to a princeps 
ruling on his own. But this is not..always the case. Gubematio in 1.2 
and 1.12 refers to men in general going into public life. Yet later on 
(1.45) in gubemanda r.p. clearly indicates one individual (magnus 
quidam civis et divinus paene vir). It is not clear whether a statesman 
is here being singled out to take command like the helmsman on a ship, 
or whether Cicero is making a passing reference to the foresight of any 
man who may happen to be moderans cursumy as, for instance, a consul.
(At any rate, he is still called civis.) But 'the analogy of the 
helmsman is taken as a decisive argument against the choice of rulers by 
lot (1.51) and in the rhetorical question virtute vero gubernante rem 
publicamy quid potest esse praeclarius? (1.52) we can observe a natural 
tendency for this line of thought to end in the recommendation of the 
rule of the few and ultimately of the one.
In the excursus on monarchy (De Rep. 1.54-65), Cicero devotes 
considerable attention to the argument by analogy and again makes use of 
imagery which seems to demonstrate the inevitability of the rule of one 
man. Thus Scipio claims uni gubernatori3 uni medico3 si digni modo sint 
iis artibus3 rectius esse alteri navem committere3 aegrum alteri quam 
multis (1.62).20 Thus monarchy too makes more sense. Again in 
discussing the moderator (quo referre velirrtus omnia as he mentions in a 
letter to Atticus in 49 B.C., Att. 8.11.1), he says ut enim gubernatori 
cursus secundusj medico salus3 imperatori victoria3 sic huic moderatori
19 Lepore, It princeps, p.44.
20 ' Ces trois termes ont un point commun: dans les trois cas, l’agent
exerce son action sur l’objet et n’en fait guere partie, le pilote n’est 
pas considere comme passager bien qu’il soit dans le bateau, le general 
est essentiellement distinct de la troupe lorsqu’il s’agit d’organiser 
la victoire, enfin le cas du medecin est clair' (van den Bruwaene, La 
Notion du prince, p.72).
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rei publicae beata civium vita proposita est (De Rep. 5.8). We notice 
how moderator has here become the term for the ruler, without any 
qualification, bringing with it the association with rule over the 
passions (e.g. Q. fr. 1.1.38: moderari vero et animo et orationi cum
sis iratus ... non mediocris ingeni).21
The use of conservare (De Rep. 2.46 of L. Brutus, 2.47 of a good 
king) shows the continued stress on saving the state from some danger 
which may or may not be specified. Individual initiative is most 
suitable for such an undertaking. As to rector and regere there is in 
the De Republica hardly any sense left of the earlier frequent meaning 
of ruling the self (as in e.g. Fam. 4.14.1). But this unofficial term 
provides a conveniently wide frame of reference for Cicero's ideal 
statesman to fit into. The rector's role is one of guidance (see De 
Rep. 5.6: Hanc [verecundiam] M e  rector rerum publicarum auxit
opinionibus3 perfecitque institutis et disciplinis),22 He exercises 
prudent foresight (6.1: Totam igitur expectas prudentiam huius rectoris3
quae ipsum nomen hoc nacta est ex providendo), he possesses every need­
ful virtue and skill (2.51: sit huic oppositus alter3 bonus et sapiens
et peritus utilitatis dignitatisque civilis3 quasi tutor et procurator 
rei publicae; sic enim appelletur quicumque erit rector et gubemator 
civitatis). The words tutor and procurator here retain their original 
sense which makes for their effectiveness, as well as suggesting Greek 
philosophical connections.23 This is also true of the occurrence of the
21 'Semmai il suo uso trasferisce nell’ambito politico certi valori in 
uso nel linguaggio filosofico dell’ambito psicologico, etico e retorico 
(si ricordi il motivo della yciptOTiaOeta giä presente in De Oratore e ehe 
tornerä in un passo anche in De Republica)', Lepore, Il princeps, p.71.
22 Cf. also De Rep. 6.13: nihil est enim M i  principi deo3 qui omnem
mundum regit3 quod quidem in terris fiat acceptius3 quam concilia 
coetusque hominum iure sociati3 quae civitates appellantur; harum
rectores et conservatores hinc profecti hue revertuntur.
23 Pöschl points out that by these terms Cicero is showing the
character required in a leader, rather than giving a description of an 
official position (Römischer Staat, pp.117-8): 'Cicero will ... mit der
neuen Bezeichnung des tutor et procurator einen Begriff schaffen, der 
dem des platonischen (puAa£ entspricht und der wie dieser schon in seinem 
Namen nicht die Vorstellung des Herrschens, sondern der treuen Fürsorge 
und liebevollen Hingabe trägt, eines Staatslenkers, der die königliche 
caritas des 1. Buches verkörpert.'
Lepore too stresses the philosophic undertones to the expressions, Il 
princeps, p.71: 'L’idea di tutela o di procura mutuata dal campo
giuridico indica non una posizione di superioritä e di pieno
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words, or rather, of tutela and procuratio in combination in the De 
Officios (1.85) where a ruler’s duty is the care of the state as a whole 
without thought of self, a sentiment attributed there to Plato.
The impact that all these titles make does not suggest a concern to 
specify precisely the political role of the figure bearing them, but 
rather a wish to bring in an extra-political dimension. Cicero refers 
in his discussion on government to rule as a science, that is, as purely 
theoretical, despite his expressed belief that virtus in usu sui tota 
posita est (De Rep. 1.2). This type of discussion, especially that 
taking place in the excursus , fits in awkwardly with, for example, the 
historical account of Roman rule given in Book Two. It shows how the 
approximation of BaouAeug and tcoältlhos developed in Greek thought, 
especially by Plato, could appear even in the work of a practical Roman. 
In the comparisons that are justifications for monarchy
le analogie empiriche della familia, della dornus e delle artes 
... servono a render piu immediata la deduzione fondamentale 
ma non fanno che precisare sempre meglio il valore speciale 
della monarchia e dell’ unus riflettendo appunto quella piü 
minuta disanima dell’ apyh e del MUpcov.24
Cicero clearly shows the connection between royal and paternal 
roles. Not only does he refer to the word rex as quasi patrium nomen 
(1.54), but he describes how a king consulit ut parens populo (2.47). 
Those who live under a beneficent king like Romulus do not call their 
rulers eri or domini, denique ne reges quidem3 sed patriae custodes3 sed 
patres^ sed deos (1.64). There is even an element in aristocratic
trasferimento di capacitä, come vorrebbero alcuni, ma solo un rapporto 
di rappresentanza fiduciaria, in cui se va rintracciata una risonanza di 
idee filosofiche stoiche, l’individuo assume semmai un ruolo subordinato 
rispetto alio stato.'
However, his criticism of van den Bruwaene for finding a radical 
transfer of power implied (i.e. from the state to the tutor and 
procurator) is hardly justified in view of Bruwaene's cautious 
conclusion: 'Les deux termes de tutor — personne qui a la tutelle d’un
mineur ou d’un incapable — et de procurator—celui qui gere pratiquement 
les affaires, evoquent l’idee d’une incapacity de fait de la part du 
corps de la Republique et un transfer! de capacite ä une personne qui 
devient en quelque sorte l’Etat par procuration. Evidemment, cette 
definition manque de nuance, et nous n ’oublions pas que Ciceron a ecrit 
quasi devant le double terme, ce qui indique que les mots ne sont guere 
adequats ä sa pensee, mais que, d’autre part, telle est bien la 
direction dans laquelle il cherche’ (La. Notion du prince, p.63).
24 Lepore, It princeps, p.92.
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government that is quasi regium and it consists of patrium consilium 
populo bene consulentium principum (1.65). In general, we can see how 
the hated term of rex is itself transformed by acquiring an association 
with the paternal role.
The examples from the arts of sole rule given in the excursus on 
monarchy are much the same as those appearing around the figure of the 
rector, summus vir, moderator and the like in the rest of the work and 
show that the latter cannot really be separated from the concentrated 
theoretical analysis that takes place in Book One. The imagery of the 
king includes comparison of his rule over his subjects with that 
dominion of mind over feelings referred to as the use of consilium 
(1.60). This connects the argument with the method of Plato and 
Aristotle who patterned public life on a model of the relationship in 
the soul. Such a view of rule also appears in 2.67 with the reference 
to the Indian or Carthaginian guide over the elephant, who is a model 
for the prudens needing self-rule before all.
With the musical analogy by which Cicero sets out the task of the 
man being looked for, we move at last into the social area and gain some 
idea of how Cicero envisages his statesman fitting into the society, 
performing his ’duty and function' — officium et munus — in the most 
comprehensive sense. We see at once that he stands outside the rest 
of the state, as a pattern to be imitated, a mirror to his fellow 
citizens by reason of the supreme excellence of his life and character 
(2.69). Therefore he is able to harmonize the conflicting elements, 
that is the different classes in the state.
Up to this point, concord had been suggested as resulting from 
popular measures (2.54: homines concordiae causa sapienter populäres)
and as a quality of the rule of Numa (2.27: cum ... summa in pace
concordiaque regnavisset). But now Cicero explains his belief that 
harmony comes rather from the resolution than the absence of conflict 
and not as the democrats would claim facillimam ... in re publica esse 
posse concordiam_, in qua idem conducat omnibus (1.49). We can remember
25 ’Via via ehe al di la dei singolo ordines si rivela l’edificio 
statale, si fa piü viva l’esigenza di riempire di un contenuto concreto 
la sua forma e di precisare il compito e i caratteri dell’uomo e della 
classe politica’ (ib., p.106).
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Cicero's own attempt at producing a concordia ordinum, but here what is 
suggested is not the sharing of rule by two upper orders but the consent 
and collaboration of all three classes in a fixed political order, under 
the supervision, however, of a figure who will apply moderata ratio to 
all problems. It is interesting to compare this conception with 
Cicero's description of the bonds linking members of society in the De 
Officiis where he uses the old organic image (De Off. 3.22).26 There 
the fact of mutual dependence is set out, with no attempt being made to 
prescribe the imposition of order or co-operation.27
Cicero in describing political activity prefers to use here an 
image which reinforces the account of the efficacy of the leader's 
example, and which unites concord and justice. But such devices as 
these, in association with the others looked at, have a part to play in 
overcoming the formal difficulties in the way of granting an individual 
powers that cannot be contained in any traditional framework of 
government.
PHILO
Philo assumes without question that ruling is a science like any 
other which the sage may acquire. He cites, among subheadings of ethics, 
the political craft, the economic, the kingly (dealing with the control 
of men), and the legislative (Ebr. 91). Failure to pursue the 
appropriate measures to acquire any form of learning is most blameworthy, 
for it is lack of education (auctLÖeuaua) which is the cause of to Aqpttv 
{Ebr. 6).28 There is a mböeuats for kings alone (and not for private
26 See on this image, 'Die Fabel des Menenius Agrippa', Wilhelm Nestle,
in Klio^ll (1927), p.354: 'Verfolgen wir nun die Geschichte dieser
organischen Staatsidee, die dem griechischen Denken frühe in Fleisch und 
Blut überging,von ihren Ursprüngen über den Hellenismus bis in die 
römische Kaiserzeit, so erhalten wir damit gewissermassen eine 
Genealogie der Meneniusfabel.'
27 This motif had been popular from fifth-century Greece onwards.
Note too De Fin. 3.63: ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata3
ut oculi3 ut aures3 alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant ... sic 
. . .  formicae3 apes3 ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. Multo 
haec coniunctius homines.
28 Cf. Ebr. 141: utoAayßdveu yap voyov a^avaxov iv xrj xou tavxos 
eaxpAtxevja^au cpuaeu xauxu itepye'xovxa, öxu uyteovov yev xau awxnpuov 
XPhya Ttaoßeoa, vdaou 6e Kao cpdopäg atxuov dnaLöeuöta.
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persons) which produces wisdom, something which great persons must seek 
and attain. Such leaders, however, are not those who have subdued land 
and sea with arms, but those who through the powers of the soul 
öuvdyeoL) have conquered the medley and confusion of the multitude which 
beset it (Ebr. 113). Political activity has here been restricted to 
rule within the soul, with no necessary outward manifestation.
Philo as the earliest writer of the Empire to deal with government 
on the theoretical level sets the tone of the discussion, in his 
references to specific arts and crafts as parallels to be used quite 
uncritically for elucidating the political order. Yet even these images 
may be made still more irrelevant by being applied also to private 
figures. Thus the ruler guides the ship of state, as he did for Plato, 
for the benefit of all {Legat. 50), but it is the wise man who is else­
where described as being the helmsman and ruler, and who takes over 
other images commonly applied to the head of state (see Abr. 272 and cf. 
Virt. 61) .
Philo’s image of the ruler as physician takes up the theme of Plato 
on the true and false leaders (expounded particularly in the Gorgias). 
Laws and magistrates are like doctors, but gatherings of the young are 
like cooks catering merely to pleasure {Jos. 63). The function of the 
ruler is thus predominantly moral, dealing with the care of the soul. A 
people who kick against the goad rob themselves of the lesson of 
submission, which also teaches how to govern, when they reject the ruler 
who acts virtuously {Jos. 79).
Philo’s use of the image of the householder shows that he follows 
Plato and Xenophon in confusing various forms of rule and thereby 
rendering the science of politics even more abstract, and more divorced 
from activities that call for the co-operation of men and not simply 
for decisions in the private intellectual and moral order. As he says,
otxta tg yap toAts GOTLV eaxaAyevri Mat ßpayeta Kat ouxovoyua
auvnyyevq rug TioAtxeua, mg xat xoAtg yev o£xog yeyag, TtoAbxeta
6e xotvn xug otxovoyta {Jos. 38).
Clearly the supreme rule of one man was the pattern to be drawn from 
household government. Reservations on this do appear, however, when 
Philo sharply distinguishes the kingly power from fatherly kindness 
{Fug. 98). Only the former has the ability to achieve submission
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through fear. This momentary political realism, accepting the 
separation of the public and private spheres of life, re-emerges when 
over-gentle rulers are condemned in the same breath as tyrants (Agr. 47, 
but cf. Spec. Leg. 4.184: good rulers are common parents of cities and
nations).
The pastoral image is common in Philo's writings to describe the 
ruler's task, and while it is true that this is one of the images 'qui, 
sans plus appartenir en propre ä aucun Systeme, sont devenues de simples 
formules de rhetorique',29 in places the detailed treatment given to the 
metaphor endows it with more than a decorative function.30 In the De 
Josepho Philo describes in some detail why practice in the pastoral art 
is so suitable an apprenticeship for a future king. Care of an animal 
herd gives a foundation for care of men, the fairest herd of all, and is 
the best method of entry into government and military command (Jos. 2). 
In the De Vita Mosis the same point is argued.31 But elsewhere (in e.g. 
Prob. 31), the image takes a different turn. Homer erred, says Philo, 
in applying the term 'shepherds of the people' to kings: the title
should be applied to the good who would be better than the kings who are 
more often in the position of the sheep than the shepherd.
The true ruler's main task is shepherding the foolish flock, 
'leading them to the true principles of culture and every virtue', and 
not, as we might expect, in organization, conquest or economic expansion 
(Agr. 44). This image is applied directly to the Roman Empire in the 
Legatio ad Gaium (20, 44), as an ideal which Gaius signally failed to 
incorporate. Few kings could be expected to measure up to the threefold 
standard of the politikos put forward by Philo in De Josepho 54, where 
the qualities of a good shepherd, a good householder and a good ruler of 
self are deemed indispensable, and exemplified by Joseph, whose position
29 A.-J. Festugiere, La Revelation d3Hermes Trismegiste II: Le dieu
cosmique (Gabalda, Paris, 1949), p.540.
30 'll parait y avoir ici plus qu’une metaphore, car Philon souhaite 
vivement voir le futur roi faire son apprentissage ä moindres frais et 
acquerir la science pastorale, dont les principes, dit-il, sont les 
memes que ceux de la politique', Jean Laporte in the introduction to Les
Oeuvres de Philon d3Alexandrie , t.21: De Josepho (Editions du Cerf,
Paris, 1964), p.23.
31 toupevLxn yap yelexri nai Tipoyuyvaata ßaatAetas xc£ ysXXovxb xhs 
nyepwxaxns xwv avdpwtwv ETitaxocxeuv ayeXns (Vit. Mos. 1.60).
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tends to be described as if Pharaoh did not exist.
Philo certainly does provide exceptions to his general attitude to 
rule as the task of the royal craftsman. Like Aristotle he objects to a 
part taking precedence over the whole (Vit. Mos. 1.323), but the very 
need for harmony in any unit seems to call for a figure external to it 
to bring it about as God did when
tcc ... yq ovxa cxaAeaev ets to e£vat xa^tv iE, axa^dac; xau iE,
^tiolwv Tioudxnxac; xat iE, avoyodwv oyotdxriTas xat iE, 
exepotoxnxwv xauxdxriTas xau iE, dxoLvwvqxwv xai dvapyoaxwv 
xotvwvdas xat apyovdas wai ex yev avtooxnxos tadxqxa ex 6e 
axoxous cpais epyaoayevos (Spec. Leg. 4.187). 32
and this is Philo's message rather than the importance of introducing 
the ruler as a part into the harmonious whole of society. Thus when he 
uses the analogy of the body he shows the head being conspicuous over 
the body 'not for its own glory but for the benefit of the beholders'
(Praem. 114).
Moses, Philo argues,
xecpaAqv yev xoö dvdpwtedou ydvous eaeodad (pqau xov atoudabov 
etxe avdpa etxe Aaov, tons de aAAous aTtavxag otov ydpn amyaxos 
jnjxouyeva xacs ev xecpaAq xau uuepdvw duvayeavv (Praem. 125) .
'One such man in a city, if such be found, will be superior to the city, 
one such city to the country around' (Praem. 114).
Examining the political language in Philo's works can be misleading, 
for it often occurs as an illustration of the 'political' power of God, 
the one true king. We shall find other writers who describe monarchy 
similarly concerned to transfer the kingdom they portray from earth to 
heaven (or rather to the community of 'gods and men'), but their 
intention is generally to fix more firmly the earthly monarch in the 
process. For Philo, the monarch becomes insignificant in comparison 
with his creator. The portrait of Joseph in the De Josepho, built up so
32 The passage continues: dec yap eaxLV ettyeAes auxaj xai rats
euepydxuoLV auxou dovdyeat xo TiAqyyeAeg xqs x £ dpovos ouadas yexaTioteuv 
xat yedapyo^eo^at Ttpos xqv ayedvco. xaüxa ytycLO^at Ttpooqxet xous 
ayadous apxovxag, e" yd xts auxots cppovxds eaxuv e^oyotwoews xqg tpos 
§eov, and as Louis Delatte comments, comparing this passage to that of 
Diotogenes, p.264, and taking into consideration the images of Spec. 
Leg. 4.186, 'tout ce developpement tend ä prouver que le chef politique 
doit etre avant tout le bienfaiteur de ses administres', Les Trattes, 
p.253.
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carefully on the common images for rulers>is elsewhere entirely 
rejected (e.g. in Som. 1.221)33 and this can only weaken the relevance 
of Philo’s ’political’ imagery to actual government.
SENECA
Seneca did not have the freedom of Cicero, his predecessor in the 
working out of Roman political theory, to put forth the 'pros and cons’ 
of all forms of government. Instead, his was the responsibility of 
evolving a language which would be appropriate to imperial government.
He could choose from the theory of the Greeks and the practice of the 
Romans who were still in many ways unwilling to admit that their 
government was a kingship in the common sense of the word. In the De 
dementia where the emphasis is on monarchy as the Romans now knew it, 
Seneca had to give advice to Nero in the most palatable form possible.
It is therefore natural that he should provide as many congenial images 
of the royal role as he could. As his pronouncements on political life 
are not confined to this hortatory work, we find material also on this 
aspect of kingship in his other essays as well.
Seneca reveals rule as an art when he compares the king's treatment 
of his subjects to the physician’s behaviour with his patients {dem. 
1.17.2). This brings the ruler's use of punishment into the area of 
personal correction — once more we have the ’care of souls' being 
postulated as part of government. Not the maintenance of an 
organization, but the remedying of individual ills is the foremost 
object of government on this view. The husbandman tending not merely 
the trees that are straight and tall, but also those that have grown 
crooked, straightening them out with props, is an image leading to the 
same conclusion (see dem. 2.7.4), and stressing even more the passive 
situation of those who are reformed by the ruler.
Examples of lesser forms of power are also useful to the monarch, 
as Seneca makes clear. He instances a teacher's power over his pupils
33 nal xov x UT&va toutov e t a d y e u  Mwoans cpuatMws a d y a x t  xecpupydvov 
e tcel6n nets 6 too toAbxeuoydvou Bdos xdcpupxat,  TtoAeyuiv xe n a t  
TtoXeyouycvog Mat üno xwv npoöTiuiixouawv aßouApxwv ouvxuxbwv ßaAAdyevos 
Mau xo^eudyevog.
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and that of a tribune or centurion over his soldiers {Clem. 1.16.2).
That these positions are best exercised with restraint does not alter 
the fact that the images are concerned with different, and in one case 
private, areas of life and that their effect is to justify removing 
kingly rule from the constraints of the constitution. Kings and princes 
and guardians of the public order are equated, the last title attaining 
almost official rank {Clem. 1.4.3).
The task of teaching the subjects belongs in particular to the 
laws, for Seneca refuses to accept Posidonius' limitation of law to 
'instructions mixed with threats' {Ep. 94.37). Laws, he affirms, do not 
only command, they also teach {ib.). Yet he also claims that consilium 
must originate with the ruling power {Clem. 1.3.5) and that history 
itself shows that the sapientes were the first to pass laws to guide the 
lives of men {Ep. 90.6). How in fact the king relates to the law is 
left conveniently vague.
Seneca has no hesitation in applying the 'father' image to the 
emperor, alluding to the official title pater patriae to reinforce his 
message (e.g. in Clem. 1.14.1-2 [eum] appellavimus Patrem Patriae; cf. 
1.13.1 where the soldier is custos parentis). The point of the analogy 
is the gentleness required of the ruler towards his erring children. 
Seneca also frequently introduced comparisons from nature into his work 
to stress the exalted nature of the king. To believe that kingship 
among men can derive its justification from the bees' use of a 'monarch' 
(see Clem. 1.19.2) is to be committed also to a belief in some species 
of superman whose claims cannot be questioned. Seneca contrives to draw 
moralising conclusions from the fact that the queen bee has no sting 
{Clem. 1.19.3) but this is merely to encourage a merciful disposition in 
the king, not to suggest a basic change in policy.
Seneca might seem a more promising source than most for an aware­
ness of the social dimensions of government. When he discusses human 
nature in general this is certainly so: Membra swims corporis magni, he
writes. Natura nos cognatos edidit3 cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret. 
Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit {Ep. 95.52). His 
society here however is purely spiritual (cf. Ep. 92.30: Totum hoc3 quo 
continemur3 et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra). 
Certainly Seneca does introduce something like this into his discussion
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on monarchy when he explains to Nero 'all will shape themselves into 
your likeness. From the head comes the health of the body' {Clem.
2.2.1), but this is a very one-sided relationship. This common theme of 
the ruler's power to determine the character of his subjects has little 
connection with analyses on the nature of man in society such as we find 
elsewhere in Seneca's work.
In the Be Ira for example he develops this speculation with regard 
to the state and insists on how obvious the sanctity of the part is, 
once the sanctity of the whole is accepted, and introduces the argument 
of enlightened self-interest: 'What if the hands should wish to harm
the feet or the eyes the hands?' {Ira. 2.31.7). Only if the parts are 
protected and loved can the society as a whole be preserved. Seneca 
does not here suggest that one part alone is to give this protection and 
love. He does so, however, in Letter 114.24, when in an extended 
comparison of the soul and the king he notes: 'The king when he is
pursuing an honourable course, cares for the safety of the body 
entrusted to him.' The king as the soul or mind of the body is not just 
a part, even the most important part, of the body politic but he is 
different in kind from the rest: to turn corpus animo deservlt {Clem.
1.3.5).34 The relationship cannot involve mutual love between equals, 
of the Stoic kind. Seneca remarks to Nero,'you are the soul of the 
state, and the state your body' {Clem. 1.5.1), and the ruler appears as 
the breath and chain of the Empire {Clem. 1.4.1). Here the metaphysical 
interest has begun to override the political, for the king resembles 
under these aspects the sage as Seneca elsewhere describes him (e.g. Ep. 
115.3).
All these metaphors fail to provide any development in political 
theory but seek to find an acceptable role for the king to adopt in the 
tradition of Hellenistic monarchies. They suggest that the de lure 
balances to royal power still existing — the senate and the consuls — 
are irrelevant to a true account of government. Fathers and tutors, 
whose conduct the king imitates, act on their own after all in a one-to- 
one relationship with a child or pupil. For Seneca then the imagery of
34 'Le "corps de l’Etat", le "corps de l’Empire", soit. Mais le corps a 
une tete ... le chef ideal, c’est le prlnceps. Affirmation de l’unite 
sous la forme du corps; affirmation d’un principe monarchique naturel, 
logiquement deduit de cette proposition' (Beranger, Re eherches , p.231).
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k i n g s h i p  h a s  been used t o  t u r n  t h e  k in g  from a p o l i t i c a l  c r e a t u r e ,  whose 
t a s k  i s  s o c i a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and who e x e r t s  h i s  w i l l  t h ro u g h  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as  t h e  army and t h e  c o u r t s ,  to  the. i d e a l  p r i v a t e  
p e r s o n  who a c h i e v e s  r e s u l t s  by m o ra l  s u a s i o n  and example ,  s u p p o r t e d  by 
an  a u r a  o f  m y s t i c  u n i t y  w i t h  a l l  p a r t s  of  t h e  Empire .
MUSONIUS RUFUS
I n  t h e  e s s a y  'T h a t  Kings Also  Should  Study  P h i l o s o p h y ' ,  Musonius
Rufus s t r e s s e s  t h a t  t h e  one who i s  to  s a v e  and b e n e f i t  men (a  t r u l y
k i n g l y  t a s k )  m us t  u n d e r s t a n d  what  i s  good and b a d ,  h u r t f u l  and h a r m f u l ,
and so on ,  to  men, such  b e i n g  t h e  t a s k  (xeyvn)  a l s o  o f  t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r
who xeyvriv TiETiotriTctL xauxpv euöevau xd cpepee Ttpos avOpahiou euöauyov tav
xaxoöaeyovdav ( p . 2 8 0 ) .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  c l a i m  to  be  a p r a c t i t i o n e r  i n  any
• 3 5t a s k  does  n o t  have  t o  depend on t h e  number o f  t h o s e  a f f e c t e d  by i t .  
M uson ius '  c o n c l u s i o n  i s :
Hat 6p Kat ßaaeAuxog TiapaTtXnodws tu xexxpydvw noAAous UTipxoous 
6 eycov eva n öuo xous ne uSoye'vous auxijj, yovov eyexu) *rfiv too 
Sa a tX e u e t v  eyrceupdav* waxe xau ßaauXLxos e ”n av ( p . 2 8 6 ) .
Thus he  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  t i t l e  ßaouAeus may be due to  one who r u l e s  
o v e r  f r i e n d s ,  o r  f a m i l y  o r  s e l f ,  a l t h o u g h  he does n o t  s e e  t h e  h o u s e ­
h o l d e r  as  such  i n  an a n a lo g o u s  p o s i t i o n  to  t h a t  o f  t h e  r u l e r .
Musonius  Rufus h a s  no o v e r t  r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e  s t a t e  o r  t h e  Empire  as  
an o r g a n i s m ,  b u t  h e  does p l a c e  g r e a t  emphas i s  on t h e  d u ty  o f  t h e  k i n g  to  
i m p l a n t  harmony (euvoydav  yev xat, oyovouav ynyavdyevov ,  avoydav 6e xau 
axa auv  cmeepyovxa , p . 2 8 3 ) .  S t i l l ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  
l a n g u a g e  o f  Musonius  l e a v e s  i s  t h a t  r u l i n g  i s  an a r t  o r  s k i l l ,  and t h a t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  p o l i c y  and s t r u c t u r e  a r e  i r r e l e v a n t .
35 Thus uaxpos ouöev ?jxxov xo\3 depai teuovxos xoAAous 6 $epaTtcdwv 
o l d y o u s ,  ed ye eyeu rpv eyueupdav  xpv daxpuxnv xau youauxos  ouöev fixxov 
xou öuödaxovxos xoXXous 6 öuödoxmv o l d y o u s ,  eu ye eycu Tr>v youauxnv* 
xau LTUiuxos oyodws xu XPWP£VV tcoAAols  ltuiols o xPwh GV°S evl p öu ol v , av 
ye e n toxpywv xfis UTUiuxps ?j ( p p . 2 8 5 - 6 ) .
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DIO CHRYSOSTOM
Because ’most men are fools’ (13.13) and do not therefore display 
the Logos that distinguishes them from the animals, Dio Chrysostom 
concluded that education has to bring out of their folly those who are 
teachable, while the rest of mankind should be directed by the Logos 
present in those who are truly human. The conjunction of mußeta and 
Aoyog produces 'good men, preservers of cities' (32.3). In this way the 
art of ruling makes its appearance. Hercules' education provides an 
excellent example of training in leadership. It was simple, yet enabled 
him to choose between tyranny and kingship (1.61ff.).36 Such a simple 
education is elsewhere (4.29) described as rt öaLydvuog in contrast to n 
avdpwTiLvri, and those who receive it are entitled to be called 'sons of 
Zeus', TiGTiatdeuyevous mg 'HpaxAea exeuvov (4.31) and are thus capable of 
performing the tasks of rule for which Hercules set the pattern. The 
ruler learns his task because it is truly a profession (epyov auxou xau 
xexvDV xauxnv, 3.55) which may be defined as the care of men. The 
instruments of government are therefore the ruler's judgement and virtue 
(3.45); no other tools are necessary.
Because men learn with difficulty from those who know (11.1) and 
even the ruler himself is likely to be in need of advice when he has 
attained power (49.7), he may well become a servant of the wise man's 
yvmyri (49.8). The kingly craft may therefore be known best by one who 
is not the king. The ambivalence about the kingly craft as Dio 
describes it appears in the Fourth Discourse where a graduate of the 
heavenly school of learning is the true king (see 4.21, 26). This may 
mean that the pupil of Zeus or of a disciple of Zeus will, like Minos, 
learn 'justice and the duties of a king' (4.40) and, perhaps, not 
exercise these skills, but the point of this section as of the whole 
discourse is that kingship is not a matter of external rule but of 
propitiating the attendant spirit (4.75). The kingly techne of Oration 
53.11, of which Minos was the first and greatest practitioner, is not 
elaborated on in sufficient detail for us to understand its effects on 
the subjects.
Dio's use of the common comparison of the art of rule with
3 6 ?jv 6g xau ueuauöeuyevog ontAwg.
198
particular trades and skills adds little that is new. A charioteer must 
steer his vehicle, a ship needs a helmsman and a state needs a ruler who 
will perform his corresponding function 'in a kingly way' (4.25). The 
ruler's task can be described in terms of the care a physician shows. 
Preventive medicine is applied by saviours and guardians to those 
capable of salvation, while treatment for the seriously ill is the work 
of 'magistrates, laws and dicasts' (32.17-18). The ruler can be 
referred to equally appropriately as a teacher of a virtuous way of life. 
For the monarch to justify his claims to sole rule, he must always 
surpass his subjects. Dio felt that he had a clear case of such a 
teacher-pupil relationship in the treatment by the emperor's 
representatives of the people of Alexandria. Here we see Rome sending 
out naböaywYOt, that is, troops, to improve the masses by their company 
(32.51).
This metaphorical description of the forces of law and order as 
guides of naughty children is no doubt ironic, but it also indicates the 
reality which is elsewhere so carefully veiled by Dio's accounts of the 
rulers. May not much of the leader's moral influence have been of this 
nature — and are we to see this implied in Dio's statements on the 
impact of the ruler's moral virtues, even though this appears to be 
limited to effecting ethical regeneration in the subjects peaceably?
Dio himself may have given the moral influence and advice the highest 
place. That this instance of an acknowledgement of the use of force is 
so striking highlights his failure in general to confront this aspect of 
rule.
Dio is particularly fond of describing the king as 'father of his 
people' (e.g. in 1.22). He justifies kingship by calling it a care to be 
exercised in the manner of a solicitous father, accompanied by kindness 
and affection. No other way of leading or ruling men is appropriate 
(53.12). This means that Dio is following the common practice of using 
the language of kinship to make the pressure of monarchical government 
more bearable. But this argument from the role assumed may also work in 
the opposite direction. Being a ruler is pleasant for those who 'know 
the art'; the art of rule, Dio remarks, may be exercised over oneself, 
one's own household, the greatest state or the world (49.2-3) and there 
is therefore no special significance in the size of one's domain. Once
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more Aristotle's sharp distinction between spheres of rule has been 
forgotten (he himself of course being the first offender in this 
respect).
Dio is also unable to resist the temptation of introducing the 
image of the ruler as the shepherd or herdsman of his people (e.g. 1.17; 
cf. 49.2). The positions of ruler and shepherd can be compared because 
in both cases there is need for Ttpovota, amxripLa and cpuAaxq (4.44). The 
ruler devotes his attention (7ipooexeL tov vouv) to himself and his 
subjects, being a true guide and shepherd of his people (1.13). Without
the qualities of a good shepherd, a ruler is not merely a bad one but is
no true emperor or king at all (3.41).
When Dio seeks enlightenment in the world of nature he too makes 
the connection between gentleness and superiority in the 'king' bee, as 
Seneca had done (4.62-3). The bull's leadership of the herd reveals its 
qualities of solicitude, its saving function and its deference to higher
authority (2.69-70). These the leader would do well to imitate. The
claims are moderate, inasmuch as the leader here excels the subject in 
degree of perfection, not in nature. Yet the superiority he does allow 
the monarch both here and in 3.50 (where 'herds of cattle and swarms of 
bees' provide 'close parallels and striking analogies showing that it is 
natural for the stronger to care for and govern the weaker') is 
considerable.
Only occasionally does Dio suggest that the task of preserving the 
health of the body politic belongs to the parts of the body working in 
harmony, and not to the physician working from outside, and then this 
line of thought is not pursued. Yet it does throw a different light on 
government from that suggested by the metaphors he generally uses. In 
the discourse on concord in Nicaea, the citizens of an harmonious city 
together form the eyes, ears, tongues and minds, just as if a god had 
granted the city a soul (39.5). So too discord in the state, like sick­
ness in the body, spreads to every part and the cure is for each part to 
recognize its union with the whole. That part which is sick, however 
humble, calls for greater attention than the sound (50.3-4).
There is a connection made between government by one and the 
presence of friendship and concord when Dio describes the rule of the
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universe, which is in one sense a city (literally defined as an 
organization of human beings) and, in another sense, a living creature.37 
Here is found the sanest and noblest form of kingship (36.29-32) — which 
suggests that the task of imparting harmony is all-important to the 
monarch. But the question of earthly kingship does not arise here. In 
his speech on concord in Nicomedia, Dio shows oyovoLot as the civic form 
of well-being, which appears in the body as health, and on the 
international scale as peace (38.14), but again does not link this with 
the rule of one man over the Empire.
In Dio’s discourses we find the clearest instances so far of king- 
ship as an ethical ideal, justified by the obvious fact that both 
intellectually and morally few men are capable of self-direction. The 
machinery of the state therefore is geared to providing such direction 
from outside.
PLUTARCH
For Plutarch, as for Cicero, politics involved more than the 
performance of a public activity —  it was a way of living that lasted a 
lifetime (Mor. 791c). But he too conceived of it in more limited terms 
as an art, a pddnya whose ingredients were BouAn, itpovota and Aoyos 
(789d). Even though the discussion is on making one's way in politics 
at the municipal level, Plutarch emphasizes the intellectual element, 
and cannot refrain from introducing the 'kingly art' as the supreme 
example of rule: old men hold royal rank in the state in accordance
with their wisdom Kara xpv (ppdvqauv (789f).
Wisdom seems to be the prerequisite for true statesmanship, and the 
uneducated generals and rulers are the ones who capsize (780b). Older 
statesmen therefore have the task of instructing the young in political 
skills (790d-f). Plutarch, like many of the writers we are considering, 
does not rest satisfied with a definition of rule in the political sense 
He describes how the teacher himself needs first to be taught, one who 
imparts order and cultivation must be ordered and cultivated within
37 It is interesting to note Dio's care to explain that he is not 
suggesting the same thing could literally be both a city and a living 
being.
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(780b) . The imposition of order is the same task as fell to the lot of 
Plato’s philosopher-kings. Here, as there, the comparison with the 
craftsman is obvious. For both writers, society is a tabula rasa.
The ruler’s task is therefore similar to those performed in a 
variety of skilled occupations. The ruler is a öq p b o u p y d s  of justice 
and lawfulness (807c) . Hence he must choose the right associates as his 
tools just as does an architect or ship’s captain (807c and 812c). He 
must steer the ship of state well at his life’s end, and experience in 
statecraft is as important as practice for ship’s captains or 
charioteers (790d-e).
Plutarch uses the well-worn analogy of the physician ambiguously. 
Sometimes he shows him apart from the body of the state (in e.g. 818d-e 
and cf. Lyo. 4.3), which is the picture frequently applied to an 
absolute ruler, but he also shows us the local ’physician-politician' 
himself part of the infected body, desperately trying to ward off 
interference from Rome in local affairs (815a-b). The ruler as teacher 
trains men to be good subjects (816f) and uses persuasion, arguments and 
threats to ensure good conduct (818c). Even the man who holds power 
alone, whom the philosopher is advised to cultivate, does not have his 
pedagogic role spelled out too precisely: he is solicitous for men
(780d), and Plutarch obviously expects the ruler to 'hold others up’, to 
teach, to impart culture and order as well as to rule: in general, to
make others fit his pattern (780b).
The distance between ruler and ruled is maintained in Plutarch's 
description of the ruler as the sheepdog guarding the sheep (781c) even 
though the point of the analogy is the care exercised by the animals for 
their charges, whose welfare is more important to them than their own. 
Plutarch, too, boldly declares that the statesman is by nature —  cpdoet — 
the ruler of the polis like the leading bee in the hive (813c). He has 
charge of the rational and political swarm (823f).38
38 Cf. Mor. 344d-e: ou yap 6 t a  Tuynv aya$wv ßaatAeoov e x a t p o u
TtpoauoSvncJHOuaLV exouadws x a l  xpox uvöuveuouaLV , a\\’ epwxu xps  ’Apexps  
wGTtep UTto cpuAxpoav yeXLXxau xw ap xovxu  7tpooexOVTaL KaL Tipoatecpuxaot and 
Lyc. 30.2: a\\’ e v a  u e p ^ a a a  T tpsaßeuxpv , $ Tidvxes e u § u s  stiolouv xo
T tp o ax a aao p e v o v , coaTtep au y e A t a a a u  (pavevxos p y e p o v o s ,  a u v x p e x 0VTeS xotu 
x a x a x o a p o u p e v o L .
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Plutarch devotes a considerable space to showing how the state is 
or should be a unity, referring to it in terms drawn from the concept of 
the state as an organism. Rome in the time of Romulus was a 'feverish* 
state (Nvov. 8.1) though Numa softened and shaped it as if his task were 
a mere craft exercised on an inanimate object. The king is intimately 
associated with the production of oyovota in the body politic: thus in
Hum. 20.8, the subjects
ipv  apexpv ev euöpAy u a p a ß e t y p a i l xau Aayxpm xtp xoö äpxovxos 
opajvxes,  exououws awcppovouau xau auYxaxaaxnpotxb^ovxab Tipos xov 
ev cptAuqt xau oyovotqi xrj itpos auxous  yexa ötxaboauvr is  x a t  
y e xp toxnxos  axuyova  x a t  yaxapuov Euov, ev $ to xaAAtaxov 
a m o n g  xoAbxeuas xeAog g o t o.
Lycurgus is praised because 'he thought that the happiness of an entire 
city, like that of a single individual, depended on the prevalence of 
virtue and concord within its own borders' (Lyc. 31.1).
The polis, still the social unit of which Plutarch thinks first,
'is, as it were, a living being' and must therefore preserve its oneness 
over time as well as space (Mor. 559a). Even for the relatively power- 
less local politician Plutarch prescribes the duty of instilling concord 
and friendship in those among whom he lives (824d). In all these cases 
Plutarch hints at the complexity of social structure but does not go 
into detail. He suggests that the statesman or the king will occupy a 
position outside the body of the state rather than simply at its head, 
and does not therefore find an opening here for the idea of the Empire 
as a well-functioning organism. Its regulatory devices are indeed seen 
as a threat to local autonomy (814e-f).
The awareness of the sociability of man is strong in Plutarch, more 
so than in most of his contemporaries (although he too can see society 
as a 'suspicious and capricious beast', 800c). The influence on him of 
theories of monarchical rule is also strong, however, and works in the 
opposite direction. In many of Plutarch's comments the sphere of 
political activity is the polis, and down-to-earth advice for the local 
politician is combined incongruously with a language and imagery 
developed to describe the rule of kings.
Relatively powerless, that is to say, in comparison with the increasingly 
bureaucratised centre of decision-making in the Empire, and in comparison 
with the influence such a class of men had once had over events beyond their 
polis boundary.
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PLINY
The occasion for which the Panegyric was composed meant that 
Pliny could not indulge too extensively in esoteric flights of fancy, 
and we can assume that the terms in which he analyses Trajan’s rule will 
be close to the emperor’s understanding of himself and his task.
Classes of society are likely to be mentioned and Pliny must make at 
least formal reference to the notion of the sharing of powers by the 
emperor and senate.
Within this framework a theory of monarchy based partly on 
constitutional claims, partly on extra-political elements, emerges. One 
of the most impressive justifications of the ruler’s position that Pliny 
introduces is the uplifting influence of the emperor on the young among 
his subjects, but, unlike Plutarch and Dio, he does not claim that the 
ruler is actually the counsellor of all. Thus after the rhetorical 
opening of Chapter 47: ’How in your role as chief citizen you fashion 
the life and habits of youth!', Pliny explains what this really means: 
'In what honour do you hold masters of rhetoric! In what esteem 
teachers of philosophy!’ (47.1). Pliny describes the emperor's rule by 
the soothing term of tutet a (e.g. in 94.3, tu enim iam tunc ilium in 
tutelam recepisti) . Similarly^s governor of Bithynia and Pontus, Pliny 
writes to Trajan on the anniversary of his accession that protection — 
tutela — of the human race had been transferred to him on that day (Ep. 
10.102),39
Rule by persuasion and reason appears as a theme even in Pliny's 
account of Trajan’s behaviour in the judiciary where he describes his 
conciliatory role tumentes populos non irwperio magis quam ratione 
compescere (Pan. 80.3). The ethical and intellectual role of the king 
is reinforced by his appearance as a father figure to his people, of 
which image Pliny makes great play. This quality acquired formal status 
in the title pater patriae but even apart from this use the attitude in
39 'La tutela n’existe pas separee de l’individu. Elle demeure 
personnelle, exerqable dans tous les domaines. La bienveillance 
imperiale est une manifestation d’homme ä homme. Elle depend de 
1’initiative privee, non d’une codification. Elle est liberalite 
spontanee, renouvelable, au plus une obligation morale', Beranger, 
Re eher ches , p.259.
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the speech is clear: eras ... in animis in iudieiis nostris, i.e. even
without Trajan’s acceptance of the title, (pater patriae) (21.3; cf. 2.3 
non de domino sed de parente ; 39.5 communis omnium parens).40
For Pliny the respublica and its citizens could be 'summed up' in 
the princeps in a way reminiscent of the sharing of sorrows and joys by 
Plato's guardians in the Republic. But with them, all felt together the 
same emotion; one individual did not epitomize all the rest. Pliny 
goes so far as to imply that no benefit need be asked of God for the 
state if the salus of the princeps is prayed for, as this includes all 
possible individual requests (94.2). The only occasion on which Pliny 
discusses the state in terms of the body politic is also the point at 
which he expresses the glimmerings of a social awareness. It is in vain, 
he says, for the ruler to support the nobility, if he neglects the plebs: 
like a head deprived of its body the former will totter with its 
disequilibrium (instabili pondere, 26.6)41 but here again, the ruler is 
detached from the conflict of interest and moderates tensions from above. 
So the general impression we receive of Pliny's attitude to government 
from his use of imagery is that for him the ruler as an individual is 
all-important.
ARISTIDES
It was left to a non-Roman, Aelius Aristides, to claim the art of
Ifla -rule as a Roman discovery, by bringing in the extent of Empire as the 
test of success, a consideration which before this had been little in 
evidence (see Roman Oration 51). The Greeks, although they had excelled 
in other forms of wisdom , had not known this art and so the Athenians 
and indeed all the Greeks could win battles but not hold an Empire (ib.). 
The emperor of the Eug BaauXea is in no danger of suffering from such 
deficiencies. He is a person who is educated and has learnt what is
40 Note also 4.2, parens noster; 29.2, parens noster; 57.5, pater
patriae; 67.1, parens publicus and 87.1, parens publicus.
41 Cf. the discourse of Galba in Tacitus, Histories 1.16: Si
irrvnensum imperii corpus stare ac librari sine rectore posset, dignus 
eram a quo res publica inciperet, and Beranger's comment (Reeherches ,
p .222): 'L’essentiel n ’est plus le corpus imperii, dejä banal, mais ce 
qui en decoule, le principe directeur.'
413 Vergil had of course expressed this idea without elaboration in Aen. 
6.851-3.
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needful; he neglects no duty but puts his soul in order, and hence is 
likely to be without fault in his external relations (p.102). The lack 
of such training in previous rulers is directly related to failure to 
retain as king the virtues possessed as a private citizen (p.107).
Aristides makes the point that all realize that it is best to be 
ruled by one's betters — 'accordingly all are held fast and would not 
ask to secede any more than those at sea from the helmsman' (R.O. 68). 
Again in the Els BaouXea the king is likened to the helmsman of a ship, 
'no inexperienced one, but rather the most skilled' (eyiteLpoxoixos) of 
kings and the most outstanding in wisdom (p.103); hence he can bring 
the troubled ship of state to a safe harbour. This speech also suggests 
that the king has a pedagogic role by hinting at the educative function 
of royal punishments (p.105). A ruler, in Aristides' view, should 
perform his task with the care of a horse trainer, taking into account 
the different personalities of his 'charges' {R.O. 96).
Aristides at one stage displays a certain hesitation in taking up 
the metaphor of the ruler as father because of the danger of equating 
king and master of a household, and having government and slave- 
management undifferentiated as with the Persians {R.O. 23). Such 
wariness seems to have disappeared a little further on when governors 
are described as standing in greater awe of the great governor than one 
would of a despot (32), and he even goes so far as to claim that in fact 
Rome had brought it about that the whole world was, as it were, one 
house (102) . It is therefore not surprising to find that in the Els 
BaoLAea the emperor should be (and is indeed more than) the universal 
father (p.106). In the Roman Ovation Aristides also invokes the old 
analogy of the shepherd and the true king, to show where the Persian 
rulers failed (18) . The king addressed in the Els BaGLAea has on the 
contrary given proof of his excellence by being a 'shepherd of the 
others' (p . 106).
In the second century when these works were written we can still 
find Aristides talking of the civilized world as ailing, and being 
brought back to health {R.O. 98). Harmony is most important, but its 
presence is due to the leader —
ojöTtep auAos cxMCHadapyevos s ouxws aiaoa q oLwouyevq x°P°0
dMpLßeaxepov ev (pdeyYexaL, auveuxoyevq ycvetv xov aiavxa otLwva
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xrjvöe xqv apxnv* ouxwg MaAös utio xo06g xou Kopocpauou nyepdvos 
auyKpoxebxat (R.O. 29-30; cf. 66).
The Els BaabAea, again, shows the emperor as a physician, himself 
uninfected by the illness of the ’great unhealthy body1 of the state 
(p.102). Aristides is thus a faithful preserver of the most common 
imagery used since at least the fourth century B.C. to refer to, 
describe and justify monarchical government.
CONCLUSION
There is a clear similarity observable in the type of language used 
by these writers to describe the ruling power. All make use of the 
cliches which linked government to the arts or other occupations 
requiring skill and the exercise of undisputed authority. All see the 
principle of superiority and inferiority, applying in other spheres than 
the civic, as valid also for public life.
Philo in the early days of the Roman Empire expressed most 
explicitly what all would have assented to: "'Rule'’ or "command" (xo
xhs apxhs eZboz) is a category which extends and intrudes itself, I 
might almost say, into every branch of life, differing only in magnitude 
and amount. For the relation of a king to a state is the same as that 
of a head-man to a village, of a householder to a house, of a physician 
to his patients, of a general to an army, of an admiral to the marines 
and crews, or again of a skipper to merchant and cargo vessels or of a 
pilot to the seamen.’ (No doubt the list could go on indefinitely!)
’All those have power for good and for worse, but they ought to will the 
better and the better is to benefit instead of injuring as many as they 
possibly can’ (Spec. Leg. 4.186).
This idealism found safeguards against abuse of power virtually 
irrelevant, but it often emerged that the true ruler should not be the 
one exercising power in the state at all, for the mere possession of the 
right qualifications resulted in self-rule and the moral rule over 
others by example that was true kingship. A multitude of analogies from 
non-political activities diverted attention from the public scene, and 
softened any incongruity in the turn taken by a discourse.
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The connection frequently made between the presence of harmony and 
good order in a state, and the actions of a detached, superior figure is 
perhaps natural if the ruler epitomizes in his person the unity desired 
for the whole, much as Hobbes described in The Leviathan, Part I, ch. 16: 
'A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or 
one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every 
one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the 
Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person 
One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one 
Person: and Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.'
But what perhaps begins as a way of expressing concern for the 
unity of the whole social body in its orderly functioning itself often 
becomes once again a discourse on the individual. Under the Empires, 
monarchy was the one form of government on which it was reasonable for 
discussion to take place. Such discussion was a convenient vehicle for 
the development of an ethic of individual behaviour and we need not then 
be surprised that frequently this becomes the real message of the essays 
and speeches.
The most powerful principle which governs man is the religious 
principle. ... Man was made to adore and to obey.
Benjamin Disraeli.
Le rationaliste prefere un humanisme eclaire3 fonde sur la dignite 
de Vhomme3 V  equilibre interieur et la culture de V  intelligence; le 
mystique prosterne la creature humaine aux pieds de son dieu et la 
pousse d lui faire le don total de sa personne et de sa vie3 ä suivre 
les directives qu3il lui donne; le rationaliste est partisan d3un Etat 
laique3 gouverne grace aux lumieres de la raison et de la sag esse pour 
le bien de la coliectivite; il respecte la personne du souverain3 
consent meme a lui reconnoitre des merites superieurs ä ceux des autres 
hommes3 mais se refuse ä voir en lui un dieu; le mystique est enclin ä 
vouloir que la politique soit subordonnee a la religion et que le 
gouvernement de V  Etat ait pour principes les conseils de son dieu3 pour 
fin son service; il va souvent jusqu3ä croire que la divinite s3est 
incajmee dans le souverain.
Jean Beaujeu, La Religion romaine ä 
l3apogee de l3empire, I, p.33.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RELIGION AND KINGSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Kings and rulers of ancient Greece had from Homeric times been 
credited with more than human greatness, and later were revered as, at 
least, demi-gods who had achieved the immortality denied to ordinary 
men.1 2 An attempt to overleap the boundaries between the human and the 
divine without warrant was however a risky business, but clearly the 
more common this became, the safer it appeared,3 until in the third
1 But we must note that the distinction between men and gods was still 
preserved by Homer: ’On the one hand,Homer never confused "godlike” with 
"divine"; he never crossed the line between the mortal and the immortal. 
Hesiod spoke of "a godlike race of hero-men who are called demi-gods", 
but there were no demi-gods in the Iliad or Odyssey. Kings were 
honoured like gods, but never worshipped’, M.I. Finley, The World of 
Odysseus (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967), p.157. The one possible 
exception is Odysseus' description of the ’blameless king', Odyssey,
19.109ff.
2 ’Unendlich oft, und besonders eindringlich von Pindar selbst wird es 
ausgesprochen, dass Götter und Menschen verwandt sind, aber eine 
unüberschreitbare Kluft sie scheidet', Fritz Taeger, ’Isokrates und die 
Anfänge des hellenistischen Herrscherkultes’, Hermes, 72 (1937), p.356. 
As examples see Pyth. 3.59-62; Isth. 5.14-16.
3 Louis Delatte claims that 'les Grecs divinisent les hommes avec une 
facilite deconcertante', and that ’la ligne de demarcation entre les 
dieux, les heros et les hommes n'est pas toujours bien marquee' (Les 
Traites, p.129). This applies particularly to writers like Heraclitus, 
Empedocles and Pindar. Nemean Ode 6 is an obvious instance, but in many 
other places Pindar, as we have seen, lays the emphasis on the risks of 
forgetting the difference. For Heraclitus and Empedocles the 'divine 
man' is the seer and prophet.
A.D. Nock, discussing the honours accorded to Hellenistic kings, 
comments: 'To the Greeks there was often a shading off of the
distinction between man and god, and in addition to this general 
tendency of thought we have to reckon with two widespread ideas, the one 
that the gods of popular worship were men deified by grateful humanity, 
the other that the soul of a man or at least the soul of an outstanding
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century Euhemerus could explain the origin of the gods in the elevation 
of the benefactors of mankind, and religious awe gave way generally to 
cynicism and indifference.
Aristotle shows the ambivalent attitude held by the men of his time 
towards the exceptional individual. He describes the man excelling his 
fellows in the polls, ’like a god among men’ (ukntep ... §eov ev 
avdpojTtous — Pol. 1284a) . He claims that one could as soon contemplate 
ruling over Zeus as expect such a person to be a subject (1284b) . Yet 
Aristotle sees little likelihood of someone of this kind emerging, and 
elsewhere notes that if there were one class in the state surpassing all 
others both physically and mentally as much as gods and heroes are 
supposed to surpass mankind, then it would be only right for them to be 
obeyed without question. But such an assumption he found difficult to 
make (see 1332b).
But philosophers seeking to explain and justify kingship, and being 
confronted with the developing ruler-cult, could not let the matter rest 
there. For they had to consider how the king fitted into the structure 
of the world of gods and men. His authority, in any case, could not 
easily be explained solely in human terms, as that of an assembly or 
council in a polls could. Its supernatural derivation seemed an obvious 
alternative explanation. But how was this to be accounted for?
To begin with, all the writers, as we have seen, accepted without 
question that some men were better than others and that a society could 
function properly only if this fact were recognized in its structures. 
The ruler who alone can lead men to virtue must himself possess 
exceptional moral and other qualities, and hence he will attain to a 
more than human stature, for, as Bowersock has explained it, ’man is 
capable of virtue, and virtue is divine; hence there is something 
divine in a virtuous man'.* 4 Pythagoras appears as the great exemplar
man was in a sense divine. All the same a difference remains' (C.A.H.
vol. 10, edited by Cook, Adcock and Charlesworth [University Press,
Cambridge, 1952], p.481).
4 G.W. Bowersock, 'Greek Intellectuals and the Imperial Cult in the 
Second Century A.D.', in Le Culte des Souverains dans VEmpire Romain 
(Entretiens sur l’Antiquite classique, Tome 19, Fondation Hardt, 
Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1973), pp.189-90.
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here: 'Er ist der Sebog dvqp, der zwischen Gott und Mensch steht.
Schon Aristoteles beruft sich auf eine in Pythagoreerkreisen gangbare 
Einteilung der vernunftbegabten Wesen: xo yev cotl §edg, xo ö’
dv^pwuog, xo 6e oCov üodaydpag.'5
A man invested with the role of king must then have received a 
divine commission to rule and care for a people. This close association 
of the ruler with the deity implies that his task is not only to 
represent God on earth but also to imitate him. The subjects for their 
part are likely to do best if they take the king for their model, as far 
as is possible. In this way the earthly society becomes ultimately a 
copy of the divine.
Theorists can therefore feel justified in investing the monarch 
with a religious authority, and can indeed suggest that the whole 
purpose of royal rule is to infuse into the subjects something of the 
king's divinely-derived virtue. This, we should note, is, on the 
surface, as far removed as possible from the ruler cult. How far any 
writer goes in reconciling these two aspects of the divine in kingship, 
the cultic and the moral-metaphysical, depends on his own attitude. In 
general, there is found in our writers a protest against the excesses of 
the cult and an attempt to place virtuous conduct at the centre of any 
account of the ruler's divine qualities. The intangible and inward 
honours of grateful hearts are to be cherished more than temples and 
statues.
ISOCRATES
In the introduction to the Panegyricus, Isocrates complains that 
the men who obtain recognition and honours in states are those who excel 
in physical achievements, and not, as should be the case, those who have 
laboured on behalf of the common interest and have made their souls fit 
to aid others (Paneg. I).6 This deficiency he in some measure made good
5 Otto Weinreich, 'Antikes Gottmenschentum', Neue Jahrbücher für
Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung , 2 (1926), p.637.
6 Thus he puts forward the premise, in discussing Athen's claims to
recognition: et 6eC xouxoug scp’ endox^ xuyotaOau xwv epywv, xoug
eyxetpoxdxoug dvxag holl yeytoxnv öuvaytv ex0VTaS {Paneg. 21).
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in his own works when he dealt with outstanding benefactors of society. 
Individuals who excelled clearly interested him as objects of addresses 
and as topics to dwell on. He preferred to point to the exploits of 
Theseus rather than to give a general account of the development of 
Athens and its institutions. With this in mind we must approach his 
remarks on the nature of such people with care, and distinguish 
different types of comment. A remark that reveals a belief in the 
connection between political excellence and superhuman characteristics 
meriting divine or semi-divine honours may be mistaken for mere rhetoric 
— or vice versa — and it is clear that Isocrates is not producing in his 
works a properly-developed apologia, based on religious grounds, for any 
particular form of rule. What is important in his view is the general 
principle that worth be given its due. This means in one account that 
proportional equality should be the basis of any government (Nie. 14).
This is for him a common-sense arrangement, but in addressing 
individuals Isocrates often ventures further and grants them an 
authority that has a supernatural source. The divinity, though not 
acting personally in human affairs, inspires some men to speak, others 
to act (Phil. 150-51).7 The nature of this relationship is not made 
clear, and it certainly has no institutional form. In his advice to 
Nicocles, Isocrates points out the folly of comparing kingship to a 
priesthood which could be the job of anybody at all (To Nie. 6), so that 
what we meet here is certainly no priest-king figure. But in the 
Areopagitieus he claims that even the present constitution is made by 
God (Areop. 62) .
The ruler may appear sometimes as the representative of the deity, 
yet in the address which Isocrates puts in the mouth of Nicocles, the 
king in justifying his possession of power refers to his behaviour, and 
derives his claim from his ancestors and not from any divine mandate.
The appeal is to empirical evidence, and shows that such power is to be 
put to strictly utilitarian uses.
7 otyau 6d o' oux ayvoetv ov xpoitov oi §eot xa xwv av-BpcoTiwv v
ötoLKoOatv. ou yap auxoxetpes ouxe xwv ayadwv ouxe xwv xaxwv yuyvovxau 
xwv aoyßatvdvxojv auxoCs, aAX’ exaaxots xotauxqv evvotav eyTtou ou ae v , 
a»axe 6l. dXAnAwv qyuv exaxepa, uapaydyveodau xouxoov. o£ov lows xat vuv 
xous yev Aoyous nytv audvetyav, ett 6e xas Tipa^eus at xaxxouou.
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Nevertheless, history could show how elevation to semi-divine 
status had come about through acts of valour. Philip of Macedon's 
ancestors included the great hero Hercules who was raised to the company 
of the gods by his father Zeus because of his virtues (Phil. 132). So 
too the exploits of the Athenians in the Persian wars entitle them to 
the same honours as demi-gods, and ensure them a deathless glory (Paneg. 
84).8 The actual conquest of the Persian Empire Isocrates sees as a yet 
more exacting task. So here he tells Philip, to spur him on, that the 
gods have judged and 'you would be the best leader' (Phil, 151),
Isocrates does not suggest that Philip’s or any other leader's task 
is to reproduce in an earthly kingdom the heavenly state, nor that the 
king is the image of Zeus, but he does hint — and this is the first case 
of an argument that is to become common in later writers — that monarchy 
resembling as it does the rule of Zeus over the gods may for that reason 
be the best form of government (Nie. 26). His reservations were because 
it seemed too rash to assert that the myths of the gods were true. But 
even if such stories could not be verified, the fact that men imagined 
such a structure was a sign that Ttdvxeg xqv yovapytav Tipoxuywyev (ib.). 
This ingenious argument, based as it is on public opinion, circumvents 
the problems that an examination of the different forms of government 
might pose.
When Isocrates ascribes the role of saviour and benefactor to some 
heroic figures he paints the past in epic colours, linking it with a 
present which ought to be equally glorious. Hercules is praised in the 
Panegyricus because he was a benefactor of all men (Paneg. 56; cf.
Phil. 76) . Isocrates urges Philip to be a present-day benefactor of 
Greece (Phil. 154). There is no religious significance in this 
expression as yet, but in linking a current euepyexriS to an heroic 
figure of legend, the elevation has been made easier.
In a fragment allegedly recalling the opinion of Isocrates, we read
8 On the actions attributed to Busiris, he comments (Bus. 32) dAAa to 
yev iris twv dqpuojv wyöxryros, xo 6c xqg xrnv öuvdyewg epyov eoxcv and
note also: ’Eyw yev o\5v ouy OTtwg xoug 5eoug, ctAX’ ou6e xoug c£ ehclvwv
yeyovo'xag ouöeybäg nyoöyat Mantas yexaaxetv, aXX ’ auxoug xe ixdaag 
exovxag xag dpexag epovat xat xoCg allots xmv xaXXtoxmv etctxriöeuydxojv 
nyeyovag Mac 6u6aoxdXoug yeyevpadaL (Bus. 41).
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that he described the gifted among his pupils as children of the gods.9 
If this is so, it is not surprising to find him thinking it natural that 
men looking at the honours and wealth of dynasties should all consider 
those in charge of monarchies equal to the gods, tao^eous {To Nie. 5). 
Isocrates himself however does not share this view, and when he wishes 
to extol the character of Evagoras he contrasts him with other rulers — 
they cannot claim to be good whether they be mortal or demi-god or 
immortal (Evag. 39). In this case supernatural attributes are dismissed 
as unimportant when compared with moral excellence, and are contrasted 
with it, rather than being seen as rising from it or causing it. Later 
in the same work the criterion is once more virtue, but now Isocrates 
comments:
t ’ e l T tveg  twv TCpoyeysvriysvwv 6u dpexqv ddctvaxot  
y s y o v a o u v ,  o £ y a t  xdxeuvov  r i^uwadat  xauxqs xrjs örnpeäs {Evag.
70).
Here as often immortality and honours after death, if real, are the 
sign and acknowledgement of supernatural qualities. Nothing is said to 
prove that Isocrates concedes the premise. The same goes for his remark 
a little further on:
ei rives t w v uounxuiv Ticpb xtvos xwv Ttpoyeyevqpdvrnv ÜTtepSoXaus 
x e x P n v x a L ,  X e y o v x e s ,  ms ?iv Qcog iv  avdpwuoLS n 6auyu>v § v q x o s ,  
a n a v x a  xa  x o u a ö x a  Ttept xqv  e k e l v o u  cpuouv pn^nva u  y a X t a x ’ av  
a p y o a e t e v  {Evag. 72).
Taeger notes the hesitation here and concludes:
Hier künden sich also nicht die religiösen Ideen an, die bald 
unter dem Eindruck eines übergewaltigen Geschehens die 
göttliche Verehrung eines Menschen dulden und fordern werden, 
sondern hier spricht die allgemeine Zersetzung, die unter dem 
Einfluss der ionisch-attischen Aufklärung die hergebrachte 
Religiosität bedroht und gestattet, einen Fürsten aus den 
Randgebieten des griechischen Siedlungsraumes wenigstens nach 
seinem Tode in einem Enkomion neben die Gestalten der 
mythischen Vorzeit zu rücken.10
The advice in the letter to Philip, if we assume that this letter is 
correctly ascribed to Isocrates, comes at the end of the rhetorician's 
life. His comment that once Philip had brought the Persian monarchy to
9 See Fritz Taeger, Charisma I (W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1957), 
p.125 note 29, and note Taeger’s warning against seeing too much 
religious significance in this statement.
10 Taeger, ’Isokrates’, p.358.
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heel, there would be nothing left for him to do but to become a god (Ep. 
3.5),might seem an unambiguous declaration that the transformation of a 
political ruler into a divine figure had become a theoretically 
acceptable doctrine. But here hyperbole is just as likely to account 
for the language:
Isokrates krönt seine Aufforderung mit einem Adynaton, das er 
bei dem Makedonen selbst als bekannt voraussetzen durfte, um 
die Grösse der gestellten Aufgabe und ihres Lohnes zu zeigen.
Der Sieg über den Perserkönig ist die höchste Stufe, die 
Philipp zugänglich ist; und wir brauchen hier nicht weiter 
auszuführen, dass diese Interpretation allein in das Bild 
passt, das wir von Isokrates’ politischem und religiösem Denken 
in der letzten Periode seines Lebens uns machen können.
We may see here a challenge to excite Philip’s ambition rather than the 
enunciation of a theory of divine kingship. Certainly Isocrates 
expresses his disgust at the proskynesis practised in the Persian 
monarchy and the treating of the Persian king as a god, as he saw it 
(Paneg. 151) though perhaps bus attitude Hud softened in the decades s»nce tho.C 
speech
Isocrates' position is probably that of the average rational man 
of his day for whom much of the religious belief of the past had become 
meaningless. ’So sind Begriffe wie tooSeos bei ihm völlig entleert, 
während awxiip und euepyerns nach wie vor rein menschlich gewandt 
bleiben.'12 However, his use of these terms in his writings on monarchy 
brought them into the vocabulary of works similar to his that were to 
follow. There, their meaning could well be more ambiguous.
XENOPHON
Apres avoir expose, dans la "Cyvopedie" et la "Vie 
d3Agesilas", ses conceptions sur la royaute ideale nourrie 
uniquement d’humanite, Xenophon certifie, dans son 
"Economique">que le monarque, pour commander avec efficacite,
doit etre doue d’une qualite divine qui subjugue ses sujets
1 3lorsqu’ils le regardent.
11 Taeger, 'Isokrates', p.357.
12 Taeger, Charisma I, p.125.
13 L. Cerfaux and J. Tondriau, Le Culte des souverains dans la 
civilisation greco-romaine (Desclee, Paris, 1957), p.113.
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This account of Xenophon’s variations in approach highlights the fact 
that in him we find the same contradiction as appears in Isocrates 
between an analysis of a situation in human and political terms without 
any outside influence, and the temptation to see the ruler on a 
different level from his subjects and deriving his authority from that 
fact. Yet Xenophon is far more concerned with details of administration 
than is Isocrates. The training of troops, improvement of a state's 
economy and so on are topics which he goes into thoroughly, and even in 
analysing the factors making up the ideal king, his concern is with the 
concrete expression of virtue.
Xenophon is very much aware, nonetheless, that his heroes are 
exceptional men, and they exist in large measure abstracted from society, 
since Xenophon does not show us the structure of the community they are 
to lead. Leaders are those who have an inborn love of honour and praise, 
who differ most among men from the beasts of the field, and who are to 
be considered 'men' and no longer mere humans (Hiero 7.3). This is not 
as precise as we could wish, and yet it is in the tradition of Greek 
attitudes on the elevating effect of praise and honour, and the need to 
strive to attain these and in this way achieve whatever immortality 
might be possible for one who was still, after all, a man. Immortality 
is still seen as unattainable, and so the jester Philip can say oüxe yap 
eywye atouödaai, av öuvaupnv yäAAov ptep aSdvaxog yevto^at (Sym. 1.15).
Divine warrant is assumed for rule in general, and prayer and 
sacrifice to the gods precede any decision made by a ruler, especially 
in the Cyropaedia. More than this, however, Xenophon shows the leader 
in any situation obtaining this position with the consent, if not the 
active involvement, of the gods (Anab. 7.7.22). A ruler such as 
Agesilaus is praised by various groups of people in personal terms 
glorifying his possession of such qualities as 'being devoted to his 
family', 'being an unfailing friend’, a 'champion' of the oppressed and 
— significant for our purposes — for his friends in danger 'a saviour 
second to the gods' (Ages. 11.13). Taeger finds that 'behalten auch die 
alten Begriffe öwxqp und euepyexps bei ihm ihre ursprünglichen Inhalte 
unverändert',14 and yet it is important that the connection of saving
1 4 Taeger, Charisma I, p.120.
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acts with a ruler who is close to the gods has been made clear.
Xenophon is too down-to-earth and practical to go further than this 
and venture on comparisons of divine and kingly rule, or suggest that a 
ruler should model himself on the king of the gods. He prefers to 
emphasize the divine or heroic origins of rulers like Agesilaus who 
counted Hercules among his ancestors (Ages. 1.2). The kings of Sparta 
offered the public sacrifices because they themselves were ano $eoö (Lac. 
15.2). Xenophon does claim, too, that the gods cause particular honour 
and favour to dance attendance on a ruler (Hiero 8.5) without explaining 
exactly what this means.
On one occasion he goes so far as to suggest that the laws of 
Lycurgus had, as the object of the regulations on the honours paid to 
dead kings, the wish to show o t l  oux ws otvdpwnous dAA’ ws npwas t o u s  
AaxeöauyovLwv ßaauAeus ipoTCTuynMaay (Lao. 15.9). That ruling bore some 
intrinsic relationship to divinity Xenophon was prepared to admit, but 
as Taeger has noted, over-emphasis on this point would not accord well 
with his belief in the duty of rulers to display the piety and humility 
of a mere man when they wished to obtain the favour of the gods, 
although such contradictions are not always absent from his work.15
Several expressions in Xenophon, although in themselves restrained, 
point the way ahead. The capacity to rule over men who serve willingly 
he describes as godlike (Oec. 21.12) and this is one of a number of 
positions described in this way. ’Dieses -fteCov wurzelt aber nicht in der 
alten charismatischen Sphäre, sondern in der Seelenlehre des Sokrates­
schülers', says Taeger,16 yet this title is not lightly given and its 
association with the business of government can hardly be accidental. 
Perhaps we may take as Xenophon’s considered conclusion the remark he 
puts into the mouth of Simonides: eyotye 6 o k c l  moil, cm xtyn xus Mat
Xapus GuyitapeneaSat avöpu apxovxt (Hiero 8.5).
15 For an account of the conflict between Xenophon's old-fashioned 
piety and his fitful bursts of rationalism, see Taeger, Charisma I,
pp.118-20.
16 Taeger, Charisma I, p.119.
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ARISTEAS
In the Letter to Philocrates we find no theories of outstanding 
semi-divine individuals, no $euos avqp who appears in the person of the 
king. Instead the stress is all on the role of the king as God's deputy 
on earth. The position is clearly a very important one, but it is not 
described in exaggerated language. Simply, the king is chosen for his 
post, which involves care for the welfare, temporal and spiritual, of 
his subjects.
This attitude owes more to the Jewish than the Greek influence. It 
is the oriental view of kingship, with the emphasis on the ruler's 
sacredness much weakened by the fact that kingship developed late among 
the Jews and was clearly viewed as a dubious improvement by those who 
recorded it.17 'I will not rule and my son shall not rule among you' 
says Gideon, when offered the kingship of his people (Judges 8.23). 
Judges certainly are specifically called upon to be saviours, endowed 
with the spirit of Yahweh (Judges 3.9-11), but the exalted personality 
of the judge is the last of his claims to sovereignty.18
The request for a king in the First Book of Samuel, 'give us a king 
to rule over us, like the other nations' (1 Sam. 8.5), is shown as a 
spurning of Yahweh's rule, and the disadvantages of monarchy are vividly 
described (1 Sam. 8.11-18). The advent of monarchy is recorded 
favourably in some sources, however, and a mystique of kingship can be 
found, contrasting the beneficent order under a king with the days when 
'there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his 
own eyes' (Judges 17.6; 18.1; 19.1; 21.25). However, 'the first
I 1 9objections to monarchy as such seem to date from the eighth century
17 C.R. North, 'The Old Testament Estimate of the Monarchy', The 
American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, 48 (1931), 
suggests that accounts hostile to monarchy were the product of a time, 
probably in the eighth century, when the Jews were becoming 
disillusioned with the institution of monarchy from their own experience 
(see p.Iff.).
18 Erwin R. Goodenough, 'Kingship in Early Israel', Journal of 
Biblical Literature, 48 (1929), pp.182-3, believes that 'while the 
judge-ruler is described in royal language throughout, he lacks any 
claim to personal pre-eminence,... The judges rule simply as God's 
agents, and their dignity seems not to have involved the overshadowing 
of their subjects with their personal manifestations of royalty'.
19 North, 'The Old Testament Estimate of the Monarchy', p.4.
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and frequently they emphasized the evil of rulers’ making claims to
2 0divine or quasi-divine honours.
There is in Aristeas no hint of any alternative form of political 
life to kingship, much less of any ’levelling' suggestions about the 
equality of all men under God. Such views would hardly have met with 
approval from those who supported the Ptolemies. Aristeas does nonethe­
less give a different stress from that of theories already existing 
which made the king superhuman in his own right and not simply as the 
intermediary of the deity.
Ptolemy is told that it is God who maintains the prosperity of his 
kingdom (15), for He is the Master and Creator of the universe (16). 
Ptolemy himself is shown acknowledging that God has preserved his 
kingdom in peace with the greatest glory throughout the entire world 
(37). Because he has been granted this gift and this trust, the king 
has a heavy responsibility. He has not, after all, been selected at 
random, but on the basis of ethical criteria: 'God has given you 
supreme responsibility as your value deserves’ (§eoö ödvxos oou xaxa^Lws 
xä)V TpoTiojv xqv qyeyovuav, 219) . There is little suggestion, however, 
that the qualities sought from rulers were to be charismatic. This 
selection of the ruler concerns God alone, and Aristeas does not imply 
that popular approval had been sought and obtained, even at the most 
superficial level.
God, furthermore, allots glory and great riches to kings (224) and 
no-one is king by his own will alone, for 'kingship is a gift of God'
(ib. , cf. 'Power is a gift to you from the Lord, Sovereignty is from the 
Most High' — Wisdom 6.3). Many of the qualities required of a king are 
also described as gifts of God; to make oneself agreeable to everybody 
is to have received a free gift from God, the best (225). So too love, 
the power of piety, is a gift of God (229). To be a performer of good 
deeds and not the opposite is also ömpov deou (231) . These are only the 
most obvious expressions of the belief that God is the source of the 
disposition that enables the king to attain to personal excellence and 
to perform his special royal duties.
20 See on this J.M. Powis Smith, 'Traces of Emperor-Worship in the 
Old Testament', The American Journal of Semitic Languages and 
Literatures, 39 (1922), p.37.
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The king is not without a pattern to follow in God, since gentle­
ness (188) and mercy and indulgence even to faults (207-8) are 
attributes of God. Elsewhere, Aristeas describes God ruling the world 
with clemency and without the least anger and the king is advised to 
imitate Him in these respects (254).21 Such imitation may just as 
easily be referred to as 'following the law', that is, the laws and the 
divine command are complementary, the former, indeed, derived from the 
latter. In the most basic matters of government, the divine model is to 
guide the king. This is so too in his performance as a benefactor and 
saviour of his people. There need not be a particularly strong 
religious significance in these titles, but even Schubart.; who , in 'Das 
hellenistische Königsideal', treats them in connection with the mortal 
and not the divine or heroic aspects of the king, admits that 'freilich 
kann es nicht gelingen, reinlich zu scheiden . Certainly we can say 
that there are variations in meaning in the use of these words, from the 
physical preservation referred to in the advice to the king in choosing 
generals who will save their men (281) , to the preservation and even 
improvement of men's lives described as brought about by lawgivers, and 
the suggestion that the king should save human life (279, 292).
The king's role as benefactor is related specifically to God's in 
two of his replies: the king, in drawing to him the affection of his
subjects by his beneficence will be following God's example, 'for He is 
the universal benefactor' (6 deos taotv atiuos aya6u)V eotlv, 205).
Again, a sage tells the king: 'Just as God is the benefactor of all men, 
so you imitating him make yourself the benefactor of your subjects'
(281). The language is relatively restrained, but there is no doubt 
that such a role makes the ruler especially close to God.
Aristeas has no hesitation in proclaiming that, for all this, the 
king remains a man (263). The king's superiority is real, but based 
firmly on his excellence. He is urged to surpass all men by the bright-
21 'Since the statements in Ep. Ar. are ethical imperatives, there is 
an obvious distinction from the mimesis idea of Hellen, ruler theology
(Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, IV, edited by Gerhard 
Kittel, [Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1956], p.664). An example of such 
Hellenistic ruler theology is the kingship writing of the neo- 
Pythagoreans .
22 Schubart, 'Das hellenistische Königsideal', p.13.
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ness of his soul (16) as he does by his gentleness and humanity; these 
also are gif Is of God (290). This is in line with the trend we have 
observed so far in our writers, for rule to be justified on ethical 
grounds. The king must render his account, however, to God alone who 
gives him power. Hence his relationship to God, though not granting him 
super-human status, is part of what it means to be a king and shows 
religion to be one important basis of monarchy.
HELLENISTIC INFLUENCES
Of the various cultural influences at work in the fourth century in 
areas of Greek rule, not all favoured the conversion of the kingly 
office into a sacred or divine position. Nor did those people who 
wished for various reasons to surround monarchy with a religious glow 
all understand the same thing by this. One could also oppose extra­
ordinary honours being paid to a ruler on conservative religious grounds 
or for rationalistic reasons. The devout Greek who took to heart 
Pindar’s warning on the folly of attempting to become immortal would be 
affronted by the claims of a mere mortal, however high his position, to 
be worshipped alongside the traditional gods.
One who questioned the whole framework of Greek religious belief 
would rather be inclined to scoff at aspirations to divinity in a ruler, 
though he might be willing to accede to a ruler’s demands for 
recognition as divine for political reasons. Such a person was, 
however, likely to turn to an alternative explanation of why a ruler 
should have a special relationship with the gods to that given by the 
king. Indeed, most thoughtful men might well believe that a ruler’s 
moral excellence could alone exalt him, and would eschew the more 
extravagant and mystical accounts of the king's position.
The piety of the old-fashioned, however, was no longer sufficiently 
strongly rooted to be an efficient opposition weapon, and 'entscheidend 
... ist ... die Tatsache, dass die staatlichen Kulte, aber auch die 
Volksreligion durch Geschichte und Aufklärung so weit zersetzt sind, dass 
sie keinen unüberwendlichen Widerstand mehr gegen Missbrauch zu leisten 
vermögen und Formeln gestatten, gegen die echte Religiosität sich
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2 3leidenschaftlich auflehnen musste'. There were no doubt many who were 
willing and even eager to fill the gap left by the decline of 
traditional beliefs with worship of a ruler about whose existence and 
power there could be no doubt, and political theorists could not ignore 
this trend.
The Stoics and Epicureans had no objection in principle to 
elevating men to heroic status. Founders of philosophic schools, such
2 4as Epicurus himself, often received great honour after their deaths.
particular!} cteiVicoric/n,
But this does not mean that they approved of extending such recognition^ 
to monarchs, especially to those still alive. Philodemus records a 
saying of Chrysippus from the first book of his Tiept •dewv, asserting 
that men are changed into gods (SVF 2.1076), but there is no such remark 
applied to rulers in particular. Yet benefactors of mankind, it seems, 
were especially suitable subjects for reverence, and indeed the Stoics 
accepted the doctrine of Euhemerus that deification of mortals who had 
helped their fellows was the origin of many of the members of the Greek 
pantheon.25 It is a stock Stoic theme that good men are godlike^and so 
once a monarch becomes accepted as the model of the good and beneficent 
man, he may also acquire such an attribute.
Polybius leaves on record his view that religion and belief in the 
gods and their punishments are useful tools for the statesman to obtain 
submissiveness from the populace (6.56).26 No doubt he would have
23 Taeger, 'Isokrates', p.360.
24 On Epicurus and the reverence paid to him after death, see
Weinreich, 'Antikes Gottmenschentum', p.643: 'Wie unwiderstehlich der
Drang war, den Weisen in göttlichen Formen zu ehren, beweist nichts 
deutlicher als die Aufnahme solcher Formen durch den Garten Epikurs. In 
der Schule, die die alte Religion so entschieden bekämpfte, genoss das 
Schulhaupt selbst göttliche Ehren.'
25 On this point see Babut, Plutarque et le stoicisme, p.464: 'll
nous suffit de noter ici que le stoicisme est en principe etranger ä 
l’idee d’une divinisation d’etres humains, mais que sa position sur ce 
point manque encore de nettete, moins sans doute par suite d’une 
hesitation ä se prononcer, que par indifference pour une idee qui ne 
menace nullement sa conception du divin et pourrait meine au besoin s’y 
integrer.'
26 And we must also take into account, as has already been suggested, 
that 'this rendering of divine honors to human beings while yet on earth 
was not an outgrowth of extreme superstition, but was made acceptable by 
the rationalistic attitude toward the gods current in educated circles 
of the time', A.E.R. Boak, 'The Theoretical Basis of the Deification of
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accepted the ruler cult for the same reason, but we have no cause to 
believe that orthodox Stoics took such a blatantly pragmatic approach to 
the question. More commonly, we may believe, a moral and religious 
apology would be made for monarchy, with the utilitarian motive for 
defining it in religious terms hovering somewhere in the background.
The Pythagorean doctrine on honours paid to mortals seems to be 
revealed by the statement attributed to Pythagoras in the Life of 
Pythagoras of Iamblichus that friends were to be honoured like gods 
(V.P. 259). The Pythagoreans tended to narrow the gap between god and 
man, by talking of the three kinds of beings existing, gods, men and, in 
between, kings or, in one case, also wise men (Scholia on the lZiady 
A 339-40a, Erbse, vol. 1, and A 340, Dindorf, vol. 3).
Our writers on kingship express a similar attitude. For Ecphantus, 
the king alone retains a connection with his divine origins that most 
men, weighed down by much earth, have lost (p.244). Diotogenes 
expresses the relationship of king to God in terms of the charge of men 
with which God has entrusted the king (p.266).27 More often, however, 
for these writers the king's imitation of God is significant. This 
imitation is more than an ideal; it is assumed to exist of necessity, 
as divine and human rule are parallel to each other. This is not 
surprising, says Ecphantus, as God, the best workman, himself fashioned 
the king, using himself as archetype (pp.272 and 245). Diotogenes 
explains this correspondence between God and king in terms of the 
kingdoms each rules. As God has power in the cosmos, so has the king in 
the poZis, and as poZis is to cosmos, so the king is to God. Thus the 
king's rule, like God's, is unexamined (p.265).
Sthenidas claims that the king's possession of wisdom means that he 
will be an imitator and emulator of the first God (p.270). The 
imitation, that is, takes an essentially ethical form. Diotogenes too
Rulers in Antiquity', CJ, 11 (1916), p.294, and see the whole article, 
pp.293-7.
27 'La theorie du droit divin de la monarchic est bien exprimee dans 
la phrase: u) öeöuntev 6 §eos auiuj xav dyeyovuav' comments Louis Delatte.
He adds that this concept of divine right 'apparait souvent chez les 
theoriciens, surtout ä partir de l’epoque imperiale' and sees it viewed 
as a welcome alternative to granting the king divine status {Les 
Trattes , p.262).
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emphasizes that the king's majesty is the quality by which he imitates 
divinity (pp.267 and 268). The very institution of monarchy is an 
imitation of the divine order (p.270). One of the main tasks of the 
king is cultivating the gods (pp.264-5), since the best must be honoured 
by the best (p.265). In the opinion of Ecphantus, the king passes on to 
his subjects for imitation the character he has acquired while imitating 
God (pp.277-8) so that all men will, even indirectly, have some share in 
the divine nature. The only limitation on the king's divinity is the 
recognition that there are other, more divine, beings than he (p.274). 
This in fact restricts the king's activities very little since he is the 
interpreter of the divine mandate. His authority is derived then not so 
much from his position in the state as from his links with the supreme 
ruler of the universe.
CICERO
In the introduction to the De Republica Cicero makes a clear 
connection between the earthly civitas and the divinely-organized 
cosmos: 'There is nothing in which human excellence approaches more
closely to the godhead than founding new states or preserving those 
already founded' (1.12).28 This grants a considerable religious 
significance to such founders or preservers, while not directly 
suggesting that they may make any exceptional claim to being no longer 
merely human. Even in the De Oratore a similar note had been sounded 
when Cicero declared that the art of oratory was the gift of a divinity 
(even though unaided nature bestowed on man a great capacity for it), so 
that id ipsum3 quod erat hominis proprium, non partum per nos sed 
divinitus ad nos delatum videretur {De Orat. 1.202). A great man does 
not lightly lay down the munus humanum adsignatum a deo {De Rep. 6.15).
The individual who is to save the state and almost, it seems, 
interrupt the decline of the forms of government (a decline described as 
inevitable for all forms but the mixed one) can be described as paene
28 Pöschl, after mentioning Plato, Rep. 500b-c, comments: 'Das ist
die Vergöttlichung des Menschen, die Cicero für den wahren politischen 
Führer beansprucht.' He goes on to compare this idea to that expressed 
in Plato, Laws 708d {Römischer Staat, p.183, note 110).
2  8 cl •The heroic honours offered to founders of cities had prepared the 
ground for this development. See, e.g., Thuc. 5.11 on honours given to 
Brasidas as second founder of Amphipolis, and Demos. 19.20 on the cult 
in honour of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the liberators (and in some 
sense second founders?) of Athens.
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divinus (De Rep. 1.45). This reinforces the high value that was put on 
government itself at the beginning of the De Republioa, but also shows 
that praise can be bestowed on a person who is noteworthy in being out­
side the traditional structure. Elsewhere the art of good government 
(ratio eivilis et diseiplina populorum) and the right character (bona 
ingenia) together bring about inoredibilis quaedam et divina virtus (De 
Rep. 3.4).
Because not all men are able to interpret the divine will in 
matters of government, only some chosen souls will be entitled to these 
descriptions, but they are bestowed on man as such in Stoic thought 
because of mankind’s share of reason: Est igitur, quoniam nihil est
vatione melius, eaque (est) et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo 
rationis societas (De Leg. 1.23). Thus
die Natur des Menschen und die Natur des Staates werden weder 
aus der Idee des Guten abgeleitet, noch konstruktiv nach der 
Verwirklichung der vier Kardinaltugenden bestimmt, in denen 
sich Natur und Arete des Menschen und der menschlichen 
Gemeinschaft erfüllen, sondern dem stoischen Naturbegriff 
untergeordet in der Weise, wie es das erste Buch von De 
legibus zeigt, das auf die ausführliche Behandlung in de rep. 
ausdrücklich zurückverweist (leg. 127).29
Hercules as the hero is an example of the rank ascribed to the 
benefactors of humanity whose souls are not merely immortal but divine 
(De Leg. 2.27; cf. De Off. 3.25 and the mention of Herculem ilium quern 
hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio caelestium collocavit) .
These accounts are generally of an a-political type, not bound strictly 
to a particular form of government, but, by their emphasis on the 
individual, they predispose us to see kingship as the obvious equivalent 
in the political sphere.30
This becomes even more likely when we consider the reward promised 
to Scipio (in Book Six of the De Republioa) and likewise to all those 
who patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint (6.13). Scipio himself
29 lb. , p. 151.
30 Cf. De Rat. Deor. 2.62: Suscepit autem vita hominum consuetudoque
communis ut beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate 
tollerent. Hinc Hercules hinc Castor et Rollux ... hinc etiam Romulus,
... quorum cum remanerent animi atque aetemitate fruerentur, rite di 
sunt habiti cum et optimi essent et aetemi.
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is told deum te igitur scito esse (De Rep. 6.26) but here he is 
addressed as a rational being, not as leader, and the close connection 
between state service and an immortal destiny that Cicero generally 
maintains is broken. Scipio is divine si quidem est deus qui viget3 qui
sentits qui meminitqui providetqui tarn regit et moderatur 
et movet id corpus cui praepositus est3 quean hunc mundum iVte princeps 
deus (ib.) .
What Cicero emphasizes is the command exercised by mind, and he is 
not especially concerned with whether an internal agent or a deity 
separate from man has control. Still, such language can easily be 
applied to the political sphere, though the topic here is religious and 
teleological. In this sense, we can see how the life of the civitas is 
an example which may be applied to the microcosm of man or the macrocosm 
of the universe, but which may in its turn be influenced by these 
spheres. The result is that, throughout, rule is hallowed and its 
various forms intertwined.
Political argument takes on a new dimension when, in the 
assimilation of the divine and the human, God is described in terms 
appropriate to the leading figure in the Roman state. Cicero refers to 
God as magister et imperator3 tegis huius (i.e. the true law, right 
reason) inventor3 disceptator3 iator (De Rep. 3.33). The citizen of the 
world, aware of the nature of reality, will grasp ipsum ea moderantem et 
regentem (deum) (De Leg. 1.61), or will perhaps prefer to believe that 
the divine form of government is aristocratic: sit igitur ... persuasion
civibus dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores deos (De Leg. 2.15). 
This is, however, far less common.
Cicero uses the argument that, as there is kingship among the gods, 
so there should be among men, as part of the philosophical justification 
of monarchical government. He refers to Jove quern unum omnium deorum et 
hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique consentiunt (De Rep. 1.56). 
Cicero may not have intended this argument to be decisive (he even 
admits that this belief about the deity may be erroneous) and Lepore 
rightly stresses also how unrelated theory and practice could be at this 
time. For Lepore, 'piuttosto sembra evidente nel nostro passo 
1’intonazione e il carattere teoretico piü ehe politico-prammatico del 
motivo1, and he emphasizes the various sources available:
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In De Rep. 1,56 la giustificazione teologico-cosmologica della 
monarchia ci riconnette a tutta una tradizione greca ehe 
comincia con il tardo Platone, e con l ’Aristotele 
platonizzante, combinandosi con elementi non platonici o 
addirittura pre-platonici, e sfociando in quelle correnti 
cinico-stoiche, peripatetiche e neopitagoriche.31
What we find in Cicero's works on political philosophy is a willingness 
to use arguments from various traditions to show the relationship 
existing between the man leading his country well as an individual and 
the divine order which grants him special favour. However far this 
speculation was removed from political reality, the theory at least was 
important, and showed how ready Cicero was to import religious sentiment 
and atmosphere into his political thought.
PHILO
The first impression Philo gives us of his views on man's relation 
to God in his introduction to his exposition of the laws, De Opificio 
Mundi, is when he says that man is patterned after God's image. Here we 
are shown mankind as a whole without any consideration of differences in 
individuals. Basing himself on the text Tiounowyev ävBpwtov Max’ euo'va 
npexepav nau naB’ oyoumoev (Gen. 1.26), Philo develops a view of the 
world which sees it as a progression from God through his Logos to 
spiritual man made according to this Logos, that is to say, divine 
reason. Man as he actually is has a spirit unhappily compounded with a 
body which provides the earthy, less exalted element. Man's union with 
and at the same time separation from the divine as a result of this 
combination is a common theme in Philo:
tas avBpwiios Kara yev xpv ötdvouav (pMeuoxaL Aoyw deup, xhs 
yaxaptas (puaems cxyayetov n auoauaaya p atauyaoya yeyovms,
Kara 6e xpv xoü owyaxos xaxaaxeupv äuavxu x^ ) xoay(|) (Opif. 146).
God breathed into man the divine breath, which was a sort of colony 
of his blessed and fortunate nature sent here for the help of our race) 
so that man is both mortal and immortal (Opif. 135) . This is a very 
similar sentiment to that of Ecphantus who describes men thus: ’Eut 6e
yas dvBpuuiou onupwuayevov xPhha > hardly able to rise from mother earth at
31 Lepore, Il princeps, pp.83, 82.
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yp -öedyoypds xyg ey tvoyncry s eXeup Cojw öüvä^ev  auxd ( p . 2 4 4 ) .
This vision of man seeks to elevate humanity above its apparently 
'material' state. The elevation comes, not from an individual's own 
virtues or efforts, but from outside, divine intervention. Nevertheless, 
the endowments of some men are exceptional, and reflect a particular 
relationship between them and God. There are, after all, two kinds of 
men, the heavenly and the earthly. The heavenly, in as much as it is 
made in the image of God, has no part at all in the mortal and earthly 
reality. Although this sometimes refers to the ideal man or the 
disembodied soul of man, it can also refer to the wise, for whom heaven 
is the true home and who have, even on earth, risen above their 
surroundings (see Conf. 77-8) .
Those in whom the divine element predominates are of course the 
patriarchs of Israel, whose authority derives from the divine mandate 
granted them because of their excellence. The source of their authority 
is, for Philo, God, directly intervening in the affairs of men. In a 
general sense, without God's directing care the business of kings and 
subjects cannot go aright {Vit. Mos. 2.5) but specifically this means 
that the king is one who non ab hominibus3 sed a deo ordinatus sit (QG 
4.76). Moses too is the elect of God {Legat. 50).
Philo repeats the common theme that it is just for the better part 
to rule always and everywhere and for the worse to be ruled {LA 1.72), 
and as the good is scarce and the evil abundant, it is hard to find a 
single wise man while of inferior men there is a countless multitude 
{LA 1.102). The good man's portion is then the whole world, and hence 
he becomes a partner with God and can even be described in the same way 
{Vit. Mos. 1.157-8, cf. 1.155). Moses received the authority which the 
people willingly gave him, with the sanction and assent of God 
(ßpaßcuovTOS xau eutveuovxos §eoö, Vit. Mos. 1.163). Joseph, appointed 
to a high position in Pharaoh's court, claims that not the action of his 
brothers but God was the cause of his present position: he is a 
UTtnpE ins  K a t  ö y a M o v o s  to administer boons and gifts for mankind {Jos. 
241) .
Philo does not often describe rulers as the counterpart of God on 
earth; he prefers to give a prescription to them of how they should
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behave, rather than consider their metaphysical position. One exception 
is the fragment preserved by Antonius Monarchus [= Migne P.G. 36 765ff-] 
where the king’s authority makes him like God. Yet though he is here 
oyouog and an glhujv 6clhi1 this is how mankind in general is often 
described by Philo (e.g. in Opif. 69). 32 In this case, however, the 
king alone is the highest thing there is on earth and so his element of 
divinity is higher than most people’s. (For a description that is in 
some ways comparable to this, see LA 3.82, where Melchizedek, the 
priest-king, has the Really Existent as his portion and thinks about Him 
in a way that is ’high, exalted and sublime'.)
The mystic interpretation suggested here is not so much a part of a 
philosophy of kingship as the temporary ascription to the monarch of a 
role that Philo more commonly granted to Jewish patriarchs, examples for 
the rest of mankind, or to good men who followed the Royal Road (see 
e.g. Irrmut. 159-60). Nonetheless, Philo does use the three-tiered 
structure that goes from God to the father of a household by way of the 
political figure of the king, thus showing the continuing power of such 
an image. These parallels discovered in the universe satisfy the 
need for order even when, as here, the point being made is about the 
nature of God: as parents are in their families to children, so is a 
king to a city and God to the cosmos: o yap ev toils auyyeveLaLS tpog 
TSKva yoveig, toDto BaatAeug yev upog tcoAl v, itpog 6e nooyov 6 0eog 
(Provid. 2.3). It is not surprising to find, then, that just as the 
king may borrow titles from private life and become, as we have seen, 
the father of his people, so too he may borrow a divine title and be 
princeps principwVj isque divinus3 et rex regum3 optimus et generosus 
(QG 4.76). He can be described as universal father — mxpp molvos — a 
title commonly given to Zeus (Spec. Leg. 4.184), and can even, as with 
Moses, be called 'god and king of the whole nation' (Vit. Mos. 1.158). 
These titles do not in fact constitute an acknowledgement of the ruler's 
divinity, but certainly kingship seems to need a greater than human 
power animating it in order to function efficiently.
32 As Isaak Heinemann comments of the comparison, Phiions griechische 
und jüdische Bildung (Breslau 1929-1932, reprinted Olms, Hildesheim, 
1973), p.186, note 5,’ 'Gott und Geist stehen, ganz in griechischer 
Weise, Op.m. 69 nebeneinander.'
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In the Life of Abraham, Philo, discussing the wise man, compares 
his position to so many other roles, including the one of ruler, that, 
although the general point he wishes to make is clear, no one item on 
the list can be considered, by the mere fact of its presence there, to 
have a special connection with kingship. Truly, says Philo, the wise 
man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in the ship, or a ruler 
in the city, or again as a soul in the body or the mind in the soul, or 
once again heaven in the world or God in heaven {Abr. 272). The king 
may be first in his world as God in the whole universe, but he shares 
his pre-eminence with experts in less elevated situations. His value 
then cannot be assessed simply in terms of the comparison, nor can his 
relationship to God.
A more personal approach sees the monarch as saviour of his people, 
a role which may be limited to providing material benefits and 
protection from an enemy, but which may also come to have a religious 
significance when the king 'saves' because of his close connection with 
the deity. This could be so only when God already had a clearly-defined 
salvivic function, and for Philo this was so in two senses. God was a 
preserver of what he had made (see QG 4.130) and also, as Brehier says, 
Philo 'y joint (i.e. to the Stoic idea) le sens mystique du dieu 
liberateur'.33 When this term is applied to a king, the general sense 
of 'caring for a people' predominates. This may be an attribute applied 
to any individual who has protected the state, but when Philo records 
the sentiments that people had expressed at the accession of Gaius while 
he was still regarded as 6 awxqp Mat euepyexns {Legat. 22) the titles in 
this context suggest a more than human excellence.
This is quite different from suggesting that the ruler be deified. 
What Philo approves of is the kind of reputation as a ruler that 
Augustus had earned; he was Ttpwxos moil yeytoxos Hat holvos euepyexns 
{Legat. 149). The king is encouraged to imitate the divine virtues and 
in this way come close to God: xauia ybyetaBat Ttpoonxeu xous aya$ous
apxovxas ,  et yi its aüxoüs cppovxus eoxtv e^oyouojoeoas xhg tpos deov 
{Spec. Leg. 4.188),34 and such imitation means doing good to the
33 £mile Brehier, Les Idees philosophiqu.es et religieuses de Philon 
dJAlexandrie (3rd ed., Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1950), 
p.235.
Note 34 over page.
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subjects, as well as enabling them to have a God-like model to work 
from. Moses, for example,
xadaxep i s  ypoupqv eft ö e ö q y Loupyriyevnv eauxov  moil tov eauxou  
ßuov £ ls yeaov  xpoayaymv xayxaAov xau %coeuöes epyov eaxqae 
uapaöeLypa xous cdeAouat yLyeuadaL (Vit. Mos. 1.158).
Although for Philo monarchical government often turns out to be a 
description used metaphorically for the rule of reason in the soul, this 
does not mean that we should take notice only of those cases where king- 
ship in the ’true' public sense is meant. Since monarchical rule is 
interrelated at all levels, and the divine government provides a guide 
and pattern for them all, this shows us once more that 'government' in 
Philo has no independent existence.35
SENECA
The most noteworthy element in Seneca's attitude to men and his 
view of what made some worthy of more honour than others is his profound 
respect for the Stoic wise man. Seneca does not himself divide up man­
kind into the wise and foolish in quite as dogmatic a fashion as the 
3S*
early Stoics did — motivated in this partly perhaps by some uncertainty 
as to where he should place himself! — yet he is clear on two points: 
the wise man is a rare creature, and he rises by his wisdom far above 
his mortal nature. In one of his more moderate expressions of this 
belief Seneca describes how there is friendship between good men and 
gods due to the harmonizing power of virtue (conciliante virtute, Prov. 
1.5). The rareness in itself implies that the wise or good man stands
34 'Nous retrouvons ici le parallelisme que nous avons Signale ä 
Plusieurs reprises entre la religion des mysteres et la soteriologie 
monarchique', says Louis Delatte, Les Traites, p.215.
3 5 This attitude, according to Heinemann, is typical of Judaic 
thinkers of the time: 'Wenn die Prophetenjzugleich der Religion wie der
Erhaltung des geliebten Staates Rechnung trugen, wenn der rein 
hellenische Staatsbegriff sich durch die Einbeziehung der religiös­
sittlichen Ideale in die politische Sphäre vom römischen fühlbar abhob, 
aber doch den Machtgedanken und die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit im Auge 
behielt, saugt in den beiden jüdischen Theorien der hellenistischen 
Zeit, der palästinischen wie der alexandrinischen, das Ethische und 
Religiöse gleichsam das Politische völlig auf' {Phiions griechische und 
jüdische Bildung, pp.i201-2).
35 In this, he was of course following on from developments in Stoicism 
since the time of Panaetius, if not before.
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out from his fellows as a matter of course. It is not often that magna 
et excedentia sott turn ae vulgarem modum ... g-ignuntur {Const. Sap. 7.1), 
as he says to Serenus, almost granting the latter’s point on the 
difficulty of finding any example of the Stoic sage. Such a person, 
however, may be said to be free of the laws governing human nature 
(Brev. Vit. 15.5). Because of this all ages are at his service as at a 
god’s, and he is not bound by the constraints of time (i b .).
This may be taken as mere hyperbole, but more significant is the 
actual relationship of the good and wise man to the deity. We have 
mentioned that Seneca believed friendship existed between the two, but 
he also saw kinship here. The good man is god’s pupil, imitator and 
true offspring (disoipulus eius aemulatorque et vera progenies — Prov. 
1.5). This is because of necessitudo et similitudo {ib.). The wise man 
has been brought into proximity to God (he is in vicinum deo perduotus, 
Cons, ad Helv. 5.2). Elsewhere Seneca repeats this with heavier 
emphasis: the wise man is vicinus proximusque dis, and_>apart from the
fact that he is mortal, is similis deo {Const. Sap. 8.2, and note Ep. 
65.24 on the parallel between God and the soul).
Seneca then has no basic objection to making the similarity between 
men — at least some men — and God as close as possible, and though the 
wise man is of course pious, his godlike self-sufficiency comes from his 
own efforts more than from the assistance of the deity. The ascent of 
the soul is significant as much because man is thereby raising himself 
above the human as because it leads to union with God.36 These examples 
show that Seneca subscribed to a view which could quite easily grant 
reverence to a mortal, and hence there is no absolute bar to his 
accepting that a ruler could also occupy a position which made him like 
God.37
q c In some way man can even be said to be superior to the gods if he 
is wise. See Marion Altman, ’Ruler Cult in Seneca', CPh, 33 (1938), 
p.202 and Epp. 53.11 and 73.14.
q n Where the ruler was the object, scepticism about claims to divine 
status might just as easily result in 'going along with' the 
contemporary attitudes. Note Taeger’s comment on Seneca, Charisma II 
(Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1960), p.502: 'Seine Ablehnung and Skepsis 
verhindern freilich nicht, dass er dort, wo er durch gesellschaftlich­
politische Rücksichten gebunden ist, oder wo er seinen eigenen Vorteil 
verfolgt, sich der üblichen Formeln rückhaltlos bedient.’
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In some respects the language used for the king’s situation is like 
that used of the wise man. Seneca describes the ruler asking himself: 
egone ex omnibus movtalibus placui electusque sum3 qui in terris deovum 
vice fungevev? (Clem. 1.1.2). This deputizing for God becomes 
increasingly stressed in writings from this period on, and is associated 
with the idea of the ruler as one sent to imitate on earth the rule of 
the gods. This divine government is sometimes seen as held by Zeus> 
sometimes described in general terms as a higher rule, parallel and 
analogous to kingly rule. As imitation occurs only if there is an 
essential similarity in form between the model and the imitator, 
monarchy alone can reproduce on earth government corresponding to that 
most obvious among the gods.
A monarch has therefore the duty of interpreting the deity to his 
subjects — optime hoc exemption pvincipi constituam3 ad quod formetur3 ut 
se talem esse civibus3 quales sibi deos velit (Clem. 1.7.1). The 
comparison here acknowledges the power of the gods over the ruler, but 
does so fairly superficially. The message seems to be simply: ’do unto
men as you would have the gods do unto you'. Seneca does not here 
suggest that the ruler himself is divine, although this is certainly 
suggested in other parts of the De Clementia. Seneca sees the citizens 
thanking Nero for the benefits he has brought them, and Seneca himself 
refers to the ideal king as one who bears himself in a godlike manner 
(qui se ex deovum natura gerit), who is beneficent and generous and uses 
his power for better ends (Clem. 1.19.9).38 The king, like the gods, 
cannot descend from his lofty eminence (Clem. 1.8.3). When Seneca 
writes of the 'divine hand' of Claudius in the Consolatio ad Polybium, 
flattery is probably dictating his choice of words (Cons, ad Polyb.
13.2; cf. 14.2, divina auctoritas), but we can agree with Altman that
although it is rather difficult to understand Seneca's view 
of emperor-worship from the scattered passages where he 
specifically mentions it, his Stoic doctrine of the deios avpp 
is clear and predominant. He has so completely torn down the 
barrier between god and man that the transition is an easy 
matter.3 9
38 Cf. Ben. 3.15.4: Generosi animi est et magnifici iuvare3 prodesse;
qui dat beneficia3 deos imitatur.
39 Altman, 'Ruler Cult in Seneca', p.201.
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In this sense, it is perfectly reasonable for Seneca to conclude 
deum esse (Augustum) non tamquam iussi credimus {Clem. 1.10.3), since 
Augustus has shown by his deeds that he merits the title. The ruler 
appears performing his proper task deorum ... sibi animum adserens 
{Clem. 1.5.7). Seneca does not go into detail in propounding a theory 
of the distribution of divine blessings via the king but he does hint at 
such a notion in his description of the ruler as spiritus vitalis {ille 
est enim vinculum3 ... ille spiritus vitalis3 quern haec tot milia 
trahunt, Clem. 1.4.1). At the same-time we can recall, as Delatte 
notes, that 'un des portraits les plus enthousiastes qu’en (i.e. of the 
sage) a traces Seneque ... contient bien des traits qui rappellent les 
qualites qu’Ecphante attribue au roi'.40 The wise man is here the one 
who aderit levabitque (nos) si colere earn (faciem) voluerimus {Ep.
115.5). On the other hand Seneca can also describe the effect of 
Claudius on his secretary Polybius in the following similar terms: 
quotiens lacrimae suboriuntur oculis tuis3 totiens illos in Caesarem 
derige; siccabuntur maximi et clarissimi conspectu numinis {Cons, ad 
Polyb. 12.3). The divine power held by the ruler is gregatim ac publice 
servare {Clem. 1.26.5).
Seneca is however aware of the limitations on this divinity. He 
refers to the bereavements of the Caesars, which show that ’not even 
they who are said to be born from gods and to be destined to give birth 
to gods can have the same power over their own fortunes as they have 
over the fortunes of others' {Cons, ad Mavc. 15.1). For Augustus this 
meant that nemo magis ex omnibus mortalibus hominem esse se3 dum inter 
homines erat3 sensit {Cons, ad Polyb. 15.3).
The role that the princeps was called upon to play was one given to 
him by God (see e.g. Clem. 1.1.2), whereas the wise man’s situation was 
largely achieved by his own efforts. For both, however, it could be 
said that si cui virtus animusque in corpore praesens3 hie deos aequat3 
illo tendit originis suae memor {Ep. 92.29). All men after all can 
ultimately trace their origin back to the gods {Ep. 44.1) and social 
status does not, at least in this case, come into the matter (see Ep. 
31.11) .
40 Delatte, Les Traites, p.193.
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Because of his position, the king is elevated to a near-divine 
status at one moment, yet the next, when Seneca's Stoicism gains the 
upper hand, he is only one of many men who are potentially divine 
because of their possession of reason. Still, Seneca comes close to 
investing the king, like the wise man, with mystical powers. In all 
these instances, then, he avoids facing the reality of political life, 
either by assimilating the king to some other figure, or by disguising 
his powers under a mantle of qualities that resemble God's.
MUSONIUS RUFUS
Musonius Rufus makes no extravagant claims for the king as 
incarnation or representative of divinity. All he suggests is that the 
king should be a true imitator of Zeus in his care for his subjects 
(p.283). Whereas any man with self-control has dignity, such a quality 
in a king makes him godlike and worthy of reverence (p.282). Godlike 
virtue Musonius elsewhere expects of all men, for he claims that man 
alone of all creatures on earth resembles God, having his virtues. So, 
when he lives as he ought he may well be considered like him; hence men 
of virtue are considered godlike (Stob., Flor., 117,8). Thus the king 
and the good man coalesce.
DIO CHRYSOSTOM
In Dio's opinion the man excelling in virtue has a reasonable claim 
to rule others and make them better than they could be unaided.41 This 
implies that the main purpose of government is such improvement. The 
distinction accorded to the morally outstanding men and accepted by most 
philosophic schools of the time did not of itself however bolster the 
spiritual position of the ruler. But beliefs about the exalted 
existence after death of good men could be applied to kings who were 
examples of such goodnessjand so we find this used as an incentive to 
encourage kings to virtue, as individuals, not as monarchs (3.54).
41 See 2.71, kings should be taught to 6tbV av-dpmnmv yev xmv öyoLwv 
xpeLTxova cpacvoyevov apyecv, and note also 3.62.
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It is only when the king’s task becomes an act of salvation that a 
certain divine activity is associated with royalty, and for Dio the 
saving function is an important element of rule. A king rules because 
his superiority means that he must save his subjects. This may be on a 
physical or spiritual level, but for Dio the latter is obviously more 
important. Dio describes kings as deified for the safety of the realm, 
real guardians (nriöepdves) and good and righteous leaders of the people 
(32.26). But further on in this speech to the people of Alexandria he 
mocks those who apply the terms ’saviour’ and ’god' to a pitiful human 
being (32.50). Only his behaviour can allow a ruler to claim such a 
title; in other words it does not come automatically with accession to 
the throne, at least in theory.
The ability to rule correctly comes from imitating the rule of the 
gods. This is more profound than a mere pious desire to act in a way 
pleasing to the gods; it implies a certain correlation between the 
heavenly and earthly kingdoms. Imitation of the greatest and first king 
and ruler of the universe (yeyuaxou  wau tpmxou ßaauAefais Mat apy o v io g )  is 
a duty particularly appropriate to kings who could rightly be called 
'Zeus-nurtured' and like Zeus in counsel, as Homer says (1.37-8). In the 
First Discourse Dio devotes considerable space to an account of the 
divine administration of the universe^ to show an example to the earthly 
ruler. The imitation is not because the ruler is of a different species 
from his fellows. Mortals and those who administer the affairs of 
mortals have a duty to imitate Zeus and these classes are at least not 
suggested as being mutually exclusive. Dio constantly moves from 
consideration of the ruler bearing the responsibilities of the kingdom, 
to dwell on a citizen of the divine kingdom, and brings these two 
elements of his thought into formal harmony by explaining that any 
offence against the divinely-imposed order of the world is far greater 
and more evident to all when the ruler is the one erring (1.43).
Good kings are not produced as models of God without effort on 
their part. In the discourse on Homer Dio instances this for the case 
of Minos, called an associate and pupil (oyuArixns and yadpxns)  of Zeus. 
Good kings in their turn, learning the kingly art, should 'shape their 
rule with an eye to (Minos), patterning their own conduct after a God', 
acpoyotoOvxag dem xov auxwv xpouov (53.11; cf. 1.38: 'practically all
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good k i n g s  have been  ya$r|Tau nau CqAwxaL o f  Z e u s ' ) .  Minos a l s o  a p p e a r s  
i n  t h e  F o u r th  D i s c o u r s e  on k i n g s h i p  as  t h e  i d e a l  i m i t a t o r .  The 
d e s c r i p t i o n  öuoxpecpeus and öuecptAou when a p p l i e d  t o  k i n g s  means t h a t  
t h e y  r e c e i v e  t h e  t e a c h i n g  and i n s t r u c t i o n  c a l l e d  d i v i n e  to  h e l p  them in  
t h e i r  work ( 4 . 4 1 ) .
The p r e c i s e  way i n  which  r u l e r s  a r e  to  i m i t a t e  the  d e i t y  i s  in  
e t h i c a l  a c t i o n ,  as  t h e  t i t l e s  g r a n t e d  t o  God as  k i n g  show. The k i n g  
i s  a d v i s e d  to  i m i t a t e  t h e  s u n ,  which  i s  a god ,  i n  do ing  h i s  t a s k  w i t h o u t  
c o m p l a in t  ( 3 . 5 7 ;  c f .  3 . 3 7 ) .  The k i n g  must  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i m i t a t e  i t s  
power and l o v e  o f  hum an i ty  ( 3 . 8 2 ) .  T h i s  l i n k  be tw een  god and k i n g  i s  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  and c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e  du ty  o f  men t o  t a k e  up t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  community o f  men and gods making up th e  cosmos.
To be s u r e ,  t h e  r u l e r  does  p o s s e s s  a m andate  f o r  h i s  s p e c i a l  
p o s i t i o n . 43 Dio s e e s  t h i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  i n  Homer 's  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  
k i n g  ' t o  whom th e  son o f  S a t u r n  g i v e s  t h e  s c e p t r e ,  making him th e  law­
g i v e r  t h a t  he may r u l e  t h e  r e s t '  ( I I . 2 . 2 0 5 - 6 ,  c i t e d  i n  1 . 1 1 ) .  Th is  
c h a rg e  i s ,  however ,  c o n d i t i o n a l  on t h e  k i n g ' s  showing v i r t u e  ( 1 .1 2 )  b u t  
i t  a p p e a r s  t o  a p p ly  o n ly  to  a m o n a r c h i c a l  form o f  gove rnm en t ,  s i n c e  t h i s  
a l o n e  p a r a l l e l s  t h e  d i v i n e  form.  Hence Dio r e f e r s  t o  yanapua  öauywv 
BaouAeua, Alos ßaauAe'ws exyovos ( 1 .7 3 )  and m e n t io n s  ' t h a t  man, t h e  i d e a l  
k i n g '  to  whom God has  a p p o r t i o n e d  t h e  r i g h t  to  g iv e  o r d e r s  o n l y  ( 3 . 8 ) .  
Zeus '  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  one p o s s e s s i n g  t h i s  power depends  on th e  k i n g ' s  
f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  m an d a te ,  which i s  ' h e l p i n g  mankind '  ( 3 . 5 5 ) .
P i e t y  tow ards  t h e  gods i s  o f  c o u r s e  t h e  f i r s t  o f  v i r t u e s  ( 1 .1 5 )  b u t  
s e r v i c e  o f  t h e  gods i s  a l s o  a means o f  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  k i n g ' s  own 
i m p o r t a n c e :  'He b e l i e v e s  i n  good s p i r i t s  and d e m i - g o d s ,  which  a r e  t h e
s o u l s  o f  good men who have  c a s t  o f f  t h e i r  m o r t a l  n a t u r e ,  and i n  
confo rm in g  t o  t h i s  b e l i e f  he does  no s m a l l  s e r v i c e  to  h i m s e l f '  ( 3 . 5 4 ) .  
Here we have j u s t  a h i n t  o f  t h e  u t i l i t a r i a n  f u n c t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o n  f o r  the
42 See 1 . 3 9 ;  2 . 7 5 ;  3 6 .3 1 ,  35 and 1 2 .7 5 .
43 Dio o f t e n  m e n t io n s  t h i s  f a c t .  See 1 .45  cixe ouyai  Ttapa xou Auos  ^
exovxwv xqv öuvayuv n a l  xqv encxpoTcnv ( r e f e r r i n g  to  k i n g s )  and 3 .55  axe 
uno xou yeyuaxou §eou xay^eus e n t  xoöxo xo epyov.  As V a ld e n b e r g  p o i n t s  
o u t  ( ' L a  T h e o r i e  m onarch ique  de Dion C h r y s o s to m e ' ,  p p . 1 4 8 - 9 ) ,  ' ce n ’ e s t  
pas  dans t o u t e s  l e s  formes  de l ’E t a t  que l e  gouve rnement  r e q o i t  son 
p o u v o i r  de Zeus,  mais  s e u l e m e n t  dans l a  m o n a r c h i e ' .
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royal regime, but unlike Isocrates and Cicero, Dio does not spell out 
the theory that the monarchy considered as the form of government 
prevailing among the gods gives the divine sanction to earthly monarchy 
(although he sometimes implies that it does), nor does he suggest that 
because men imagine monarchy to prevail among the gods this shows it as 
the highest form of rule that can be envisaged. Dio argues instead for 
the importance to good men of a belief in elevation to semi-divine 
status as a return for practising virtue. The king, as one type of the 
good man, will naturally expect to be one of those so rewarded.
Hercules is the ideal here, as the hero who on earth had been entrusted 
by Zeus with the kingship of all mankind (1.84).
Not only does Dio show a monarch deriving his power from God, but 
he finds it reasonable to describe such rule in terms which link it 
clearly with divine rule, even where the theme of imitation does not 
appear. Trajan's power is second only to that of the gods (3.3). The 
happy and god-given polity he rules can best be illustrated from that 
government of the universe which is under the control of the first and 
best god (3.50); so, of the earthly ruler it can be said that if he is 
self-controlled and knows the royal art of Zeus, 'nothing prevents you 
(i.e. Trajan) being a son of Zeus' (4.21).44 The combination of the 
ethical and technical qualities in this quotation is typical of Dio. 
Indeed here the ethical excellence seems to produce the skill in the 
royal — and divine — art. A king who takes delight in bestowing 
benefits also reveals a quality bringing him close to the nature of the 
gods (2.26).
Dio does not properly face up to the fact of the ruler's authority 
as emissary from God, since he does not consider the risks of abuse of 
this claim. He hopes no doubt that that by his description the king 
will recognize what character a deputy of God should display, and act 
accordingly. He does not present to us the king in all his facets but 
only in those where he most resembles other good men striving for 
excellence and its rewards. His position differs from theirs only in 
its caring salvivic aspect which is also the basis of his special 
relationship to God.
44 So too those who possess virtue are represented as gods, heroes and 
demi-gods, and men like them are appointed kings and rulers on account 
of their goodness (69.1).
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PLUTARCH
Plutarch is more disposed than Dio to argue boldly that between 
gods and men there exists another species of individuals, but he does 
not stress so much the waywardness of most men and derive from this the 
need for earthly rulers to be superhuman. They may still in fact be so, 
however, and in his Lives Plutarch provides examples of individuals who 
were clearly superior to their fellows, and he describes the love 
engendered in states and peoples for an individual because of his virtue 
as at once the strongest and most divine (821f).
What entitles such people to this respect is the fact that they 
have the special task of providing salvation; a ruler attends as a 
service of god to the care and safety of men (780d).45 He is a public 
blessing (xouvov otpeAog) , in other words he supplies many of the 
benefits also expected from the gods (779b) . We note here the 
comparison of priests obtaining blessings from the gods with 
philosophers influencing rulers to make them more just, more moderate 
and more eager to do good (778f).
When Plutarch discusses the divine qualities which the ruler should 
imitate, we see that he has more than Dio to tell us of the way in which 
the king mirrors Zeus, for he does not merely describe the kingdom of 
gods and men and recommend that the ruler duplicate it like a good 
Stoic, by the exercise of virtues on his subjects' behalf. Instead he 
talks of the nature of the ruler's position in the universe as a whole. 
The monarchy is necessary so that the gifts and blessings bestowed by 
the gods may be rightly enjoyed, but not only kings but also law and 
justice are indispensable. These two elements of a good society depend, 
however, on the ruler because he is the image of God who orders all 
things (780e) . This resemblance is due solely to the ruler's virtue, 
and Plutarch expands on this to show how it involves goodness and mercy 
(upog to hoiAov nai (pyAdvSpojTiov äcpoyoxoövxag eauxoug, 781a). The ruler is 
God's metaphorical image and light (yuyqya xau cpdyyos) just as the sun
45 Cf. Aratus 14.3 where Plutarch records the verses inscribed to 
Aratus by the fellow-citizens whom he brought back from exile: ctyyeg 6
s u k o v ’, ’Apaxc, xeav vo'axouo xuxovxss axaaayev avx ’ apsxctg 
öuxauoauvag awxqpos awxhpoL $eoCg, oxu naxpudu xqt aqt öauydvbov $euav x 
wuaoas euvoyuav.
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and moon image forth God in the material world (780f).
Zeus can be imitated by the king because he is in many of his 
manifestations a ’political' figure, as counsellor and protector of 
cities associated with Themis and Justice.46 The king in his turn 
becomes a model for others. He appears in the Life of Numa, for 
instance, providing by his life a shining example of virtue (euönÄy 
TtapadeLyyaTl H a t XayTtpto tw (Sup, 20.8) enabling the many to imitate him 
to their profit. This obviates the need for naked power as an element 
in (theoretical) monarchical rule. .
The source of the ruler's power is also, of course, God, who has 
given the ruler the charge of the rational and political swarm, and he 
can be said to have fulfilled his task if he produces 'quietness and 
tranquillity' (fiaux^0 nau T t p a o x n s )  in the people (823f). The Lives 
give us instances of this 'call'. Romulus 28.2 describes how God sent 
Romulus for a certain length of time to perform his task of founding the 
city of Rome, destined to have the greatest authority and reputation. 
Plutarch also describes Alexander the Great as having come from God as 
harmonizer and reconciler —  'God sent him forth and then summoned him 
back' (Fort. Alex. 330d) . This accords well with Plutarch's 
explanation, in his 'Advice to an Unlearned Prince', of the duties of 
the ruler, and whence these derive.
Numa is exhorted by his relations to consider kingship a service of 
God (Rum. 6.2). Such a position can be a field for, among other things, 
worship of the gods and piety (ib.) . The qualities of such 'servants of 
Zeus' are counsel, foresight, and ability in speaking (789d).
The ruler's participation in divine or semi-divine status must then 
be by this road of service. Plutarch defines clearly what it does not 
imply, and has no time for the adulation which the flatterers of 
Alexander bestowed on him and which Alexander himself encouraged (even 
though this may have been for propaganda reasons and not because he was 
himself convinced of his divinity, Alex. 27 and 28).47 The most royal
46 See 781b, 789d and 819e. Zeus either is, or is closely associated 
with, Dike and Themis.
47 'II n ’y a pas d’hommes "divins", sinon en un sens figure et second, 
il n ’y a que des hommes avises qui ont su, tels Alexandre, Numa ou
(continued over)
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and divine title is ’The Just’, and Plutarch explains that of the three 
components of divinity, immortality, power and virtue, the last is the 
most lofty and god-like, as well as being the only good belonging to the 
gods of which man too is capable (Aristid. 6.1-2).48 Plutarch does in 
fact on occasions assign immortality to man but he is careful to define 
what this means and who the recipients of this divine gift are. Only 
the soul can survive death, and Plutarch quotes Heraclitus: 'A dry soul
is best flying from the body like lightning from a cloud’. This shows 
that it must be undefiled. Virtues and the souls of good men go from 
men to heroes and heroes to daimones and ultimately attain divinity 
{Rom. 28.6-8). This cannot come about however, voyip uoAeoos, so the 
political capital to be derived from the fact is small.49
The king, then, is once more reduced to a level with all good men, 
but Plutarch's general attitude is reminiscent of Cicero's in the 
Somnium Scipionis where the ’father of his country' is given a 
particular assurance of a blessed divinity after death, although 
detachment from worldly affairs is also recommended as a way of hurrying 
in this happy state {De Rep. 6.29). The political importance of hommage
Sertorius, renforcer leur autorite en donnant ä croire qu’ils etaient 
inspires directement par la divinite, et des hommes ä l’ame sainte et 
sage, que les dieux consentent ä distinguer "du reste du troupeau”’ 
(Babut, Rlutarque et le stoicisme, p.469).
48 'Plutarch does more than express his disapproval of the ruler cult, 
for he points out what he believes the true glory of the prince to be, 
namely virtue, especially political virtue and absolute justice',
Kenneth Scott, 'Plutarch and the Ruler Cult', TAPAt 60 (1929), p.126.
And yet, 'it is it be noted that Plutarch makes outspoken criticisms of 
the self-deification of Hellenistic kings without any feeling that what 
he says might be taken as reflecting on Roman practice', Nock, C.A.H. 
vol. 10, p.489, note 2.
49 'La premiere remarque suggeree par ce texte est que Plutarque, pour
sa part, ne voit aucune contradiction entre la condamnation du culte des 
souverains et de l’espece de divinisation qu’il implique, et l’idee d’un 
cycle de transformation des ames, pouvant les faire acceder ä la 
condition divine: les mots ou voyq) tcoAews s’appliquent evidemment aux
decrets instituant les cultes imperiaux, et cette pseudo-divinisation 
est expressement opposee ä la vraie, ä celle qui se conforme ä l’ordre 
naturel' (Babut, Rlutarque et le stoicisme, p.471).
However, as Bowersock points out ('Greek Intellectuals', p.191), 
Plutarch 'is not saying that there is anything wrong with organizing 
worship of one who through virtue has become divine. It is a question 
of priorities: virtue first, then legislation'. Bowersock would not
accept Babut's claim that the cult necessarily implies 'a kind of 
divinisation' (see pp.187-8).
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rendered to the monarch was a fact of life in the Hellenistic and Roman 
Empires, but Plutarch seems unwilling to come to terms with it except as 
a recognition of human virtue, reflecting divine virtue through 
imitation and association with the gods. He does however acknowledge 
that a ruler's commerce with a deity, or a reputation for this, may win 
acceptance of his new measures by the people for whose benefit they are 
intended (see Num. 4.7-8). This, at least, shows a trace of realism in 
Plutarch's make-up.50
If full divinity is denied to a living monarch, the possession of 
divine ancestors is certainly not. Thus Alexander could claim Hercules 
as his ancestor (334d and Alex. 2). This fact does not, however, 
destroy the basis of Plutarch's approach to the question of deification. 
Service of gods and men is the only way to win elevation to more than 
human status. But, just as for Dio, only God can be the judge of the 
king, in the sense of condemning him during his lifetime.
PLINY
In the Panegyric Pliny puts forward what we may take to be the 
official view, at least for the duration of Trajan's reign, on the 
position of the king with respect to the gods. But, despite the fact 
that he has no intention of giving any sort of theory to account for 
this position, he is compelled to explain in what sense the link between 
the divine and the human worlds takes shape in the king. That even in 
the context of an official vote of thanks such details appear shows just 
how important a basis they were for the whole exposition of Trajan's 
achievements. What needs to be explained by recourse to a religious 
element is indeed the outstanding achievement, the amazing generosity, 
for hominisne istud ingenivm est3 hominis potestas3 venovave gaudia 
redintegrccre laetitiam? (61.9) .
The response to this rhetorical question involves a particularly
50 'La superstition, malgre sa nocivite, peut dans une certaine mesure 
concourir ä des fins honorables: dans les mains d’un politique avise,
eile devient un moyen de gouvernement' (Babut, Plutarque et ie
stoicisme, p.508).
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strong emphasis on the government of the Empire as a commission from the 
gods. But Pliny does not derive the proof for this, as so many of our 
writers do, from an appeal to the divine order of the world, followed by 
the conclusion that such an order should be manifested on earth through 
the rule of the emperor. Instead he argues that, 'if there were still 
doubt as to whether it was by the hazard of chance that our rulers were 
given to earth, or by some spiritual power (numen) it would now be clear 
that our princeps was divinely appointed' (1.4).
This assertion is followed by the claim that Trajan was found, not 
by the hidden power of the fates, but openly, by Jupiter himself. Such a 
conclusion that divine approval blesses the emperor was a platitude, but 
Pliny goes into the matter a little more deeply than this. In the very 
discussion of the process of royal adoption the opinion of men and the 
opinion of the gods are both together seen as resulting in the choice of 
Trajan (8.1). (We can compare Philo's account of the emergence of the 
patriarch.) The balance goes quickly to the side of divine appointment 
sibi ... gloriam M a m  di vindicaverunt: horum opus, horum M u d
imperium (8.2; cf. 10.4), although earlier he is willing to concede that 
pax et adoptio et tandem exorata terris numina dedissent (Trajan as 
ruler) (5.1).
The very force of this concept of the emperor as God's deputy over­
shadows that type of elevation where the king on earth is actually made 
to correspond to the ruler of the gods, in which case the relationship 
between the two may almost be as between equals. Pliny does nonetheless 
frequently describe the ruler's task as an imitation of that of the 
supreme god. This may be expressed as connected with his personal 
morality: quod enim praestabMus est aut pulchrius munus deorum, quam
castus et sanctus et dis s i m M i m u s  princeps? (1.3). This also extends 
more widely to the exercise of his duties; the emperor is charged with 
a duty on earth, which the gods may now leave to him without a second 
thought, devoting themselves to their own world. It is clear then that 
he is to hold power just as they did before — postquam ad te imperi 
summam, et cum omnium rerum turn etiam tui potestatem_, di transtulerunt 
(56.3). The parens mundi on whom the parens publicus is modelled is now 
free and is relieved of this part of his duties. The king henceforth 
fulfils the divine role for the whole human race (80.5). In some
244
respects Trajan appears to perform his duties too well since Pliny 
records a prayer that the gods will imitate Caesar’s behaviour! (74.5).
The 'saviour' aspect of rule plays an important part in the 
Panegyric, mostly referring to material benefits. But when Pliny uses 
the actual term salus, he refers in most cases to the ruler's own 
security: this is all that is necessary for the Empire to prosper.
Without Trajan's prospering, there is no hope for the nations. With it, 
all is assured (see 94.2; 72.1).
In the ruler's acts, there is a divine power revealed which the 
ruler himself mediates (80.3). But the emphasis on power needs to be 
balanced by another aspect of the ruler's nature, and so Pliny gives an 
account of the attainment of divine status, from the bottom up, as it 
were, as a consequence of virtue, and this involves him in an effort to 
distinguish between true and false claims to affiliation with the gods. 
It is natural that he should wish to show how much Domitian's behaviour 
failed to conform to that of the ideal monarch in his arrogant 
assumption of divine titles as in other ways. In the process, Pliny has 
to make it clear that the institution of monarchy could not of itself 
ensure divine approval, or participation in certain divine 
characteristics. What is important is the virtue which brings the 
reward of divinisation after death. Paradoxically, the very 'common­
ness' of Trajan gives him a claim to exaltation —  te ad sidera tollit 
ista communis humus et confusa principis vestigia (24.5). The ethical 
attitude accompanying it dictates the rightness or wrongness of a 
successor's deification of his predecessor: 'You have given your father
a place among the stars not to frighten the citizens, nor to insult the 
powers nor for your own honour and glory but because you believe him to 
be a god' (11.2).
Suggestions of this reward for good conduct abound (see esp. 35.4), 
and Domitian, who claimed for himself what he did not deserve, is held up 
as a horrible example of the abuse of the ruler cult. His 'divinity' 
was not merely an instance of presumption; it was a mockery because it 
was not based on human qualities as it should have been (see 24.5).
Pliny therefore announces with relief of Trajan: nusquam ut deo,
nusquam ut numini blandiamur: non enim de tyranno sed de cive3 non de
domino3 sed de parente loquimur (2.3). He wants to emphasize, instead,
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what truly is worth honouring in the emperor — dxvxnxtatem prxnc'tp'is 
nostrx3 an hwnanitatem temperantiam facilitatem, ut amor et gaudium 
tulit3 oelebrare universi solemus? (2.7). As Scott comments of both the 
Younger and the Elder Pliny, 'for both, as doubtless for all the upper 
classes of Roman society, there seems to have existed no religious 
belief in the imperial cult, and it appears to have been accepted and 
observed by them only for its theoretical and practical value as a 
political institution'.51 Even here as we have seen there were limits 
to what was acceptable. Yet there can be no doubt that Pliny was 
perfectly prepared to link the imperial government to religious 
sentiment.
ARISTIDES
For Aristides, the Roman Empire parallels the kingdom of Zeus (R.O. 
103) and just as prayers are addressed to God so they may be to the 
emperor with perfect propriety (R.O. 32). This does not make the ruler 
the equal of God, but for a citizen his presence probably makes a 
greater impact, and all the religious feelings can have him for their 
object. In the Els BaauXea too, the king is described as 'divine'
(p.98) and further on we obtain some insight into what this means when 
the king thinks it right to imitate the 'king of the universe' by 
displaying the qualities of (ptAav^ pwitta and upovota (p.107). Again we 
find that 'divinity', to some extent at least, depends on the ruler's 
moral qualities. From these late sources we can see that the same 
religious emphases are important as were so in the earlier writings on 
kingship.
CONCLUSION
None of our writers claimed without qualification that a monarch 
was a god. All found some other way of expressing the sense of the 
ruler's superiority to ordinary mortals in terms that had, at the least, 
religious associations. A ruler might be seen as the supreme god's
51 Kenneth Scott, 'The Elder and Younger Pliny on Emperor Worship', 
TARA , 63 (1932), p.165.
246
representative on earth, or at any rate in his kingdom, with the writers 
assuming perhaps that he held this position only if and so long as he 
used his powers well. This meant the ruler imitating the government of 
Zeus, assumed to be a pattern for rule as such.
The link between the divine and human worlds worked to the benefit 
of autocratic rule since, as we have seen, monarchy in heaven was 
assumed to justify and indeed demand as its counterpart monarchy on 
earth. Hence political debate about the best form of government became 
pointless. Indeed, most of our writers were more interested in setting 
up the ruler as a model for humanity, endowed with reason, and 
possessing virtues entitling him to his position. Yet they eschewed, for 
the most part, the mystical outlook which saw something of the divine in 
the monarch qua monarch. In either case, however, the actual function 
of the king — his ruling a kingdom — receded into the background.
On ne s3imagine Platon et Aristote qu3avec de grandes robes de 
pedants. C3etaient des gens honnetes et comme les autres3 riant avec 
leurs amis. Et quand its se sont divertis ä faire leurs lois et leurs 
politiques its l3ont fait en se jouant. C3etait la partie la moins 
philosophe et la moins serieuse de leur vie; la plus philosophe etait 
de vivre simplement et tranquillement.
S3ils ont ecrit de politique c3 etait comme pour regier un hopital 
de fous. Et s3ils ont fait semblant d3en parier comme d3une grande 
chose c3est qu3ils savaient que les fous ä qui ils parlaient pensaient 
etre rois et empereurs. Ils entrent dans leurs principes pour moderer 
leur folie au moins mal qu3il se peut.
Pascal, Pensees.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PHILOSOPHIC MAN AND THE KING
INTRODUCTION
When philosophers in late fifth-century Greece turned to ethics 
as a more fruitful field of study than natural philosophy,1 they began 
to bring philosophy and political theory into contact in a way that was 
to blur the boundaries between them for a long time to come. Philosophy 
in Plato's hands became a sophisticated metaphysics as well, but the 
same range of interests did not extend to all who called themselves 
philosophers. The term philosopher could in fact be used fairly widely. 
It applied for example to those giving training in the oratorical side 
of education, as Isocrates’ speeches make clear. At the same time it 
acquired associations with a retiring, withdrawn way of life, described 
most vividly by Callicles in the Gorgias:
oxav 6e öq Ttpeaßuxepov eöu) e u  (puAooocpouvxa xau yq 
aTtaAAaxxoyevov, uAqywv yoL öoxet qöq öeLo-Sau, m Ewxpaxes» 
oiüxos 6 dvqp. o yap vuvöq eAeyov, uxapytt xouxy xy avdpwTt^, 
wav navu edcpuqs ?i, dvdvöpu) yevea^au cpeuyovxt xa yeaa xqs 
uoAews xau xas ayopas, ev als ecpq 6 Ttotqxqs xous avöpas 
apuitpexeus ydyveadat, xaxaöeöuxdxu 6e xdv Aoltiov ßdov ßumvau 
yexa yetpaxewv ev ymvua xpuwv q xexxapwv (J;b-9upu4ovxa, 
eAeudepov 6e xau yeya xau uxavov yqöe'noxe cp§ey£aa§au (485d).2
A story ascribed to Pythagoras compared the life of men to the 
Greek games where some went to win glory from their prowess, some to 
make a profit, and some to see and reflect on the sights:
We notice Socrates’ denial of any expertise in natural philosophy in 
the Apology 19d.
2 Cf. Theatetus 173d: xl yap av xus xous ye (pauAws öuaxpußovxas ev
tpu Aoaocpuqi Aeyou; oöxou 6e nou ex veoov Tipmxov yev eus ayopav oux taaoi 
xqv o6dv, ouöe otou öuxaaxqpuov q ßouAeuxqpuov q xu xolvov aAAo xqs 
xdAews ouve'öpuov vdyous de xau (Jjqcpuoyaxa Aeydyeva q yeypayye'va ouxe 
opwouv ouxe axououat.
* Isocrates, as we shall see later, claimed for himself the title of 
philosopher, and would have considered Plato's activities those of a 
sophist.
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xoug yev y a p  xP^yaxoav hol, xpucpns aupeu 7io§og, xoug 6e ocpxns 
Mat nyeyovtag uyepog cpuXoveuMuaL xe Öo^oyavetg Maxe'xouotv• 
eyÄLKpLveaxaxov 6e e l v öl  xouxov av^pojuou xponov, xov 
aTtoöe^dye vov xqv xwv xaXXuaxwv dewptav, ov moil tpooovoydCeLV 
(ptXdaocpov (V.P. 58) .
How far back such notions went is difficult to determine, and it is 
still more difficult to find the first use of the actual word (poXboocpog 
which is also attributed to Pythagoras. If we adopt a conservative view 
and decline to see any contemporary basis in the stories about Thales' 
absentmindedness (see Theatetus 174a and contrast Herodotus 1.75, 170), 
or about how easily Democritus was deceived in a question of succession, 
we may at least conclude, with Jaeger, that 'toutes les anecdotes qui 
font des anciens philosophes des adeptes conscients de 1*ideal de la vie 
theoretique sortent ou bien immediatement de l’ecole platonicienne, ou 
bien sont nees sous 1*influence de 1*ideal platonicien immediatement 
apres'.3 This still places the origins of this attitude to philosophy 
back as far as the fourth century. The tradition of a belief, from 
early times on, that philosophy imposed on its practitioners a life 
removed from the public view is supported by the reference in the 
Hippias Mac or (281c):
xo noxe to aoxoov  oxo oil luxXauob cmclvol, uv ovoya xa  yeyaXa  
Xeyexau e n l  aocptqt, n tx x a x o u  xe xau Buavxog xau xwv aycpu xov 
McXpobov 0aXfjv xau cxu xrnv uaxepov ye'xpu ’AvaCayopou, wg q 
uavxeg n oil ttoXXol auxmv (pauvovxau cniexov101^ 0  ^ T^ v ttoXlxukwv 
Tipa^ toov;4
There grew up the idea that the philosopher was a remote, aloof 
figure whose very retirement and separation from others gave him an 
importance in his own eyes at least. This appears most clearly in the 
story recorded by Diogenes Laertius, on the authority of Antisthenes, of 
Heraclitus' renunciation of a kingship (D.L. 9.6). Earthly honours, 
when compared with the self-sufficient life of the philosopher, are seen 
to be unimportant. Democritus,5 in several of the fragments attributed
3 Quoted by Robert Joly, who does not accept that the roots of these 
stories go back only as far as the Platonic circle, in Le Theme 
phi'losoph'ique des genres de vie dans t3antiquite classique (Academie 
Royale de Belgique, Brussels, 1956), p.24.
4 And so 'la vie contemplative n’a un aspect politique que dans 
l’Etat ideal' (Joly, Le Theme philosophique, pp.100-101. He is 
referring to Plato here ),
E.g. in DK fr. 40, fr. 118, fr. 171, fr. 194.5
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to him, displays a similar independence, but it was in the works of 
Plato and Aristotle that the confrontation was worked out in most 
detail. Plato showed Socrates upholding a different set of values from 
those of the polis, even while determined to obey its laws. The 
individual must still bow his will to the state’s, but he may judge and 
condemn it as he does so. Never again can Anytus and his kind be 
assured of the undivided loyalty of the best men (the worst are not 
under discussion here, their loyalties being to self, and state service 
being a mere means of self-aggrandisement).
Disaffection could easily lead the philosopher to turn his 
attention away from the sordid field of politics to pursue his concerns 
in peace.6 In practice this is what happens for the most part, but in 
theory the philosopher makes no such abdication. At the very least if a 
ruler cannot be a philosopher he should take the advice of one. Such is 
the burden of Plato’s message, and it was to be repeated frequently in 
the centuries following. Such a view was based on the belief that the 
rule of men was itself a serious matter in reality and not simply in the 
opinion of the ignorant and those easily impressed by the trappings of 
power. It showed, moreover, a belief that the true definition of rule 
could come only from the philosopher — and thus that the exercise of 
rule like the pursuit of philosophy was possible for only a few select 
individuals. What else, after all, was rule but control over those who 
could not control themselves, in their own best interests? The forms of 
government which had been classified were therefore irrelevant, but 
clearly it could be taken for granted that no true government could be 
in the possession of the majority who had no philosophic ability.
These conclusions seem to warrant an intrusion of one sphere of 
life into another, which may appear unjustifiable once the original 
close relationship between the two no longer exists and the occupation 
of sage has become almost a profession. But a truly radical assault on
6 As Plato described in his Seventh Letter, esp. 325. He did also, to 
some extent, come to separate the philosophic life from that of the 
public figure in the Statesman, which, with the Sophistes and a never- 
written Philosophies, was to contribute to a trilogy on these three 
figures. For a discussion on this point, see pp.20-22 of J.B. Skemp's 
edition of The Statesman (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969 pbk. 
ed.) .
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political structures could go even further and pronounce reigning 
monarchs no true kings, since the term king could legitimately apply 
only to the man who possessed wisdom —  at which point all claims of the 
political life to significance are rejected, as previously in Plato’s 
day its claims to autonomy had been. The philosopher having drained 
political terms of their ordinary meaning substitutes for it his own and 
serenely ignores his actual lack of power. This, at least, is the 
impression the writings give us.
The fourth century, however, was an age of transition when the 
pressures of political life were still directly felt in the poleis. At 
this stage, could the essentially practical minds of Xenophon and 
Isocrates show awareness of and concern for the special position of the 
philosopher, and, if so, did this affect their political outlook, in 
particular their views on the rule of one man? The last question 
becomes increasingly important when we go from the Hellenistic Age into 
the days of the Roman Empire, and discover detailed expositions on 
monarchy together with clearly developed attitudes on the life of the 
philosopher and on the duty of the citizen-subjects to contribute to the 
life of the state.
ISOCRATES
Isocrates and Xenophon both lay claim to some expertise in 
philosophy.7 In Isocrates we find that the term philosophy possesses 
several meanings. In the Panegyricus it is a civilizing force (derived 
from the Logos) which took part in discovering and developing the
7 As H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (Mentor, New 
York, 1964), points out (p.120): ’He (i.e. Isocrates) was not a
philosopher. Nevertheless, we must not blame him for having claimed so 
constantly and so eagerly the title of cptXoaocpta, cpt Aoaocpetv, for he had A 
strict right to it: in the mouth of a fifth-century Athenian, ... these
words simply evoked in a general way the ideas of disinterested 
intellectual activity and culture; ... It remains true that there was 
nothing of the philosopher about him in the sense in which the word has 
been understood ever since Plato's time.' Cf. the comment of Mathieu,
Les Idees politiques, p.175: 'Isocrate, comme on le sait, pretend faire
de son enseignement une "philosophie", et meme, ä l ’en croire, la seule 
qui soit vraiment digne de ce nom.' Mathieu also provides a partial 
justification of this title: 'll y ’a lieu de remarquer des maintenant
que le souci qu’il a toujours d ’unir la morale et la politique trahit
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im provem en ts  b e s to w e d  by A thens  upon t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  Greek w o r l d .  I t  
was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  e d u c a t i o n  i n  a f f a i r s  o f  s t a t e  and c i v i l i z e d  
b e h a v i o u r  to  o t h e r s  ( mcxl , upog tg xas i tpa ^ e ts  nyag enauSeuae  m cx l , Ttpos 
aXXq'Xous e u p d ü v e ) ; t h a t  i s ,  i t s  s cope  was c h i e f l y  s o c i a l  and e t h i c a l  
(Paneg. 4 7 ) .
I s o c r a t e s  goes  on t o  i n c l u d e  s k i l l  i n  words as  an e l e m e n t  i n  
p h i l o s o p h y ;  i t  i s  t h i s  w h ich  yovov g£ dudvxojv xwv £okov uötov  ecpuysv 
eyov iGS,  b u t  a t  t h e  same t ime  he  p ro n o u n c e s  t h a t  good and s k i l l e d  powers 
o f  s p e e c h  a r e  beyond  th e  scope  o f  o r d i n a r y  p e o p l e  b u t  a r e  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  
o f  ’a  w e l l - o r d e r e d  m in d ’ (Paneg. 4 8 ) .  I t  i s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h a t  t h e  
w i s e  and t h e  i g n o r a n t  a r e  f u r t h e s t  a p a r t  (Paneg. 4 9 ) .  T h i s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
an e l i t i s t  view o f  the  p h i l o s o p h e r - o r a t o r  to  whom I s o c r a t e s  i s  r e f e r r i n g ,  
y e t  he does  n o t  o f  c o u r s e  e x p e c t  such a p e r s o n  to  d e p a r t  f rom t h e  
g a t h e r i n g s  o f  men. Acknowledgement o f  h i s  s u c c e s s  can come a f t e r  a l l  
o n l y  from a community,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  ’p h i l o s o p h e r '  i s  n o t  q u i t e  t h e  
e q u i v a l e n t  o f  the  o r d i n a r y  p u b l i c  f i g u r e .  At t i m e s ,  o r a t o r y  i t s e l f  
becomes t h e  same a s  a c t i o n  i n  I s o c r a t e s ’ mind ,  b u t  i n  g e n e r a l  he shows 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a n e e d  f o r  t h e  man o f  a c t i o n  as  w e l l  a s  t h e  man o f  i d e a s . * 8
P h i l o s o p h y  h a s  t o  be c a r e f u l l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from i t s  unwor thy  
c o u n t e r p a r t .  But  t h e r e  a r e  t h o s e  who c l a i m  too  much f o r  i t :
TtGTtounMaöbv wo tg 60MGÜV ayeuvov BouXeueadau Toos pa^uycCv ailpouy evous  
Tüjv uept xqv (ptXooocpuav öuaxpußdvxmv (Soph. 1 and c f .  A n tid .  266 and 
Panath. 263 on t h e  c o r r e c t  u se  o f  t h e  term).  T imotheus  i s  an i n s t a n c e  o f  
a  p u b l i c  f i g u r e  who i s  a l s o  a ’p h i l o s o p h e r ’ — x o ö x ’ ecptXoödcpGL, m o i l , xoux ’ 
Gupocxxev (A n tid . 121) — b u t  c l e a r l y  I s o c r a t e s  i s  u s i n g  th e  t e rm  v e r y  
l o o s e l y  h e r e  and w i s h i n g  s im p l y  to  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  h i s  h e r o  made t h e  r i g h t  
d e c i s i o n .
une a f f i n i t e  de p e n s e e  a vec  c e t t e  r e c h e r c h e  de l a  v e r i t e  m o ra l e  q u i
semble  a v o i r  e t e  l a  t a c h e  e s s e n t i e l l e  de l a  p r e d i c a t i o n  s o c r a t i q u e  dans
l e s  d e r n i e r e s  a n n e e s  e t  q u i  du moins e t a i t  l a  p a r t i e  de c e t t e  a c t i v i t e
q u i  i n t e r e s s a i t  l e  p l u s  g r a n d  p u b l i c '  ( p . 3 1 ) .
8 'L a  d i v i n i t e  n ’ a g i t  p a s  p e r s o n n e l l e m e n t  s u r  l a  d e s t i n e e  hum aine ,  
m ais  e i l e  i n s p i r e  c e r t a i n s  hommes q u i ,  s o i t  p a r  l a  p a r o l e ,  s o i t  p a r  
l ’ a c t i o n ,  d o i v e n t  e n t r a i n e r  t o u s  l e s  a u t r e s .  I s o c r a t e ,  p e r s u a d e  que n u l  
ne p e u t  l u i  e t r e  s u p e r i e u r  p a r  1 ’ e l o q u e n c e ,  va done c h e r c h e r  un homme 
d ’ a c t i o n ,  a p a r t i r  s u r t o u t  du moment ou l e s  f a i t s  l u i  p r o u v e n t  que l a  
p a r o l e  s e u l e  ne p e u t  s u f f i r e  ä d i r i g e r  l e s  G r e c s ' ,  M a th i e u ,  Les Id ees  
p o l i t i q u e s , p . 9 6 .
* On t h i s  
d e t a i l s ) .
p o i n t  s ee  J a e g e r ,  P aideia  I I I  p . 49 ( s e e p .2 55 n .11 be low f o r  p u b l .
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It is important, however, for philosophy and action to work 
together for the state’s benefit. The prerequisites Isocrates announces 
for acquiring the ’philosophy’ he teaches are consistent with this 
attitude. The first need is natural talent in the student as well as 
ability in the chosen field, next education to produce epistenie, and., 
thirdly, practice (Antid. 186-7). This list is geared to Isocrates' own 
aim of producing orators, and he claims that his philosophy is concerned 
with weighty matters for the benefit of all while others espouse a 
philosophy merely for profit, concerned only with conflict (cf. Het. 6).
Nothing shows the object of Isocrates’ concern more clearly than 
the frequency with which he combines philosophy and tcovos (see e.g.
Antid. 247 where the effort and the mental endeavour complement each 
other). Nicocles is described as the first person possessing a tyranny 
and wealth who undertook to philosophize and to labour (Evag. 78), i.e., 
to think and act properly. There is therefore no need to set one 
against the other, and certainly devotion to philosophy does not entail 
any abandonment of a previous way of life. Even in referring to the 
Spartans Isocrates can find matter for praise not only in their nature 
and order of life and their love of effort, but also in the truth of 
their philosophy (Panath. 260).
Experience and philosophy can indeed be taken as two sides of the 
same coin. Philosophy shows the way to go, while practice at tasks 
makes one able to deal with affairs. Philosophy therefore is the 
business of choosing the direction in which to proceed. Even writing in 
praise of a ruler like Evagoras may now itself become a philosophic 
activity, though none of those uept xqv (puAooocpuav övxes heretofore 
thought of applying their learning in this way {Evag. 8). But Isocrates
gappears to have no doubts about his correctness in doing so.
Some of Isocrates' phrases about philosophy are reminiscent of 
Plato’s. Nicocles is urged eruycAetö^au Kau xqv 4>oxhv aanetv {Evag.
80) . This involves setting a high value on (ppovqaus which is 
particularly important for those in charge of weighty matters {ib.) .
9 See e.g. Paneg. 186 where Isocrates describes how any person of 
capacity would want to ’labour and stretch their wits’ to record the 
praises of whoever will conquer Asia.
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Such c a r e  seems to  r e f e r  however  more t o  p e r s o n a l  accom pl i shm en t  t h a n  to  
r e f l e c t i o n  on u l t i m a t e  q u e s t i o n s  i n  n a t u r a l ,  e t h i c a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
p h i l o s o p h y .
In  t h e  A n tid o s is  I s o c r a t e s  d e s c r i b e s  p h i l o s o p h y  a s  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  
(ercuydAcua) d i s c o v e r e d  f o r  t h e  mind ( s e e  181,  3 0 4 ) ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  a 
s c i e n c e  which g i v e s  e x a c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  on what s h o u ld  be done .  The power 
o f  c o n j e c t u r i n g  r e s u l t s  f rom t r u e  p h i l o s o p h y  which i s  m odes t  i n  i t s  a ims 
( 2 7 1 ) .  I s o c r a t e s  t a k e s  i s s u e  w i t h  t h o s e  who t e rm  ’ s t u d e n t s  o f  
p h i l o s o p h y '  t h e  men who ' i g n o r e  p r a c t i c a l  n e e d s  and d e l i g h t  i n  the  
m e n t a l  j u g g l i n g  o f  t h e  a n c i e n t  s o p h i s t s ,  w h i l e  r e f u s i n g  t h e  t i t l e  o f  
p h i l o s o p h e r  t o  t h o s e  who p u r s u e  and p r a c t i s e  t h o s e  s t u d i e s  which  w i l l  
e n a b l e  us  to  gove rn  w i s e l y  b o t h  o u r  own h o u s e h o ld  and t h e  commonwealth,  
which  s h o u ld  be t h e  o b j e c t  o f  o u r  t o i l ,  o f  ou r  s t u d y  and o f  o u r  e v e r y  
a c t '  — itoviyreov xau cpuAoaocpriTcov xau uavxa Tipaxxeov eaxuv (A n t id . 285) .
P h i l o s o p h y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  an a p p r o p r i a t e  s t u d y  f o r  a r u l e r  {Antid.
71) and t h e  L e t t e r  t o  A l e x a n d e r ,  i f  g e n u i n e ,  p r o v i d e s  f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  
t h a t  I s o c r a t e s  h e l d  t h i s  b e l i e f  s t r o n g l y .  A l e x a n d e r  i s  r e p o r t e d  to  be 
(puAdvSpooxos xau cpuAadqvauos xau cpuAoaocpos and t h i s  l a s t  i s  expanded  i n t o  
oux dcppovms aAAa vouv eyovxms {Alex. 2) . There  i s  e ve ry  r e a s o n  to  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  cpuAdcrocpos i s  d e f i n e d  by t h i s  l a s t  p h r a s e ,  y e t  i t  i s  n o t ,  as  
we s e e ,  t h e  s p e c i a l  f u n c t i o n  o f  a r u l e r  to  be a p h i l o s o p h e r ,  as  w i t h  
P l a t o .  I t  i s  s im p ly  a u s e f u l  a c com pl i shm e n t  i f  he  can ' p h i l o s o p h i z e ' .
The d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  g i v e n  i n  t h e  B u s ir is  comes c l o s e s t  to  
d e f i n i n g  th e  e x t e n t  o f  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  — xaus 6e cpuAoaocpuas
daxpauv x a x e ö eu ^ a v ,  n xau voyodexqaau  xau xpv cpuauv xmv ovxwv ChTpaau 
öuvaxau {Bus. 2 2 ) .  T h i s  g e n e r a l  a c c o u n t  o f  p h i l o s o p h y  i n c l u d e s  t h e  
u t i l i t a r i a n  e le m e n t  as  w e l l  a s  what  we m igh t  c o n s i d e r  more c o n v e n t i o n a l ,  
' o t h e r - w o r l d l y '  a s p e c t s . 10 These  l a s t ,  however ,  have  l i t t l e  im p o r t a n c e  
h e r e  o r  e l s e w h e r e  i n  I s o c r a t e s  i n  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  o f  h i s  
r e m a r k s .
P h i l o s o p h y  f o r  I s o c r a t e s  i s  t h e  means o f  s e p a r a t i n g  t h e  c u l t u r e d  
few from the  m asses  and o f  l e a v i n g  t h e  l a t t e r  b e h i n d .  However ,  i n  t h e
10 We n o t i c e  t h a t  l a t e r  on i n  t h i s  sp e e c h  t h e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  t h e  s o c i a l  
o r d e r  o f  t h e  f e a r  i n s p i r e d  by r e l i g i o n  and ' p h i l o s o p h y '  a r e  h i g h l i g h t e d .
255
very moment of Isocrates’ proclaiming the Logos at the service of the 
political world, this world was disintegrating. But Isocrates had 
ensured that his paedeia would continue to serve the political order.11 
Since the Logos of Isocrates can be a tool for princes, and is itself 
almost a personal force, a teacher of philosophy can ensure its use by 
the monarch by transmitting this skill to him (for skill it then 
becomes).
This interpretation of government, however much it may broaden the 
scope of rule, does not present any real challenge to the state and its 
structures by offering the philosopher as an alternative ruler over 
'souls’, who alone has true claim to the title of king. The merging of 
the two functions into one still leaves the political element dominant, 
in contrast to Plato's method in the Republic, but the philosopher as 
accessory to the ruler is here sketched for the first time when 
Nicocles is told to cultivate xous 6e voöv ex0VTaS xau öuvayevous opav 
TtAeov XL xwv aAAuiv (To Nie. 53) .
Isocrates does not seriously consider metaphysical speculation to 
have a place here, except for its use as a propaideutic (Antid. 266). We 
must conclude that if Socrates had lived to see Isocrates' career 
develop, he would have been disappointed in his hopes for him as a 
philosopher (see Phaedvus 279a). Nowhere, either, do we find in 
Isocrates’ writings any appreciation of the philosopher as one who has 
opted out of society but maintains the respect of the discerning who
1 9alone can see that he represents the truest values of man.
11 This is not to deny the truth of Jaeger's comment as it applies to
the polis order: 'State and culture — which had complemented and
strengthened each other in the fifth century — were drifting further 
apart every year. Then poetry and art had transfigured the life of the 
political community. Now, philosophy and culture bitterly criticized 
it, and they were supported by many of the politically disaffected', 
Raideia, III (Blackwell, Oxford, 1947), p.154.
12 Schubart has the following interesting comment on Isocrates' role
in building up the portrait of the ideal king, which philosophers would 
later take over to produce a composite 'philosophic man-king': 'Während
Platon weniger den König als den geborenen Führer im Auge hat und sein 
Merkmal in der rechten Verbindung von Mannhaftigkeit und Besonnenheit 
findet, legt Isokrates bereits den Grund für das Königsbild, das die 
Philosophie des Hellenismus ausgestaltet und die öffentliche Meinung 
ebenso übernimmt wie ausmalt', W. Schubart, 'Das Königsbild des 
Hellenismus', Antike, 13 (1937), p.287.
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XENOPHON
Xenophon’s view of the nature of the philosopher differs just as 
much from the impression we receive of this figure in Plato as does 
Isocrates’. He too acknowledges that there is some confusion in the 
meaning of the term ’philosopher’. He records that Socrates was accused 
of the charge commonly levelled against philosophers by the masses (Mem. 
1.2.31). This was no doubt the one of trying to make the worse cause 
appear the better. Self-styled philosophers claimed that a just man 
could never become unjust (Mem. 1.2-19). What such people often 
disputed about was 'the nature of things' (Mem. 1.1.11).
Justice and wisdom, discussed in Memorabilia 3.9, might at first 
glance have little in common with each other, and indeed seem to be 
contradictory values, so that the wisdom of a philosopher needed more 
precise definition by Socrates in the Memorabilia. The understanding of 
the task of the philosopher that was generally accepted emerges clearly 
in the explanation of Euthydemus: 'I did feel confident that if I was a
student of philosophy, that would provide me with the best education in 
all things needful to one who would be a gentleman’ (Mem. 4.2.23).
There is no question here of philosophy becoming a threat to the polis 
interests of the citizen and diverting his attention from his public 
duty, no Socrates ’stargazing’ and drawing upon himself the ridicule of 
his peers. Socrates is certainly shown questioning Euthydemus' grounds 
for confidence, but he does not challenge this interpretation of the 
role of philosophy.
Xenophon, indeed, defines the general objectives of Socrates’ 
pupils in their association with him thus: They
g k clvop ouvfiaav, oux tva öriynyopLXoi. n ölxcivlxol ydvotvxo, aAA’ 
uva xaAou xe xayadot yevoyevot xau otxip xat otxdxaug xat 
ouxedotg xau (pdAoug xat TioAeo Mau toAdxaug öuvauvxo xaAwg 
XphadaL (Mem. 1.2.48).
When Socrates explains that ÖLxauoöuvq xat n aAAn u ä a a  a p e x n  oocpda cgxl 
(Mem. 3.9.5), this does not really display any incompatibility with the 
students' aims, even though the terms may here be wider than their 
utilitarian goals required. Even here it is interesting to note how 
Xenophon exhausts the content of wisdom, once he has described the
practical virtues, instead of going on from justice and the other 
virtues to wisdom, and showing how they all derive from it, as we might 
expect.
Socrates as the ideal philosopher is self-sufficient and 
independent, but Xenophon is careful not to suggest that Socrates 
approves of Aristippus’ anti-social predilection for withdrawing from 
ordinary society, rather than belonging to the class of rulers or of 
ruled (Mem. 2.1). Such a course of action is no part of his teaching 
and in view of Xenophon's accounts of the active lives of Cyrus and 
Agesilaus and of the keen interest in affairs of state depicted in the 
Hellenica and the Anabasis, we could hardly expect a portrait of 
Socrates which made him appear as an uöuog in the derogatory sense.
Those who cultivate wisdom are nonetheless an identifiable class (note 
Mem. 1.2.10 —  oi (ppovnotv aöMoövxeg) who choose persuasion rather than 
violence to effect their wishes —  but this, of course, is at the 
personal level.
The idea of the philosopher retiring from public life is far from 
Xenophon’s thoughts. If he was aware that popular conceptions of the 
wise man tended to portray him as a recluse shunning the company of the 
agora (see Gorgias 485d above) he does not refer to such a view. He 
does, however, show that Socrates' life could appear to some such as 
Antiphon to be evidence that the philosopher did not become happier than 
other men, as one might expect of those who studied how to be virtuous 
(Mem. 1.6.2).13
The deliberate choice of a particular way of life engages 
Xenophon's interest as a topic only when he introduces the tale of 
Prodicus about Hercules’ choice between the life of virtue and that of 
vice, and this is not really the same as choosing or rejecting the 
philosophic life (see Mem. 2.1.21-34). The philosopher is therefore no 
threat to the importance of public life, for he is fitted into the city-
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13 Ewxpaxes, eyw yev cjüyriv xoug (pcAoaocpoüvxas euöauyoveoxdpoug 
Xpnvau yLyveo^au* oü 6e yoL öoxeug xävavu'a xhs (puAoaotptas axoAeAauxevaL. 
Crig yoöv oüxwg dg ou6’ av eug öoöAog üito öeaxdxi^ öuaLXwyevog yecveue.
See too Mem. 1.6.15 for the criticism Xenophon records, but does not 
accept, that Socrates took no part in state affairs.
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state without any difficulty. Only the triumph of his ideas in the 
political arena is lacking, and meanwhile the legendary Cyrus can 
provide a sketch of a sovereign who 'ressemble souvent a un philosophe 
couronne'.14
Isocrates and Xenophon have different concerns in their writing, 
but for both philosophy is defined in practical and political terms:
Leur eloignement pour les grandes theories metaphysiques, leur 
souci de morale pratique et de bonheur parfois terre ä terre 
en faisaient des esprits qui tout naturellement devaient se 
rencontrer sur certains points.15
ARISTEAS
Aristeas spends little time in the Letter analysing the nature of 
philosophy or the ruler’s relation to it. Indeed, a direct reference to 
it occurs only once (256) where the definition of philosophy stresses 
its practical implications. Philosophy is
to xctAws öuaXoyLCtadau t p o s  e x a a i o v  twv a u y3aLVovxa)V, ... xau
yq cxcpdpea^aL xaCs o p y a t s .
Learning these skills, the Jewish sage adds, comes from praying to 
God. Nothing is said of any course of study and there is no connection 
made between the king's particular role and his duty to acquire 
knowledge himself or obtain advice from those of his friends who may be 
called philosophers. Nevertheless we must not forget that the setting, 
with the king questioning a number of wise men to obtain their opinions 
on various topics, is a commonplace of the Greek philosophic tradition. 
The legendary confrontation of Alexander the Great and Diogenes could 
serve as a model.16
14 Jean Luccioni, Xenophon et Ze socratisme (Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris, 1953), pp.155-6.
15 Mathieu, Les Idees poZitiques, p.185.
16 See too Tarn’s analysis of the tradition of the 'advice to the 
king' in ancient literature, and especially his comparison of the Letter 
to Aristeas and the Pali Milinda, in the excursus to The Greeks in 
Bactria and India (2nd ed., University Press, Cambridge, 1951).
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To claim that Aristeas conceives of Judaism as mainly Greek 
philosophy with the addition of the belief in the one God17 is reason­
able so long as we broaden our definition of philosophy here to include 
moral commonplaces. The actual impacts of the counsel given here is not 
described since the narrator has to assume that Ptolemy already 
possesses all the characteristics desirable in a monarch. The advice 
given in no way compromises his position, nor is there any suggestion 
that the wise man is the true king. Rather the king himself is wise18 
and is likely to become still more so by his good sense in heeding 
judicious recommendations.
HELLENISTIC ATTITUDES
In both Epicurean and Stoic thought, the philosopher is a clearly- 
defined figure who is the chief object of attention in any ethical 
treatise. For he is the one who, alone among men, is able to reach the 
standards required of the true man, that is, the wise man. Both schools 
of thought gained many adherents in the Hellenistic Age, and so their 
views on the philosopher and on his relations to society and the state 
cannot be neglected, despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence from 
this time.
Epicureanism dealt a severe blow to the integration of the 
philosopher into the community when it proclaimed that community to be 
held together simply by mutual need and fear (see D.L. 143 = KD 14, D.L. 
150 = KD 31 and 33) and drew the wise man away from involvement in state 
affairs. Political life came a very poor second after personal life.
As Voelke interprets the Epicurean attitude,
un homme sain d’esprit ne s’occupera pas des choses de l’Etat, 
il preferera mener une vie oisrve! ...,La vie politique ruine 
completement le bonheur! ...,Que les ambitieux se donnent tout
As Victor Tcherikover asserts in Hellenistic Civilization and the 
Jews, p.351.
18 Jewish wisdom literature could have given some warrant for this 
view. The Book of Wisdom, itself heavily influenced by Greek ideas, 
gives (7.25) a definition of wisdom which, as L. Delatte remarks {Les 
Tvaites , p.206), 'reunit les qualites qu’Ecphante attribue ä la royaute 
et au roi', and this wisdom kings should acquire.
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le mal qu’ils veulent et se creent tous les tracas possibles,
le sage sait que la couronne de l’ataraxie surpasse en valeur
1 9toutes les dominations!
Put positively, this becomes the famous injunction \a%£ ßtwoac;!
We cannot therefore expect to find in the writings of the 
Epicureans any information on how to live in society, where society is 
the city-state or a larger entity. They could give no support or 
encouragement to anyone with political inclinations or a wish to reform 
public life, nor could the particular form of government be of concern 
to them, when all forms were alike irrelevant to the sage. The only 
outstanding individual with whom he was concerned was the figure of the 
wise man, so the problems of the king would be meaningless to one living 
his life as he ought.
The Stoic viewpoint is far less dogmatically condemnatory, 
the view of the social life of man developed in the doctrine of 
olmclwols gives the widest possible scope to the social impulses 
such impulses are here harnessed to the universal society of the
II n ’y a done plus ni sphere de l’individuel ni sphere du
social independantes de la sphere du cosmique: tous ces
domaines se recouvrent.20
As well, the Stoics no less than the Epicureans had their gaze for the 
most part fixed on the sage and hence while 'l’opposition entre le sage 
et 1*insense est sans doute une des donnees les plus traditionnelles de 
la pensee grecque' yet ’avec le Portique eile est poussee ä l’extreme et 
revet presque le caractere theologique d’une opposition entre elus et 
reprouves' • 2 1
Still, because society is an indispensable prerequisite for the full 
development of the human faculties, the sage must himself be part of a
Indeed
— but 
cosmos:
19 Andre-Jean Voelke, Les Rapports avec autrui dans la philosophie 
grecque (Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1961), p.88.
20 Tb., p.116. This however implies, as Emile Brehier has pointed out
(Chrysippe et l*ancten storcisme [2nd ed., Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris, 1951], p.263), that 'cette cite ideale (of the sage) est 
dejä realisee d’une faqon aussi parfaite que possible: le monde pris
dans son ensemble est cette cite dont les dieux et les hommes sont les 
citoyens, et dont Zeus est la loi eternelle'.
21 Voelke, Les Rapports, p.128.
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society which in one case (in Zeno’s Republic) consists only of an elite 
who are the sole possessors of all the necessary virtues because of 
their share in the Logos. The good man (philosopher) can be described 
as among other things BoiolAuho's xt xaL axpaxriYLMos wau tioAutuxos nal 
olmovojjlmos xai xpnyaxcGTLMo's, while the base anavxa xouxous evavxua 
e'xEtv (SVF 1.216). There are, that is to say, two kinds of men (ib.) . 
Clearly here the philosophers are envisaged as being at the head of a 
society composed of both the good and the bad, i.e. the wise and the 
unwise, where rulers are chosen by the same criteria as are applied to 
determine the wise man. Yet other accounts suggest that the non-wise is 
unable to perform even the duties of a subject satisfactorily (see SVF 
3.615). But this clearly poses a dilemma for it means that
un bon nombre des vertus accumulees sur la personne du sage 
demeurent sans emploi et perdent toute signification s’il n’a 
de relations qu’avec d’autres sages. A quoi bon en effet etre 
legislateur, roi, juge, general, pedagogue, dans une cite 
uniquement formee de sages, c*est-a-dire d’etres qui d’eux- 
memes et en toute circonstance agissent selon la droite 
raison? ... C’est done ä une impasse qu’aboutit cette volonte 
de detacher absolument le sage du reste de l’humanite!
Yet the very claim of the sage to be king over others was in a sense 
itself an anti-political statement, for it presented a challenge to 
actual rulers and proclaimed that the possession of power could be 
justified only on grounds which were foreign to political considerations.
When a Stoic had before him the ideal philosopher as a pattern of 
individual perfection he could not but describe the king as he saw him 
after the same fashion, since the sage was of course the true king. The 
Stoic delight in paradox meant that politics was sometimes included in 
those matters of no account. It is not always easy to decide whether 
any particular statement is referring simply to a political situation in 
a vacuum or whether its author is claiming the right to make judgements 
on actual kings, and theoretically to depose the unworthy on the basis 
of their lack of wisdom.
22 Voelke, Les Rapports, p.131.
See the comment of H.C. Baldry in The Unity of Mankind in Greek 
Thought, p.158: ’Zeno rejected this belief that those whose souls are
not governed by reason could be free from strife, and regarded inclusion 
of the unwise, even with inferior status, as impossible.’ Note, too, his 
conclusions in ’Zeno’s Ideal State’, pp,3-15, especially the argument 
drawn from D.L. 7.33.
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Writers of the Middle Stoa appear to have been less concerned with 
describing a model kingdom than were their predecessors. They attempted 
to deal with the actual situation and their most outstanding 
representatives, Panaetius and Posidonius, gave advice to Roman 
politicians of the Republic. Hence their writings showed fewer signs of 
preoccupation with monarchical government. They were still concerned, 
however, with the figure of the sage, and could not avoid discussing his 
role.
Retirement from public life, which was to become such a contentious 
issue for Stoics of the Roman Empire, assumed a significance also in 
Stoics from Chrysippus onwards. Perhaps the most that we can say of the 
latter’s theoretical preferences (as distinct from his behaviour in 
practice) is that
Chrysippe insiste plus que ses preddcesseurs stoiciens sur la
contemplation: simple preference personnelle d’ailleurs qui
2. 3ne pouvait modifier la doctrine officielle de la vie mixte.
Indeed there is evidence that the Stoa had a reputation for 
encouraging participation in public life. Diogenes Laertius notes 
(7.123): aXXa pnv o ü ö ’ cv epnp tq i ,  (paou, (i.e., the Stoics) BLcoaexau 6
OTtouöaCos* holvwvlhos yap cpuoer xau upaxTLMo's. But even by the time of 
Chrysippus the actual situation of non-involvement must have made an 
impression on the theory, which had always, from its Cynic derivation, 
contained elements favouring detachment and autarchy (note the ambiguity 
of D.L. 7.121), so that Plutarch could attack the Stoics by taunting 
them with the words of Chrysippus: xov (ppovppov xau a x p a y p o v a  e£ vau  xau
o l u y o r p a y p o v a , xau xa  auxoö  ixpdxxeuv {Stoic. Repug. 1043b = SVF 3.703). 
And yet what this actually implies is of course by no means clear, and
2 4even Plutarch's remarks after this show another side to their views.
23 Joly, Le Theme philosophique, pp.145-6.
24 The diversity of opinions on Stoic attitudes to politics is well 
reflected in the quotations below:
’Les Stoiciens n ’ont pas repris l’attitude cynique militante ä l’egard 
des communautes politiques; ils se resignent ä 1’existence des 
nombreuses conventions, mais tachent d’en rester personnellement exempt 
autant que possible', Modestus van Straaten, Panetius: sa vieses
ecrits et sa doctrine avec une edition des fragments (H.J. Paris, 
Amsterdam, 1946), p.204, note 2.
'Par la (the examples of Stoic advisers to monarchsX on voit qu’il 
n ’est pas possible de souscrire sans reserve au jugement severe de
But such a tendency, at the very least, provided no impediment to the 
emergence of the completely self-sufficient sage.
The influence of PytJiagorean theory on the development of the 
philosopher as an identifiable type, set apart from others, is of great 
significance, however much of the record on this point we may ascribe to 
later reconstruction and the false attribution of fifth-century ideas to 
the mythical figure that Pythagoras had become. There is a strong 
tradition that Pythagoras or at least his school was responsible for 
making the name cpuAdaocpos the one applied thereafter to those striving 
after wisdom, but not arrogant enough to claim the title of aocpos with 
its overtones of divinity (see V.P. 58-9) . The philosopher as spectator 
of truth (see D.L. 8.8) is separated off from those eager for fame and 
fortune — and hence, we may assume, from those who participate in public 
life. Thus Plato says that the successors of Pythagoras exu xau vuv 
nudayo'pebov xpoitov eitovopd^ovieg t o D 8 c o u  duacpavecs tit) öomoöglv e£vau tv 
t o Cs aAAous (Pep. 600b).
Later Pythagorean (or neo-Pythagorean) writers maintained much of 
this tradition even in their works on political themes. Sthenidas in 
his treatise on kingship lays it down that the king must be wise even 
though his wisdom is not the true wisdom of the first god, but rather an 
CTtucrrdpa (p.271). The line of thought here seems to be that the wise 
man and the king both reflect and serve god on earth — hence their 
assimilation into one person is only natural. For Ecphantus vous is the 
pre-condition for euMooyua and Tct^ us in the universe, while 
correspondingly the cppovaacs of the king enables him to possess the 
virtues (p . 279) .
Here the king because of his cosmic role, does not precisely with-
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Plutarque, qui fait grief aux fondateurs du Portique de s’etre abstenus 
de toute politique active, ou ä celui des auteurs modernes qui leur 
reprochent leur conservatisme ou la "resignation fataliste" avec 
laquelle ils acceptent toutes les formes de gouvernement’, Voelke, Les 
Rapports, p.138.
It is easy, by concentrating on particular statements of Stoic 
doctrine, to form quite a different impression of its political 
philosophy from that reached by selecting others concerned with a 
different aspect. No final conclusion can be reached, but we must be 
careful to assess all statements in their contexts, especially those of 
a hostile witness such as Plutarch.
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draw — a contemplative figure — from the strife of life, but he comes to 
occupy an isolated peak between God and mankind, since his influence 
upon his subjects does not come so much from positive action on his part 
as from imitation of him by those below.
CICERO
At one level Cicero is not an obvious candidate as spokesman for 
the isolated philosophic individual. In his speeches, naturally enough, 
he praises the practical man of affairs for whom philosophy and its 
practitioners may be useful butts for point-scoring humour — for example, 
in the Pro Murena (60-63) where he mocks the Stoics. Occasionally, 
however, in an atypical speech like the Pro Arohia, he deems it wise to 
show philosophy and cultural endeavour in general in a more favourable 
light.25
Cicero's theoretical writings are of course a different matter, and 
in them he deals with philosophy as if it affected life seriously, 
though it is the ethical aspect of it to which he attaches most 
importance. Here the figure of the philosopher is ambiguous, 
particularly when put beside the public figure in the works where both 
make claims to supremacy. On the positive side, Cicero is willing to 
bestow on Plato the title of princeps (De Rep. 2.21) and can describe 
wisdom as prinoeps omnium virtutum (De Off. 1.153). He defines 
philosophy, after a rhetorical outburst in praise of it (quid enim est3 
per deos3 optabilius sapientia3 quid praestantius3 quid homini ... 
melius3 quid homine dignius?), as rerum divinarum et humcmarum 
causarumque3 quibus eae res oontinentur3 scientia (De Off. 2.5).26
Despite this, Cicero's most common attitude is that expressed at
25 E.g. Pro Arohia 2: Ornnes artes3 quae ad humanitatem pertinent3
habent quoddam commune vinculum et quasi cognatione quadam inter se 
continentur.
26 Cf .De Fin. 5.7: Ex eorum (i.e. the philosophers) enim scriptis et
institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis3 orrmis historia3 omnis sermo 
elegans sumi potest3 turn varietas est tanta artium ut nemo sine eo 
instrumento ad ullum rem illustriorem satis omatus possit accedere. Ah 
his oratores3 ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes 
exstiterunt.
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the beginning of the De Republioa’ nihil ... dicitur a philosophise 
quod quidem veote honesteque dioatur, quod {non) ab iis partum 
confirmatumque sit3 a quibus civitatibus iura discripta sunt {De Rep. 
1.2). So philosophers when compared with statesmen are of only moderate 
value but may take some credit to themselves if they put forward 
proposals for others to carry out — since they have investigated and 
written so much about the state, and have therefore performed some 
service for it {De Rep. 1.12).27
This still leaves philosophers-in a fairly humble position. Only 
when they emerge with claims to counter those of the statesman could 
they be considered a threat to the political values of Rome. There is a 
suggestion of such a threat in De Republioa, Book One, where Scipio 
describes those who claim all as their own not by the law of the 
Quirites but by that of the wise {De Rep. 1.27). Indeed only by the 
test of humanitatis antes are men shown to be truly worth the name of 
men {De Rep. 1.28) .28
Cicero is willing to admit that ideally sapientia governs the 
state, making it irrelevant whether just one man or several actually 
possess power {De Rep. 1.52) and in the De Legibus he claims sapientia 
as the mother of all good things when he derives it from the eternal law 
and shows its part in developing the moral sense {De Leg. 1.58 and end 
of 59). Yet the qualities that here seem particularly the property of 
philosophy and its adherents are the very ones that elsewhere he 
requires of the statesman in a greater degree, that is, magnificentia 
et despicientia rerum humanarum {De Off. 1.72)^  and the political claims 
put forward by the spokesman of the Stoics for the sapiens in the De 
Finibus 3.75 should not be accepted as Cicero's own, though the right to 
the title of rex, he might have agreed, should rather go to the wise man
27 As Cicero puts the value of both ways of acting in De Off. 1.19, 
Virtutis ... laus ommis in actione consistit, a qua tarnen fit 
intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; ... Orrmis autem 
cogitatio motusque animi aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et 
pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum aut in studiis scientiae 
cognitionisque versabitur.
28 Cf. De Fin. 5.11; Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis 
(i.e. the Peripatetics) plaouit quieta in contemplatione et cognitione 
posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est 
dignissima.
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than to Tarquin who neque suos mores regere poterat neque suorum 
libidines (De Rep. 2.45).
But it is particularly about the challenge of the life of the full­
time philosopher, the life of retirement from public affairs, that 
Cicero has most to say. Any yielding to the temptation to embrace this 
life meant acknowledging the failure of political involvement to satisfy 
the needs of man; it was even an admission that man's social side might 
have to take second place to his intellectual interests. It is doubtful 
if a political theory worked out by one holding this view consistently 
would be anything but an expression of the philosophical predilection 
for the rule of the best, that is, the rule of the wise. We should not 
expect to find in it any analysis of the structure of society, or any 
apprehension of a king's duties beyond those that came within the ken of 
the philosopher himself.
Cicero was well aware that the 1choice-of-life’ question had been 
thoroughly canvassed before his day, and that not only the Epicureans 
had espoused the life of retirement. Theophrastus could also be cited 
as a more respectable example — and he, we note, had written more than 
one Tiepu B a a t A e t a g .29 Cicero of course deplores retirement that has 
self-indulgence as its aim, but at least men who left politics for this 
reason were not likely to be of the calibre to contribute much to the 
state in any case. He is primarily concerned lest true philosophers 
(like himself) may fail, through retirement, to use talents which could 
be of considerable benefit to the community. The rights of people of 
different temperaments to different ways of life he acknowledges, to the 
extent of conceding that exemption from public service may be granted on 
account of ill-health or for some grave reason (De Off. 1.71).
Yet Cicero rates the absolute claim of the state highly just as 
Plato shows Socrates deferring to the city's laws in the Crzto. One 
must give a return to one’s country for existence and education, with 
the greater share of one's most important powers of mind, ability and 
wisdom (De Rep. 1.8). The despised alternative is described here as 
otium though Cicero also uses this word for the well-earned rest from 
public endeavour, or for an abstention from public activity that may, in
2 9 See D.L. 5.42 and 5.49.
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3 0some instances, be blameworthy. Cicero also decries the division of 
life into completely separate spheres which had meant that since the 
time of Socrates philosophers had taken to themselves the right to 
expound on both good living and good speaking, which formerly had been 
held by such public figures as Pericles, Themistocles and Theramenes or 
by orators like Gorgias and Isocrates.31 The orator and the public 
figure almost merge in Cicero's account since the former may profoundly 
influence policy.
One form taken by Cicero’s campaign to retain men in public life 
was the investigation he made into the sometimes conflicting demands of 
otium and dignitas especially in the Pro Sestio. What he wished to 
achieve was a compromise, and the danger lay, he felt, in the tardiness 
of honest men in coming to the defence of the state, through their wish 
to enjoy otium even without dignitas.32 Fear of the same response 
dictated his introductory justification of participation in public 
affairs in the De Republica: Quae (disputatio de re publica) ne frustra
haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere 
(De Rep. 1.12). Circumstances on occasion made him more sympathetic to 
such a point of view, as his letters show,33 and as a certain weakening
30 See especially 'Cum dignitate otium', REA, 43 (1941), 172-91, by 
Pierre Boyance.
31 See De Orat. 3.59-60. Socrates hoc commune nomen (of philosophy) 
eripuit sapienterque sentiendi et ornate dicendi scientiam3 re 
cohaerentes_, disputationibus suis separavit (60) .
32 Whether the otium of the Pro Sestio is to be taken as a private
or a public state has been a matter of much dispute. See, on this, 
besides the article by Boyance mentioned above, 'Cicero’s Cum Dignitate 
Otium: A Reconsideration1, JRS t 44 (1954), 1-13, by Charles Wirszubski.
His contention is that ’there can be no doubt that he [Cicero] thinks of 
cum dignitate otium primarily in terms of the tranquillity of all and 
the dignity of the "best"' (p.9). It is useful, however, to consider 
the conclusion of Manfred Fuhrmann, 'Cum dignitate otium', Gymnasium, 67 
(1960), p.497* 'Ein Vergleich der Sestiana mit der Schrift über den 
Staat, eine Betrachtung der Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede beider 
Werke lehrt, dass Cicero nicht so sehr eine schroffe Wendung von der 
Politik zur Philosophie, insbesondere zur griechischen Staatsphilosophie, 
vollzogen als vielmehr seine eigenen, durch die Reden der Jahre 63 und
58 dokumentierten politischen Konzeptionen durch die Einkleidung in ein
philosophisches Gewand umgebildet und erweitert hat. Politisches 
Programm und philosophische Utopie sind bei ihm nur durch eine schmale 
Grenze voneinander getrennt'. See also Jean-Marie Andre, IS Otium dans 
la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine (Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris, 1966), pp.295-304 and Lepore, II princeps, pp.144-54.
33 Et pevexeov ev xp TiaxpuÖL xupavvoupevns auxfis.  El navxL updiKp
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of his resolution evident in the De Officiis confirms.34
Exceptional talent for doctrina may justify a claim for exemption 
from public life (De Off. 1.71) and otium may even be used in the 
service of the state, since Plato and many others in their retirement 
taught people to be better citizens, more useful to their countries (De 
Off. 1.155). Cicero even suggests that nobilissimi philosophy longeque 
principes and men severi et graves might justifiably retire, when nec 
populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt (De Off. 1.69)35 — a clear 
reference to his own situation in 44 B.C., though in the De Republica he 
had claimed (1.9) that such a course of withdrawal meant ignoring the 
fact that there is no better reason for going into public life than to 
avoid obeying wicked men. There is no doubt, however, that Cicero still 
values the life of the statesman more highly (it is fructuosior et 
aptior — i.e. for fame) than the philosophic (which is facilior et 
tutior, De Off. 1.70) and Joly is justified in asserting: 'Quand il
etudie la question pour elle-meme, la position de Ciceron est 
extremement ferme et precise: il opte sans hesitation pour la vie
politique.'3 6
Abstention could be justified then only in specific instances on a 
temporary basis.37 Even at the end of Cicero's life, he showed no clear
Tupavvuöog xaxdXuauv npayyax eu xe ov , xav yeXXq 6ua xoüxo nepu xuiv oXwv q 
TtdXus KLV Öu ve ua eu v . E l, eüXaßqxeov xov xaxaXuovxa yq auxos aCpqxaL. E l, 
Tteupaxeov apqyecv xij naxpuöt xupavvouyevq xauptjj xau Xo'ycp yäXXov q 
TioXey^). E l, tloX l x l x o v  x o qauxctCeuv avaxwpq'aavxa tlol xqg naxpuöos 
xupavvouyevqg q 6ta navxos uxeov x l v ö u v o u  xqs eXeu^eptas tdpu (Ad. Att. 
9.4.2): these are the questions he considers.
34 Referring to De Off. 1.71, E. de St. Denis comments: ’Qui ne voit
1’importance de cette concession, et l’abime qui separe les deux theses, 
celle du De Re publica et celle du De Officiisl' (La Theorie 
ciceronienne de la participation aux affaires publiquesT, RPh, 12 (1938), 
p.195. He concludes (p.213): 'La formule du philosophe a change, parce 
que la situation politique de l’homme a change.'
35 A. Grilli, Il problema della, vita contemplativa nel mondo greco- 
romano (Fratelli Bocca, Milan-Rome, 1953), p.121, note 3, believes 
Cicero does not intend his comments here and in 1. 70 to indicate 
sarcasm, as Max Pohlenz (Antikes Fühl.1 er1 turn) believes (pp.46-7).
Grilli's argument here seems the more convincing.
36 Joly, Le Theme philosophique, p.162.
37 'Rien ne permit ... d’affirmer que, pour l'auteur du De Republica,
la vie contemplative soit un bien autonome: meme le ... haec caelestia
semper spectator ilia humana contemnito ne peut s*entendre que de celui
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awareness that the way of the 'political manj as he conceived it, was 
henceworth to be blocked, and could be enjoyed only vicariously by 
philosophers describing what they took to be kingship. Yet for him, as 
a Roman, to have gone as far as he did in pointing out the worth of 
philosophy and the philosopher was significant, and probably made the 
'abdication' of later Roman writers easier.
PHILO
Many of the definitions of the wise man to be found in the 
appropriate sections of Von Arnim's Stoicorum Vetevwn Fragmenta are 
derived from Philo, and we may well consider him in his attitude to the 
philosopher to be in the line of those Stoics who had devoted much 
attention to the individual as a sage. We should note that Philo's work 
displays two attitudes which appear throughout his writings in different 
contexts, one evincing great concern for the theory of the Law and its 
interpretation and explanation, the other taking account both of social 
structure in a general sense and of the contemporary political 
situation.
The unavoidable fact of the Empire and the emperor set a limit to 
what could be expected realistically for society, as well as providing 
some sort of touchstone when discussion on government occurred. The 
wise man appears both in contexts where individual needs are being 
stressed and also where Philo's concern is the society at large, and 
clearly this figure provides a challenge to that political choice based 
on the belief that life can best be lived and improved by an ordered and 
organized existence in a community under a political leader or leaders. 
And here too we must be aware that some of Philo's responses may be 
derived just as much from his Jewish inheritance as from the Hellenistic 
environment.
Philosophy for Philo is that way of viewing the world which was 
expounded most coherently by Moses who had attained the very summit of
qui a pleinement satisfait, sur terre, aux obligations de la virtus' , 
Jean-Marie Andre, L3Otiwn dans la vie morale et intelleetuelle romaine , 
p.313.
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p h i l o s o p h y  and had been  d i v i n e l y  i n s t r u c t e d  i n  t h e  g r e a t e r  and most  
e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  n a t u r e ’ s l o r e  (Opif.  8 ) .  By t h i s  p h i l o s o p h y ,  man 
becomes im m or ta l  (Opif.  77) and on t h i s  he p o n d e r s  e v e ry  s e v e n t h  day 
(Opif. 1 2 8 ) .  D e s p i t e  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  much o f  t h i s  to  n o n - J e w is h  
a c c o u n t s  o f  p h i l o s o p h y ,  P h i l o  l i m i t s  h i s  d i s c o u r s e s  to  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  a 
t e x t  i n  l i n e  w i t h  c u r r e n t  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h i n k i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e v e l o p i n g  
an  argument  coming from u n s u p p o r t e d  r e a s o n  o r  f rom a P l a t o n i c  m y s t i c a l  
p e r c e p t i o n .  Th is  ' p h i l o s o p h e r '  must  a l s o  t h e n  be d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e  
o f  t h e  G e n t i l e s .  Moses,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i s  t h e  c h i e f  exem pla r  f o r  J e w i sh  
p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  and p r o v e s ,  to  P h i l o ' s  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  t h a t  P l a t o ' s  remark  
t h a t  good government  c o u ld  come a b o u t  o n ly  when k i n g s  were p h i l o s o p h e r s  
o r  p h i l o s o p h e r s  k i n g s  was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t r u e  (Vit .  Mos. 2 . 2 ) .
The a t t i t u d e  to  wisdom o f  t h e  Book o f  P r o v e r b s :  ’Apyh oocptas cpoßos
Kupuou ( 1 .7 )  i s  one t h a t  no Greek  would a d o p t .  The c o n f i d e n c e  t h a t  
power and wisdom go t o g e t h e r ,  found i n  P r o v e r b s  8 . 1 5 ,  where wisdom s a y s  
ö t  cyoö ßaoLÄeis BaouAeuouau, xau ou ö u v a o i a i  'ypatpouaL öuxauoouvriv i s  
c o u n t e r e d  by t h e  pe s s im ism  o f  E c c l e s i a s t e s  9 . 1 6 :  aya§n oocpua u t e p
S u v a y u v  xau oocpua xou itevrvroc; e^ouöevwyevri. We need  to  remember t h a t  
P h i l o  worked w i t h i n  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n . 38
Using  Moses a s  an  example o f  a p h i l o s o p h e r  k i n g  does n o t  o f  i t s e l f  
c o n s t i t u t e  an a t t a c k  on p o l i t i c a l  v a l u e s ,  b u t  shows P h i l o  t r y i n g  to  
r e c o n c i l e  p u b l i c  l i f e  and c o n t e m p l a t i o n .  A s i m i l a r  c o n n e c t i o n  i s  made 
f o r  Abraham b u t  h e r e  h i s  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  as  oocpos seem to  e n s u r e  t h a t  he 
w i l l  a l s o  p o s s e s s  t h o s e  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l s  which make him head  o f  t h e  
human r a c e
dos Mußepvruns  pev  iv  vyu apywv 6 ’ ev tioAs u , o i p a x y y o s  6* ev
TioXeya), nau cjjt>xh y t v  cv amyaxu,  voüs 6 ’ ev c|>ux9 (Abv. 272 ) .
These a r e  o n l y  c o m p a r i s o n s ,  b u t  t h e y  endow t h e  w i s e  man w i t h  a l e a d e r ­
s h i p  n o t  o n l y  o v e r  h i m s e l f  b u t  by i m p l i c a t i o n  o v e r  o t h e r s  t o o .  P h i l o  i n  
e f f e c t  th rows  down th e  c h a l l e n g e  to  a u t h o r i t y :  ' i n  t r u t h  t h e  w i s e  man
i s  f i r s t  among m ank ind '  ( ib. )  b u t  e l s e w h e r e  he does  no t  s im p ly  o f f e r  a 
new ty p e  o f  k i n g .  I n  t h e  De nominum mutatione , he  a s s e r t s :  Hat  yap
38 But  n o t e  a l s o  Wisdom 6 . 2 0 - 2 1 :  ETiuduyua äpa  aocpuas a v a y c t  euu
ßaouÄxtav.  e i  o5v n öeade e m  §povous Mai, OMyitTpoLS, TUpavvot Xamv, 
Tuyqaa ie  aocpuav, "va t u s  tov aiw va  ßaauXeuopTe, and 24 .’iXfidos 6e oocpwv 
aoiTypua Ko'ayou, nai BaatXeus cppovuyos e u a x a ^ e t a  öyyou.
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ovto>s 6 yev (ppdvtyog nyeywv ouppdvwv eoxiv ttöwg a xPh touetv xe Mai a yn 
(153, and cf. Virt. 186).39
The content of the wise man’s wisdom is explained in Vit. Mos. 1.29, 
’he displayed the dogmas of philosophy through his daily deeds, saying 
what he thought and acting in a way consistent with his words in a 
harmony of reason and life’.40 In other words, the philosopher here is 
not simply a theorist.
However, Philo is not inflexible on this point; in the division 
between the learning of the philosopher and earthly learning the former 
appears as the commandment of the 'father', right reason, which pursues 
truth, while the latter is the mother or education, concerned with 
obeying the conventional laws established in cities, peoples and 
countries by those who have looked for appearance rather than truth 
(Ebr. 34). Here a mixture of the two is recommended. Yet later on in 
the same work, Philo extends the field of the sage's action to include 
the political life: 'When his power deals with the amelioration of
human ways of behaviour it becomes ethics ... which ... as political 
science deals with the life of the city, ... as the science of royal 
power with the government of men, as legislative power with commands and 
prohibitions.' So that the sage now appears as one who has numerous 
titles and names (Ebr. 91-2) but 'in all these he will be seen to have 
one and the same shape' (Ebr. 92).
The wise and good man may therefore claim to possess true kingship. 
That this is kingship in a metaphorical sense is shown most clearly by 
the description of the first man as possessing wisdom and kingship; his 
wisdom derived from the fact that he had been taught by wisdom's own 
lips, for he was made by divine hands. 'He was moreover a king, and it 
befits a ruler to bestow titles on his several subordinates' (here of 
course the animal world — Opif. 148). The royal way frequently referred 
to belongs to the only true King and this way is wisdom (Imrrrut. 159-60) . 
Here the view is strictly religious and the Stoic sage is far away. The
39 So too he says of the man with God for his leader, i.e. the wise 
man, Max’ eypv 6t ötavouav Mai xwv aAAwv nyeymv, tTCLxexpayyevog xa 
rceptyeta, oSa yeydAou ßaouXews, dvqxos adavdxou, öudöoxog (Prob. 20).
40 And after listing the good man's virtues, Philo can comment uv xtg 
n tiXouxos tTtd^Log fj BaotXetas Mai öuvaoxeuag kxpols wtpeAuywxepa; (Abr. 
24) .
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wise man does not inherit a royal title but acknowledges God as king.
This in its own way also denies the significance of earthly kingship.
Philo, however, also makes frequent use of the Stoic adage that the 
wise man is king in its simple straightforward form. The kingship of 
Saul (that is, actual rule) cannot come into effect until the king has 
left behind the baggage of the body and can listen to the principles and 
rules of kingship — 'and we pronounce wisdom to be kingship and the wise 
man to be king' (Mig. 197). Another point about the kingship of the 
sage who possesses the four royal virtues is that this king is appointed 
not by men but by nature, the infallible, the incorruptible, the only 
free elector (Som. 2.243). Such 'kingship' is described just like 
political supreme rule, as irresponsible. Philo goes into some detail 
to emphasize the paradoxical nature of this kingship. Abraham, when 
described in the Bible as 'King from God among us' (Gen. 23.6) could not 
resemble a king in the earthly sense since his material resources were 
minimal and he was a migrant with not even a city to dwell in. His 
kingship then must have been of the mind, and so his wisdom was the 
criterion by which he was judged king (Mut. 152).
Philo does draw out a political consequence here by hinting that 
the prudent man, the brave man and so on are kings over their opposites 
(or at any rate entitled to be called so — Mut. 153). A similar 
suggestion that actual rule should be a consequence of spiritual king- 
ship appears when Philo writes that the kingdom of the sage, unlike 
other kingdoms established by wars etc., comes by the gift of God and is 
taken by the virtuous man, who brings no harm to anyone (perhaps unlike 
the king in public life?) but ensures the acquisition of good things to 
all his subjects, to whom he is the herald of peace and order (ttpqvnv 
Hat euvoqCav xaxayYEXXmv, Abr. 261). Kingship and freedom are 
associated in the sage; he alone is noble and rich, so that all earthly 
values are upset by him (Sob. 56-7). The sages are called shepherds 
because this is a title of kings — but the herd is as much the 
irrational tendencies in man, as actual people (ins otvdpcotwv arcavimv 
aXoyou cpopcts, Agr. 41).
In spite of all Philo's attempts to set up the sage as the model of 
the ruler, it is still true, as Goodenough notes, that:
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As the ideal king is a sage, every sage is essentially a king, 
since kingliness is a matter of character, not of external 
position. The kingliness of a private citizen has little 
practical importance beyond making him a complete 
individualist as over against the government.41
These claims to kingship of one sort or another are different in 
tone from the passages (e.g. in Abr. 22-3) in which Philo advocates 
retirement from public life as the best course for an honourable man to 
take. Such promptings, as well as hesitations on the advisability of 
such a step, are frequent, and introduce many of the common arguments 
for and against the move. Because the practical comes before the 
theoretical and is a sort of prelude to it, retirement should not be 
undertaken hastily (see Fug. 33), and indeed both practical and 
contemplative lives have their place {Dec. 101) . If the motive for 
withdrawing from the world is unsociability, it may even be blameworthy 
(see Immut. 17-19 and Mig. 90). It is none the less true that the soul 
of the wise man finds its fatherland in heaven and the earth is a 
foreign country (Agr. 65). The men who have retired from active life 
may still contribute towards the state’s well-being by the excellent . 
advice which they put forward {Virt. 3). But the best condition is 
clearly that of those who retire altogether, like the Essenes, who are 
'self-governing and free by nature' {Prob. 91). No earthly government 
is of any real account when compared with the monarchical rule of God, 
and they are most fortunate who acknowledge its dominion alone.
SENECA
When we come to examine Seneca's writing for evidence of his 
attitude to the philosopher, we are struck by the fact that he says so 
little about the king's duty to study philosophy and apply it to his 
rule. On the other hand he rarely avails himself of the Stoic 
expression that the wise man is king. The hints he gives of this way of 
thinking are generally vague, for example, si- vis omnia tibi subicere3 
te subice rationi3 multos reges si ratio te rexerit {Ep. 37.4). The 
idea, however, occurs much more frequently.
41 Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, p.91.
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What we do find is that in Book Two of the De dementia Seneca 
turns from talking about the king’s tasks, and the qualities he should 
bring to their performance, to a discussion whose subject is what the 
wise man ought to do.42 The wise man will not show pity, but will give 
support, for instance {dem. 2.6.3). The assumption that the king him­
self should be wise is made without comment, evidence of how easily 
Seneca can combine the two characters into one. What he says elsewhere 
on the competing claims of philosophy and public life shows that the 
true king has become for him the man who is wise and is therefore a 
member of the true kingdom of the universe. The extent to which Seneca 
espouses this view depends on his situation at any particular time, in 
relation to the emperor. But the wise man can in certain respects be 
compared to a god (Ep. 87.19)43 and so too can the king (e.g. dem.
1.3.7).44
A Stoic philosopher may indeed claim a special superiority since he 
is considered as born to command where other philosophers must obey 
{Const. Sap. 1.1). Attalus, Seneca’s teacher, was therefore entitled to 
call himself a king and indeed more than a king: plus quccm regnare mihi
videbatur3 cui liceret censuram agere regnantium {Ep. 108.13). This is 
indeed a high claim which takes the philosopher above the world of 
politics and makes its concerns appear petty. Adam, after considering 
the relevant passages, concludes that ’Seneca überträgt hiermit also auf 
den Weisen fast alle diejenigen Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten, die nach 
östlich-hellenistischer Auffassung den König auszeichnen'.45 Ethics is 
no longer a part of politics, but the philosopher, the ethical guide, 
himself prescribes behaviour for the ruler, or rather, having donned the
42 But of course 'les titres memes des ouvrages, du De dementia ou de 
son pendant le De Ira, prouvent qu’en dernier ressort la personnalite du 
prince est 1’element determinant et que la seule esperance ä formuler 
est que le Prince soit un sage: ...Etre un sage, c’est s’oublier pour 
n’etre plus que le serviteur de la loi positive aussi bien que de la loi 
morale', Jean Sirinelli in Histoire des idees politiques: Tome premier 
by Jean Touchard (3rd ed., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 
1967), p.82.
43 After advising Lucilius to pay court to philosophy, Seneca says 
{Ep. 53.11), ornnes mortales multo antecedes3 non multo te di antecedent.
44 And see too dem. 1.7.1.
45 Traute Adam, dementia principis, p.75, and note her examples of 
comparable statements made of the king and the philosopher, on pp.75-7.
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royal attributes he becomes a model for the king. Seneca is perhaps the 
first to spell out actual political consequences 'angesichts der 
Regierungsform des Principats'.46
ln one sense the result is a devaluation of the ruler when compared 
with the wise man.47 But it is also a dignified admission of defeat on 
Philosophy's part, when confronted with an impossible situation. In the 
mythical Golden Age government was actually in the hands of the wise 
(Ep. 90.5) but now concern with government has given place to concern 
over individual behaviour. The good man nowadays passes laws non uni 
civitati3 sed toti humano generi (Otio 6.4). In Seneca's essays and 
letters the wise man emerges as totally self-sufficient, ruling himself 
alone: hoc nempe ab homine exigitur3 ut prosit hominibus3 si fieri
potest3 multisj si minus3 paucis3 si minus3 proximis3 si minus3 sibi. 
When he renders himself useful to others he is actually engaging in 
public affairs (Otio 3.5).
The most effective assault on the claims of public life comes from 
that section in the De Brevitate Vitae where Seneca describes the plight 
of Augustus wishing for but never obtaining release from his task (4.2), 
even if the general conclusion is put no more strongly than maior pars 
aetatis3 certe metior rei publicae data sit; aliquid temporis tui sume 
etiam tibi (18.1). The wise man, it is suggested, will be free from the 
engrossments of the state — integrae semper libertatis et solidae3 
solutus et sui iuris et altior ceteris (5.3).
Seneca shows hesitation about recommending retirement as a valid 
choice in some of the letters, stressing that for the philosopher with 
his gifts of sensus communis3 humanitas et congregatio physical retire­
ment may not be necessary to the pursuit of virtue (Ep. 5.4). He 
concludes temperetur vita inter bonos mores et publicos (Ep. 5.5). 
Athenodorus, Seneca notes, says that the best course is actione rerum et 
rei publicae tractatione et officiis civilibus se detinere (Tranq. 3.1)
46 lb. , p.79.
47 'Für die hier interessierende Frage ist es von Bedeutung, dass 
gerade mit der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung der Ideale von rcx und 
sapiens der sapiens bei Seneca Züge annimmt, die politische Konsequenzen 
haben, da sie notwendig dem Herrscher etwas von dessen Wirkungsraum 
entziehen', Adam, dementia principis, p.79.
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but nonetheless admits that this is a counsel of perfection. Seneca 
himself shows his own ambivalent attitude by first attempting to 
moderate the expression of Athenodorus' surrender to the pressure of 
circumstances, but in the process of the argument coming to very much 
the same conclusions.
Why should life away from the market place and the court house 
exercise such an attraction on one who was himself so closely involved 
in the governing of the Empire? The sense that the company of men in 
general is not likely to promote the true peace of an individual is one 
explanation. The wise man, or even those on the way to wisdom, are rare 
among the mass of less-than-perfect people who may impair the inner 
withdrawal necessary for philosophic thought.48 From this point of view 
the sapiens should avoid contact with most of humanity. Here the claims 
of the organic society modelled, Seneca himself tells us, on the bee­
hive break down most decisively and pessimism predominates, a pessimism 
in marked contrast to the apparent optimism in the De dementia about 
society and about the function and performance of the king.
In the De Tranquillitate Animi Seneca forcibly expresses his 
provisional conclusion multum et in se recedendum est (17.3). He goes 
on in the De Otio to conclude that there are in fact two commonwealths 
and that the true one is that which embraces the whole world and can be 
served by contemplation (Otio 4.1-2).49 The wise man is content with 
himself (Ep. 9.3). Indeed, Seneca hints that if the sage enters the 
fray of public life he may come into conflict with those in power, as 
well as with the masses (Ep. 14.7 — sapiens numquam potentium iras 
provocabit). Men expect that the reason for retirement may very well be 
taedio rerum civilium et infelieis atque ingratae stationis paenitentia 
(Ep. 36.9). Such a motive accounts for the relief of the philosopher 
when given his conge by the emperor (nullis enim plus praestant quam 
quibus frui tranquillo otio licet — Ep. 7 3.1).50
48 See Epp. 7 and 8.
49 As Alberto Grilli, quoting Castiglioni, puts it (II problema,
pp.249-50): 'Dal De tranquillitate alle Epistole, attrayerso il De otio, 
esiste una linea di successione nitida e naturale ... II primo scritto 
preludo al ritiro ...; il secondo lo giustifica alia luce della teoria 
filosofica, le lettere esprimono in atto cio ehe e e pub dare la 
solitudine operosa, in cui si affind lo spirito.'
50 'Siccome, per realizzare gli ideali della vita contemplativa, e
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Seneca as we have seen was not so consistent that he always held to 
the anti-social line outlined above. He had described the aim guiding 
him in his previous involvement in public life as the desire ut amicis 
propinquisque et omnibus oivibus3 omnibus deinde mortalibus paratior 
utiliorque svm (Tranq. 1.10). Here he sought support for this activity 
in the advice but not the example of the early Stoics. The progressive 
weakening of this view emerges clearly in Seneca’s explanation of what 
doing good service to the state may involve. Admonishing young men 
instils virtue into their minds and so a man teaching the meaning of 
justice and piety to the next generation is surely performing as 
important a task as the praetor's (Tranq. 3.3-4).51 Duty no longer 
coincides with civic duty: offioia oivis amisit? Hominis exerceat
(Tranq. 4.4).52
The inevitable conflict of ideals between an earthly kingdom and 
one made up of the wise appears clearly in the De Beneficiis where the 
Cynic Demetrius is described as talking of the kingdom of the wise, 
great and secure, and is contrasted with Gaius and his inverted values 
(Ben. 7.10.6-11.1). If the sage may justifiably withdraw into 
seclusion, then it is acceptable to leave the government to its own 
devices — an obvious admission of its relative unimportance.
MUSONIUS RUFUS
Since Musonius Rufus wrote a treatise 'That Kings too Should Study
necessaria la secuvitas, il filosofo apprezza grandemente colui (il re, 
il principe) che dispone le cose in modo da consentire ai sudditi di 
attendere serenamente al loro perfezionamente interiore (I. Lana, Seneca
e la politica, p.42).
51 Seneca is at great pains to convince himself of the usefulness of 
philosophy, in the broad sense. Andre claims that 'tous les 
atermoiements de Seneque, toutes ses fluctuations sur le probleme du 
"genre de vie" ideal, s’expliquent par la foi dans la mission active de 
1 * intelligence et de la philosophie, mere des techniques et des 
institutions' (L3Otium, p.536). This is in general true, although Seneca 
denied that technical inventions were sufficiently valuable for mankind 
to have merited the attention of philosophers (see Ep. 90.7ff.).
52 'Seneque a systematise, dans les Lettres ä Lucilius, ce 
Protreptique ä la philosophie qui la presente comme un asile sacre et 
inviolable, comme une militia exigeante', Andre, L3Otiumi p.538.
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Philosophy' he was clearly concerned with the relation the monarch 
should have with philosophy and philosophers. His own experiences under 
Nero were proof that the views he held could be considered a threat:
'He was put into chains because of his wisdom' (Life of ApotZ. 4.35).
In order to benefit his subjects the ruler needs to understand what is 
good and bad, harmful and helpful, and so on. This is precisely the 
philosopher's task, as his texvt1 is e t S e v a t  t u  cpepeu npos av-öpokou 
e u ö a u y o v u a v  n M a n o b a t y o v u a v  (p.280).
Justice can be applied only when its nature is understood, and this 
can be done only through philosophy. The same could be said of self- 
control and courage: in all cases knowledge holds the key to
performance. Other practical results of philosophy are the ability to 
tell true from false and the gift of verbal proficiency. Here Musonius 
shows the philosopher triumphing over the professional orator (see on 
these points pp.280-83).
General excellence then is what a king needs and what philosophy 
alone can produce. The conclusion Musonius comes to is that the good 
king must necessarily be at the same time a philosopher (p.285). Here 
we have him bypassing the recognized political account of the ruler.
What follows completes this process by standing the original 
conclusion on its head. The philosopher must needs be royal (p.285). 
Kingship Musonius then proceeds to define as 'being able to rule well 
peoples and cities, and being worthy of ruling men' (ib.). Whether or 
not the philosopher actually does rule does not affect the definition, 
since even rule of self can entitle one to be called king. A reference 
to Socrates for confirmation of this claim (p.286) triumphantly 
completes a thesis that now claims the opposite of what it set out to 
prove. In the process the king in the political sense has disappeared.
THE 'STOIC OPPOSITION' AND THE MONARCHY
Here we must pause to consider one form of political activity, or 
inactivity, which developed in the second half of the first century and 
has often been associated with the Stoic school of philosophy. This was
279
the ’Stoic opposition’ to the monarchy, of which Thrasea Paetus was the 
most outstanding exemplar, although for him pointed absences from the 
Senate and from public life generally were the means whereby he made his 
attitude to Nero's rule clear.
The difficulty is in deciding how far philosophy motivated Thrasea 
Paetus and his followers, and how political their opposition to the 
government really was. This becomes particularly important when we 
consider the reputation for subversion that philosophy seems to have 
acquired by the time Vespasian expelled the philosophers from Rome. And 
how did the Stoic view of ideal kingship change, if we accept that 
Stoics were in the front ranks of the opposition?54
Certainly Tacitus describes Thrasea’s last hours, spent discussing 
the immortality of the soul with the Cynic philosopher Demetrius, in a 
way which stresses his philosophic affiliations (Ann. 16.35).
Tigellinus could play on Nero's suspicions of Rubellius Plautus by 
describing him as possessing the arrogance of the Stoics, who breed 
sedition and intrigue (Ann. 14.57). Seneca himself confirms that such 
an opinion of the Stoics was fairly common (see his Letter 73). Under 
Vespasian, Helvidius Priscus, the son-in-law of Thrasea, adhered to the 
Stoic philosophy, not to indulge his leisure hours under a respectable 
appearance, Tacitus tells us, but to arm himself against the risks of a 
public career (Hist. 4.5). In the reign of Domitian, others of the 
senatorial class suffered for writing lives of the political martyrs, 
and philosophers were again expelled en masse from Rome.
Adam considers that ’Seneca zeigt also, wie Thrasea, im Anfang eine 
durchaus positive Einstellung zum Principat. Wachsende Kritik und 
Entfernung beider aus der Politik lassen sich jeweils an konkreten 
politischen Vorgängen verfolgen und haben nichts zu tun mit einer 
allgemeinen vorgefassten, philosophisch-stoisch bestimmten Abneigung 
gegen diese Staatsform', Clementia principis, p.68.
54 There is of course an ambivalence about government inherent in 
Stoicism: ’In so far as Stoics were prepared to acknowledge the emperor
of the day as the embodiment of their lofty ideal of kingship. Stoicism 
might be welcome and become a kind of semi-official philosophy; Stoics, 
who despaired of improvement and acquiesced in a quietist contemplation 
of their ideals, may have been unwelcome, but nevertheless harmless; 
if, however, Stoic tenets were wedded to the Roman tradition of 
political activity^ ... Stoic idealism might, in the eyes of the Roman 
government, become dangerous’, Wirszubski, Liberias, p.145.
280
There is, however, no evidence of a coherent united opposition 
based on philosophy. It is true that 'Tacite nous dit ... que Stoicien 
signifiait pour les delateurs intrigant et rebelle’ but it is more 
likely that ' le stoicisme n ’est point la cause de l’opposition mais 
seulement le moyen pour les opposants de legitimer occasionnellement les 
distances qu’ils prennent par rapport ä l’autorite imperiale'.55
Was this opposition related to the character of a particular ruler 
or was it an hostility to monarchical government as such? Rostovtzeff 
believes that in fact the opposition as early as Nero's reign had become 
philosophical under the leadership of Thrasea Paetus,56 and derives the 
hostility of the government to the movement from its use of the popular 
theme of the tyrant, the counterpart of the ideal king, and the Cynic- 
Stoic belief that succession should pass by adoption and not be 
hereditary. But we have no evidence that this particular version of the 
rule of the best played a part in discussions of the time^and Pliny the 
Younger, who does appear to favour adoption, is hardly reliable as a 
witness for Stoic thought.'"
There does still seem to have developed an attitude either of 
indifference or hostility to the government on the part of the more 
concerned members of the Senate, and this can be called philosophical so 
long as we make it clear that the word is here being used very loosely. 
This movement intensified under the Flavians whose own path to the 
throne was certainly not through any connection with the original ruling
55 Jean Sirinelli in Jean Touchard's Histoire des idees politiques, I,
p.83. Griffin takes up essentially the same position: 'It is quite
clear that the grounds of Thrasea's opposition to Nero's regime did not 
follow from his Stoicism: for one thing, Seneca had shown in his De
dementia how Stoicism could be used to justify and provide a 
monarchical ideology for the existing system. What Thrasea and 
Helvidius Priscus wanted was libertas senatoriar ... Thus, in so far as 
there was political opposition, it was not philosophical in origin' — 
Griffin, Seneca, p.365.
56 'We know that as early as Nero's time the personal opposition had
been replaced by one of a philosophic type, of which Thrasea Paetus was 
one of the prominent leaders' — Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, I, p.114 and see 
p.116 and II, p.586. So too Garzetti claims: 'Vespasian had to cope
with an opposition inspired for the first time by theoretical 
principles' — Albino Garzetti, From Tiberius to the Antonines: A
History of the Roman Empire A.D. 14-192 (Methuen, London, 1974), p.240.
5 6 a
There may be a reference to a (Stoic?) debate over adoption in the 
comment of Vespasian, reportedly made on the arrest of Helvidius Priscus
m  the Senate (see Dio Cass.^  65.12) that either his son would succeed hii 
or no one would (cf.Suet. Vit.Vesp. 25).
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dynasty. Domitian's reign seemed, no doubt, only to confirm the 
pessimism about imperial government emerging under Vespasian.
Adam sees a general opposition to autocratic rule as such coming
5 7about after Nero, and not simply opposition to a specific emperor, but 
there is nothing to show that either the theorists or the men of affairs 
seriously envisaged a return to the Republic. What complicates the 
issue is the fact that,as Michel has pointed out, 'sous l’Empire les 
problemes politiques deviennent des problemes individuels: tout depend
directement des rapports entre le citoyen et un homme, le prince , and 
Wirszubski well describes the difficulty of drawing a demarcation line 
in autocratic despotism 'between the personal character of the despot 
and his power, because a despot's power is what the despot makes it'.60
This accords with our view that at this time much of what passed as 
political debate could not validly claim that name, since the 
personality of the ruler dominated the outlook of theorists, and even of 
men of affairs. In the particular climate that existed in late first- 
century Rome, with dissatisfaction apparently widespread in the higher 
ranks until the accession of Nerva, even where opposition did not take 
the form of the conspiracy of Piso resignation to circumstances might 
lead to the idealization of the monarch, so that he resembled the sage 
of the philosophers. It might also result in retirement from the life 
of public service. And both courses, however innocuous, were likely to
5 7 ' Die Radikalisierung der Opposition unter einem sich verschärfenden 
Willkürregiment führte in der 2. Hälfte des 1. Jahrhunderts dazu, dass 
die der Stoa anhängenden Senatoren unter Herrschern wie Nero und 
Domitian ihre ursprüngliche, weitgehend neutrale, wenn nicht gar 
positive Einstellung zur Monarchie verloren .... Mit dem immer stärker 
werdenden Widerspruch gegen die einzelnen Principes verband sich 
allmählich eine allgemeiner gefasste Opposition gegen den Principat als 
solchen' — Adam, Clementia principis, p.70.
5 8 They (i.e. Rubellius Plautus, Thrasea, Helvidius and the rest)
'objected, not to the throne, but to its unworthy and, to conservative 
eyes, "un-Roman" occupant', and 'Boissier is surely right, pace 
Henderson and Dudley, in describing their opposition as being "pas tout
ä fait politique dans son principe, mais plutot morale"', J.M.C. 
Toynbee, 'Dictators and Philosophers in the First Century A.D.', G & R,
11 (1941-5), p.47.
°5 *9 *1Alain Michel in La Philosophie politique ä Rome cR Auguste ä Marc 
Aurele (Armand Colin, Paris, 1969), p.50.
60 Wirszubski, Liberias, p.143.
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cause imperial hostility, the former because the sage virtually 
displaced the public figure, the latter because abstention implied or 
seemed to imply disapproval.
DIO CHRYSOSTOM
Perhaps the most self-consciously philosophical of our writers is 
Dio Chrysostom. On many occasions he discusses the position of the 
philosopher in society, the mistakes people make in not distinguishing 
the true philosopher from the false, and the damage thereby done to the 
reputation of philosophy. When he addresses the inhabitants of 
Alexandria, Rhodes or Tarsus, he does so avowedly as a philosopher.
The definition of philosophy given in 13.28 is directed solely to 
the ethical aspect. To practise philosophy is to seek and strive to be 
MaAos nab ayabos, but another account of it as learning from the wise 
goes into more detail on the results to be expected. Men become 
euöaupoveg and rulers especially and firstly of themselves and then of 
other men (see 13.31-4). Here we have a harmonizing of the two ways of 
life — the public one of active service for the benefit of others and 
the private introspective one. Potential conflict between the two is in 
this way avoided but the priority of self-rule gives an extra stress to 
the philosophic life.
The philosopher, as a matter of course, should be wise in all 
respects and ’the prudent man, such as the philosopher should be, would 
in everything be superior to all the world' (71.8). The oration on 
virtue expresses this most clearly. The prudent and righteous and wise 
man, that is the good man, is chosen to be king and is willingly obeyed
by other men (69.1). This is because it is not reasonable that some men
should be wise and others versed in human affairs or some versed in 
human and some in divine matters (69.4). When a man’s soul becomes 
rational and his mind good he will be able to manage his own affairs
successfully and those of his neighbours too (ib.). The details given
of all-round excellence show a gradual spreading of the impact of being 
wise, good and self-controlled from private to public to divine matters 
(see 69.2) .
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The task of philosophy has a similarly large scope in Oration 22, 
where philosophers and orators are described as fulfilling in many ways 
the same role — TtoXXa yev Hat aXXa eupou its av May ^uyiavra arcxv&s ra 
epyou Tuvos hxoveva Mat Tipa^ ews Mouva tops cpyXoadcpobs, Mat pdropauv daot 
yq dyopatot ynöe ytaSapvot (22.1). Both groups discuss questions 
which are their especial concern, such as whether one should marry, 
whether one should go into public life, whether a monarchy should be 
adopted or democracy or some other form of government (22.3). This last 
theme in Dio’s day was of course treading on dangerous ground.
A different (and more innocuous) appearance is given to the 
philosopher in the dialogue on philosophy where the life of the 
philosopher is set apart from all others: Ma^o'Xou ßtog aXXos yev too
cptXoaocpouvTos, äXXos 6e rwv uoXXrnv avSpakwv (70.7). This is far more 
exclusive than the account given of the philosopher king in the second 
discourse on kingship where Dio explains, through the young Alexander, 
that it is not necessary for the king to study philosophy to the point 
of perfecting himself in it; he need only live simply and without 
affectation (2.26 — dTtXdarws 6e nay arXws).
Nevertheless, if we accept the stern injunction of Diogenes yn o&v 
Tipoiepov, w parate, ßaatXeueyv eTibxttpet tpyv n cppovqoay (4.70), this 
kingly knowledge is itself no light matter, since this essentially non­
political acquisition has become a necessary qualification for a king. 
Indeed in his first oration Dio claims that yovos 6e 6 rwv (ppovuycov re 
nay aocpwv Xoyos, otou yeyo'vaatv ou tioX X o u  t w v  Ttporepov, dvevöens Mat 
reXetog nyeywv Kau ßon^og e u retdoOs Mat ayadhs (puaews (1.8).
Even if we take the common estimation of the importance of wisdom, 
popular opinion, claims Dio, is delighted to see wisdom honoured by the 
greatest power and might (4.2). The man who possesses wisdom as 
distinct from the self-deception that passes for it with the majority 
(the perspicacity of the common man is not rated so highly here) will be 
successful in all that he attempts, since he will know the true object 
of his actions. Thus, if he should wish to be a general or to hold the 
other offices or to conduct the other public business in the city, he 
will do everything well (see 68.3-6; cf. 9.9).
The philosopher here has pre-empted the office of the ruler, since
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it is now the former who may rightfully claim to rule, and Dio does not 
simply assert that a king should have acquired philosophy as one 
desirable characteristic among others.61 A philosopher, indeed, is the 
one person of whom it should be expected that, having taken a government 
in hand, he should produce a united city (48.14). This is because the 
true philosopher will be found devoting himself to no other task than 
that of learning how he will be able to rule well, whether it be ruling 
himself or a household, or the greatest state, or, in short, all mankind 
(49.3).
Yet Dio admits that few philosophers have become rulers (49.6) and 
he explains that the most powerful nations have instead publicly 
appointed them as superintendents and officers for their kings (49.7). 
The result was that ’in truth it was the philosophers who ruled, while 
the kings became their servants and the ministers of their will, though 
they sat on golden thrones, dwelt in great houses and feasted 
sumptuously’ (49.8).
There is, to be sure, the problem that of the many philosophers who 
have recommended public life, few have ventured into it themselves (see 
47.2-3). This is of course because of the dangers to be met with in 
society. This does not prevent Dio from claiming that statesmen such as 
Pericles, Solon and Lycurgus may be regarded as philosophers in politics 
(22.1-2). Yet Dio also claims, and this is probably more typical of 
him, that the only truly happy constitution is the partnership of god 
with god, the term ’god’ including man by virtue of his possession of 
reason (36.23).
PLUTARCH
Like Dio, Plutarch allots an important place in his work to 
philosophy and philosophers. In discussing the education of children he 
(or his imitator) announces: 6eC xhs dAAns Tiauösuas wonep MEcpdAauov
61 ’Ces deux courants de pensee, philosophique et courtisan (the one 
talking of the sage who would one day be king, the other investing the 
current king with all the virtues) restaient paralleles. Avec Dion ils 
se confondent' — Sirinelli in Touchard’s Histodre des ddees poldtdques, 
I, p.90.
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TioucLV m v  cptAoöotptav (Mov. 7d) . Indeed the remedy for illnesses or 
affections of the mind also comes from philosophy. When Plutarch 
provides a definition of philosophy, it is severely practical.
Philosophy enables us to discover x l  to  xaAov x l  to  ataypov, x l  x o
ÖLHCXL0V XL TO CCÖLXOV (ib. ) .
In the light of such a definition it is not surprising that 
Plutarch is quick to make a connection between politics and philosophy. 
TI consider these to be complete men', he says, 'who are able to mix the 
political capacity with philosophy,.and be possessors of the two 
greatest goods, being politically active in the common life, and in the 
calm and unruffled part of their lives being involved in philosophy'
(7f; cf. 33b). In the Life of Numa he quotes with approval Plato's 
remarks that the one way for men to obtain relief from evils was if by 
some divine chance royal power coinciding with the insight of a 
philosopher might establish virtue as powerful and supreme over vice 
(20.6-7) .
At a less exalted level, Plutarch's writings on political themes 
show us the municipal councillor displaying a poUs citizen's view of 
the importance of local government and a tendency to clothe this 
political viewpoint in the theory of monarchical government, however 
inappropriate. But to note the pre-eminence given to political life is 
to take into account only part of Plutarch's attitude, for like most of 
his contemporaries he was aware that, seen under a certain aspect, all 
political matters were fragile, and political life existed only through 
the goodwill of the emperor.
To assess the position that public life and the figures of the 
ruler and the philosopher occupied in his total outlook we need to 
investigate a range of texts, for, directly and indirectly, Plutarch 
touched on these topics frequently. One way to detect the prominence 
given to the philosopher in his own right is to note the occasions on 
which he appears alongside or in the person of the politically active 
individual who is in many cases the king. Even in the 'Advice to an 
Uneducated Ruler' Plutarch asserts the need for Logos to rule the ruler 
(779e) and philosophy and political activity appear together, associated 
with worthwhile activity, in the De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta (136d).
CK The doubts about Plutarch's authorship of this work would make it 
unacceptable as a source if the views expressed were out of keeping with 
those appearing in works obviously authentic. But such is not the case, 
and subsequent references reinforce the impression given by the excerpts 
from this work.
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Again in the De Superstitione Plutarch associates cpuAdoocpoL and 
tioAltukol ävöpcs as men who can be expected, each no doubt for good, but 
perhaps very different reasons, to show that God’s majesty is associated 
with goodness, liberality, kindness and caring (167e). There is a 
certain similarity between the life of a statesman and that of a 
philosopher (oyooov 6’ eotl, cptloaocpeCv to itoAuTeueadau) in the fact 
that for both it is the activity becoming to it rather than the badge of 
office that gives a title to the practitioner. Life at all times in all 
parts, in all experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy, 
and the same can be said of statesmanship (796d-e).
So far we have seen that Plutarch assumes that the philosophical 
and political lives are not incompatible, that a ruler may indeed find 
philosophy of great assistance to him in his task (see e.g. Mor. 779f — 
'when philosophical reason ... has been established as the ruler’s 
coadjutor and guardian, it removes the hazardous element from his 
power'). Does Plutarch accept that the giftsof the philosopher are in 
themselves sufficiently comprehensive to allow him to teach the 
political art also, or can he even use them to override entirely the 
independence of the political sphere?
Plutarch certainly believes that a ruler's friends may be just as 
qualified to give advice in their capacity as philosophers as the ruler 
is to take action, but this is an informal function, taken for granted 
when friendship as such plays so important a part in the carrying on of 
government. He is aware that a friend of one in power who attempts to 
advise a ruler may well be suspected simply of flattery and self-seeking, 
so that this personal element has its drawbacks (see 776b) . A 
philosopher whose task is the care of the soul is best equipped to 
counsel one who will then pass on the benefit of his lessons by being 
solicitous for many, and obliged to be wise and self-restrained and just 
on behalf of many (776d) . The need for the ruler himself to take care 
in his choice of friends shows the very important place they may be 
granted in policy-making.
Plutarch criticizes the Stoic equation of the sage with the 
prudent, just and brave man, orator, poet, general, rich man or king 
(472a; cf. 1060b), and is clearly not willing to leave the field to the 
sage. Pronouncements of the wise, he suggests, are not as significant
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as actual enactments of real rulers. When he writes that Zeno gave 
shape to a dream or as it were a shadowy picture of a well-ordered and 
philosophic community, but it was Alexander who gave effect to the idea 
(329b) , Alexander obviously wins his approval as a man of action over 
the man of ideas (cf. Lye. 31.2).
We should therefore expect to find that Plutarch makes no attempt 
to hold aloft the philosophic ideal of the life of retirement as 
desirable, and by and large this is so. But this does not mean that he 
paid no attention to such a possibility — hence his discussions of the 
topic are useful in revealing the arguments that could be advanced at 
this time in favour of non-involvement in political life. Plutarch 
plainly saw the Epicureans as the main proponents of such views since 
even in theory they decried any sort of involvement in political life — 
although this could lead them to write a nept BaotAeuas discouraging 
their adherents from living with and giving advice to monarchs (1127a).
In the Life of Pericles, Plutarch explains that there is a 
difference between the life of the theoretical philosopher and that of 
the man of state; one, being self-sufficient, is directed to what is 
good, the other displays a virtue involved in human needs where riches 
are both necessary and good (Per. 16.6; cf. Agis 2.1). Such an 
instance shows Plutarch tending to favour the politician, and evincing 
sympathy with his difficulties, even while he presents the life of the 
philosopher as more elevated in absolute terms. Although we can hardly 
conclude that Weber is right in claiming Plutarch as ’eine politische 
Persönlichkeit ersten Ranges',62 Babut does disregard this practical, 
even pragmatic, side to Plutarch when he asserts: 'll faut avouer que
Plutarque n'a pas la tete politique. C’est toujours en moraliste qu’il 
aborde les questions politiques.'63
Plutarch's concern for public life was real, but he did not see it
62 H. Weber, Die Staa.ts-und Rechtslehre Plutarchs von Chaironeia, 
p. 84.
63 Babut, Plutarque et le stoicisme, p.359.
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as a special area of life with its own code of behaviour different from
that of life in general, and so the philosopher had as good a claim as
anyone else to be concerned about it. A philosopher who observed his
political duty by training a potential or actual leader in the way that
he should go has, of course, Plutarch's support (see e.g. Philop. 1.2-4)
but there is no suggestion that the philosopher would have any
particularly efficacious political theory to offer. He would simply be
taking part in an important sphere of life as all men should dof although, 
as a. philosopher, he m ight well see Ins way more dearly than m ost ■
The Stoic position came in for Plutarch's criticism because of its
paradoxes. He mocked at the failure to take part in public life of
those Stoics who most recommended it (1043b-c). He was not likely then
to see isolation from society as an acceptable alternative to
participation, with philosophy entitling one to arrogate to oneself
political titles and a spiritual hegemony. A suggestion that
tranquillity may demand inactivity is hotly denied (465c).
It is however interesting to examine a passage revealing Plutarch's 
view on life and compare it with the way in which Aristotle formulates 
the aim of human existence. Plutarch describes life as a gift from 
parents and the gods, but the good life not simply as the object of 
politics, but as brought about through the philosopher's gift of Logos, 
the fellow worker of 6Cnr\ and vo'yog (1108c). Aristotle had been 
satisfied to describe the potis as the means to the good life without 
introducing figures from outside. So even while Plutarch blames the 
Epicureans for destroying the moral basis of society by their attitude, 
he goes halfway towards meeting them here, as he does in his account of 
the effects of Logos in the soul (101d-e):
auidpKris e o q , i av yadqs xu to xaAov naya^ov eaxu* xpucpqaeug ev 
TisvLqt Kai SaauAeuaeug nau xov aTtpdyyova ßuov Mat uduwxyv ou6ev 
?iIt ov ayouinaeus n xov eitu axpaxriyuaus x a t  yyeyovuaus* ou ßutoafl 
(puAoöocpnoag äqötog, äXAa tavTayou fiöetos yadyen^ xau axd
navxüjv eucppaveC oe itAoöxos uoAAoug cuepycxoOvxa n a l Tievua 
TtoXXa yy yepuyvüjvxa Hau 6d£a xuymyevov mad aöo^ua  yq 
(pOovouycvov.
PLINY
The Panegyric was not the place for Pliny to lay down his views on
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the role of the philosopher in public life. In this eulogy Pliny 
appears as the typical Roman, concerned only to show how the Emperor 
Trajan excels in all the Roman virtues and functions appropriate to a 
public figure. He speaks as a consul, not a theoretician, and his 
reference to Trajan's honouring of dicendi magistri and sapientiae 
doctoves (47.1) does not imply that Trajan used such people as advisers.
However, in Pliny's letters, philosophers and philosophy are quite 
often the subject of discussion. Pliny's complaints about the amount of 
time taken up by his public affairs imply that he wished to devote time 
to literature and studious pursuits, but it is not likely that 
philosophy in the strict sense absorbed him greatly.64 Rather he was 
concerned to act in accord with the precepts that became a Roman gentle­
man. In fact, Pliny claimed the support of a philosopher for the high 
value of his activities. The philosopher Euphrates, he records, 
consoled him by saying that anyone who holds public office, presides at 
trials and passes judgement, or expounds and administers justice — 
thereby putting into effect what the philosopher only teaches — has a 
part in the philosopher's life and indeed the noblest part of all (Ep. 
1.10.10). Pliny might well see himself as corresponding to the ruler 
whom the philosopher was encouraged so often to instruct in his duties.
Yet, though Pliny praises philosophy, his examples of its operation 
show that he attached almost as much significance to manner as to 
matter. The philosopher occupies no special position in relation to the 
government, and though Pliny refers to the expulsion of the philosophers 
from Rome in 93 A.D. (Epp. 3.11.3; 7.19.4), he does not go into the 
reasons for this. His references to Dio Chrysostom (Ep. 10.81), in 
connection with the litigation taking place in Prusa over Dio's building 
schemes, do not contain any mention of the latter as a philosopher.
For Pliny to associate himself in a small way with members of the 
Stoic opposition like Herennius Senecio (Ep. 7.33), or express 
admiration for Thrasea Paetus (see Epp. 7.19.3; 8.22.3) did not mean
54 'Though in general Pliny felt that the active life was more 
becoming to a Roman than the contemplative, he is not always consistent. 
... Thus, though Pliny on the whole preferred the life of public 
service, he admired leisure devoted to letters as well' — Mason Hammond, 
'Pliny the Younger's Views on Government', HSCPh, 49 (1938), pp.133-4.
In this, of course, he resembles Cicero.
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that he was in any way committed to their views. When he wrote his 
Panegyric he did so as a loyal citizen (Ep. 3.18) and a consul and 
nothing more. For him no philosopher could claim to possess royal 
powers, or show that he ruled a spiritual kingdom. Such assertions he 
would probably have understood to indicate the speaker’s natural wish to 
be of significance, even though not taking part in government.
ARISTIDES
In Aristides we meet the only one of our writers who explicitly 
disdained the title of philosopher in favour of that of ’sophist'. We 
do not therefore find him claiming that the king should be a philosopher 
still less than the philosopher was the true king. As for the person 
most suited to advise a monarch, clearly in Aristides' view a sophist 
like himself was the best choice.
Aristides does reveal something of his view of philosophers, for he 
claims that they did not 'honour the gods, advise cities, comfort the 
distressed, settle civil discord or educate the young' (XLVI, vol. 2, 
p.404 Dind.). This is hardly true but no doubt reflects a view held by 
some members of society under the Antonines that philosophers were 
impractical recluses.65 Marcus Aurelius as emperor should have given 
the lie to this, but Aristides' attitudes seem put forward rather to 
elevate his own profession and usurp the philosopher's role than to deny 
the philosophic function as such.
Certainly Marcus Aurelius had explicitly rejected the notion that 
for a philosopher retirement meant separation from the affairs of one's 
fellow men. Such a notion was 'wholly unworthy of a philosopher' (4.3). 
Yet such a man can still say: 'Alexander, Caesar, Pompey — what were
they beside Diogenes, Heraclitus, Socrates?' (8.3). In a way true king- 
ship for Marcus was 'not of this world'. And no doubt it is this 
aspect of philosophy that Aristides is attacking. Through Aristides, 
then, we gain some insight into how philosophy could appear at this time
D0 'Aristides' antipathy to philosophers was strong, and his strictures 
were not altogether just. Philosophers had been known to advise cities, 
comfort the distressed, settle civil discord and educate the young', 
Bowersock, Greek Sophists, p.ll.
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to be holding up a standard that made naught of the claims of society in 
the strictly practical sense.
CONCLUSION
The writers on kingship whom we have examined have almost all had 
something to say about philosophy. What we have to consider is if their 
comments could appear in any way subversive of government in general and 
monarchical government in particular. This can happen by implication if 
the philosopher gradually replaces the king as the centre of attention, 
or by outright comment to the effect that the true king is the wise man. 
To some this is the natural consequence of starting with the assumption 
that the king should have training in philosophy. The writer may also 
decry public life and suggest that the life of retirement and 
contemplation is best. This is a logical result of a belief in the wise 
man's supremacy, once he is seen as no longer connected with government. 
Such attitudes express more than simple opposition to a particular ruler 
or even to a particular form of government, though disaffection with a 
regime naturally encourages this outlook.
We can see clear evidence of 'subversion' in the writers of the 
Roman Empire, although describing the king's character so that it 
resembles the philosophic ideal, while political duties take second 
place, does occur even before this time. Philo, Seneca, Dio — and even 
Plutarch at times — all talk of the wise man as if he were a king, or 
rather as if his way of life counted for more than the existence of 
monarchical government. They all find that the life of retirement can 
be as satisfying and justifiable as the life of the politician. This 
must mean that whatever their avowed intentions their support for 
monarchy would have seemed a doubtful blessing to any observant king who 
believed that his position was the highest possible one and the values 
it supported the most important. The theorists posed no direct threat 
to the throne, to be sure, but neither were their 'mirrors for princes' 
quite what they seemed.
292
CONCLUSION
We cannot deny that there was considerable continuity between the 
world of the polis and the world of the Hellenistic Empires, and this 
applies to political theory as much as to anything else. The ideas we 
have examined on society and law, on the qualities of the ruler and the 
imagery of rule, even attitudes connecting the king with the deity or 
substituting the wise man for the king were not unknown in fifth- and 
early fourth-century Greece, but most of these points of view had to 
share the field with others. Thus, many theorists then believed that 
the development of society was the gradual work of many ordinary people; 
law could mean an agreement of the polis as well as other things; forms 
of government were discussed and compared; society was more than a 
piece of material to be moulded from outside; God need not have any 
special connection with political life, or its chief protagonist, and 
philosophers might be thought to have a duty to be involved in society, 
not to stand outside or despise it.
What we see is a change of direction, a change of concern at many 
levels, in the writers who provided a theory for the changed political 
situation — and we must not forget that this theory corresponded in part 
to official propaganda from the Greek kings and Roman emperors. This 
does not mean that the theorists’ ideas won unqualified approval from 
government and people. Catchcries and slogans adopted by government do 
not prove much about the influence of these writers. Waters stresses 
how little, for example, those making free with advice to Trajan may 
have had to do with the imperial functions and personalities, and how 
little we can deduce about the ruler’s character from them.1 Few are 
quite as sceptical as this on the reliance to be placed on Pliny and the 
kingship speeches of Dio for information on Trajan’s rule, but we must
l In ’Trajan’s Character in the Literary Tradition’, pp.233-52.
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stress that we have not set out to find how well or ill the works 
examined tally with any actual rule. Our aim has been the more 
theoretical one of discovering how consistently there can be detected a 
particular way of viewing government, which we see being first spelled 
out tentatively in the work of Xenophon and Isocrates. We have to 
determine if this outlook is truly political, or if it is more 
appropriate to designate it by some other term.
We have found that there is a certain tension in the views our 
writers had about society. They often describe it at length as good and 
natural, and several of them have a deep sense of men's need for one
another, but at the same time their distrust of ordinary men is obvious.
In describing the origins of society, even those who fully accept that 
men did not decline from a primitive Golden Age, when all needs were met 
without effort, write of the outstanding individuals who brought their 
fellows civilized ways. This naturally implies that any society will be 
best served by just such a person. Most, we may suspect, make the 
assumption spelled out by Porphyry in the De Abstinentia (4.18) that if 
all the world were virtuous, there would be no constitution, just as, if
all were king, life would be impossible. But, as things are clearly
quite otherwise, government, and monarchical government at that, is 
necessary. The ruler, then, and not the society under him, becomes the 
main object of attention.
Law, after it lost its position of prominence in the polis, could 
be denigrated in favour of a preferred alternative, such as Logos, but 
nomos as a term was never completely dispensed with. It could be 
personified in the king, or be weakened to mean custom or imply some 
sort of moral injunction. But it could certainly no longer stand up as 
an alternative to monarchy, as it had seemed to do at one stage in the 
fourth century. Law as regulations arrived at by the deliberations of a 
community no longer had a place in theory or public life. This left 
monarchical authority unchallenged, and even when the king is encouraged 
to abide by the laws, these are of course laws of his own making.
When our writers describe monarchical government, they devote a 
large proportion of their work to accounts of the ruler's personal 
qualities, clearly assuming that this was the most important part of
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government. There is considerable agreement among the writers about the 
qualities they consider it desirable for the ruler to possess. Self- 
control and beneficence are two particularly significant virtues, one a 
characteristic considered desirable in all, and revealing that the ruler 
is expected to display private morality of a high order, the other what 
we might consider a virtue especially appropriate to a public figure.
Yet this quality is one that stresses the arbitrary ad hoc way in which 
a king was expected to run his kingdom, guiding himself by kindly 
impulses in personal relations with his subjects rather than acting 
according to a fixed norm. The ruler's position is frequently described 
in terms from which the reference to power is absent, and which make him 
seem almost the servant of his subjects, in a position none of them 
would crave for themselves if they were aware of its difficulties. This 
helps to turn our attention away from actual monarchies where power is 
significant, to contemplate the ideal ruler working by persuasion and 
not force.
The impression we receive on reading these accounts is that the 
ruler is the ideal man, and even his society-related characteristics, 
such as phzZanthropza, are meant to give him a chance to display his 
virtue rather than to relate him structurally to his subjects.
Describing him often gives writers the opportunity to express their 
views on the philosophic hero, frequently cast in the Stoic mould.
One of the most emotionally appealing ways of describing how 
government works is, as we saw in the Introduction, by the use of key 
images, which can also determine what qualities the ruler is expected to 
display. Whereas Plato and Aristotle could see government in terms of 
either an organism or a craft, our later writers use a range of images 
almost all of which have the effect of placing the ruler above or over 
against his subjects. Rarely does the organic image of the state appear 
and when it does it is soon displaced. Instead the ruler resembles the 
possessors of expertise and authority in particular fields. This 
distracts our attention from the power relationship existing between a 
king and his subjects. Many of the images convey an impression of 
purely moral suasion, when, by a sympathetic figure such as father or 
shepherd, a writer anticipates and deflects potential criticism of 
autocratic rule.
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The roles to which monarchical rule is compared are of course ones 
where the practitioner has a control which is undisputed in ordinary 
life. In one way, however, this concentration on these metaphors 
devalued kingship as one independent form of government among others, 
especially when, as often happened, both king and sage could be 
described in the same way.
Kings, for all our writers, have some kind of religious 
significance, but the nature of it varies considerably from being 
predominantly ethical, when kings are seen as appointed by God because 
of their virtue, and closest to Him when they imitate Him best, to 
mystical where a dynamic and personal expression of the deity is 
mediated through the ruler to his subjects. In all cases, however, a 
divine mandate to rule, even if it does not vest or presuppose divine 
characteristics in a ruler, makes him something other than an earthly 
ruler whose government could be set alongside that in a democracy or an 
aristocracy, and who could be judged by the people as leaders, in 
governments using these forms, are judged.
A ruler, related to God by his goodness, is easily transformed into 
the good man as such when a writer is discussing him, and his strictly 
political personality vanishes; if his position is more elevated than 
this he becomes a heroic figure for whom earthly rule is of little real 
account. Our writers paid lavish compliments to their ideal ruler, 
particularly where he was considered to be embodied in the ruler to whom 
the work was addressed, but they stopped short of acclaiming the ruler 
as divine in an independent, and absolute sense. But for the point we 
wish to make this is not as significant as the fact that the religious 
emphasis does, by implication or explicitly, justify monarchy as 
imitation of Zeus' rule, and short-circuit objections to the institution 
itself.
The king whose basic qualification for office is that he is wise is 
no true political figure, part of a society and a state. It is one step 
further for the philosopher to acquire the traits of ruling of the 
monarch. Thus it comes about that one who has apparently no connections 
with government may be the only true governor, and retirement is 
actually the height of activity.
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The writers whom we have looked at composed works in which kingship 
was avowedly praised, for the most part considering it to be the 
obvious and best way for people to be governed. Yet what they commend 
has little in common with the types of kingship that Aristotle examined 
in the Politics, and certainly we gain few insights into the society 
which the king was to rule. Problems of power relationships are 
presumed not to exist, which is one way of overcoming them in theory! 
This of course is not simply part of a propaganda effort, but expresses 
a particular attitude to government as a mental, emotional and moral 
fact, but not an institutional one. What concerns these writers, not 
all equally, but all to a marked extent, is the individual they are 
examining, whom they create after their own ideal of lofty manhood.
These men have narrowed their options in the political arena. 
Instead of discussing the range of constitutions and comparing them, 
they show interest only in the one form. (This does not apply of course 
to Cicero, or, in some parts of their works, to Isocrates and Xenophon, 
but they too are apt to discuss even other forms in a way which lends 
itself to language about the sovereign as one individual.)
They have then limited themselves further, for their one man does 
not stand revealed as the summit of a society whose intricacies we come 
to understand as we analyse his manner of government. The individual 
had come into his own in philosophy in fourth-century Greece, as he did 
indeed in history as well, and such a person, although he must have had 
relations with others,is best seen as self-sufficient, and even 
isolated by his very eminence. He then becomes easier to analyse in 
simplistic terms. Just as the individual whom the writers understood 
best was a private person, because most of them were acting in a limited 
local sphere, so the 'king' had many of the qualities appropriate to 
such an individual.
We have sought to demonstrate through the use of representative 
writers how what had been an independent form of debate and discussion 
on government came to be simply a means for dealing with topics other 
than the political, under the heading of kingship. There was an obvious 
need to concentrate on the one person to be depicted, since the out­
standing personality was the one that mattered at all levels, now that
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the community no longer absorbed a citizen’s energies, making him 
content to be an anonymous part of the whole. If the writer could not 
himself be this self-sufficient, self-regulating individual, he could at 
least describe his ideal, who now seemed realizable only in the king.
Some of the writers, particularly the neo-Pythagoreans, emphasize 
the formal, institutional aspect of monarchy more than do the others, 
providing almost a mystique of kingship. It may appear more difficult 
to consider the king they describe in detachment from the paraphernalia 
of actual government. But the difference is not as striking as the fact 
that both groups of theorists are after all describing the same sort of 
person, who is the society he rules, who is wise and good and linked in 
a special way to the divine order.
There will probably always be controversy over the precise 
relationship between political theory and practice, between those like 
Michel, who claim that the Roman principate was born of philosophical 
speculation, and those such as Syme who vigorously deny any such 
influence, and see theory following practice. Obviously theorists do 
not write in an historical vacuum, but equally rulers must appeal to 
theory in some form to serve as propaganda for their regime. In most
2 'C’est la nature du regime qui justifie son (i.e. Seneca’s) attitude 
puisque le principat etait ne d’une reflexion philosophique — et qu’on 
ne peut guere s’arreter ä mi-chemin de la philosophie', Michel, La 
Philosophie politique, p.52, and see Syme’s The Roman Revolution (2nd
ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), passim.
Beranger shares Michel’s view of the importance to be attached to 
theoretical influence on the imperial government (Beranger, ’Ciceron 
precurseur politique', p.115): ’Tel fut le principat imperial, melange 
de l’excellent et du pire, mais toujours, sous une influence dont il ne 
peut s’affranchir, ramene ä ses origines philosophiques.’
3 Rostovtzeff even goes so far as to claim (and in our view he claims 
too much) that the speeches of Dio 'expounded a programme on which the 
emperors and the intellectual leaders of Roman imperial society were 
agreed', Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, p.131.
Kaerst provides an account of how this apparent similarity of interests 
could have originally come about, stressing the ethical content of 
both the philosophic and kingly ideal. (Both ideals were of course 
developed by philosophers.) 'Wenn der Philosoph in bezug auf seine 
Person das unbedingte und souveräne Recht des auf sich selbst gestellten, 
aber vernünftig denkenden und handelnden Individuums behauptete, so 
konnte dieses individuelle Recht nun doch auch von einem politischen 
Herrscher auf Grund seiner persönlichen Stellung und Überlegenheit 
geltend gemacht werden, namentlich wenn durch die Rücksicht auf das 
Wohl der Unterthanen die Notwendigkeit einer absoluten Herrschaft
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4cases, we may surmise a two-way influence, and it is not surprising to 
find rulers claiming credit for behaviour as an individual, and not just 
as the most efficient monarch.
An example of the confusion that the use of political language 
can cause when we know that we may expect to meet with it in many 
contexts, not all political, is the current disagreement over whether 
adherents of Stoic philosophy were really interested in government, or 
were simply describing a spiritual ruler.* 45 Perhaps the Stoics them­
selves, as well as other theorists, would not have considered these as 
mutually exclusive alternatives. They discussed kingship in terms of a 
ruler's spiritual hegemony, convinced that they were considering the 
essence of rule.6 If a king in the political sense chose to follow
gerechtfertigt schien. Und das war es doch, was vor allem eine 
Verbindung zwischen jenem rein philosophischen persönlichen 
Herrscherideal und dem politischen Königtum bilden konnte: jene
eigentümliche ethische Idee der Monarchie, wie sie im Bilde des Hirten 
namentlich zum Ausdruck gelangte', Kaerst, Die Entwickelung, p.34.
Schubart comments similarly: 'Freilich darf man nicht verkennen, wie
ungleiche Gedanken sich hier kreuzen. Die philosophischen Richtungen 
des Hellenismus weichen zwar in vielen Dingen von einander ab, aber 
Stoiker und Epikureer, Akademiker und Peripatetiker bilden sich im 
wesentlichen die gleiche Vorstellung von dem philosophischen Manne, wie 
er sein soll: sich selbst beherrschend und sich selbst genügend, der
Welt nicht bedürfend, sie bezwingend durch Entsagung, der Gemeinschaft 
nicht feindlich aber ohne Bindung an den Staat. Dem gegenüber der König, 
schon von Platon her Hirt, Heiland, Wohltäter, Führer, Hort der 
Gerechtigkeit und der Güte, Menschen und Welt beherrschend durch 
Einsicht, Fürsorge und Tat. Nicht nur ungleich sind diese Vorstellungen, 
sondern sie stehen einander gegenüber. Und doch hat die öffentliche 
Meinung des Hellenismus sie mit einander verschmolzen', Schubart, 'Das 
Kö’nigsbild' , pp.287-8.
4 Kaerst is not so sure about tbe influence of the theory on the 
practice: 'Wenn wir noch einmal zusammenfassend auf das Verhältnis der 
philosophischen Theorie zu der hellenistischen Monarchie hinweisen, so 
müssen wir hervorheben, dass wir eine direkte Beeinflussung dieser durch 
jene nur in sehr beschränktem Masse annehmen können' , Die Entwickelung, p.63.
5 Thus Brehier concludes: 'Les Stoiciens sont les premiers ä faire
une distinction qui, dans leur pensee, est nette, mais qui peut encore 
etre obscurcie par le double sens du mot Polis: lorsqu’ils parlent de
la eite cosmique, ils ne veulent entendre rien de pareil ä un empire 
d’Alexandre etendu jusqu’aux bornes du monde; il s’agit pour eux de 
relations interhumaines, independantes de toute forme politique. Mais 
ils emploient, pour les designer, le vocabulaire politique, n ’en ayant 
pas d’autre ä leur disposition', Brehier, Chrysippe, p.263.
6 This applies of course to other than the Stoics, but it is 
particularly important to take account of it in their works. 'La 
negazione della monarchia nella teoria stoica (where this does occur)
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their recommendations, well and good. But if not, the principles were 
just as valid and could be applied by any individual who fulfilled the 
other qualifications for rule.
Were we to discover works by members of the 'Stoic opposition' of 
the first century A.D., we might find that there was a Stoic theory of 
government that was antipathetic to monarchy and not just on pragmatic 
grounds. But from what we know of the writings from this circle, it is 
likely that these Stoics composed only biographies of their hero- 
martyrs, in this respect showing some similarity to writers of mirrors 
of kingship.
Occasionally we do find traces of the political reality which these 
writers were generally so careful to ignore. Dio Chrysostom, in his 
Borysthenic Oration, is concerned with the social problem of the urban 
poor in Greece, and offers suggestions on how they might be gainfully 
and respectably employed. On one occasion he can even provide a 
practical list of kingly qualities and duties, where the king does 
appear as a public figure (3.127: 'the ruler ... attends to some
matters needing his supervision, acts promptly where speed is needed, 
accomplishes something not easy of accomplishment, reviews an army, 
subdues a province, founds a city, bridges rivers, or builds roads 
through a country'). So too Aristides can imply that the king's tasks 
include 'putting contributions in taxes, men or ships on a permanent 
basis', and 'conducting affairs by a routine administration with 
automatic progress and fixed periods of time' (see R.O. 26). Pliny 
stresses more than most the ruler's military duties, and Plutarch some­
times gives practical details on municipal government.
However, comments relating the ideal portrait of the king to the 
actual day-to-day business of government are exceptions. When even 
Plutarch could assert that without the organs of government, men could 
live decently so long as they observed the dictates of religion and true 
philosophy, we see that the real interest of theorists like him was in 
the spiritual order which made institutional arrangements for government
non tiene conto abbastanza della sottile identificazione, per cosi dire, 
fra sovrano ideale ed "avqp BaotAtMos", rimanendo sempre sul terreno 
teorico, che e l’unico, ehe possieda un valore assoluto', Andreotti,
'Per una Critica', p.292, note 154.
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of secondary importance (see Mot. 1124d-e). Political life was useful
if it served the desired end but was only a means, not important of
itself as a representation of the social interaction in a community.
Monarchy was rarely seen, now, as one among other forms of government.
The monarch stood outside such comparison, affecting his subjects by
0means of his personality.
His was an essentially a-historical figure,10 since the personality
7 See also 1125d-e: eupous 6’ av cuwv TtoXeus axeuxucrxous,
äypayydxous, aßaatXeüxoug, aoLXOug, axPnyaxous, voyuayaxos yn öeoycvas, 
aueupous •deaxpmv Mat yoyvaotwv avtepou 6e itoXems Mat ou, yq xPwP£vrlS 
euxats yri6’ opxous yp6e yavtcuaus ypöe duatats et’ ayadous yqö’
cmox potats xaxwv oudcug eoxuv ouö’ eoxat yeyovmg ■Oeaxps.
8 IDie aktive Teilnahme am Staatsleben ist nur soweit berechtigt oder 
erwünscht, als jene aüxoupaytcc nicht gehindert wird. Insbesondere war 
dem Anscheine nach die politische Thätigkeit des Weisen (mehr als in der 
Sokratisch-platonischen Philosophie, in der wir ja auch schon bedeutende 
Ansätze hierzu gefunden haben) durch die Möglichkeit begründet, für 
Verbreitung der Tugend zu wirken, und zwar im Sinne der jetzt immer 
stärker zur Herrschaft gelangenden individuellen Sittlichkeit, so dass 
das staatliche Leben mehr als Mittel und Werkzeug, weniger als 
Selbstzweck galt’, Kaerst, Die Entwickelung, p.69.
The model was also largely Greek in origin, as has often been pointed 
out: 'A l’ombre d’une doctrine condensant la sagesse d’une civilsation,
un Systeme original romain du principat n ’a pu se developper. Le 
princeps-pyeywv du monument d’Ancyre s’est etiole devant le ßaotXeüg 
des philosophes et finalement lui a cede la place. Tandis que seuls les 
theoriciens etudiaient en vase clos le souverain ideal, les peuples 
s’accommodaient de la realite politique: 1’omnipotence de l’imperator -
aüxoxpdxwp’, Beranger, ’Pour une definition du principat: Auguste dans
Aulu-Gelle,XV, 7»3' , REL, 21-2 (1943-4), p.154.
Speaking of the political philosophers of the early second century, 
Sirinelli comments: 'Soulignons encore que, sauf Pline le Jeune qui 
apportera en quelque sorte l’hommage des Romains, tous ces doctrinaires 
sont des Grecs ou tout au moins de culture grecque. C’est assez dire 
que les themes qu’ils developpent puisent leur origine dans la tradition 
hellenique ou heilenistique et sont adaptes de pres ou de loin a la 
situation particuliere de l’empereur’ (in Touchard's Histoire des idees 
politiques, I, p.88).
9 'Le souverain ideal est "ecrase de soucis", contrairement au tyran 
qui ne recherche que le plaisir. Sans quitter la place, nous assistons 
ä la controverse philosophique qui sevit depuis Platon. La legitimite 
ne repose pas sur des institutions, mais sur la valeur morale du 
souverain’, Beranger, Recherches, p.195.
The principate ’consiste ... dans l’exercice permanent d’une 
auctoritas sans rivale, c’est-a-dire dans la possession d’un privilege 
de nature morale autant que politique et purement personnel, nous 
voulons dire attache ä la personne du prince ... bien plutot qu’a ses 
fonctions', Gage ’De Cesar ä Auguste’, p.289.
10 ’Zu einem organischen Neuaufbau des antiken Staates eignete sich
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of the monarch described was made up of elements which remained, for the 
most part, constant, and so we should not be surprised to find Marcus 
Aurelius not feeling obliged to carry over into his administration of 
the Empire the qualities he strove to acquire as a private individual.11 
At the other end of the social spectrum we see Epictetus, for whom 
freedom no longer meant freedom from arbitrary rule, but interior 
freedom and self-rule.
This view of true rulership lasted long after the Empire had become 
thoroughly bureaucratized and the monarch’s personality could have 
counted for very little with his subjects. Philostratus in his Life of 
Apollonius of Tyana uses just such imagery and descriptions of the ideal 
king as we have found in our writers, and after the Empire had become
1 3Christian, the language was surprisingly little changed.
We believe that the works we have examined, which either have 
kingship as their theme or else refer to it in some detail in the course
aber dieses philosophische Prinzip auch nicht; denn es ist durchaus 
einseitig rational, unhistorisch; der Mangel an geschichtlichem 
Bewusstsein, der überhaupt in gewissem Sinne für das griechische 
Altertum charakteristisch ist, findet hier seine höchste Zuspitzung. 
Dieser philosophischen Monarchie fehlt jegliche Legitimität; die 
Legitimation zum Königtum wird ausschliesslich auf die persönlichen 
Eigenschaften des zum Herrschen Bestimmten begründet', Kaerst, Die 
Entwickelung, p.24.
11 See G.R. Stanton, ’Marcus Aurelius, Emperor and Philosopher',
Historia, 18 (1969) 570-87, and note the comment of Sirinelli: ’Sur son
metier d’empereur, aucune indication; on dirait qu’il s’epuise tout 
entier dans la pratique de la justice, vertu generale, ou dans ce devoir 
d’activite sociale qu’il preche pour chacun. La morale a completement 
absorbe la reflexion politique', Touchard, Histoire des idees politiques, 
I, p.91.
12 'In the first place freedom to him was an ethical rather than a 
political concept. Politically it was a passive thing', Chester G.
Starr, 'Epictetus and the Tyrant', CPh, 44 (1949), p.26.
13 Especially illuminating are the Tricennial Orations of Eusebius.
In particular, see 201.20ff. (Heikel, ed.), and In Praise of Constantine: 
A Historical Study and Hew Translation of Eusebius' Tricennial Orations 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1975), 
and the article 'Teologica politica, successione dinastica e consecratio 
in eta constantiniana', by Salvatore Calderone, in Le Culte des 
Souverains dans V  Empire Romain (Entretiens sur l’Antiquite classique, 
Tome 19, Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1973), 213-69.
Many of the speeches of Themistius also show the language of the 
kingship theory we have examined applied to Christian emperors. See on 
this the article by Vladimir Valdenberg, 'Discours politiques de
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of examining a broader topic, are all representative of their times. We 
have found that they all fail to provide a genuinely political theory of 
autocratic rule. What they do give is an often interesting, if 
repetitive account of individual excellence, corresponding to the ideal 
of the age.14
Themistius dans leur rapport avec 1 ’antiquite’ , Byzantion, 1 (1924), 
537-80, and the examples given there.
14 Reese well notes of the writings on kingship of the Hellenistic Age: 
’Originally, these tracts were written by philosophers to provide 
prudent pedagogical advice for the reigning monarch or heir apparent.
But soon productions of this genre became the ordinary vehicle for 
tracing the moral ideal of Hellenism in the form of a mirror for the 
wise and benevolent king, ideal of the true philosopher’, Reese, 
Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences 
(Biblical Institute Press, Rome, 1970), p.72.
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